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Abstract 
Launched in October 2009, ChiNext provides finance for hi-tech and innovative 
SMEs from China‘s Strategic Emerging Industries. SMEs with families, individuals and 
groups of individuals as controlling shareholders dominate listings.  
Employing both qualitative and quantitative research methods with a socio-legal 
approach, this thesis examines the legal and regulatory framework and practice at company 
level emerging in a market dominated by private ‗owner-managers‘.  The research makes 
three main contributions as follows. 
Firstly, the thesis finds that social norms such as Chinese networks (guanxi) and 
Confucian filial piety (xiaoshun) play an important role in internal governance privately listed 
SMEs in ChiNext. Interestingly, large individual pre-IPO subscriber who hold non-executive 
directorships have the potential to and do constrain controlling shareholders through the use 
of guanxi arising from being key start-up or early investors in the company. Their 
effectiveness as a corporate governance mechanism may depend on how aligned their 
interests are with minority shareholders. Equally, filial piety plays a key internal governance 
role in (conflicting and complementary) parallel to the legal and regulatory corporate 
governance framework, not only in family-run listed companies but also in other private and 
State listed companies.  
Secondly, the thesis finds that bottom-up corporate governance innovations occur in 
privately listed companies on ChiNext by adapting existing institutions or adopting non-
mandatory requirements to their corporate framework. Results of the research demonstrates 
the emergence of a new category of supervisors sitting on the supervisory board at company 
level not expressly provided for under Chinese Company Law or corporate governance 
regulations.  
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 Finally, the research observes two key mechanisms in support regulatory 
enforcement in the private listed sector, namely the media as a corporate governance 
watchdog on ChiNext based on its state role as public opinion supervisor (yulun jiandu), and 
China‘s public whistle-blowing system (jubao) as a voice for investors and stakeholders alike.   
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Chapter One – Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
I. Introduction 
China aims to maintain a relatively high economic growth rate in order to rapidly 
transition into an industrialised market economy. One pathway to achieving this has been to 
focus on developing hi-tech and innovative strategic emerging industries. The establishment 
of ChiNext, a growth enterprise market, presents a key strategy that targets hi-tech and 
innovative small and medium-sized enterprises (‗SMEs‘) that fall into these industries by 
providing them with much needed financing. Another pathway has been the promotion of 
corporate governance in companies listed on stock exchanges in China. One of the reasons 
for raising the importance of corporate governance is to promote a ‗harmonious society‘ in 
China. Good corporate governance also enhances firm performance, which ultimately results 
in economic growth at the macro level. In addition, it will attract foreign investors, with the 
objective of internationalising China‘s equity markets. 
Thus, the domestic focus on corporate governance implementation and enforcement 
in China has never been more apparent than in the SMEs applying and obtaining a listing on 
ChiNext. Indeed, ChiNext can rightly be perceived as a showcase of corporate governance in 
China in the twenty-first century. This thesis examines the nature of corporate governance 
practice on ChiNext from a legal perspective through case studies. 
Chapter One is divided into five sections, with the first section providing an overview 
of ChiNext and its development. Section II delves into the key theories of corporate 
governance. Section III presents the theoretical underpinning of the thesis, while Section IV 
presents the methodological framework. Finally, Section V provides a summary of each 
chapter. 
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A. What is ChiNext? 
ChiNext was officially launched and open for trading on 30 October, 2009, to provide 
capital market funding for China‘s innovative and hi-tech small and medium-sized 
enterprises. SMEs are generally perceived as economic drivers and, therefore, important to 
emerging economies.
1
 China has focused on promoting its domestic SMEs for this reason, 
but also because, compared to large enterprises, SMEs are highly innovative and have growth 
potential. The SMEs chosen for listing on ChiNext fall within the Chinese government‘s 
Strategic Emerging Industries (SEIs). They include new energy, new materials, information 
technology, biomedicine, green technology, advanced manufacturing, hi-tech, ocean-related 
technology and innovative businesses in other sectors. Thus, the SMEs listed on ChiNext are 
deemed to be hi-tech and innovative with core competences and growth potential. 
The seeds for developing ChiNext were, arguably, only planted in a competitive 
impulse when, in 1998, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange submitted a consultative paper for 
the establishment of its own growth enterprise market based on the US NASDAQ model, 
which opened for business later that year. After a decade of deliberation, urgency for a 
growth enterprise market re-emerged with the financial crises, and this time transformation of 
China‘s economic model took precedence, with SMEs tasked with a key role. 
A well-publicised economic policy in China is to steer the economy from export-led 
growth and re-focus on consumer-led growth. China‘s SMEs make key contributions to 
China‘s domestic economy, not only in providing goods and services but also in terms of 
employment. The creation of these stock markets sits well with China‘s ambitions to become 
a global hub of finance. The trend toward globalisation means that investors are seeking 
investment opportunities all over the globe in the form of direct investments and investing in 
                                                 
1
 See, Charles Harvie and Boon-Chye Lee, eds., The Role of SMEs in National Economies in East Asia, Studies 
of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises Series (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002). See also the series of studies 
by Charles Harvie and Boon-Chye Lee between 2002 and 2007 of mostly unlisted SMEs in East Asia, from an 
economic perspective.  
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securities markets.
2
 China is making its SMEs accessible through listing, but investor 
confidence and regulatory compliance by enterprises are integral. As such, corporate 
governance is now firmly on the political agenda. 
In general, SMEs are important in emerging economies such as China because they 
assist in industry restructuring, employment growth, as a source of competition for large 
enterprises, be they state-owned or private, for improving skills, increasing flexibility and 
innovation.
3
 This is of great importance as China refocuses on building demand in the 
domestic economy. In addition to these strategic advantages of SMEs, they also have the 
potential to contribute to the promotion of regional trade and investment within the local 
economy, especially in China with its urban-rural growth disparity. According to the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, China‘s domestic SMEs are responsible for 60% of China‘s gross 
domestic product (GDP), 70% of exports and 80% of urban employment, and they hold 70% 
of patents for technology inventions.
4
 The trend toward globalisation also means that 
investors are seeking investment opportunities all over the globe in the form of direct 
investments and investments in securities markets 
5
 
So far, ChiNext has proved itself: in the first year of business, 134 SMEs listed on 
ChiNext raised US$14.8 billion.
6
 Foreign financial institutions such as Goldman Sachs and 
investment vehicles of foreign organisations such as Columbia University increasingly invest 
on ChiNext, making handsome returns on their investments.
7
 However, the ability to be a 
successful equity market delivering on its objectives for China in the long term will depend 
                                                 
2
 Yuwa Wei, Securities Markets and Corporate Governance: A Chinese Experience (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
3
 Henry Wan Jr., ―SMEs in the Globalised Developing Economies: Some Asia-Pacific Examples,‖ in 
Globalisation and SMEs in East Asia, edited by Charles Harvie and Boon-Chye Lee, Studies of small and 
medium size enterprises in East Asia v.1 (Cheltenham, UK: E. Elgar, 2002). 
4
 Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Small is beautiful, Focus No213 (publisher WFE, November 2010): 3 to 7 at page 
3. 
5
 Yuwa Wei, Securities Markets and Corporate Governance: A Chinese Experience (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
6
 Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Small is beautiful, Focus, No.213 (publisher WFE, November 2010): 3. 
7
 RefKe Zhihua, ―QFII de‘er da fu jianchi dichan gu [QFII Huge Sell-off of Property Shares: Columbia 
University Loves ChiNext Most],‖ News, Dongfang Zaobao [Eastern Morning Paper], (August 9, 2011), url: 
http://epaper.dfdaily.com/dfzb/html/2011-09/08/content_527198.htm. 
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on the investment protection afforded investors, whether foreign or domestic, and whether 
institutional or individual. 
 
B. Objectives of Research 
The main objective of this research is the examination of company-level practice and 
the legal and regulatory enforcement of corporate governance in SMEs listed on ChiNext. 
The research aims to make three main contributions. 
Firstly, the thesis proposes that institutional shareholders may not necessarily be the 
most effective mechanisms for shareholder activism in listed SMEs in China. This thesis 
proposes that individual (large) shareholders who subscribe before the initial public offer of 
the company, and crucially hold non-executive directorship on the board of directors, present 
a more effective mechanism, especially when their interests align with those of the other 
shareholders of the company. In this examination, the thesis proposes that Chinese 
‗relationships‘ (guanxi), as a key source of empowerment for this type of shareholder, enable 
an effective check and balance on private controlling shareholders. 
Secondly, it proposes that bottom-up corporate governance innovations occur in 
China‘s corporate governance environment. The results of the research demonstrate the 
emergence of a new category of supervisors sitting on the supervisory board at the company 
level clearly not provided for under Chinese Company Law or any corporate governance 
regulations. 
Finally, it also proposes that the dynamics of regulation change depending on whether 
the listed regulated entity is state-owned or private controlled, with the regulations becoming 
more effective, and the listed companies more compliant. 
In general, this research amounts to the first comprehensive case study of the 
corporate governance of privately controlled SMEs listed in China, which identifies the less-
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discussed mechanisms of corporate governance. Thus, in addition to an examination of the 
role of the media as public opinion supervisor on an equity market, the study contributes an 
analysis of the supportive role that China‘s public whistleblowing system (jubao) plays in 
corporate governance, especially in terms of the voice of the stakeholder. 
 
C. Justification of Research 
There are three justifications for this research. Firstly, understanding corporate 
governance issues and dynamics on ChiNext is invaluable since its objective is to foster 
SMEs in hi-tech and innovative industries that will assist in the transformation of China‘s 
economic model from an export-led to a domestic consumption-led model. SMEs, be they 
listed or unlisted, are an important component of China‘s economic growth. Therefore, the 
SME board on both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges, along with ChiNext, are 
pivotal in providing much needed funding to these businesses. Indeed, listed SMEs today 
may be China‘s listed multinationals tomorrow. 
Secondly, privately controlled listed companies have overtaken and now dominate 
listings equity markets in China‘s. However, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter, the 
literature mostly focuses on corporate governance issues relating to state-owned enterprises. 
This thesis redresses this balance by focusing on ChiNext, which happens to be dominated by 
private sector listings. 
It plays a key role in providing finance for China‘s expansive private sector. Gurmeet, 
Bhabra and Powell attribute this lack of private financing to a bias in favour of state-owned 
enterprises (‗SOEs‘) in China‘s banking system and the absence of venture capital funding.8 
                                                 
8
 Gurmeet Bhabra and Jian Shi, ―Financing Issues: SME IPOs in China and Australia,‖ in Globalisation and 
SMEs in East Asia, edited by Charles Harvie and Boon-Chye Lee, Studies of Small and Medium Size 
Enterprises in East Asia (Cheltenham, UK: E. Elgar, 2002): 96. 
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These two facts naturally raise questions about corporate governance practice as it is 
well documented that the size and source of the funding of companies affect the corporate 
governance issues that emerge. 
Fourth, understanding corporate governance practice on ChiNext becomes important 
for present and future international and domestic investors. Finally, the previous justification 
can also be linked to the increasing investments by China‘s listed companies, which makes it 
imperative to understand their corporate governance practices since they will be effectively 
exporting their models to the countries in which they operate, located in South Asia, Africa 
and South America. ChiNext has proved an important source of funding for SMEs in China 
that are geared to be the international and multinational companies of the future. 
 
D. Delimitation of Research 
 Due to the broad nature of corporate governance theory and practice, clear boundaries 
have been set for this study. The thesis focuses on privately controlled SMEs listed on 
ChiNext, almost to the exclusion of state controlled SMEs. The reason for this is that, for the 
first time, the private sector, in the form of individuals, families and legal entities, has 
dominated an equity market in China from the outset. 
In terms of corporate governance mechanisms, analysis of fiduciary duties, which are 
a key to the promotion of desirable corporate conduct, are only referred to insofar as it gives 
context to the issues of corporate conduct raised in the case studies. Equally, the examination 
of remuneration has been excluded because the market for professional management remains 
underdeveloped. Moreover, most of the companies listed on ChiNext are privately controlled 
and tend to be managed by those who control most of the total voting rights. Equally, the 
thesis does not employ cash-flow rights as a means of assessing control and private benefits 
as used in the law and finance and law and economic analyses. Instead, reflecting a legal 
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perspective, total voting rights and roles held in management and significant influence in the 
company are employed to measure control in corporate governance terms. 
 Lastly, the use of case study research methods results in a socio-legal approach and 
precludes in-depth doctrinal analysis of the suitability of laws, which, in any event, gives a 
limited analysis to corporate governance studies. Consequently, the literature review and 
main body of the thesis do not directly encompass the aforementioned areas. 
 
II Corporate Governance Theory 
As stated in the preceding section, the examination of corporate governance practice 
on ChiNext using a case study approach forms the basis of this study. Thus, the fundamentals 
of corporate governance theory stand as the most appropriate point of departure in 
preparation for understanding and giving theoretical context to the results of the case studies 
undertaken in the chapters that follow. To accommodate a comprehensive discussion of the 
key theories and model of corporate governance, this section is divided into five sections, 
which examine theories of corporate governance that span the legal, economic, societal, 
organisational and political. 
 
A. Defining Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is a dynamic area in both theory and practice, with a foray into 
English language literature providing various definitions of corporate governance depending 
on the objective or perspective of analysis as reflected in the taxonomies of corporate 
governance mentioned below. 
In the late eighteenth century, Adam Smith, in his eminent treatise, Wealth of Nations, 
wrote: 
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The directors of companies, being managers of other people‘s money than of 
their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the 
same anxious vigilance which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own.
9
 
Although the term corporate governance was not used, Smith‘s writing nonetheless 
presents a separation of the ownership of shareholders
10
 and the control of managers as a key 
issue at the time, which continues in contemporary corporate governance theory and practice 
today. 
The most prominent definition of corporate governance is by the UK Cadbury Report, 
which states that, 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.
11
 
An equally prominent definition, and one particularly favoured by Chinese policy 
makers and legislature,
12
 is that of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which defines corporate governance as ‗Procedures and processes 
according to which an organisation is directed and controlled.‘13 
                                                 
9
 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Everyman‘s Library (London: New York: Dent; Dutton, 1910), vol. 1: 
para. 107. 
10
 In law, shareholders do not actually have ‗ownership‘ but rather hold interests in shares of the company.  
11
 Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Report of the Cadbury Committee, 1992): para. 2.5.  See, Chao 
Xi, Corporate Governance and Legal Reform in China (London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Pub, 2009). 
12
 For example, the China Securities and Regulatory Commission (the ‗CSRC‘), which oversees and regulates 
China‘s capital markets.  
13
 See, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ―OECD Principles of Corporate Governance‖ 
(OECD Publications Service, 2004). See also James Feinerman, ―New Hope for Corporate Governance in 
China?,‖ The China Quarterly, v. 191 (September 2007): 590-612. In contrast, OECD guidelines have been 
criticised because, when applied to emerging, developing or transition economies, they cover too broad a range 
of rules and principles without specifying clear priorities. See, Erik Berglöf and Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden, 
―The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries,‖ 
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, no. 263 (June 1999): 31. url: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=183708. This is very interesting, especially since the Party 
and State now prefer that international standards are applied to China rather than regional or country standards, 
as represented in the slogan guoji jiegui. Hongying Wang, ―‗Linking Up with the International Track‘: What‘s 
in a Slogan?,‖ The China Quarterly, v.189 (2007): 1-23, doi:10.1017/S0305741006000774.. 
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This thesis takes a legal approach in examining corporate governance practice on 
ChiNext. Thus, this section outlines the legal aspects of corporate governance and reflects the 
issues raised and discussed later in the thesis. Legal scholarship on corporate governance has 
developed over 20 years, with a focus on examining the law governing the conduct of 
directors and shareholders of companies.
14
 Apart from scholarship, there are also legal 
models of corporate governance as discussed in the next section. Research in corporate 
governance is not limited to legal scholarship but also includes management and political 
science, with economics being the most prominent area studied. Multi-disciplinary 
approaches have also gathered pace.
15
 Legal scholars have also increasingly embraced 
empirical approaches to corporate governance.
16
 The next section examines the only 
corporate governance theory developed out of legal theory and practice, which essentially 
reflects and attempts to meet the concerns expressed by Smith: legal stewardship theory. 
 
B. Legal Stewardship Theory 
Legal stewardship in the UK and the separation of ownership and control expressed 
by Smith were dealt with in the English Common Law stewardship theory and model, which 
comprised, among other laws, fiduciary duties developed by the law courts in England. The 
stewardship model originated in mid-nineteenth-century industrial England and was enacted 
in law.
17
 In the context of a free market and a relatively non-state interventionist economy, 
the law attempted to regulate conflicts while facilitating the economic activities of 
                                                 
14
 For example, B.R. Cheffins, ―Does Law Matter - The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United 
Kingdom,‖ J. Legal Stud., v.30 (2001). Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance (Charlottesville, US: 
Michie Co., 1993). 
15
 For example, the most famous is the ‗law matters‘ debate contributed to by both law, finance and economics 
scholars. 
16
 For example, Benjamin L. Liebman and Curtis J. Milhaupt, and economics scholars. in ChinaL. Liebman and 
Curtis JColumbia Law Review 108, no. 4 (May 1, 2008): 929-83, doi:10.2307/40041782.  
17
 For ministerial discussions and comments on enlightened shareholder value see DTI, ―Companies Act 2006 
Duties of Company Directors - Ministerial Statements,‖ (June 2007), url: 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file40139.pdf. 
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incorporated enterprises. At the core was the enterprise, incorporated as a separate entity, 
with shareholders who appointed directors to act as steward over their interests. As such, the 
law provided that the directors‘ sole concern was to act in the interests of their present and 
future shareholders.
18
 Common-law-developed fiduciary duties were also owed by directors 
to shareholders in recognition of the fact that directors do not always act in the best interests 
of the shareholders. This system was in place in relation to all companies incorporated in 
England and Wales up until 2006. Recently, English legislation introduced a statute-based 
model, namely the enlightened shareholder value model.
19
 Both are recognised as the legal 
stewardship models of corporate governance.
20
 These models must be distinguished from 
management-theory-based stewardship theory.
21
 The legal stewardship models must also be 
distinguished from stakeholder theory, which also warrants some explanation because of its 
potential relevance to China‘s experience of corporate governance. 
In China, in efforts to find theoretical and policy solutions to the inadequate 
performance of independent directors, scholars have begun to take a more critical interest in 
the UK legal stewardship model of corporate governance. However, there is, as yet, no 
literature regarding this. 
                                                 
18
 The problem is that, apart from profit maximisation to ensure shareholder return on investment, there is no 
other way of judging non-financial interests. 
19
 The enlightened shareholder value model is the current model in English company law. The Companies Act 
2006 promotes enlightened shareholder value, which has an inclusive societal flavour in ensuring that directors 
also consider the interests of other stakeholders. DTI, ‗Companies Act 2006 Duties of Company Directors - 
Ministerial Statements.‘ The new fiduciary duty to act for the success of the company is an example. Existing 
fiduciary duties were also codified in the Act. There is still some debate as to the practicability of this new 
theory of enlightened shareholder value. Because of its societal aspects, it is arguably harder to empirically 
judge. 
20
 To be distinguished from management theory of stewardship, which is less relevant to understanding the PRC.  
The theory emphasises the importance of structures used to empower the steward and offers maximum 
autonomy so the interests of the shareholder can be maximised. The theory has since been developed in the field 
of management, where it was defined by Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson as a theory in which ―a steward 
protects and maximises shareholders [sic] wealth through firm performance, because by doing so, the steward‘s 
utility function are [sic] maximised.‖ James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman and Lex Donaldson, ―Toward a 
Stewardship Theory of Management,‖ The Academy of Management Review 22, no. 1 (January 1997): 20. 
21
 Robert Ian Tricker, Corporate Governance Principles, Policies and Practices (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). Bob Tricker identifies two legal models of corporate governance as the stewardship model and the 
enlightened shareholder value model.   
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C. Economic Theories 
In contrast to the legal perspectives and models developed in the UK, the economic 
perspectives developed in the US attempt to explain and correct the presumed misalignment 
of interests between principals (shareholders) and their agents (directors), which is said to 
arise when there is a separation of management and control in an enterprise; otherwise known 
as the concept of separation of ownership and control. The predominant theories of corporate 
governance are agency theory, transaction costs theory and managerial stewardship theory 
thus centre on the relationship between owner and manager, and between owners. 
The most prominent economic perspective expounded two centuries after John Smith 
was in 1932, by Berle and Means, who built on Smith‘s sentiments in their seminal work, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property.
22
 Based on the results of a survey of large listed 
companies in the US, Berle and Means demonstrated that, in the modern large listed company 
where share ownership is widely held, managerial actions naturally depart from those 
required to achieve shareholder returns, which gives rise to a conflict of interests between 
shareholders and those who manage the company.
23
 In addition to their contribution to 
scholarship, the work of Berle and Means is particularly significant as it laid the groundwork 
for the concentration on research on large listed companies to the exclusion of small and 
medium-sized listed companies. 
 
1. Agency Theory 
Focusing on ‗agent-principal‘ relations, in 1937, Robert Coase, in the Nature of the 
Firm, proposed that firms grow to a point where the external market (for labour) becomes 
                                                 
22
 Adolf A. Berle and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New Brunswick, N.J., USA: 
Transaction Publishers, 1991).    
23
 Ibid. 
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cheaper, and this eventually gives rise to agency relationships as owners are no longer 
managers.
24
 
These perspectives and observations were developed and formalised into ‗agency 
theory‘ by Jensen and Meckling, who provide a rationale for ensuring the survival of a (listed) 
company, despite self-interested managers, by defining the owners or shareholders as 
principals and the managers or directors becoming their agents.
25
 They posit that, in the 
modern listed company where share ownership is widely held, there is a conflict of desire or 
interest between shareholders and directors. The extent to which the residual return to owners 
falls below that which it would have been if they had exercised direct control over the 
company is known as the agency loss or cost. Therefore, agency costs occur when the 
residual returns to shareholders fall short of the amount expected had the shareholders 
exercised direct control over the corporation.
2627
 
This arises from the separation of ownership and control. The agency theory, 
therefore, proposes mechanisms to deal with this loss. The agency theory has gathered pre-
eminence because it is used foremost as a tool for empirical study and it proposes 
mechanisms to counter agency problems. It proposes mechanisms to deal with this loss, 
which include internal and external audits, information disclosure, independent 
outside/external directors, separation of board chairmanship from CEO, risk analysis, and the 
establishment of audit, nomination and remuneration committees.
28
 The theory was 
developed further in 1983 by using financial economics to examine the causal links between 
                                                 
24
 R. H. Coase, ―The Nature of the Firm,‖ Economica 4, no.16 (1937): 386-405. 
25
 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure,‖ Journal of Financial Economics 3, no.4 (October 1976): 305-60, doi:16/0304-
405X(76)90026-X. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Adolf A. Berle and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New Brunswick, N.J., USA: 
Transaction Publishers, 1991). 
28
 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,‖ The Academy of Management 
Review 14, no. 1 (January 1, 1989): 57-74. 
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governance systems put in place to control the agent and the effect on the interests of the 
principal.
29
 
Agency theory proves popular for three likely reasons. Firstly, it is a simple theory in 
which a company of any size can be reduced to two participants, namely managers and 
shareholders, with each of their interests assumed to be clear and consistent.
30
 Secondly, 
agency theory supposes that people are self-interested and unwilling to sacrifice personal 
interests for the interests of others that play into age-old and widespread beliefs.
31
 Thirdly, 
the theory has gathered pre-eminence because it is used foremost as a tool of empirical study 
and it proposes mechanisms to counter agency problems.
32
 The theory can, arguably, be seen 
in the corporate governance controls devised to protect the shareholders‘ interests.  
It is perhaps for the aforementioned reasons that there exists an abundance of 
quantitative research on corporate governance in China which expressly relies on agency 
theory as the point of departure for analysing shareholder-management relations.
33
 Laterly, 
qualitative research also expressly or implicitly examines the agency dilemma especially in 
the context of the State being controlling shareholder, regulator and manager of listed SOEs. 
Most qualitative research is led by law scholarship.
34
 The full extent of the influence of 
agency theory, and indeed transaction costs theory discussed below, in China is probably 
reflected by the adoption of the fundamentals of capital market regulatory framework found 
                                                 
29
 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, y: An Assessment and Review,‖ agerial  Journal of Law and 
Economics 26, no. 2 (June 1, 1983): 301-25. 
30
 Catherine M. Daily, Dan R. Dalton, and Albert A. Cannella Jr., ―Corporate Governance: Decades of Dialogue 
and Data,‖ The Academy of Management Review 28, no.3 (July 1, 2003): 372, doi:10.2307/30040727. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,‖ The Academy of Management 
Review 14, no.1 (January 1, 1989): 57-74, doi:10.2307/258191. Agency theory can also be applied in disciplines 
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―Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from 
State Policy Implementation,‖ Sociological Theory 17, no. 2 (July 1, 1999): 146-70, doi:10.2307/202095. 
33
 There is an abundance of quantitative research arguably first led by Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang‘s research on 
ownership structures and corporate goverance in China. See Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang, ―Ownership Structure 
and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies,‖ China Economic Review 10, no. 1 (1999): 75–98. 
34
 See Gan Peizhong, Qiye yu gongsi faxue [Jurisprudence on Enterprises and Companies] (Beijing: Beijing 
daxue chubanshe, 2012). See also Chao Xi, Corporate Governance and Legal Reform in China (London: Wildy, 
Simmonds & Hill Pub, 2009). 
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on US stock markets (ie which are aimed at their simplest aimed at monitoring and reducing 
agency costs) with slight policy modifications for State ownership and policies (i.e. Chinese-
style). 
 
 
2. Transactions Cost Theory 
Transactions cost theory, similarly to agency theory, presumes an agency relationship 
based on contract, with goal conflict between shareholder and director. Williamson 
developed the theory further and argued that large corporations could overcome this goal 
conflict by their choice of governance systems.
35
 
More recently, Strange, Filatotchev, Wright and Buck have attempted to develop the 
theoretical aspect further by proposing that parties to a transaction (in this case enterprise) 
will minimise the expected combined production and transaction costs.
36
 
 
3. Institutions and Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 
The Anglo-US approach to corporate governance described above is effectuated by its 
key institutions. These can be divided into private market-based institutions and public (state) 
promulgated institutions.
37
 
Private market-based institutions purport to align the interests of managers with those 
of shareholders. Market mechanisms of corporate governance traditionally include the market 
for management and the market for control, and executive compensation. Broadly speaking, 
they can also include informal mechanisms and institutions such as whistleblowing, as well 
                                                 
35
 Oliver Williamson, ―Why Law, Economics, and Organization,‖ Annual Review of Law and Social Science 1, 
no.1 (2005): 369-96. 
36
 Roger Strange et al., ―Corporate Governance and International Business,‖ Management International Review 
49, no.4 (October 2009): 395-407, doi:10.1007/s11575-009-0001-z. 
37
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as nongovernmental institutions that influence corporate governance such as credit-rating 
agencies, and commercial and investment banks.
38
 
Public institutions of corporate governance include those provided for under company 
law and securities laws, and regulations. They aim to regulate the conduct and activities of 
those who manage and control companies for the benefit of shareholders (and stakeholders). 
In terms of internal governance, the institutions of corporate governance are the shareholders‘ 
general meeting and the board of directors. At shareholders‘ general meetings, shareholders 
cast their votes relating to important matters affecting the company and especially to elect the 
board of directors. In turn, generally, the role of the board of directors in corporate 
governance is two-fold: they provide strategic management advice to managers and also 
monitor the actions of management. Therefore, they have key obligations imposed by law 
and regulation reflecting their responsibilities to the shareholders as a whole. The disclosure 
of information to shareholders and stakeholders is, therefore, another institution formulated 
under law and regulations. Here, those who manage the company (both directors and 
managers) must provide full, true and verified information to the shareholders and other 
eligible constituents. Public institutions include the regulators such as the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the UK‘s Financial Conduct Authority. Of course, the judiciary 
systems in each of these countries also play a key role, especially in corporate governance 
norm creation.
39
 
These aforementioned public and to some extent private institiutions and mechanisms 
of corporate governance found in Western economies, today also apply in China, however 
                                                 
38
 Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton University Press, 
2008), 44. 
39
 See, Troy A. Paredes, ―Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate 
Law Isn‘t the Answer,‖ William and Mary Law Review 45 (2003), url: 
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they remain relatively undeveloped.
40
 Moreover, the extent to which they are effective 
mechanisms in practice has been of some debate. China‘s disclosure of information 
mechanism is relatively the most functional market mechanism in corporate governance, as 
will be demonstrated later in the study. One reason for this is the use of state policy to ensure 
the fair distribution of information among participants in the market. As will be seen, there is 
a limited market for the supply and demand of professional managers, which means that an 
inefficiently managed company may not result in a change in management. Another reason is 
the limited market for control, which arises not only from state policy but nonetheless means 
that there is no external impetus or threat to improve management or compliance.  
 
 
D. Alternative Perspectives 
1. Societal Theory - Stakeholder Theory 
As the only prominent theory with a societal perspective of corporate governance, 
stakeholder theory deserves individual mention. In contrast to the stewardship models 
discussed in Section A above, stakeholder theory assumes a more inclusive perspective.
41
 It is 
‗premised on the theory that groups in addition to shareholders have claims on a company‘s 
assets and earnings because those groups contribute to a company‘s capital‘.42 
There are two approaches to stakeholder theory. The first, the fiduciary model, 
complements the stewardship theory above in that the board is perceived as neutral with 
neither bounded rationality nor otherwise positive traits, rather they have have fiduciary 
                                                 
40
See, Stoyan Tenev, Chunlin Zhang, and Loup Brefort, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: 
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 Roberta S Karmel, ―Implications of the Stakeholder Model,‖ George Washington Law Review 61 (1992): 
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duties. Under this theoretical model, stakeholders are not given direct rights of representation 
on the board, they are protected through (as yet undefined) mechanisms that relax the board‘s 
duty or incentive to solely represent the interests of shareholders. The second is the 
representative model. Here, two or more stakeholders would have representatives on the 
board of directors. The drawback is that the board then becomes what has been aptly termed 
as a ‗coalition of stakeholder groups‘.43 Like most coalitions, there are implications for the 
expediency of decision-making. 
A particular criticism from the comparative corporate law school is that stakeholder 
theory is merely a combination of elements found in older manager-orientated and labour-
orientated models that are inefficient and, consequently, outdated models of corporate 
governance.
44
 The theory is held to have little application in practice because of empirical 
difficulty in defining and researching societal perspectives. For instance, there remain 
different perspectives and approaches to defining the stakeholders of a firm.
45
 
Stakeholder theory may prove relevant for China where, with an autocratic top-down 
decision-making system, choices are made arbitrarily as to who amounts to a stakeholder of a 
company and how they can be represented. For instance, China‘s two-tier board system, one 
being executive and the other supervisory in nature, potentially reflect the stakeholder 
representative system, at least on paper. Stakeholders such as employees and creditors can be 
co-opted onto both boards, with compulsory representation on the supervisory board. The 
board itself has been the criticised as being weak and ineffective in monitoring management 
and sometimes a hindrance when dominated by, say a controlling shareholder.  
                                                 
43
 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ―The End of History of Corporate Law,‖ in Convergence and 
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2. Organisation Theory 
The main organisation models of corporate governance include organisation theory and 
resource dependency theory. Organisation theory in corporate governance is a relatively new 
approach. Organisation theory challenges agency theory‘s ‗closed system‘ approach, which 
presumes that the principal-agent relationship is the core issue in corporate governance.
46
 
Instead, the theory advocates an ‗open-systems‘ perspective also referred to broadly as 
‗complementarity‘. It proposes that different corporate governance practices may be more or 
less effective depending on differing contexts in different organisational environments.
47
 
However, like similar organisation theories such as resource dependency theory, this theory is 
hampered by the difficulty in collecting empirical evidence.
48
 Another particular limitation is 
that it takes a managerial perspective and assumes the organisation structure peaks at the 
chief executive level. Organisation theory also retains some relevance in that substantial 
contributions to comparative corporate governance have come from organisational scholars, 
particularly in their attempt to ‗open‘ perspectives on corporate governance. Other aspects of 
organisational theory include resource dependency theory, which denotes the importance of 
power relations in and around enterprises.
49
 The problem with resource theory, as with the 
other organisational theories, is the lack of empirical examination and clarification of the 
theory‘s basic premise.50 Similarly, systems theory purports to identify an appropriate 
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corporate governance system by defining the system itself and the environment in which it 
exists, the proposed level of abstract of its examination and the function of the system.
51
 
Despite the criticism regarding their limitations for the purpose of empirical research, the 
abovementioned theories are each nonetheless useful qualitatively as they aid understanding 
of the impact of diverse and seemingly unrelated mechanisms. 
 
3. Political Theory 
This theory acknowledges the existence of government in the regulation of enterprises, 
which has resulted in strong political influence. The theory was developed by Mark Roe in 
response to a conundrum of dispersed share ownership seemingly prevailing in the US and 
the UK, while it was empirically proved that concentrated ownership dominated around the 
globe.
52
 Roe proposes that dispersed ownership arises in the Anglo-US experience as a result 
of an immense distrust of concentrated financial power. Thus, he challenges the premise that 
only law matters and proposes that politics also plays a more significant role, especially in 
corporate governance.
53
 
In terms of China, political theory remains relevant as a tool to understand the 
powerful and influential role of the Communist Party of China, especially in determining 
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economic structures such as share ownership.
54
 As such, this theory instinctively has 
particular credence when considering China‘s polity. 
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
This section constructs the theoretical framework that underpins this thesis on the 
corporate governance practices of companies listed on ChiNext. As a general background 
framing the theoretical framework, it first presents the key corporate governance theories, 
indicating their reception in China, where relevant. Equally, certain key concepts of 
comparative law aid analyses of corporate governance in China. This section sets out the 
analytical framework that facilitates the description and the understanding of corporate 
governance practice and enforcement patterns emerging on ChiNext. 
With the recent surge in privately controlled listed companies, the traditional 
approach of examining corporate governance practice solely through the lenses of the State 
and Party relations is no longer relevant. Within this, there appears to be an obvious 
taxonomy in the literature on corporate governance in China, which includes analysis of 
SOEs, the securities market in terms of listed SOEs, corporate governance modelling for 
SOEs and identifying and proposing reforms for agency problems. This veers away from the 
macro theorising approach that takes a high-level view – the so-called lumpers approach. 
Instead, it takes a micro-level approach, focusing on a specific equity market and the 
companies listed on it with the objective of providing insight into the prevailing corporate 
governance practice. 
 Less research has been undertaken in relation to non-state-owned listed companies. 
There has been even less research on small and medium-sized state and non-SOEs. It is 
anticipated that this thesis will go some way to filling this gap. 
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A. Defining Corporate Governance in China 
One of the main issues facing this study is how best to define the corporate 
governance that ChiNext-listed SMEs (CSMEs) are purported to have. There are various 
definitions, depending on the objective or perspective of analysis as reflected in the 
taxonomies of corporate governance. Nonetheless, there are three noticeable trends in the 
literature on corporate governance in China. One trend is to narrowly define corporate 
governance as it relates to the subject of discussion. Some scholars prefer to use a narrow 
shareholder-orientated definition that relates to SOEs listed on the stock exchange.
55
 Others 
use broader definitions in which stakeholders are reflected, such as Tam‘s proposed model 
that includes an institutional role for the Communist Party of the People‘s Republic of China 
(the ‗Party‘).56 The final trend disregards definition, perhaps because all definitions are 
perceived to be too confining. Instead it dives straight into the issues that arise; these tend to 
lean toward a shareholder-orientated view.
57
 Definitions of international corporate 
governance, namely the OECD definition and general principles, are rarely used as a starting 
point.
58
 As there is no right or wrong definition, it is anticipated that systems theory, 
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discussed later, presents the best way to develop a suitable working definition for this study.
59
 
The aspect that most of the literature on China has in common is the focus on identifying the 
agency costs arising and the effect on the protection of shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders. 
1. Transition vs Emerging Economy 
In terms of definitions, China has almost solely been categorised as a transition 
economy
60
 due to the predominance of comparative studies into the development of a market 
economy and modern legal system in the former Soviet Bloc and Eastern Europe.
61
 It could 
be argued that the treatment of China as an emerging economy
62
 is more accurate than as a 
transition economy. After all, China is an emerging (as opposed to developed) economic 
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power as testified by, among other things, China‘s purchasing power parity world ranking at 
second only to the US.
63
 Notwithstanding this, one cannot remove China from its strong 
ideological context, which still overlooks every aspect of economic activity, especially those 
related to listed enterprises. Thus, this trend has extended into corporate governance literature, 
which unequivocally states or assumes the ontology of China as a transition economy as the 
point of departure.
64
 As both terms fundamentally assume a predisposition to convergence 
toward an advanced market economy, which is the assumed bedrock of good corporate 
governance, this thesis ignores such categorisations of China. It adopts Mark Roe‘s argument 
that the emerging economy, developing economy and transition economy can be viewed 
together because, for him, they have similar features.
65
 
 
B. Public and Private Corporate Governance Institutions and Mechanisms in China 
The literature forewarns of the pitfalls of ignoring culture when trying understanding 
the dynamics of internal governance in privately controlled companies, whether listed or non-
listed.
66
 A taxonomy of public and private can again be employed to understand the types of 
corporate governance mechanism and institution in China. Indeed, the emergence of the 
private sector in the ownership and control of companies listed in China arguably brings 
hitherto private institutions and mechanisms of governance to the public arena of the equity 
market. Thus, the ways in which these private governance mechanisms and institutions 
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impact and react to those of corporate governance are brought to the fore. Douglas North‘s 
definition of institutions gives some clarity: 
…humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, 
laws, property rights).
67
 
This thesis proposes that, in particular, Confucian filial piety (xiaoshun) and Chinese 
relationships (guanxi) have important implications for the protection of shareholders. 
 
1. Public: State Institutions and Mechanisms 
In terms of public mechanisms and institutions, China has adopted the basic corporate 
governance approaches found in the Anglo-American model described in Section II above. 
China has a tripartite system comprising the shareholders‘ general meeting, and a two-tier 
board system comprising the board of directors and the board of supervisors. Thus, the key 
difference in form is the addition of the board of supervisors intended to monitor the board of 
directors. Employees also have a key role in corporate governance due to mandatory 
representation on the supervisory board, as well as the possibility of presentation on the board 
of directors. In terms of institutions, China has the China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
and stock exchanges issue regulations and enforce corporate governance.
68
 The courts play a 
relatively minor role with much emphasis on so-called administrative governance by 
regulators.
69
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However, the literature largely ignores two institutions in China that play a key role in 
corporate governance, namely the press and China‘s public whistleblowing system (jubao). 
Scholars have made passing references to the role of the press but have not provided a full 
treatment in relation to corporate governance.
70
 To date, there has been little written on 
China‘s public whistleblowing system itself, and none in relation to its role in corporate 
governance. This thesis intends to fill both of these gaps in knowledge in the context of this 
case study of ChiNext. 
 
2. Private I: Confucian Filial Piety (Xiao) 
 The emergence of families as controlling shareholders in both private and listed 
companies is in line with the Confucian tradition, and, more specifically for the purpose of 
this thesis, filial piety. The Tsinghua dictionary neutrally defines filial piety as ‗devotion to 
caring for parents and obeying their will‘.71 Thus, filial piety denotes obedience to and 
reverence for one‘s parents. Importantly, filial piety is perceived as the root of all virtues in 
Confucianism and is considered relevant to contemporary society in China.
72
 
 Filial piety plays an important role in developing private enterprise in China, in that 
strict enforcement of filial piety in Chinese society translates into obligations such as honesty 
in statements and actions, loyalty to superiors (bosses), respectfully (jing) carry out public 
office and being trustworthy with friends.
73
 These four obligations arguably make up the 
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internal governance and control dynamics in private enterprises controlled by families. 
Importantly, when a family-controlled company becomes listed, these obligations do not 
disappear but continue to exist alongside the legal and regulatory framework of the relevant 
equity market.
74
 Inevitably, this has implications for corporate governance in terms of which 
internal control and governance system takes precedence, and the implications for protection 
of shareholders who are not family.  
 
3. Private II: Relationships (Guanxi) 
Guanxi can simply be defined as interpersonal relationships − a form of personal 
network − and is one of the longest-standing, most pervasive of traditions in contemporary 
China.
75
 Most of the literature on guanxi concentrates on its role in business relations in 
China
76
, which has been a key challenge for foreign businesses.
77
 Business and management 
scholars have alluded through definitions of guanxi to distinctions between social
78
 and 
economic,
79
 and between formal and informal.
80
 For the purpose of this thesis, it suffices that 
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guanxi falls outside of state law and regulation. It assumes for the purposes of this analysis 
that all of these traits are subsumed into a generic ―guanxi‖, which this thesis proposes acts as 
a key source of empowerment for non-controlling shareholders in restraining undesirable 
corporate conduct by controlling shareholders by methods such as expropriation.  
 
 C. Corporate Governance in Listed SMEs 
As comparative corporate governance scholarship has attested, corporate governance 
differs from country to country depending on the received knowledge regarding corporate 
governance, which is most crucial for large listed companies. Consequently, the literature has, 
to the neglect of listed SMEs, largely focused on corporate governance in large listed 
companies. In China, this has manifested in a predominant focus on large listed companies, 
too. This has added complexity and curiosity about governance in listed companies in which 
the state is controlling shareholder-fuelled research. However, Tenev and Zhang‘s economic 
analysis of corporate governance in state-owned SMEs 
81
 is well received. Thus, the study of 
SMEs listed on the Shenzhen stock markets will contribute to the literature on both listed 
private and state-owned SMEs from a legal perspective. As mentioned earlier, similarly to the 
West, there has been a predominance of research in the large listed enterprises in China, 
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which have been dominated by scholars in management
82
 and a few in law
83
. They have 
focused mainly on understanding corporate governance practice in SOEs since they form the 
majority of listed enterprises, and have been a relative rarity in the West prior to the financial 
crises government bailouts. However, Tenev and Zhang‘s economic analysis of corporate 
governance in state-owned SMEs 
84
 is well received. Moreover, literature on SMEs in China 
has focused on their management systems and their role as drivers of the economy. 
The literature on SMEs is dominated by economic arguments that SMEs are key 
drivers in economic development. Thus, the literature on SMEs in China has focused on their 
management systems and role as drivers of the economy.
85
 There has been little corporate 
governance research on SMEs except for an in-depth case study of transformed (i.e. 
privatised or corporatized) state-owned SMEs by Tenev and Zhang, from an economic theory 
perspective.
86
 This is because most SMEs are private and, therefore, there is both a lack of 
information about and access to the enterprises. For this practical reason, this thesis focuses 
on those SMEs that are listed. Another reason for focusing on listed SMEs is the important 
role that the stock market is said to play in promoting economic growth and developing an 
economy. One way of spurring economic growth in emerging countries (such as China) is to 
promote securities markets.
87
 Empirical studies have focused on listed enterprises because of 
the apparent link between the development of capital markets and economic growth. Roe also 
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argues that the capital market, among others, is the most important institution of corporate 
governance.
88
 It is perhaps for these reasons, but weighing heavily toward the latter reason, 
that PRC corporate governance scholars have focused entirely on listed enterprises.
89
 
Therefore, this study of PRC SMEs within their listed environment should accomplish a 
compelling demonstration of the practice of corporate governance and its contribution to the 
economic development of China. 
Research on privately controlled listed companies in China remains sparse, but is 
gradually increasing, as least in the Chinese language literature, especially with the rising 
interest of China‘s stock exchange regulatory authorities.90 Thus, this case study of SMEs 
listed on ChiNext seeks to fill this gap, and from a legal perspective. 
D. Securities Markets and Regulation 
The effectiveness of law enforcement also remains a key area of concern in corporate 
governance, especially in the advanced market economies. This is because scholarship 
proposes that strong equity markets promote economic growth. The key aspects are the 
availability of good information about the company‘s business and the protection of 
shareholders from self-dealing by managers and/or controlling shareholders is crucial.
91
 
Emphasis on the importance of legal and regulatory mechanisms in enforcement, particularly 
by the courts and regulators, has dominated the literature. Some research has also been 
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undertaken regarding transition and emerging economies. Pistor and Xu‘s series of studies of 
governance on equity markets identify the dilemma of requiring financial markets for 
economic development but not having the necessary institutions for monitoring and 
enforcement.
92
 They enumerate the positives of administrative governance using China‘s 
quota system as a case study, noting that the courts have played a minute role in enforcement 
since the establishment of China‘s equity markets in the early 1990 s.93 
 Regarding China, the literature can be taken from general overviews of securities 
market regulation
94
 to specific treatments such as Jane Fu‘s examination of disclosure 
obligations and regulatory framework in context of the theories of convergence, divergence 
and differentiation, where she finds the CSRC less than adequate in fulfilling its enforcement 
function.
95
 Zhu Sanzhu‘s study on securities dispute resolution neutrally lays the groundwork 
for further examination of developing civil-law-focused enforcement practices.
96
 From a 
corporate governance enforcement angle, Donald Clarke assesses the relevance of China‘s 
stock markets as institutions of corporate governance, and the effectiveness of the CSRC and 
stock exchanges in enforcing law.
97
 He finds that China too has gaps in the law that the 
regulatory framework and enforcement cannot fill, and which can only be filled by market 
institutions. Liu Chengwei examines the role of China‘s Securities Law from a transactional 
perspective, focusing on investment vehicles, mergers and acquisitions.
98
 Crucially, the 
aforementioned studies have taken place in the context of the dominance of SOEs in China‘s 
equity markets. This thesis will assess enforcement and the role of the regulators in the 
context of an equity market dominated by the private sector rather than the public sector. It is 
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envisaged that, although the substantive law may remain mostly the same, there will be some 
differences in the approaches of the regulators and the regulated on ChiNext because of the 
dominance of the private sector in the market. 
 
E. Institution-based and Process-based Analysis of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance scholars have developed institution-based and process-based 
approaches to understanding corporate governance practice. An institution-based approach
99
 
examines the institutional framework;
100
 that is, it focuses on the mechanisms of corporate 
governance.
101
 In regards to China, research initially took an institutional approach by 
identifying and analysing the political and legal infrastructure within which corporate 
governance is developing.
102
 PRC scholars have also undertaken theoretical modelling but 
mostly focus on SOEs.
103
 Most research has also taken an institutional perspective of 
corporate governance in relation to China‘s political and legal infrastructure.104 Most notable 
is On Kit Tam‘s complex model for China, which includes both the Party and State as 
mechanisms of corporate governance.
105
 The process-based approach focuses on how and 
why (prescribed) institutions carry out their corporate governance functions and assesses their 
functional effectiveness within their environment.
106
 Questions of how to treat China‘s 
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categorisations and analytical approaches to corporate governance are important in 
understanding the implicit perspectives of many of the scholars in their analysis of China. 
Both approaches conclude with proposals for reform. 
Thus, this thesis strides both the institution-based and process-bases approaches. The 
structure of the thesis reflects an institutional approach, with the study spread over four 
chapters, starting with an analytical description of the institutional framework on ChiNext. 
Equally, the case studies enlist a process-based approach to examine the roles of identified 
mechanisms and institutions and their effectiveness in carrying out their functions. 
Importantly, this approach also aids assessment of the extent to which private mechanisms 
such as Confucian filial piety and guanxi play a role in corporate governance. 
The next section builds on this theoretical framework by detailing the methodology 
employed in examining the above facets of corporate governance practice and enforcement 
on ChiNext. 
 
IV. Methodological Framework 
The previous section explained the basis of the analytical framework in understanding 
corporate governance practice and enforcement on ChiNext. However, the question remains 
as to how to ascertain and assess this. To this end, this thesis employs a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods that complement the combination of institution-based 
and process-based approaches for the analysis in this thesis. It also reflects the overall socio-
legal approach of the thesis, which, in turn, complements comparative corporate governance 
perspectives of complementarity. 
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A. Quantitative Method: Identifying Trends 
1. Chosen Subjects 
The chosen subjects are the first 40 companies listed on ChiNext.
107
 These companies 
were selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, they demonstrate the initial requirements of 
corporate governance. Secondly, the analysis enabled their progress on ChiNext to be 
monitored over a three-year period, thereby providing a more accurate understanding of 
emerging and dominant trends in corporate governance practice on ChiNext. Thirdly, as the 
first 40 companies chosen for listing, they represent the types of share ownership and internal 
governance structure that the government and regulators deemed worthy of listing. Finally, 
methodologically, having a defined set of entities also controls extraneous variation and 
assists in defining the limits for any generalisation in the findings.
108
 These companies also 
have published annual reports for 2009.
109
 The difficulty envisaged here is the potential lack 
of transparency in ChiNext information and an unwillingness to divulge information. 
An archival survey of the first 40 companies (‗surveyed companies‘) proved effective 
in identifying the prevalent and emerging trends in share ownership and internal governance 
as well as compliance and enforcement on ChiNext. This involved the examination of the 
annual reports of each CSME over a three-year period, namely 2009, 2010 and 2011; a total 
of 120 annual reports. Further analysis was undertaken on the information about 
shareholdings and each compare announcement. Utilising a case study allows the use of a 
multiple set of methods; namely, interviewing, examination of primary and secondary 
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companies; however, one of them unceremoniously had its listing license revoked in mid-2010. A case study of 
this company is presented in the chapter on disclosure and enforcement practice as an example of the regulators 
purported strictness. Secondly, and more importantly, annual reports for 2009 remain unpublished for 
companies 40-60 because their IPO timelines were such that their financial reporting obligations only arose for 
the next financial year, i.e. for 2010.   
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documentary evidence and observations. Empirical evidence also forms an important aspect 
of this research and was sourced from both primary and secondary sources. 
As stated earlier, as a key objective, this thesis demonstrates the changing trend from 
state-ownership to private ownership for the purpose of understanding the implications for 
corporate governance policy and practice. 
 
2. Documentary Text: Sources of Company Data and Information 
The key sources of data for the company annual reports, initial public offer 
prospectuses, regulatory disclosures and websites of enterprises assisted in selecting CSMEs 
for case study. It was hoped that, during field study, the veracity of these texts could be 
ascertained. 
Data from a total of 138 annual reports for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 provided 
data for assessing patterns in share ownership, internal governance, and legal and regulatory 
compliance. Details of shareholder attendance and voting gleaned 40 annual shareholders‘ 
meetings resolutions and several hundreds of stock exchange announcements provided data 
for assessing shareholder engagement.
110
 In addition, prospectuses and other public 
announcements and websites of the companies provided supplementary historical background 
on ownership and management where annual reports could no. The results of the survey 
provided the basis of examination of ownership and control structures in chapters Three and 
Four, and enforcement trends in Chapter Five. 
Library-based archival research poses two problems. First, there is no ready-made 
formula to assess the accuracy of written material and so caution must be used. Therefore, 
although newspapers are used, they rarely provide sophisticated theoretical analyses and, as a 
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result, are considered to be a primary rather than a secondary source.
111
 Secondly, regardless 
of the amount of objectivity professed, published material still introduces a certain amount of 
bias into research results. This results in incompleteness of a study if it is solely library-based. 
These two limitations were mitigated through field study, whereby interviews were 
undertaken. 
 
B. Qualitative Method: Case Studies 
Case study evidence remains one of the best methodologies for understanding 
mechanisms at work in social systems. There remains no standard format for case study 
analysis.
112
 Legal quantitative measurements, however conclusive in revealing trends, cannot 
be used as substitutes for legal analysis and qualitative approaches. A total of ten companies 
provided case studies on ownership and control. Purposely chosen from the pool of the first 
40 companies, they give a detailed and nuanced examination of corporate governance 
practice. Chapter Three provides case studies on the dynamics and role of the share 
ownership structure. Chapter Four provides case studies on the management structures and 
independent directors. 
The data collection methods used included questionnaires, interviews and 
observations. The case study approach was chosen because the objective is to understand 
corporate governance practice from a legal perspective. This entailed understanding the share 
ownership structure to ascertain who needs protection and why, and the methods below were 
employed. 
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1. Field Research and Interviews 
To enhance the veracity of the case study approach, field research was undertaken in 
China with five target groups for interview in Shenzhen, Beijing and Hong Kong.
113
  
The first group of interviews comprised both foreign and domestic shareholders, and 
included individuals and institutions (e.g. fund managers and venture capitalists). Interviews 
with shareholders were mostly with retail shareholders who were probed on the appeal for 
investing in ChiNext and their understanding of corporate governance. The second group 
comprised entrepreneurs, directors and managers. For directors, the questions focused on 
internal governance systems and particularly the board of directors process. The third group 
included professional intermediaries such as China-based lawyers, public auditors, public 
accountants and Hong Kong chartered secretaries, who provide fruitful insights regarding the 
key dynamics that influence and challenge privately controlled companies in China.  
The fourth group of interviews related to regulatory authorities. Interviews were 
undertaken at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, in particular with regulators of ChiNext. The 
questions concentrated on regulation and the law enforcement process and the reactions of 
companies. Interviews were also undertaken at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, which 
proved fruitful in giving more context to the challenges of corporate governance in the region, 
especially from the point of view of a mature and international regulator. No interviews were 
undertaken at the CSRC because it operates a blanket ban on interviews unless undertaken in 
an official (i.e. state) capacity.  
The fifth group included government policy makers and senior academics, who were 
interviewed on the adequacy of current law and future reforms for the protection of investors 
and stakeholders. Interviews were also undertaken with senior law and economics academics 
based at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Research Centre, the Beijing People‘s University and 
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the China Academy of Social Sciences School of Law. These institutions are influential 
because of the significant role played in the theoretical aspects of public policy that is 
subsequently translated into law.  
The final group comprised financial markets journalists based in China, who were 
also interviewed to gain a sense of the perceived and actual role of the media in corporate 
governance in general, and specifically on ChiNext. 
 
2. Documentary Text Research I: Sources of Chinese Law 
 The School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) library and the British Library 
were the main UK resources used in this research, as well as the Internet. SOAS library 
provides rich electronic online databases of primary data in English and Chinese language 
law, regulations and judicial decisions. Most primary and secondary sources of data are 
obtainable through Internet research. However, treatises and textbooks by Chinese language 
scholars remain in hard copy form, as explained below. 
 
a. Primary Sources 
SOAS library provides rich electronic online databases of primary data in Chinese 
language law, regulations and judicial decisions. Due to the relative newness of ChiNext, 
most primary sources of data were obtained through the Internet. Primary legislation, along 
with official and unofficial documents, were sourced from the official websites of China‘s 
legislature, central and local governments, and government departments. These included the 
National People‘s Congress Standing Committee and the Legislative Affairs Bureau of the 
State Council. Secondary (such as listing rules) and tertiary legislation (such as guidance) and 
enforcement data relating to listed companies, and ChiNext in particular, were mainly 
sourced from websites of the China Securities Regulation Commission, the Shenzhen Stock 
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Exchange, ChiNext and Shanghai Stock Exchange websites. Judicial interpretations were 
sourced from the website of the People‘s Supreme Court. 
 
b. Secondary Sources 
Secondary sources of Chinese law included the China Law Yearbook series, Chinese 
language textbooks, and articles in journals and magazines, which assisted in identifying and 
clarifying the predominant paradigm relating to corporate governance in contemporary China. 
These texts are mostly published by the government and written by academics that have 
strong ties with the government. In addition, newspapers, especially the People‟s Daily, 
magazines and other reports proved useful in gathering information about enforcement 
practices in China. Yearbooks also provided information on industries and enterprises 
considered to be drivers of China‘s economy. 
Notably televised and documentary interviews by leading investigative magazines 
such as China Network Television‘s (CNTV) Jingji banxiaoshi (Half Hour Economy) and 
Dongshi hui (Directors and Boards) were used as secondary sources. As state-owned 
organisations, they have a high and wide reach in terms of interviews, and are able to act as 
an implicit barometer of matters of particular interest or importance to the State or general 
public.  
 
V. Summary of Chapters 
Chapter One, as the introductory chapter, has three functions. Firstly, it locates this 
study within the larger discourse on state policy for China‘s economic development and the 
role of ChiNext. Secondly, the chapter provides both the theoretical and methodological 
framework of the thesis, which is, in essence, socio-legal. 
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Chapter Two provides both the historical development of ChiNext and its legal and 
regulatory framework. It presents, in context, the development of corporate governance 
regulation to counter problems apparent on the other equity markets in China. The chapter 
sets out the main features of the corporate governance framework of ChiNext, including the 
ways in which it relates to Company Law and Securities Law. 
Chapter Three presents the trends in share ownership; in essence, the different goals 
and expectations of shareholders on ChiNext, with reference to case studies of purposively 
chosen case studies. Within this analytical framework, the chapter seeks to identify the 
minority and the majority shareholders, probing any difference between the two in dealing 
with their interests and expectations in the company. Not only do shareholders have their own 
goals and expectations but also their own behavioural patterns. 
Chapter Four, following the format of the preceding chapter, provides trends in 
internal governance structures, with case studies. The chapter presents the management 
structure of companies listed on ChiNext. Indicators are used to determine the effectiveness 
of the internal governance of CSMEs. They include the number and type of committees, their 
constituents and attendance. 
Chapter Five assesses the effectiveness of external mechanisms for enforcement. It 
integrates into the enforcement debate, and the watchdog role played by both the Chinese 
media and China‘s public whistleblowing system in facilitating effective regulation by the 
regulators. 
Chapter Six analyses which type of shareholder may be the most effective for 
corporate governance based on the results of the survey and case studies. In particular, it 
focuses on the role of pre-initial public offer (IPO) individual subscribers as being the most 
effective contributors to corporate governance at listed SME level. 
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Chapter Seven concludes the thesis with a summary and evaluation of the 
contributions of the study, highlighting the implications for comparative and traditional 
corporate governance theory, policy and practice, as well as making recommendations based 
on the study. It also indicates other disciplines to which the thesis makes contributions, as 
well as the limits of the research. 
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Chapter Two – Regulating ChiNext 
I. Development of ChiNext 
  The idea for a growth enterprise market for China was first hatched in 1998. That 
year, under the leadership of Premier Li Peng of the State Council‘s National Science and 
Technology Leaders Working Group (guojia keji lingdaoxiaozu), official research started into 
the development of an equity market solely dedicated to funding the science and technology 
industry and the establishment of a venture capital system.
114
 Even then, the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange was the choice for the new equity board. Following recommendations of the then 
chairman of the CSRC, Zhou Zhengqing, and research commenced on how the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange could support technology transfer and promote the development of a hi-tech 
board.
115
 Although no official reason was proposed for the selection of Shenzhen as the 
choice for the new market, clearly its location in the southern economic zone, its proximity to 
Hong Kong and, most importantly, the region‘s historical significance as being where Deng 
Xiaoping gave a mandate for market-based economic development are significant factors. 
As noted above, it took a decade before the actual establishment of ChiNext. Three 
practical reasons contributed to the long wait in establishing China‘s growth enterprise 
market. Firstly, venture capital investor financing, which was meant to be the core source of 
start-up funding, was limited.
116
 For instance, as well as the lack of knowledge, there was no 
definite government policy, especially in terms of exit strategy by IPO or private transfer.
117
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Secondly, there were not enough hi-tech SMEs for listing. Although China‘s answer to 
Silicon Valley, Zhongguancun Science Park, was established as early as 1988, it was a 
regional initiative by the Beijing government.
118
 China‘s national economy mainly focused 
on the manufacture of cheap exports to the West, mostly by medium and large SOEs, which 
dominated the funding. Official promotion of hi-tech science and technology industry had 
only just started in early 1996 with the establishment of the State Council‘s national science 
and technology leaders working group. Even if the hi-tech industry had true potential at the 
time, it was marred by the problem of funding on two levels. One was the deep-rooted and 
ideological problems in the national banking system, because SOEs were funded regardless 
of their financial viability, and consequently had had a high number of non-performing 
loans.
119
 The healthy few were geared at financing large SOEs. The other problem was the 
state policy of getting rid of SMEs, twinned with the fact that most of the burgeoning 
technology-focused enterprises were not state-owned but rather private. In all, few official 
avenues lay available for the funding of SMEs, especially for those in the private sector.
120
 
By the mid-1990s, getting rid of state-owned SMEs through absorption, bankruptcy or 
privatisation became the focus.
121
 Consequently, there was no encouragement of SMEs at 
either government, or private level where they now mostly existed. 
Despite the above and the lack of funding for the private sector, constitutionally, 
ideological changes took place with the private sector being expressly encouraged to partake 
in the economy. In 1999, at the second session of the Ninth National People‘s Congress, the 
importance of the role of the self-employed, private enterprise and non-public sectors in 
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China‘s growth was emphasised, and reflected in the revised constitution.122 In 2004, this 
reached a crescendo with another amendment to the Constitution recognising that ‗the non-
public ownership economy is an important component of the socialist market economy.‘123 
Equally, article 17 states that: 
Collective economic organisations have decision-making power in conducting 
independent economic activities, on condition that they abide by the relevant 
laws. 
This was effectively freedom to undertake economic activity in whatever form. This saw not 
only the increase of privately controlled enterprises but also the emergence of privately 
controlled listed enterprises, either as a result of private sector entrepreneurship or 
management buy-outs of former state-owned SMEs, and, importantly, their subsequent public 
listing in China. But, as mentioned earlier, a lack of funding from the state and limited private 
funds incapacitated the very hi-tech enterprises the state wished to encourage. 
A policy turning point came in March 2002, with a three-step process (‗sanbuzou‘). 
Step one was the establishment of SME Boards on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges for subsequent development into a venture capital market. Step two was the 
promotion of venture capitalism as the initial funding mechanism for SMEs to enable 
transition into a venture capital market. The final step was the establishment of the venture 
capital market.
124
 By the end of 2003, the Party finally indicated that China should focus on 
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the establishment of multi-level stock exchanges.
125
 In early 2004, the State Council 
produced a notice on the establishment of multi-level capital markets to address the funding 
needs of various SMEs.
126
 Importantly, the proposals were no longer for a board dedicated 
only to hi-tech, science and technology enterprises. Instead, focus turned to establishing 
boards for SMEs in China‘s traditional industries of manufacturing, construction and 
engineering enterprises. In May 2004, SME Boards were launched on each stock exchange as 
pilot markets designed for the eventual conversion into a venture capital market. But, as 
noted above, most of the companies came from traditional industries. Furthermore, the 
venture capitalist industry in China remained too small and, therefore, not enough ventures 
were eligible for the establishment of a venture capital market.
127
 From 2005 to 2008, 
research and reports were presented at the Party, State Council and central government levels 
discussing and recommending the form and regulatory framework ChiNext should take. For 
example, during this time, China‘s venture capital industry received a lot of patronage from 
the state. In November 2009, the ChiNext board was finally established as a standalone board 
rather than a conversion of existing SME Boards. This, in section, related to the relative 
success of the boards in raising funds. For example, between 2004 and 2010, the SME Board 
of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange raised USD53bn.
128
 
The 11-year history of ChiNext before its final establishment illustrates the 
acknowledgement of two deficiencies in China, namely the inadequacy of corporate 
governance practice and the lack of venture capital, private equity and institutional investors 
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required for venture capital. Undoubtedly, corporate governance practice needed to be 
improved before a market on similar terms to NASDAQ could be introduced in China. 
Moreover, such a market could only succeed with a mix of both venture capital investors and 
institutional investors that would not only provide much needed funding but also monitoring 
and governance. China enlisted a gradual approach to the development of ChiNext.
129
 
 
II. Legal Governance Mechanisms and Framework of ChiNext 
All companies listed in China are also domiciled in the country and registered as joint 
stock companies in accordance with Chinese Company Law. China has developed its own 
model of internal governance structure for companies distinct from those of the advanced 
economies in North America, Europe and Asia Pacific. Under Chinese Company Law, the 
key constituents of an incorporated joint stock company in China are shareholders who are 
considered to be owners, represented by the shareholders‘ meeting, and a dual board system 
consisting of the board of directors and the board of supervisors and managers. The diagram 
below illustrates the basic structure required of all listed companies, i.e., companies 
incorporated as joint stock companies.
130
 
 
Figure 1: Legal internal governance structure of all companies listed in China 
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 Further guidance supplements the cavities of the 2005 revision of both Company Law 
and Securities Law.
131
 The Listed Companies‘ Articles of Association Guidance 2006, the 
Listed Companies' Shareholders‘ Meetings Rules 2006, and similarly, the Takeover of Listed 
Companies Regulations 2007 each correspondingly set the disclosure obligations that related 
to direct and indirect purchases among other provisions and related legal liability. The Listed 
Companies‘ Information Disclosure Regulations 2007 introduced further information 
disclosure requirements for an IPO. It details information obligations in the publication of an 
IPO prospectus, periodic reports, ad hoc reports, information disclosure management, 
supervision and legal liability. 
  Company Law has two main functions: to promote business and to protect the 
interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.
132
 The emphasis of the revised law on the 
spirit of self-regulation by companies affords a more flexible approach to decision-making 
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and reflects a key objective to promote business.
133
 This not only reflects the freedom of 
enterprise afforded under the 2004 Amended Constitution but also, equally, provisions 
empowering shareholders such as derivative-type actions. 
 
A. Capital Structure of ChiNext Companies: A Shares Only 
The listing requirements on ChiNext are less vigorous and cheaper than the main 
markets in China. The minimum registered capital for listing on ChiNext is 30 million 
yuan
134
 with at least 25% of the total amount of the company‘s shares stipulated for IPO.135 
Although these are the main share capital requirements, others can be imposed at the 
discretion of ChiNext (which is the market and regulatory body, too). However, the surveyed 
companies showed that all of the first 40 companies listed on ChiNext had less than 25% but 
more than 20% in the hands of the public. Thus, 80% or more of the share capital is retained 
by subscribers to the company who tend to be highly concentrated in a small group of 100 
shareholders or less. The average percentage holding of share capital retained by subscribers 
on IPO of the surveyed companies is highly concentrated at 68.58%. There remains reason to 
believe that this average is unlikely to change much due to the origins of the companies, as 
explained later. 
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1. Capital Structure of ChiNext Companies 
Under company law, all companies listed on stock exchanges in China must be 
incorporated as or converted to joint stock limited companies. They have common shares that 
rank equally, with each common share carrying one vote. 
Two important observations can be made specifically about the companies listed on 
ChiNext. One is that shares issued in CSMEs are all tradable and only subject to subscriber-
related lock-up trading provisions, as discussed below. Moreover, as most of the companies 
have been incorporated or converted to joint stock companies after China‘s share reform,136 
they are relatively free of legacy on non-tradable shares. Another is that the ChiNext 
framework does not permit multiple classes of shares in CSMEs. That is, no dual class of A 
and B shares exist. This means that domestic and foreign investors can invest equally and, 
thus, be exposed to the same investment risks and returns.
137
 This did not help the already 
problematic oversight and monitoring problems of the state, as evidenced by tens of billions 
of US dollars expropriated from listed SOEs between 1998 and 2006.
138
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2. Restricted Shares and Free-floating Shares on ChiNext 
With IPOs, restrictions on the trading or transfer of shares issued may be imposed for 
a predetermined period of time by law, the regulators, the company or by mutual agreement. 
In most jurisdictions, these ‗lock-up‘ provisions attached to shares apply to those who fund 
the company prior to its listing. They may include founders, members of management, 
employees, venture capitalists and other investors who invested in the company pre-IPO, 
referred to as insiders. 
The same applies for companies listed in China, and they are referred to as restricted 
shares (youxianshou tiaojian gupiao). Those without trading restrictions are free-floating 
shares (wuxianshou tiaojian gupiao).
139
 On ChiNext, at least 20% of the issued shares must 
be subject to IPO, i.e., free-floating shares. Most restricted shares are locked in for either 12 
months or 36 months. The latter time period is voluntary because Company Law and 
Securities Law, as well as the ChiNext framework, only provide for an initial 12 month 
restriction on the trading of the shares to a maximum of 25% of the total holding in any 
financial year. In all of the surveyed companies, the controlling shareholders were 
covenanted to not transfer or deal in the shares of the company within the first 36 months 
following IPO. The average percentage of free-floating shares in the surveyed companies on 
IPO is 42.42%. Companies with more floating shares tend to be those that do not necessarily 
have maintaining a substantial part of the share capital as priority because they have non-
monetary reasons for investment. This may be due to the need for funding outweighing 
retention of most of the shares in the company. That is, they are willing to sacrifice a 
substantial dilution of their shareholding in return for funding from the public. On the other 
hand, it may be a combination of both reasons. 
                                                 
139
 It must be noted that restricted shares are different from so-called non-tradable shares, which are being 
phased out. Non-tradable shares were held by the state and not subject to trade on any exchange, even though 
they formed part of the share capital of the company. 
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B. People’s Court as a Corporate Governance Mechanism 
The limitations of the People‘s Courts as general enforcers of law and, in particular, 
corporate governance are well documented.
140
 In addition, there are legal and regulatory 
constraints. Investors are particularly limited; for instance, there is no recourse for action 
under Company Law for actions arising from related party transactions.
141
 There are also two 
hurdles before a claim gets to court. The first hurdle is that such actions can only be 
instigated where the Exchange to CSRC has first escalated the matter, or any other 
administrative agencies, the CSRC, or any other administrative agencies have found criminal 
acts or imposed administrative sanctions on the company or directors in question. Without 
either of these two decisions, the matter cannot be litigated. As a result, private litigation is 
very rare.
142
 For instance, between 2002 and 2003, only ten listed companies subjected to 
litigation reached the Supreme Court out of 900 cases heard at various levels in regional 
courts.
143
 The second hurdle is that such an action would need the approval of the legal 
representative of the company. The legal representative is also likely to be the controller (or 
an associate), who is unlikely to authorise an action that could be to his or her detriment. 
Thus, minority shareholders seeking legal redress are limited in private law. Conversely, the 
chairman‘s signature is both necessary and sufficient for the company to act as a plaintiff in 
litigation. If litigation is unfavourable to his or her position, most certainly if a defendant, 
                                                 
140
 Studies have indicated the problems of corruption, fraud, lack of independence or political power in China.  
For corporate law and governance perspectives, see Peizhong Gan and Liu Lanfang, eds., Xinlei Xing Gongsi 
Susong Yinan Wenti Yanjiu (Studies on the Litigation Difficult Issues of New Style Corporate), Di 1 ban, Jingji 
Faluncong (Series of Economic Law) (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2009); Clarke, ―The Ecology of 
Corporate Governance in China.‖ For a general perspective of the (limited) role of the courts in the legal system, 
see Tang Xin, ―Siren Susong Yu Gongsizhili (Personal Litigation, Corporate Governance and Law Enforcement 
in Securities),‖ in Gongsizhili Zhuanlun (Studies on Corporate Governance), ed. Gan Peizhong and Lou Jianbo, 
Di 1 ban (Beijing: Beijing da xue chu ban she, 2009), 381-419; R. P. Peerenboom and Cambridge Books Online, 
China‟s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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 Hu Tianye, Gongsi Fal  Caipan, Di 1 ban (Beijing shi: Fal  chubanshe, 2012): 4. See also, Liu Junhai, Xin 
gongsifa de zhidu chuangxin: lifa zhengdian yu jieshi nandian (Institutional Innovations of New Corporate Law: 
Legislative and Judicial Controversies). 
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 For a detailed case-study examination, see Clarke, ―The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China.‖  
143
 See Song Xiao, Zhongxiaotouzizhe baohu falü zhidu yanjiu [Research on the Legal Protection Framework 
for Small and Medium sized Investors] (Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 2012): 142. 
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then it is unlikely to proceed without agreement, except in certain circumstances.
144
 The 
matter is worsened where the legal representative also holds the role of chairman and 
controlling shareholder. In any event, it is currently unlikely that the government will permit 
private litigation so soon on ChiNext. The implications of permitting such loosening of the 
CSRC‘s tie are that the floodgates might be opened. Discussions about shareholder actions 
fall outside the remit of this thesis, largely because of empirical results demonstrating that 
there has been no corporate governance litigation relating to ChiNext listed companies either 
disclosed or revealed through news media. In general, scholars have found that company-law-
based litigation has been mostly related to non-listed companies, specifically limited liability 
companies.
145
 
 
C. External Enforcement Mechanism: CSRC 
The China Securities and Regulatory Commission (the ‗CSRC‘), formally established 
in October 1992, had its regulatory role confirmed under Securities Law in 1998, and 
expanded upon in the revised Securities Law in 2005. The CSRC reporting directly to the 
State Council has generated some debate about the extent of the powers of the CSRC, 
whether it is merely an institutional unit (shiye danwei) or an administrative department with 
powers to enforce rules.
146
 
In terms of its administrative function, the CSRC presides over the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange as a whole. Indeed, the CSRC approves the articles of association of each stock 
                                                 
144
 See Fang Liufang, ―Guoqi fading daibiaoren de falu diwei, quanli he liyi chongtu [The Position, Powers and 
Conflicts of Interest of the Legal Representative in State-owned Enterprises],‖ Bijiaofa yanjiu [Research in 
Comparative Law], no.3 (1999), url: http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=9199. 
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 See Peizhong Gan and Liu Lanfang, eds., Xinlei Xing Gongsi Susong Yinan Wenti Yanjiu (Studies on the 
Litigation Difficult Issues of New Style Corporate), Di 1 ban, Jingji Faluncong (Series of Economic Law) 
(Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2009). (Collection of essays relating to company law and corporate 
governance litigation with Beijing courts as a case study, wherein most of the judicial decisions are related to 
non-listed companies.) 
146
 See Fu, Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Governance in China, (2010). See also Clarke, ―The Ecology 
of Corporate Governance in China,‖ (29 August, 2008). 
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exchange and appoints their general managers, including ChiNext. Although the Exchange 
issues and enforces the ChiNext Measures and the Rules, overall power remains with the 
CSRC as new regulations fall within its purview and are, therefore, subject to its prior 
approval.  
The challenge for the CSRC and the Exchange is to balance corporate governance 
regulation and the need to encourage entrepreneurial spirit and innovation. As Clarke notes, 
these debates are academic in China, as the wielding of power is political and the CSRC can 
only be judged by its success or limitations in exercising its authority under Securities 
Law.
147
 The recent focus on corporate governance indicates a move away from a sole focus 
on economic growth. The corporate conduct of both companies, their directors and officers 
was overlooked by imposing barriers to private law enforcement and law administrative 
enforcement. As will be seen below, this change toward a more proactive corporate 
governance environment is also demonstrated by the new delisting rules, which emphasise 
corporate governance failure as just as important a reason for delisting a company.  
As the institutional corporate governance framework for enforcement under the CSRC 
was perceived inadequate, during the revision of Securities Law in 2005 its role and remit 
was reinforced with detailed specific securities offences for which it imposed fines on market 
participants. Notwithstanding this authority, from 2002 to 2007, none of the punishment 
decisions by the CSRC or stock exchanges related to any substantive rule of corporate 
governance.
148
 A study by Pistor and Xu indicates that, in 2003, only one in 25 companies 
listed on both stock exchanges were subject to any type of enforcement activity.
149
 Part of the 
reason for the weak enforcement was the lack of clear apportionment in law and rules of 
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 For further details on the debates, see Clarke, ―The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China,‖ (29 August, 
2008), 32ff. 
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 Ibid., 42. 
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 Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, ―Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from 
China,‖ American Law and Economics Review 7, no.1 (Spring 2005): 195, doi:10.1093/aler/ahi008. 
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responsibility for ensuring a robust internal governance system in listed companies. Only 
general principles were provided under Company Law and Securities Law, and no procedural 
guidance or designated mechanisms were used for ensuring internal controls that companies 
and their constituents implemented and complied with until a spate of secondary and tertiary 
legislation after the amendment of both laws in 2005. 
The CSRC has been described as policy-driven in application of its rules and 
enforcement activities.
150
 Nonetheless, it appears that individual shareholders (and 
stakeholders) have confidence in the CSRC to resolve issues.
151
 The CSRC has proved a 
more effective and even shareholder-friendly mechanism for the protection of shareholder 
rights, compared to the courts. 
 
III. Regulatory Mechanisms under the ChiNext Framework 
The legal, regulatory and operational rules of both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, including ChiNext, remain very much the same.
152
 Thus, this 
thesis focuses on the ChiNext framework, examining those areas that are unique. Where 
required, this thesis will provide the context of ChiNext in relation to the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange Main Board rules. Legal commentators have advised that the scope, quality and 
characteristics of different listed companies clearly demonstrate that there should be different 
market trading rules.
153
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 For an analysis of the CSRC‘s role and effectiveness see Jane Fu, Corporate Disclosure and Corporate 
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investors on China‘s stock exchanges were more likely to report an infraction to the CSRC than the courts, 
seemingly due to ease of access and cost-effectiveness of the regulator. See Song Xiao, Zhongxiaotouzizhe 
baohu falü zhidu yanjiu [Research on the Legal Protection Framework for Small and Medium sized Investors]  
(Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 2012). 
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The details of the regulatory framework of ChiNext are set out in three main 
documents. Firstly, the Temporary Administrative Measures for Initial Public Offerings and 
Listing on ChiNext 2009 (the ‗ChiNext Measures‘) provides the basis standards and 
requirements for listing and applies prior to and after IPO. Secondly, the Rules Governing the 
Listing of Shares on the ChiNext board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 2009 (the ‗ChiNext 
Rules;) sets outs the continuing obligations of listed companies. Finally, the Guide to 
Operational Standards on ChiNext 2009 (the ‗ChiNext Standards‘) provides further guidance 
that complements and supplements the former two regulations. Since the establishment of 
ChiNext in November 2009, the CSRC and Shenzhen Stock Exchange have formulated 
further regulations. Most importantly, they include the revision of the Listing Rules in 2012 
to crucially include tailor-made and detailed delisting rules for ChiNext, and earlier in 2011 
the issue of the ChiNext Public Condemnation Rules (the ‗Public Condemnation Rules‘) 
provide clarity on violations and corresponding disciplinary actions, both of which aimed at 
managing the expectations of listed companies, their investors and their advisers. An 
examination of both of these regulations and developments and others takes place in Chapter 
Five as a demonstration of the continuous development of corporate governance law-making 
and enforcement by the regulators in response to undesirable corporate conduct. 
The 2009 ChiNext Rules apply after listing as continuing obligations that provide the 
detail that the general principles of Company Law and Securities Law omit. Thus, to meet the 
corporate governance legislative requirements, a company publicly listed on ChiNext must 
comply with the provisions of Company Law, Securities Law, the Corporate Governance 
Standards of Listed Companies 2002 jointly issued by the CSRC and the defunct State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC),
154
 the Rules on Listed Companies Shareholders 
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 See China Securities Regulatory Commission, and State Economic and Trade Commission, ―Guanyu fabu 
shangshi gongsi zhili zhunze de tongzhi [Corporate Governance Standards of Listed Companies 2002].‖ 
Government. China Securities and Regulatory Commission, July 1, 2002. url: 
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Meetings,
155
 the Guide to Articles of Association for Listed Companies
156
 and the Guiding 
Opinion on the Establishment of a System of Independent Directors.
157
 Both the Measures 
and the 2009 Rules must also be taken in the context of other provisions such as those 
relating to independent directors, shareholder meetings and articles of association.
158
 The 
figure below provides an overview of the regulatory corporate governance structures of 
ChiNext. The main difference from the basic structure under Company Law is that there must 
be a board of supervisors rather than an appointed person and there are prescribed board 
committees. 
Figure 2: Regulatory framework of ChiNext 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ssb/ssflfg/bmgzjwj/ssgszl/200911/t20091110_167722.htm. In March 2003, 
the responsibilities of SETC were taken over by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
and SETC no longer exists as a commission. 
155
 Issued and announced on 16 March, 2006. See China Securities Regulatory Commission, ―Shangshi gongshi 
gudong dahui guize [Rules on Listed Company Shareholders General Meeting 2006].‖ Government. China 
Securities and Regulatory Commission, (16 March, 2006). url: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ssb/ssflfg/bmgzjwj/ssgszl/200911/t20091110_167766.htm. 
156
 See China Securities Regulatory Commission, ―Guanyu fabu shangshi gongsi zhangcheng zhiyin (2006nian 
xiuding) [Guide to Articles of Association for Listed Companies (As Amended in 2006)].‖ Government. China 
Securities and Regulatory Commission, (16 March, 2006). url: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/shenzhen/xxfw/tzzsyd/ssgs/sszl/ssgsxx/200902/t20090226_95494.htm. The 2006 
Guide amends the Guide to Articles of Association for Listed Companies issued by the CSRC in 1997. [Do I 
need to discuss the differences briefly to highlight how far China has come in corporate governance?]  
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 See China Securities Regulatory Commission, ―Guanyu fabu guanyu zai shangshi gongsi jianli duli dongshi 
zhidu de zhidao yijian [Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of a System of Independent Directors].‖ 
Government. China Securities and Regulatory Commission, (16 August, 2001). url: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/xxfw/fgwj/bmgz/200803/t20080305_77981.htm. 
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Source: Author‟s impression 
 
 
Public enforcement mechanism – CSRC 
 
A. Interim Measures for IPO and Listing 2009 
The Measures provide the overall objectives of the regulatory framework of ChiNext where it 
expressly promotes good corporate governance practice. The Measures state four principles, 
namely, to promote independent innovative enterprise, the development of long-term growth 
enterprises, the protection of shareholders and the protection of the public interest as a 
whole.
159
 Of especial note is that the objective to promote independent enterprise appears to 
                                                 
159
 Article 1 of China Securities Regulatory Commission, ―Shouci Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Bing Zai 
Chuangyeban Shangshi Guanli Zanxing Banfa [Temporary Administrative Measures for Initial Public 
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have developed into a concept that underpins law-making, application approvals and 
rejections and general enforcement activity on ChiNext. 
 
1 Mandatory Internal Governance Structure 
The Measures give detail on the broad principles enunciated under both Company 
Law and Securities Law. Any company wishing to publicly list on ChiNext must undertake 
corporate governance as a responsibility of the company under law.
160
 The Measures detail 
the corporate governance principles and rights and obligations arising. In addition to the legal 
requirement of a shareholders meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors, independent 
directors and board (or company) secretary, the Measures also make mandatory the audit 
committee system. They also provide the overall objectives of the regulatory framework of 
ChiNext, expressly promoting good corporate governance practice. Other objectives are 
implicit in the texts of both the Measures and the 2009 Rules. 
In addition, to the legal requirements of the executive board, supervisory board and 
independent directors, the Measures impose a mandatory internal governance structure that 
must be in place at the time of application for listing. Emphasis has been on prescribing in 
detail the internal governance system of companies wishing to list on ChiNext. For instance, 
the Measures require that every company must have an audit committee. 
Chinese scholars believe that, without more detailed internal governance as prescribed 
under ChiNext, listed companies would collapse out of managerial chaos, thereby defeating 
the objective of promoting and sustaining long-term companies in the market.
161
 Thus, the 
Measures and 2009 Rules complement China‘s modern enterprise system by imposing 
managerial governance benchmarks and regulating compliance. 
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 Article 19 of the ChiNext Measures. 
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 Zou Jian, Zhongxiaoye chuangyeban shangshi shiwu [Small and Medium-sized Enterprises on ChiNext：
Listing Practice], 136. 
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2 Listing Process and Criteria 
An independent IPO Review Panel presides over the selection of companies for IPO, 
while the Expert Advisory Committee proffers expert advice according to the type of industry 
of the company applying for listing. The figure below illustrates a snapshot of the application 
process. 
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Figure 3: Listing process and timing on ChiNext 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite going through such a long and expensive process, companies are not 
automatically listed just because they have applied. Chapter Six will demonstrate that the 
reasons for rejection are overwhelmingly because of corporate governance irregularities and 
financial reporting disclosures. 
Since late 2012, in a drive to increase transparency and also to set precedents and 
examples, the CSRC and the Exchange started publishing the IPO application waiting lists 
and rejection notifications. 
 
Preparation 
 
•Venture capital investors, private equity ty Investment 
banks seek companies with IPO potential 
•Restructuring including incorporation as a joint stock 
company 
•Local government approval of application 
•A prospectus is produced 
IPO Review 
• IPO Review Committee (part of CSRC) 
• The committee takes 3-4 months to review 
applications 
Approval 
• Initiation of a road show 
Initial Public Offer 
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B. ChiNext Listing Rules 
The 2009 Rules detail the procedures and documents mainly aimed at setting out 
disclosure obligations and identifying those responsible for fulfilling such obligations, as well 
as disciplinary actions and sanctions for their breach. Of its 19 chapters, six deal with 
substantive corporate governance issues. Chapter II sets out the general principles and 
provisions on information disclosure, with further obligations particularly imposed on de 
facto controllers. Chapter III defines the roles and duties of directors, supervisors, senior 
management, controlling shareholders and de facto controllers. Chapter IV relates to sponsors, 
Chapter VIII to resolutions of boards of directors and supervisors and shareholders‘ general 
meetings, Chapter IX to disclosable transactions, Chapter X to related party transactions and 
Chapter XVIII to regulatory measures and disciplinary actions against breaches 
. 
1. Prohibited Trading Periods 
Directors and senior managers cannot transfer the shares they hold in the company 
within one year of the date of listing of the company‘s shares and within half a year of the 
date of leaving office.
162
 In addition, along with shareholders who own 5% or more of the 
total shares in the company, they must not purchase to then sell, or sell to then purchase the 
shares of the company within a six month period. Profits accrued from such trading belong to 
the company, and it is the duty of the executive board to disgorge the offending person of the 
profits.
163
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2. Delisting of Shares 
As mentioned earlier, the ChiNext Rules were revised in 2012 specifically to include 
detailed rules relating to a delisting criteria developed uniquely for ChiNext listed companies. 
Prior to the revision of the ChiNext Rules relating to delisting, there was no clear delisting 
mechanism for companies listed, and the focus was on a graded risk warning process 
ultimately leading to delisting. The ChiNext Rules set out ten predominantly financial-
performance-based circumstances based on which the Exchange will issue a delisting risk 
warning.
164
  An important problem is that the ten scenarios where for which the Exchange 
will issue such a warning does not include corporate- governance- related matters, with the 
exception of false financial reporting. It is essentially an earning-based delisting regime.  
The delisting risk warning requires the company to revise its short stock name by 
adding a prefix of ‗ST‘ to denote its Special Treatment status.165 The Exchange further 
imposes a daily share price movement limit of 5% on ST companies. The ChiNext Rules also 
set out details on how companies can apply for removal of the risk warning, which in general 
tends to point to improved financial performance. However, there is no indication of what 
violations will result in an automatic delisting, nor is there a clear graded progression toward 
delisting as a penalty. 
This graded risk warning process meant that there was no real and immediate 
practical sanction for companies exhibiting extremely undesirable corporate activity or 
underperformance as on all other equity markets in China.
166
But the problem with this 
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 Rule 13.1.3 of ChiNext Rules.  
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 Companies to be delisted were labelled to ―*ST*‖ as a warning to investors. Rule 13 of ChiNext Rules 
mirrors a generic set of provisions found in rules of the other equity boards on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges. 
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process was that many companies continued their poor performance for years without ever 
being delisted.
167
  
In terms of corporate governance, issues relate to the content and publication of the 
financial position of the company or changes to its equity structure. They include correcting 
material errors or false representation in a previously released financial report, or failure to 
make amendments on time,
168
 and a failure to disclose changes to its equity structure on 
time.
169
 Clearly, these rules do not have direct corporate governance reasons for issuing a 
delisting warning.  
As will be seen in Chapter Six, a combination of pressures from the market and the 
media and a regulatory scandal to the detriment of investors led to the regulators setting out a 
clear-cut and (in theory a) quick process for delisting an errant company. Crucially, the 
Exchange now holds the power to delist under the ChiNext framework rather than the CSRC. 
 
3. ChiNext Operational Standards - Enforcement Proceeding 
As stated earlier, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, in addition to managing ChiNext and 
the other markets on its exchange, also investigates and enforces disciplinary actions and 
sanctions against those in violation of the ChiNext framework, which falls within its remit.
170
 
The Exchange has the following regulatory measures at its disposal, depending on the nature 
and gravity of the breach. It can require explanations and clarifications, require intermediaries 
to conduct checks and issue opinions or request the appointment of intermediaries for that 
purpose, issue written warnings (various notices and letters), issue summonses to individuals 
for regulatory talks, cancel the qualification certificates of individuals, refuse to accept the 
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 Ma Jun, ―Lun Woguo Chuangyeban Tuishe Chengxu de Wanshan: Jiyu Touzizhe Quanyi Baohu Shijue (The 
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documents issued by relevant parties, restrict trading, report (escalate) matters to the CSRC 
and other measures that are appropriate. Unlike the CSRC, the Exchange does not have any 
powers under Securities Law. Therefore, its ability to enforce is not limited to the specific 
offences and rules laid out in Chapter 11 of Securities Law. Indeed, a disciplinary action 
committee first reviews the actions of the persons and must then issue its independent and 
professional judgement to the Exchange, which the Exchange can decide whether or not to 
follow.
171
 
The Exchange is also empowered to discipline directors, supervisors, senior 
management, board secretaries and sponsors in breach of their disclosure obligations. 
Depending on the seriousness, this can be by circulating a notice of criticism or imposing a 
public announcement that the person is unsuitable for the position to be held.
172
 
 
4. A Principle of Independence for the Company and its Key Constituents 
The regulatory framework of ChiNext promotes independent innovative enterprise by 
requiring clear and strengthened information disclosure by companies. The key to ensuring 
transparency and the viability of the company is the principle of independence. The principle 
of independence does not only relate to the independence of the company as a going concern 
in its own right but also refers to independence in the context of assets, management and 
ownership structure. 
This remains one of the main challenges of growth enterprise markets in striking a 
balance between investors‘ need for information about their investments in a high-risk 
enterprise and the company‘s need for innovation requiring a degree of secrecy. Information 
asymmetry is especially high where products have not come to market and, thus, there is no 
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precedence for the investor to rely on when exercising the right to buy or sell shares in a 
company. Hi-tech companies tend to have price-sensitive information that they also wish to 
keep secret; however, the disclosure of information about company projects, innovation and 
progress is fundamental. To ensure listing companies are independently innovative within a 
month of listing, they are required to hold an annual report meeting to provide investors and 
potential investors with information about their product strategy, operational performance, 
new product or technology development, financial results, investment projects, sales and 
purchase of core technology, changes in core technology teams or key technical personnel.
173
 
Thus, the operational ideal of ChiNext is an emphasis on strict information disclosure. 
 
C. Internal Governance under Company Law and Securities Law 
This section outlines the internal governance mechanisms laid down by Company Law and 
Securities Law. 
 
1. Shareholders’ Meeting 
China has a shareholder-centred model of corporate governance wherein all decision-
making powers are vested in the shareholders‘ meeting. The shareholders‘ meeting is also 
known as the ‗organ of intention‘ (yisi jiguan), which reflects the fact that opinions expressed 
at the shareholders meeting should have (at least in theory) a restraining effect on the external 
activities of the company.
174
 Under Company Law, the shareholders‘ meeting is the organ of 
power.
175
 As a joint stock company, an annual general meeting (‗AGM‘) must be held each 
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year
176
 where shareholders decide the following matters: the business policy and investment 
plans, election and recall of members of the board of directors and board of supervisors and 
their remuneration and examination and approval of the reports of the board of directors and 
board of supervisors. The meeting also examines and approves the annual financial budget 
plan and final accounts, plans for profit distribution of the company and plans for making up 
losses, adoption of resolutions on the increase or reduction of the registered capital of the 
company, the issuance of company bonds and assignment of capital contribution by a 
shareholder to a person other than the shareholders. The meeting also presides over matters 
such as the merger, division, transformation, dissolution and liquidation of the company and 
amendments to the articles of association of the company.
177
 
In addition to the requirement of at least an AGM, joint companies must convene an 
‗interim‘ general meeting when the number of directors is less than two-thirds of the number 
of directors, unrecovered losses amount to one-third of the total paid-up capital, or at the 
request of shareholders separately or in aggregate holding 10% or more of the total share 
capital of the company, or by either the executive board or supervisory board.
178
  
The board of directors (‗executive board‘) is not independent of the shareholders‘ 
meeting and, thus, can only act in accordance with powers delegated under the company‘s 
articles of association or by a shareholders‘ meeting.179 The concentration of so much power 
in shareholders has been a source of criticism.
180
 It has been perceived as a product of the 
effects of state-ownership and the pervasive influence of the Party in corporate law. 
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2. Board of Directors 
The development of a stronger board of directors compared to the shareholders‘ 
meeting in the last several years may appear a contradiction seeing that overriding power is 
located in the board. Commentators explain that this emphasis on directors‘ duties in China‘s 
Company Law has being spurred by developments in the West.
181
 
The ChiNext framework does not provide a benchmark for judging the eligibility of a 
person nominated to be a director of a CSME. Instead, guidance must be sought in article 147 
of Company Law, which prescribes the six circumstances in which a person becomes 
ineligible to be a director. Firstly, a person of limited or no capacity for civil conduct cannot 
be a director. Secondly, anyone who, within five years or less, was sentenced criminally for 
bribery, embezzlement, seizure or misappropriation of property or sabotage of the socialist 
market economic order, where less than five years have elapsed after the expiration of the 
period of execution. Thirdly, a person deprived of his political rights because of the 
commission of a crime and less than five years have elapsed since the expiration of the period 
of execution. Fourthly, a person who was a director, the head or manager of a company or 
enterprise that went into bankruptcy and liquidation and was personally liable for the 
bankruptcy of the said company or enterprise and less than three years have elapsed from the 
date of liquidation of the company or enterprise is completed. Fifthly, a person who, being 
the legal representative of a company or an enterprise, the business license of which was 
revoked for violation of law and which was ordered to close down, was personally liable for 
the above, where less than three years have elapsed from the date the business license of the 
company or enterprise is revoked. Finally, a person who fails to liquidate a relatively large 
amount of personal debts when they are due cannot be director of a company. The provision 
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makes invalid any such appointment and also demands the removal of existing directors who 
fall within the list. But these provisions do not focus on promoting behavioural expectations. 
ChiNext rules primarily legislate to ensure the quality of the constituents of the 
executive board, which remains especially important given the potential for managers to 
control an enterprise for their own benefit. The Measures require directors to have the 
professional qualifications required by law, administrative regulations and rules, though no 
details are given. To be eligible, a person must not be under an existing CSRC ban from the 
securities market,
182
 neither must she be subject to any administrative sanction by the CSRC 
in the last three years
183
 nor recent public censure by a ChiNext regulator, nor under 
investigation by a judicial authority for suspected crimes or under investigation by the CSRC 
for suspected irregularities, when there has been no conclusive enforcement decision as 
yet.
184
 
However, most directors tend to be guilty of neglect rather than a breach of any of the above 
provisions. This neglect may be attributed to lack of time, knowledge or expertise or even 
interest in the enterprise. Therefore, even more de facto power devolves to managers since 
members of the board fail to engage with the company. 
 
3. Independent Directors 
Independent directors in China are an important mechanism for the protection of 
minority shareholders, the monitoring of the board of directors and the provision of 
independent opinions to the regulators and the public. Company Law requires that a joint 
stock company ‗shall have independent directors and the specific measures shall be stipulated 
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by the State Council‘.185 The Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of the System of 
Independent Directors in Listed Companies 2001 mandates that independent directors 
…pay attention that the lawful rights and interests of small and medium 
shareholders are not prejudiced.
186
 
At least one third of the board of directors must be independent. There is a lot of 
literature, both academic and in practice, about the importance of independent directors in 
providing the ‗independent‘ element that a board of directors needs in order to be effective in 
its decision-making and monitoring of management. In terms of appointment, it remains 
difficult to ascertain the process by which non-executives without representative shareholding 
are selected. The 2009 Rules in line with Company Law and the Code require cumulative 
voting at a shareholder‘s meeting where independent directors will be elected. The company 
must circulate to all shareholders a notice of meeting, which provides the name of the 
nominator, the candidate‘s statement and curriculum vitae.187 Before election, information 
about the candidate must be submitted to the CSRC, which then appraises the suitability of 
the candidate as an independent director. The CSRC can object to an appointment, which can 
result in the removal of the candidate from the election process.
188
 Again, in a drive toward 
transparency, and in addition to the disclosure announcement by the company, the Exchange 
also publishes the name and brief details of the independent directors on its website as part of 
the so-called credibility record system detailed under the 2009 Rules.
189
 Indeed, of late there 
has been a rise in the number of directors rejected not only as independent directors but also 
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as either directors or as persons participating in China‘s capital markets. Some suspensions 
have lasted for up to ten years.
190
 
 
4. Board of Supervisors 
Under Company Law, all listed companies must have a supervisory board.
191
 The 
supervisory board acts as a whole and not as individual members. The only time supervisors 
are given individual powers to act is where there is only one appointee to the position in a 
limited liability company. Consequently, decisions must be unanimous or represent a 
majority. Under Company Law supervisors have express duties, fiduciary and otherwise, 
which are much the same as those of the directors of the board. The terms of reference of 
supervisors include monitoring directors and officers, examining the financial affairs of the 
company, supervising acts of management that violate laws, regulations and articles of 
association, demand that the management rectify wrong-doings and propose the convening of 
an extraordinary meeting.
192
 They are also empowered to conduct an investigation and 
engage an accountancy firm if they believe the company‘s situation is abnormal.193 The votes 
of half of the board are required to adopt a resolution.
194
 As one third of the board must 
consist of employees of the company, this means that most non-employee members must 
agree before a resolution is passed. Meetings are infrequent since the minimum requirement 
is every six months, to which most companies adhere, although interim meetings are 
permitted.
195
 Voting and other procedures must be in accordance with the articles of 
association.
196
 The remit of the supervisory board is to supervise directors, officers and the 
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senior management of the company. Supervisors are permitted to attend board meetings in a 
non-voting capacity,
197
 which is supposed to enable them to carry out their obligation to 
prevent the abuse of power by the company directors, controlling shareholders, de facto 
controllers and related third parties. However, it is well documented that, although this is a 
mandatory organ of the company that reports directly to the shareholders‘ general meeting, it 
rarely does so and remains powerful only in print but weak in practice.
198
 Unsurprisingly, the 
2009 Rules do not make any specific provisions for the supervisory board; rather, both the 
Measures and 2009 Rules focus on reinforcing the role of the independent director and 
empowering the secretary and sponsors to monitor the company, with obligations to report 
irregularities. This regulatory framework in which the secretary has a dominant role in 
information disclosure, internal governance and investor relations is exclusive to ChiNext. 
 
5. Manager 
Under article 119 of Company Law, the manager (also referred to as ‗general manager‘ 
or ‗chief executive‘) reports directly to the board of directors as well as being appointed and 
dismissed by them. However, the manager has extensive powers, albeit that he or she is 
directly responsible to the board of directors for the production, operation and management of 
the company and the implementation of resolutions of the board. The manager has authority 
under law to implement annual business and investment plans, establish internal management 
organs, establish a basic management system and formulate specific rules and regulations. 
Managers also recommend the appointment or dismissal of deputy manager(s) or persons in 
charge of the financial affairs of the company, and in their own right can appoint and dismiss 
management personnel not appointed or dismissed by the board of directors. Managers also 
                                                 
197
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exercise any powers delegated under the company‘s articles of association. Although the 
remit of managers may not appear wide, their remit is one that is provided for under primary 
legislation, and, therefore, to that extent, is not a matter for internal negotiation by the board 
of directors, or even the shareholders for that matter. In effect, the board can delegate other 
functions and powers to managers but they cannot delimit those already set out in Company 
Law 2005. This, combined with the concentration of day-to-day operational power and the 
manager‘s knowledge of the company, effectively means that the power to appoint and 
dismiss worthless, otherwise the company may be put into dire straits. This remains a 
profound legacy of the state-ownership mind-set of China in transition during the 1980s. 
Apart from their privileged authority under Company Law, in reality managers also 
wield an immense amount of power that dates back to the policy of the separation of the state 
from enterprises aimed at developing efficient and competitive enterprises.
199
 For instance, in 
1984, the Party Central Committee and the State Council together issued the Terms of 
Reference for Managers of State-owned Industrial Enterprises, which unprecedentedly 
stipulated that the manager was the company‘s representative of legal personality. In those 
days, the potential for extensive managerial powers was naturally constrained by a 
supervisory and guaranteed role for the enterprise‘s own Party sub-committee and democratic 
management of employees. More power devolved to managers in 1988 under the Law on 
Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, which prohibited any state organ or unit 
from interfering with the managerial powers of SOEs. This safeguarded the day-to-day 
managerial powers of management as well as (crucially) explicitly vesting management with 
powers to which they hitherto were not entitled. Interestingly, the law became effectual 
because of its punitive nature against those that interfered. Furthermore, legal remedies were 
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given to the management of SOEs in the event that any organ or individual interfered with 
their ‗operational rights‘. This, Chao Xi notes, has resulted in managers honing an all-
powerful position in the last 20 years.
200
 
 The Measures and Rules are formulated specifically to counter and prevent the 
mistakes and weaknesses of the stock exchanges of the 1980s from being transmitted in the 
companies that list on ChiNext. These ChiNext Measures and Rules deal with the legacy of 
the notoriously extensive power vested in managers of listed companies arising in part under 
Company Law (both the revised 2005 and original 1993) and the legacy of ‗insider‘ power 
that dates back to legislation promoting the separation of enterprises from the state. The 
Measures and 2009 Rules do so by imposing more monitoring and reporting obligations on 
independent directors, board secretaries and sponsors, as illustrated later in this section. 
Whether they are effective mechanisms to counter insider control will be discussed based on 
case study evidence later in the thesis. 
 
D. Duties of Directors, Supervisors, Controlling Shareholders and de Facto 
Shareholders 
Although this thesis does not focus on the duties of directors, the main duties are reiterated as 
they become useful in understanding the basis upon which the regulators regulate corporate 
conduct in companies listed on ChiNext. 
1. Duties of Loyalty and Due Diligence 
The Measures importantly reiterate and expand on the fiduciary duties of directors, 
stating that directors, supervisors and the senior management of the company must be loyal 
and diligent as set out in article 148 of Company Law.
201
 The ChiNext Rules further sets out 
                                                 
200
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the same duties, which are then used as the point of reference for enforcement proceedings. 
They must also make express undertaking to fulfil their fiduciary duties and due diligence 
duties, and those duties imposed by the articles of association and the Exchange, the duties 
extended to ensuring that the company complies.
202
 The fiduciary duties and due diligence 
duties of directors are detailed as follows under rule 3.1.9. 
The Measures further lay out in detail other duties of directors to ensure that, prior to 
listing, directors are aware of their duties and the level of corporate conduct that is required 
of them if they want their company to be listed. 
Directors, supervisors and the senior management of the company are familiar with 
their corporate governance obligations. They must understand relevant laws and regulations 
regarding the offering and listing of shares. They must also be familiar with their statutory 
obligations as directors, supervisors and senior management.
203
 Thus, the excuse of ignorance 
cannot be used. 
Directors also have directions on how to behave at board meetings. For instance, 
when in attendance at board meetings they must act with due diligence and reasonable 
prudence, expressing their opinions explicitly on the matters under consideration.
204
 
This sub-rule becomes even more rigorous for independent directors because it requires them 
to disclose to the market and regulators their independent opinions on certain matters. To this 
end, they must carefully read all the business and financial reports of the listed company as 
well as any media coverage on the company, keeping informed of and paying continuous 
attention to the company‘s operations and management as well as the material events that 
have occurred or are likely to occur and the effect of such material events. Independent 
directors are also obliged to report problems existing in the company‘s operations in a timely 
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manner to the board of directors, and cannot shirk the responsibility under the excuse of not 
being engaged directly in the operation and management of the company or having 
insufficient knowledge thereof. 
205
 
 
2. Duty of Care and Duty of Honesty and Good Faith 
A further duty of honesty and good faith underlies the regulatory framework on 
ChiNext, more so than the duties of loyalty or duty care. In the performance of their duties, 
directors must also acting honestly and in good faith, exercising their rights within their 
authority in the best interests of the company as a whole and all shareholders, and avoiding 
actual and potential conflicts of interest and duty. Finally, they must perform all other duties 
and due diligence duties as set forth in the Company Law and the Securities Law as well as 
those acknowledged by the public. Judging whether the public has acknowledged a fiduciary 
duty is difficult. There are issues regarding what is meant by the ‗public‘ in this context, and 
whether it represents retail shareholders on the stock market or the citizens of China in 
general. 
 
IV. Key Developments in Corporate Governance as Reflected in ChiNext 
Framework 
A. Empowered Role of the Board Secretary 
Under the ChiNext Rules, the role of the board secretary
206
 is enhanced, firstly, 
because she is responsible to the company itself and not only the board of directors.
207
 Under 
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Company Law, it is compulsory for all publicly listed companies in China to have a board 
secretary.
208
 However, under ChiNext‘s regulatory framework, the board secretary holds a 
pivotal and indispensable internal governance role, and is also responsible to external 
regulators of ChiNext. This is in contrast to Company Law, wherein the secretary‘s remit is 
decidedly limited to preparing for board and shareholders meetings, keeping company 
records, managing materials relating to shareholders and handling information disclosure 
matters. The perceived importance of secretaries in ChiNext companies cannot be overstated, 
as demonstrated by the devotion of 15 sub-rules detailing their obligations and 
responsibilities. 
In terms of expertise and eligibility for appointment, under the ChiNext Rules, a 
secretary must have the ‗necessary financial, management and legal expertise for performing 
his duties, have good professional ethics, and have obtained the certificate for secretaries 
issued by the Exchange‘.209 This contrasts with Company Law, which does not provide for 
any particular qualification but merely enumerates the appointment procedures of the role and 
its key obligations. This narrow remit and lack of clear requirement for a type of skill and 
expertise mean that board secretaries require little knowledge of corporate governance, 
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Company Law or financial management. There are no chartered secretaries in Mainland 
China, despite Hong Kong having an Institute of Chartered Secretaries. Some companies 
have company secretaries with financial backgrounds, but their level of skill and expertise is 
still unknown, mostly because there has been little focus on the role of the board secretary in 
corporate governance in the Anglo-US literature, and the same is almost non-existent in the 
literature on China. 
To ensure a certain level of compliance, each person appointed as a board secretary 
must already have the Exchange‘s certificate for secretaries filed with the Exchange, along 
with other personal information.
210
 The secretary can appoint a securities affairs 
representative who is responsible for direct liaison with the Exchange and can deputise for 
the secretary in all aspects set out by the rules.
211
 Although the reading of the Rules appears 
mandatory, not all secretaries have appointed a securities affairs representative and instead 
perform the duty themselves.
212
 Furthermore, both appointments require an announcement to 
the market.
213
 Companies must also appoint a secretary within three months of either the IPO 
or the date of resignation or removal of the previous secretary.
214
 To avoid the weakening of 
this prescribed governance structure, directors of listed companies cannot simultaneously 
hold the position of director and secretary, nor can a former member of the supervisory board, 
external legal counsel or external auditors be appointed to the role. Finally, the secretary 
cannot be dismissed without sufficient reason.
215
 The ‗sufficient‘ reason for dismissal 
presumably warrants a disclosure to the Exchange, and subsequent announcement to the 
market. 
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1. Key Internal Governance Obligations 
The board secretary carries most of the burden of ensuring that the company‘s internal 
control system for disclosures is compliant. The secretary has also being awarded primary 
responsibility for internal corporate governance and investor relations; as such, any reason for 
dismissal will highlight a problem in this area. This presents a double-edged sword in that 
companies will not want to dismiss their secretaries if they believe it will highlight internal 
governance failings that are likely to affect the share price. However, the company is then left 
with a secretary in whom the board may rightly or wrongly have no confidence. 
  
B. Sponsors 
ChiNext has a listing sponsorship system for shares and convertible bonds. Sponsors 
have obligations prior to, during and after the IPO of the company, which must be detailed 
under a sponsorship agreement to provide continuous supervision and guidance.
216
 The 
ChiNext Rules require sponsors to: 
…supervise and guide the issuing company in establishing, perfecting and 
implementing the corporate governance system, financial internal control 
system and information disclosure system…217 
The ChiNext Rules include the role of the sponsor in the internal governance system 
of ChiNext companies. Sponsors of ChiNext companies have supervisory and monitoring 
obligations that continue after IPO and can be extended indefinitely by the CSRC and the 
Exchange if there appears to be a corporate governance failing on the part of the company 
that the sponsors fails to report. Sponsors are authorised to supervise and guide the directors, 
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supervisor, senior management and controllers of the company.
218
 The duration is from the 
remaining part of the year of listing and for the subsequent three full financial years. The 
Exchange can extend this period of supervision if defects or irregularities arise in the 
company‘s information disclosures, legal compliance, corporate governance and internal 
controls, or where there is a great regulatory risk as a result of significant changes in the de 
facto controller, board of directors or management.
219
 This effectively acts as a deterrent 
because sponsors tend to earn most of their fees during the IPO period and not after. The 
opportunity cost of ‗supervising‘ an errant listed client is the percentage of fees to be earned 
with a new pre-IPO client. 
Under the ChiNext framework, sponsors also have several enforcement and 
whistleblowing obligations, which are enhanced due to the riskier profile of ChiNext listed 
companies. Firstly, it must report to the Exchange when it has sufficient reason to believe the 
issuer has violated the ChiNext Rules and must urge the issuer to clarify and or rectify within 
a certain period of time.
220
 Secondly, sponsors must also scrutinize other intermediaries and 
issue in a timely manner an opinion and report to the Exchange when it believes that a 
professional opinion issued about the company by an intermediary and its signatories 
contains false representations, misleading statements or material omissions, or other 
irregularities.
221
 In order to control incidences of abuse of insider information, sponsors also 
have a negative obligation not to take advantage of any undisclosed information they 
obtained in the course of performing their duties under the ChiNext Rules, for the purposes of 
insider trading for themselves or for other parties.
222
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The role of the sponsor also continues after the IPO of the company. Chapter Five 
provides an insight into how the regulators deal with a sponsor when in default of its 
obligations under the ChiNext Rules. 
 
C. Heightened Information Disclosure Obligations for Particular Constituents 
The disclosure regime on ChiNext reflects the regulators‘ experience of the last 20 
years on the other markets and a realisation that the high-risk nature of ChiNext companies 
means that investors need sufficient and accurate information to make informed decisions. As 
mentioned earlier, originally, the intention was for professional investors to dominate 
ChiNext. The original regulatory framework of ChiNext reflected this. However, in reality, 
retail investors have dominated. Consequently, in the two years following the establishment 
of ChiNext, the CSRC and the Exchange revisions were made to the rules and new initiatives 
were started that were aimed at educating retail investors on investment strategy, company 
performance and corporate governance. 
The disclosure framework on ChiNext is aimed at investor protection. As such, the 
ChiNext disclosure framework had high disclosure obligations with a relatively wider 
requirement on disclosure compared to other markets in China.
223
 The recipients of 
information on ChiNext include finance providers such as banks, lenders and creditors, and 
stakeholders in the company, which include employees, trade unions, governments, the 
general public and supervisory bodies (jiandu jigou). 
Under ChiNext Rules, CSMEs must provide a management system for information 
disclosure.
224
 Similar to other listing rules of other equity boards in China, the ChiNext 
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framework requires all information to be true, accurate, complete, timely and fair. Directors, 
supervisors and senior management must guarantee this.
225
 
Items and format for disclosure are detailed in the ChiNext Rules, namely those that 
require periodic disclosures within a prescribed period and ad hoc disclosures required on a 
timely basis. They bear some discussion in their own right, but they also form a key source of 
data and information employed in the case study analysis in the following chapters. 
  
1. Periodic Reports 
Periodic reports come in the form of annual reports, interim reports and quarterly 
reports.
226
 Periodic reports must be disclosed in accordance with deadlines prescribed in the 
Rules. Moreover, financial disclosures must be in accordance with the relevant accounting 
laws and rules. In particular, CSMEs must hold an annual reports briefing and shareholders 
must be informed of the time, method and main activities of the annual report briefing one 
month in advance.
227
 The company‘s basic business plan and financial report must be in 
accordance with accounting law‘s guidelines and accounting system rules. They must reflect 
the financial position, business results and cash-flow of the company on which a registered 
auditor has provided an opinion without reservation.
228
 Apart from the directors‘ report and 
the corporate governance report, one of the most important reports for appraising corporate 
governance in ChiNext companies, and China‘s listed companies in general, is the ‗important 
items‘ report. The important items report contains disclosures about key events in the 
company and, notably, of related party transactions, guarantees by the company given to third 
parties, litigation and administrative sanctions against the company. 
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A noticeable problem with periodic reporting for ChiNext companies relates to the 
fact that, despite SMEs, they must provide quarterly reporting. Such frequent reporting for an 
SME can be onerous in terms of time and expertise; but, more importantly, it can present a 
distorted view of performance since the companies of a high-risk nature may not be 
performing especially well. The danger is that, despite the regulators promoting corporate 
governance, the focus on short-term reporting obligations may inadvertently push companies 
toward smoothing out, hiding or falsifying their financial reports.
229
 
 
2. Ad Hoc Reports 
Ad hoc items for timely disclosure include board and shareholder resolutions, 
supervisors‘ opinions, disclosable transactions, related party transactions, independent 
directors‘ opinions, share incentives plans, material events and acquisitions and equity 
changes during the year.
230
 Each resolution of the board of directors and board of supervisors 
must each be announced to the market, and of particular note is that, during voting, the 
number of abstentions and the reasons for objection and abstention must be stated in 
announcements.
231
 Resolutions of shareholders‘ general meetings must not only be 
announced but where any proposal is overruled at the meeting, a full text of the legal opinion 
regarding the proposal must also be disclosed.
232
 The rules also prescribe a list of transactions 
that ChiNext companies are required to disclose, but this is not non-exhaustive as the 
Exchange can include the transactions it deems appropriate.
233
 Disclosure is especially 
required where such transactions have reached the thresholds stated in the ChiNext Rules.
234
 
For example, the granting of guarantees, a historic method of expropriation of value, is now 
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subject to timely disclosure after the board of directors has considered the transaction. The 
2009 Rules prescribe the monetary threshold at which the company must guarantee 
transactions that must be submitted to the shareholders‘ meeting for review.235 The disclosure 
obligations will not apply where the transactions between a listed company and controlled 
subsidiary are included in the consolidated financial statement or transactions between its 
subsidiaries.
236
 
In order to promote transparency of the shareholdings of controlling shareholders and 
that of directors, supervisors and senior management, the 2009 Rules require timely 
disclosure of both changes in equity holdings, share incentive plans and acquisitions on a 
timely basis. Thus, the annual report must contain details of such items for the year ended. 
The scheme must be in accordance with the Regulations on Option Incentives of Listed 
Companies (Trial) issued by the CSRC.
237
 The rules do not prescribe any maximum or 
minimum requirement, but schemes are subject to the approval of the CSRC.
238
 
 
D. Mandatory Disclosures and Independent Opinions 
In accordance with the general theme of self-disciplining directors, supervisors, senior 
management, de facto controllers, controlling shareholders and sponsors have obligations to 
make disclosures to the Exchange and market, either individually or as a group. 
 
                                                 
235
 Rule 9.11 of ChiNext Rules. 
236
 Rule 9.16 of ChiNext Rules. 
237
 Rule 11.9.1 of ChiNext Rules. 
238
 Rule 11.9.4 of ChiNext Rules. 
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1. Controlling Shareholders and de Facto Controllers 
Controlling shareholders and de facto controllers must disclose direct or beneficial 
interests that amount to 5% of the total outstanding shares of the company.
239
 For every 
incremental increase or decrease of 1% point, they must disclose their direct or beneficial 
interest.
240
 The company must be notified so that it can release a cautionary announcement. 
The onus falls on the board of directors of the company to report to the Exchange and make 
an announcement where a shareholder or de facto controller fails to do so.
241
 Failure to 
comply by either of the parties may lead to disciplinary action under the ChiNext Rules. 
Controlling shareholders and de facto controllers also have disclosure obligations in the event 
of a takeover or the acquisition of their holdings in the company. However, as will be seen in 
the later chapters, there remains little opportunity for such transactions for a number of 
reasons, including a limited market for control on ChiNext. 
2. Directors, Supervisors and Senior Management Disclosures 
In keeping with the overarching Listing Rules of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
directors, supervisors and senior managers bear the onus of declaring their interests in the 
company.
242
 Such interests include direct and indirect shareholdings in the company, 
disciplinary actions imposed by the Exchange, training received in the securities business and 
other positions held in the previous five years. This last requirement goes toward to ensuring 
their professional suitability and there is, of course, little guarantee that the responsibilities of 
the post match the work experience. 
                                                 
239
 Rule 11.8.1. Further detailed disclosure obligations for acquisitions are provided under Securities Law and 
paragraphs 16 to 22 of the Measures on the Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies. 
240
 Rule 11.8.3 of ChiNext Rules. 
241
 Rule 11.8.9 of ChiNext Rules. 
242
 Rule 3 of ChiNext Rules. 
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There is also a catchall provision that requires the disclosure of other matters that 
must be declared.
243
 Prior to IPO, directors, supervisors and senior managers are obliged to 
inform the Exchange of any newly acquired shares, which are then locked up; i.e., trading is 
restricted in those shares for a specified period of time.
244
 Shares held by directors and 
officers are deemed important and, therefore, they are meant to report to the Exchange 
through their board secretary or the securities affair representative in a timely manner. 
 
3. Board Secretary Disclosure Obligations 
The secretary is responsible for corporate disclosures, which involves ensuring an 
appropriate management system for disclosures.
245
 Conversely, the secretary is responsible 
for ensuring that inside information remains confidential, which also includes identifying 
those with access to inside information. If such information leaks, the board secretary has a 
duty under the ChiNext framework to directly inform the Exchange and then make the 
relevant announcement in a timely manner.
246
 Moreover, the secretary‘s duties do not end 
with compliance; he or she must also monitor media coverage of the company to ascertain if 
reports are true or false, and then advise the board of directors to respond to the Exchange in 
a timely manner.
247
 
 
4. Independent Director Opinions 
Independent directors must provide the market with their independent opinion on the 
selection, appointment and dismissal of directors, the employment and dismissal of senior 
                                                 
243
 Rules 3.1.2 of ChiNext Rules. 
244
 Rule 3.1.10 of ChiNext Rules. They are also known as ‗restricted shares‘. 
245
 Rule 3.2.2(1) of ChiNext Rules. 
246
 Rule 3.2.2(4) of ChiNext Rules. 
247
 Rule 3.2.2(5) of ChiNext Rules. This appears to assume that the secretary is not proactive in this duty but 
reactive in that it is a response to an inquiry by the Exchange. Arguably, this is no more onerous than on AIM or 
NASDAQ, except for the fact that it has been made an express duty.    
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executives and the remuneration of director and senior executives. To effectively carry out 
this responsibility among others, the ChiNext Rules provide independent directors with rights 
of information and working conditions similar to those of directors of the company.
248
 
Neither the company nor the relevant personnel must refuse, obstruct, conceal or interfere 
with the independent director‘s performance of his role.249 This is of particular significance 
when considered that, according to the 2002 Code, the main role of independent directors is 
to represent the interests of minority shareholders and to ensure that their legitimate rights are 
not encroached on by either the directors and officers or controlling shareholders and de facto 
controllers. Compared to UK and US independent directors, the obligations of those in China, 
especially on ChiNext, are more far-reaching.
250
 Moreover, responsibility is on individual 
terms and not on collective terms, as is the case in the UK and the US where independent 
directors are not required to individually issue reports on certain operational matters of the 
company and its board of directors or when the independent director considers there to be 
potential damage to the interests of minority shareholders. 
5. Sponsors’ Independent Opinions 
Where necessary, sponsors must also submit their independent opinions to the 
Exchange on any ad hoc report in which the company has disclosed matters on fund raising, 
related party transactions, trustee investment and external guarantees.
251
 Sponsors are obliged 
to review information before or after submission to the Exchange.
252
 This is an interesting 
addition, given that the UK‘s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) corporate governance 
system, in reality, substitutes the role of secretary with the role of sponsor. Thus, the ChiNext 
                                                 
248
 Rule 3.1.15 of ChiNext Rules. 
249
 Rule 3.1.15 of ChiNext Rules. 
250
 See Fu, Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Governance in China, (2010). 
251
 Rule 4.8 of ChiNext Rules. Submission must be within 10 business days of the publication of the ad hoc 
report.    
252
 Rule 4.7 of ChiNext Rules. 
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framework provides for both an active board secretary and a proactive sponsor, thereby 
adding another layer of corporate governance scrutiny. 
 
V. Evaluative Summary 
Despite the above being the basic corporate governance framework of listed 
companies in China, ChiNext‘s framework differs in its emphasis on robust internal 
governance coupled with the mandatory disclosures and independent opinions discussed 
above. The internal trouble shooting and compliance mechanisms of ChiNext‘s regulatory 
framework fall on independent directors, board secretaries and the sponsors. Consequently, 
the traditional corporate governance mechanisms of the shareholders‘ general meetings, the 
Executive Board and the Supervisory Board seemingly have a more passive corporate 
governance role to play, despite their clearly stated internal governance obligations under 
Company Law.Two possible reasons account for these traditional mechanisms not being 
afforded more robust corporate governance roles under the legislative framework. One is that, 
because Company Law prescribes in detail the role of each of these mechanisms, the CSRC 
(and the Exchange) have either actively decided not to expand upon or perceive the fact that 
the existing abundance of secondary and tertiary legislation needs no augmentation.
253
 A 
second reason is that the board of directors and supervisory board perpetuated most of the 
mistakes and weaknesses of listed companies that Zhu Rongji was keen for China to avoid 
repeating on ChiNext.
254
 The focus on independent non-executives, board secretary and 
sponsors does not diminish the underlying perception embedded in Company Law and listing 
regulations of the conflict between shareholders and directors. Instead, it attempts to provide 
                                                 
253
 For instance, Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies 2001, Rules on Shareholders‘ Meetings of 
Listed Companies 2006, and Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies 2006. 
254
 See Zhu Rongji, ―Zhu Rongji: Wanshan fengxian jizhi, jianli chuangyeban gushi [Improve the Risk 
Mechanism, Establish a Growth Enterprise Market],‖ Government. Renminwang (People‟s Daily), (3 June, 
2001), url: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20010306/409798.html. 
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ChiNext regulators with readily identifiable parties that it would expect to have access to 
information about the company that is the board secretary and the sponsor. Arguably, some 
inspiration for the strengthenening of the board secretary role and the enhanced obligatiosn of 
the sponsor appear to be from the Hong Kong listed company system.  
Equally, false accounting scandals such as Yin Guangxia and Hainan Qiongmin, 
among many others, have laid testimony to the limitations of the supervisory board corporate 
governance function.
255
 The debate arises because the supervisory board is largely seen as 
handicapped because it is made up of shareholder nominees and employees who have 
historically failed to be independent of and effectively monitor the board, which was subject 
to the control of the controllers. Moreover, there has historically being no requirement for 
supervisors to be financially adept since an important remit is to review corporate financial 
reports. However, it must be stressed that these circumstances and conclusions have largely 
arisen from research into SOEs and not privately controlled listed companies, as undertaken 
in this research. 
On ChiNext, the objective of internal control systems is to ensure the effectiveness 
and result of business activities, and the Measures goes into some detail about how this 
should be set out. Internal control systems are divided into the internal management controls 
and the internal accounting controls. Instead, the Measures oblige the company, and, in effect, 
the board of directors and the board of supervisors, in order to implement an effective system 
of internal control.
256
 The system must reasonably guarantee that the company‘s financial 
report is reliable and that the company operates in accordance with the law, that it is 
operationally effective and that its results are such that a registered auditor has provided an 
opinion without reservation. Thus, although the dual board does not have detailed 
                                                 
255
 For a summary of these cases, see China Securities Regulatory Commission, ―Zhongguo ziben shichang 
fazhan baogao [Report on the Development of China‘s Capital Markets]‖ (China Securities and Regulatory 
Commission, 2008), url: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/yjzx/cbwxz/ebook/index.htm. 
256
 Paragraph 21 of ChiNext Measures.    
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responsibilities under the ChiNext framework, they still carry the main responsibility for 
corporate governance at a strategic level. 
Thus under the ChiNext framework independent directors, the board secretary and 
sponsors of the company take on corporate governance responsibilities on an operational 
level. Whether this translates in reality is another matter as will be discussed later in this 
thesis. The figure below represents the internal governance system (excluding the sponsors) 
imposed under the ChiNext framework. 
 
Figure 4: Internal governance structure of companies listed under the ChiNext framework 
 
 
 
The ChiNext framework, however ambitious, cannot increase the confidence of the 
equity markets in independent directors. There remains a persisting lack of confidence in the 
‗independence‘ and ‗effectiveness‘ of independent directors. With no seemingly clear way of 
judging their actual effectiveness, negative performance and violations of the law, when 
publicised, are used as the benchmark for evaluating their contribution. 
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The enhanced role of the board secretary mirrors the UK and Hong Kong style of 
board secretary, whose duties extend beyond the administrative duties of keeping accurate 
records and ensuring appropriate and timely disclosures. The ChiNext framework now 
propels the Chinese board secretary role firmly into the realm of Chinese corporate 
governance by obliging them to ensure proper resources for directors, especially independent 
directors. The board secretary now has rights of access to information that otherwise can only 
be obtained by the chairman, chief executive or legal representative of the company. Thus, 
both internally and externally, the role of the board secretary has been enhanced on ChiNext. 
It does, however, stop short of the advisory role that the board secretary has in the UK, Hong 
Kong and US systems. A key issue remains as to how to measure the effectiveness of the 
board secretary on ChiNext.
257
 
In terms of enforcement, the CSRC takes prominence, followed by the Exchange. The 
CSRC, through its IPO Review Panel, decides which companies to approve. Tellingly, the 
requirement for companies to be in the process, at least, of improving their corporate 
governance lends the CSRC a lot of discretion over and above the financial requirement 
regarding reasons for rejections. In terms of exit from the market prior to their revision of the 
ChiNext Rules in 2012, the CSRC was responsible for delisting companies. However, there 
was no clear procedure for final exit. Moreover, corporate governance was not one of the key 
reasons for delisting. The detail of the revised delisting rules importantly permit delisting 
based on corporate governance breaches by the Exchange and not the CSRC. These are two 
of the key changes in enforcement focus examined later in Chapter Six. 
                                                 
257
 See V. Board Secretary‖ on page 229. This is a wider question that relates to the broader role of the company 
secretary.  
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Finally, the ChiNext framework lays emphasis on identifying members of 
management responsible for different aspects of corporate governance practice in listed 
companies. 
In essence, the achievement of the ChiNext framework remains the complete 
restructuring of the management structure of SMEs listed on ChiNext, those applying for 
listing and those aspiring for the day. For example, CSMEs prior to listing have operational 
(as opposed to figurehead) boards of directors, independent directors and even audit 
committees. The years following the enactment of Securities Law in 1998 also saw a focus on 
encouraging and developing internal management control of China‘s listed enterprises.258 In 
2001, China acceded to the World Trade Organisation and adopted the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance to improve corporate governance of its listed enterprises. The listed 
enterprises, being the most exposed to global investors and therefore global scrutiny, were 
and continue to be the focus of corporate governance reform. This was demonstrated by the 
flurry of corporate governance legislation that led up to China‘s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation. Spurred by the positive momentum of WTO membership, bold market-
orientated corporate governance reform was initiated and implemented. The implementation 
of independent boards of directors and the adoption of the OECD Principles were examples.
 
That year, the Establishment of the System of Independent Directors in Listed Companies 
Guiding Opinions was issued. Unlike the OECD Principles upon which the Corporate 
Governance of Listed Companies Code (the ‗Code‘) is based, the Code provides, as 
mandatory basic principles of corporate governance, a basic code of conduct and professional 
ethics (moral standards) for directors, supervisors, managers and other executives in listed 
                                                 
258
 Liu Junhai, Modern Securities Law, (2011). 
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companies.
259
 It was announced in 2011 that the Code was to be updated to reflect changes in 
domestic legislation and international best practice of the last decade.
260
  
In terms of the internal controls system which forms and integral part of corporate 
goverance and corporate reporting, the ChiNext framework adopts a mix of prescriptive 
approach and principle-based approach in its provisions. To some extent it builds on the The 
Basic Standard for Internal Control (the ―Basic Standard‖)261which sets out the basic 
standards an enterprise (listed or otherwise) should adopt in relation to internal controls, 
internal environments, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication 
and internal supervision.However, it the extent to which companies actively comply with this 
standard and whether or not it is enforced remains unclear. Notably, neither Code nor the 
Basic Standard adopts a ―comply or explain‖ approach even though they each have voluntary 
and principle-based provisions of corporate governance that effectively allow a modicum of 
discretion in compliance.
262
 As will be seen in later chapters, despite the ChiNext framework 
being prescriptive in internal governance, there is considerable variation in corporate 
                                                 
259
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in China: Self-Assessment by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (Paris: OECD Publications Service, 2011): 16. 
260
 Ibid., 22. 
261
 Jointly issued on 22 June 2008 by the Ministry of Finance, the CSRC, the National Audit Office, China 
Banking Regualatory Commission and China Insurance Regulatory Commission. It came into effect on 1 July 
2009 for listed companies, and represents an attempt to introduce basic and uniform corporate reporting across 
all industries and capital markets. There has since been further tertiary legislation to improve internal control 
reporting, which can be found listed on the CSRC‘s website: www.csrc.gov.cn. 
262 From a UK perspective comply and explain inherently assumes and requires the existence of a shared belief 
on what is good corporate governance. This may be the challenge that the regulatory authorities in China may 
have in creating, even though they have taken the first step in creating uniformity as demonstrated by the 
introduction of the Basic Standard. Indeed in the UK this uniformity or shared understanding is widely referred 
to as understanding the "spirit of the Code". It also requires a uniformity of approach in regulations and 
enforcement by regulatory authorities. For a discussion of variations in regulatory approaches to corporate 
reporting and disclosures in China, see Miao Yanjuan, ―Yingmei shangshi gongsi nekong xinxi pilu zhidu dui 
wo guo de qushi (The Enlightenment of the Institutions for Public Companies Internal Control Disclosure from 
UK and US).‖ (In an analysis of tertiary legislation and other rules, Miao finds that in relation to corporate 
reporting and enforcement the regulatory authorities take different approaches to the same matters. For instance, 
for internal controls both Stock Exchanges adopt a principle-based approach while the CSRC adopts a 
prescriptive approach. Equally, the have varying requirements regarding the production of internal audit reports: 
Shanghai requires a certified public account‘s report, while Shenzhen only require the supervisory board and/or 
independent director to report.). 
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reporting on for instance cumulative voting, use of proxies, issue of third party guarantees 
and related party transactions. The ChiNext framework itself overwhelming operates a 
mandatory corporate internal governance and control and corporate reporting regime. 
However, it cross refers to the Code and other relevant legislation which are not mandatory. 
Also, tellingly, none of the regulatory decisions of the CSRC or the Exchange make reference 
to the standard.  
 
Closing remarks 
The underlying assumption of the ChiNext framework presumes that companies to be 
listed on ChiNext will have a separation of ownership and control to some degree. To some 
extent, the enhancement of the board secretary role attempts to mirror the role of the 
company secretary in the UK in particular, where there are separate responsibilities to 
constituents of the board that must be balanced with executive responsibilities. Evidently, the 
ChiNext framework appears to be well prepared to specifically deal with the mistakes and 
weaknesses in corporate governance practice on China‘s stock market in the last 18 years 
before the establishment of the ChiNext in 2009. 
As well as prescribing an internal governance structure with enforcing mechanisms, 
the preceding chapter demonstrated that the ChiNext framework implicitly proposes that the 
bases of good corporate governance for the market consist of controlling conflicts of interest 
among corporate constituencies. In terms of ownership, two conflicts may arise. Firstly, a 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. Here, management of the company 
may be in conflict with a controlling shareholder, large shareholders or minority shareholders. 
Secondly, a conflict of interest may arise between shareholders; that is, conflict between 
different constituencies of shareholders for different reasons. Controlling shareholders may 
act self-interestedly to the detriment of minority shareholders or conflict may arise between 
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two or more equally large shareholders. To this end, the framework prescribes mechanisms to 
restrain both management and controlling shareholders, to protect both shareholders and the 
public, as well as to enhance transparency and disclosure to ensure continued investment and 
stability in the market. It also prescribes a uniform internal governance structure and 
mechanisms to enhance or enforce compliance, which will be examined in the next chapter. 
As described in the preceding chapter, China‘s version of the shareholder-orientated 
system renders the shareholder general meeting the supreme decision-making organ in both 
theory and practice. Understanding the profile and dynamics of the ownership structure of 
Chinese companies is especially important, given the pervasive powers that such ownership 
has in superseding the board of directors. As stated in the previous chapter, the shareholders‘ 
meeting is the highest organ of the company, being more powerful than shareholders‘ 
meetings under the UK and US systems.
263
 China‘s two-tier board, comprising the Executive 
Board and the Supervisory Board, in both theory and practice is subordinate to the 
shareholders‘ general meeting, and is effectively subordinate to whomever potentially 
controls or greatly influences that general meeting. 
With this in mind, the next chapter examines the shareholder patterns, the role of 
different types of shareholder and the implications for corporate governance practice for 
ChiNext listed companies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
263
 This is because China‘s Company Law was introduced to ensure that the state, specifically as owner or 
controlling shareholder, retained key decision-making and veto powers. These rules apply generically to all 
joint-stock companies (‗JSC‘). This is not to say that the board does not have its own powers and the leeway to 
use others.   
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Chapter Three - Private Ownership and Corporate Governance 
Practice on ChiNext 
The preceding chapter demonstrated that, in essence, the ChiNext framework 
generally purports to deal with conflicts of interest from an agent-principal relationship 
perspective: between managers and shareholders and between the controlling shareholders 
and other shareholders. However, the effectiveness of any legal and regulatory framework 
depends on the issues it intends to deal with. Indeed, the agency issues that arise in practice 
tend to be determined by the type of ownership structure in a company; that is, whether it is 
concentrated or dispersed.
264
 
 This chapter, thus, presents the ownership structure of ChiNext and examines the role 
its constituents play in corporate governance. As the first step in this thesis in ascertaining 
corporate governance practice on ChiNext, this chapter will ascertain the extent to which 
shareholders of ChiNext listed companies engage in the governance of company. Divided 
into five sections, Section I examines who controls ChiNext listed companies, and includes 
identifying trends in share ownership based on a survey of the first 40 companies listed on 
ChiNext. Section II identifies and analyses the prevalent types of non-controlling controlling 
shareholders in the surveyed companies. Section III analyses the extent to which shareholders 
in CSMEs engage in company decision-making, and, importantly, assesses whether they 
protect themselves by being a check on controlling shareholders. Section IV presents an 
evaluative summary of the findings of the chapter. 
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 J. C. Coffee Jr, ―The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of 
Ownership and Control,‖ Yale Lj 111 (2001). 
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I. Who Controls ChiNext Companies? Trends in Share Ownership on ChiNext 
The section aims to identify trends and examine the role of controlling shareholders in 
corporate governance. A quantitative approach based on China‘s Company Law has been 
adopted. China‘s Company Law offers a two-pronged approach for identifying the 
‗controlling shareholder‘ of a listed company. It may be: 
…a shareholder whose shareholdings accounts for more than 50% of the total 
equity of a company limited by shares or a shareholder whose…shareholdings account for 
less than 50% but who holds the voting rights on the strength of its…shareholdings that 
are enough to have significant influence over resolutions of…the shareholders‘ general 
meeting.
265
 
Both approaches may be referred to as the ‗50 % rule‘ and the ‗significant influence 
rule‘, respectively. The overall Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listing Rules 2008266 (‗SZ Rules‘) 
and the Measures for Regulating Takeovers of Listed Companies 2006 both mirror Company 
Law, but with both providing a nuanced approach.
267
 This thesis adopts the significant rule 
approach. For the empirical purpose of identifying trends in controlling share ownership, a 
controlling shareholder is deemed as having significant influence over resolutions of the 
shareholders‘ general meetings if an individual or group acting in concert controls or 
exercises directly or indirectly over 20 % of the total voting rights of a company.
268
 Indeed, 
many companies incorporated in China have controlling shareholders with over 50 % of the 
voting shares in practice. Of course, wholly state-owned companies remain the exception and 
                                                 
265
 Article 217(2) of Company Law. The quote from Company Law has been edited to include only the 
provisions regarding joint stock companies, and to exclude those for limited liability companies. It is not clear 
whether the holding must be direct or an aggregate of direct and indirect holdings in the company. 
266
 See Rule 81 Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listing Rules 2008.  
267
 They each have four or five individual criteria to judge who is a ‗controlling shareholder‘, including one that 
gives discretion to the CSRC and stock exchanges to determine who might be one.  
268
 Although it appears arbitrary in itself, it reflects the average minimum required to retain control just in case 
the rest of the block holders decide to unite their holdings in a fight for corporate control.   
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are dwindling in number.
269
 This also applies to CSMEs, with the average percentage of 
control of voting rights at 40.34% falling well below the 50% rule. The table below illustrates 
constituents of controlling shareholders in the first 40 companies listed on ChiNext. 
 
Table 1: Survey of emerging trends in controlling share ownership trends of first 40 companies listed on ChiNext (the 
„surveyed companies‟) as of 31 December 2009. 
 
As a representative snapshot of controlling share ownership on ChiNext, and 
unprecedentedly, the private sector overwhelmingly dominates one of China‘s equity markets 
with 82.50% of listed companies having private controlling shareholders. Family control 
dominates, closely followed by individuals and affiliated groups of individuals acting in 
                                                 
269
 Liu Junhai notes that this requirement has less application in judging ownership of joint stock companies, 
and remains mostly a legacy from the last Company Law. Thus, the 50% rule symbolises a legacy from the 
1980s when the state used the rule to assess ownership amongst state actors. See Liu Junhai, Xin gongsifa de 
zhidu chuangxin: lifa zhengdian yu jieshi nandian (Institutional Innovations of New Corporate Law: Legislative 
and Judicial Controversies), Di 1 ban (Beijing Shi: Fal  chubanshe, 2006). 
270
 Refers to two or more individuals acting in concert so as to effectively control the company as one block of 
controlling shareholding.  
 
Percentage of 
surveyed by 
category of 
shareholder 
Highest 
percentage 
controlling 
block 
Average 
percentage 
holding in 
category  
Family 40.00% 67.93 44.23 
Individual  27.50% 62.77 33.68 
Affiliated individuals
 270 15.00% 48.17 31.8 
State-private ventures 12.50% 63.85 42.41 
State only 5.00% 51.12 49.57 
Overall average for surveyed companies 40.34 
 
Source: Author‟s survey and analysis     
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concert at 40%, 27.50% and 12.50%, respectively; the state follows with state-private 
ventures at 12.50% and state-owned enterprises at only 5%.   
The following sections present case studies to provide insight into corporate governance 
practice in the order of their dominance on ChiNext, namely families, individuals, affiliated 
groups and the state, sub-divided into state-private ventures and state-only controlling 
shareholders. 
 
A. Family Ownership 
 On ChiNext, as illustrated above in Section I, the family as controlling shareholder is 
the largest form of ownership on ChiNext. It is also the fastest growing form of ownership. 
As well as being the most common form of ownership among surveyed CSMEs, families also, 
on average, have the highest controlling holdings at 40.00%.
271
 This is also only second to 
state-ownership in having the highest average control of voting rights at 44.57%, with the 
highest incidence of control at 67.93%. This can be compared to the state sub-groups with 
49.57% and 51.12%, respectively. This may be attributed to the prevalence of two or more 
family members as shareholders. Family share ownership patterns on ChiNext include 
combinations of spouses, parent-child(ren), siblings and extended family, in order of 
prevalence. Husband and wife partnerships, otherwise referred to as the ‗husband-wife army‘ 
(fuqibing), due to their closeness and the resultant closed nature of their decision-making, are 
the most common pattern of family ownership in the sample and are, therefore, chosen as a 
typical case study below. Parent and child(ren) combinations represent the second most 
common, and are the most inclined toward an internal governance structure that reflects the 
Confucian family value of filial piety in terms of hierarchy and loyalty. 
                                                 
271
 See Table 1 on page 107. 
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On ChiNext, each member of the family has his or her own direct holdings, in 
addition to holdings that may be jointly held through a special purpose vehicle. Parents have 
controlling or larger holdings, while the children have similar holdings, with the elder child 
having slightly more and so forth, in hierarchical order. Thus, there appears to be a sense of 
hierarchy even in share ownership that may not necessarily reflect capital contributions as 
provided for under Company Law. Sometimes, parents do not partake in the management of a 
company. Finally, sibling controlling shareholders commonly occur between brothers. 
 
Case study: Husband and Wife Partnerships 
Case study 1: The Husband and wife „army‟ (fuqibing) – Beijing Toread Outdoor Products Co. Ltd. 
Beijing Toread Outdoor Products Co. Ltd. (‗Toread‘) illustrates a typical husband and 
wife partnership of direct ownership coupled with direct governance and management. 
Toread designs, manufactures and retails camping and outdoor equipment, mainly for China's 
domestic market. An innovative private enterprise start-up, established in January 1999, it 
converted to a joint stock company in August 2008 in preparation for listing on ChiNext. 
Typical to many private start-ups in China, prior to IPO, Toread was initially entirely 
privately financed by private individuals, and was then subsequently supported by a few 
short-term loans from banks. The figure below presents a snapshot of the share ownership 
structure of the controlling shareholders of Toread, identifying the pre-IPO investors in grey. 
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Figure 5: Husband and wife family controlling shareholders of Beijing Toread Out ownership structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s analysis 
 
The above figure illustrates that, as of 31 December 2009 (post IPO in 2009), Shen 
and Wang, husband and wife, respectively directly held 31.77% and 14.25% of the voting 
rights in Toread. Together they controlled 46.02%. They count individually as the top two 
block holders, with the remaining eight of the ten top block holdings ranging in descending 
order from 7.86% to 1.18%, amounting to 23.78% of the total voting rights of Toread. The 
remaining 13 pre-IPO subscribers together hold 4.83%. Several thousands of different types 
of investor comprise the 25.37% held by the public, with the majority being individuals. 
Several potential governance issues arise in Toread‘s ownership structure. Primarily, 
these comprise issues of checks and balances on the power and influence of this husband-
Wang Jing (wife) 
Director, Head of 
Technology 
19 private 
individuals 
Beijing Toread Outdoor Products Co, Ltd  
Shares held by 
the public on 
IPO 
Shen Faqiang 
(husband), 
Chairman/ 
CEO/Legal 
Representative 
20.75% 
46.02% 
14.25% 31.77% 
Leading Capital 
Fortune Ltd 
(NED, Supervisor) 
 
Mix of private 
individuals and 
SPVs  
25.37% 7.86
% 
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wife team as a controlling block holding. Together, they not only have controlling voting 
rights but also potentially exercise significant influence over the executive board and 
operational management. For instance, Shen concurrently holds the posts of chairman, 
general manager and legal representative. Therefore, he can individually, or acting with his 
wife, dominate shareholders‘ meetings and influence constituents on the supervisory board; 
he can also dominate the executive board as chairman and operational management as CEO. 
As legal representative of Toread, certain activities such as litigation in the name of the 
company cannot be undertaken without his agreement, so the abovementioned provisions 
regarding the ability of the company to litigate a violation of its articles can potentially be 
defeated if he is not in agreement. This gives him, as an individual, pervasive power and 
influence over every aspect of the company, and all backed by the assumption of key 
statutory roles as well as holding controlling voting rights. 
Consolidating power and influence in the family, Wang also acts as executive director 
and head of technology controls. As an executive director, she poses a counterbalance to 
other executive and non-executives on the board, thereby strategically enabling mutual 
support in decision-making on the executive board. Her role as head of technology 
importantly controls access to price-sensitive and key information about the entire business. 
Thus, the division of business acumen and key technical skills between the husband and wife 
strategically enables them to retain control of all key internal management and control 
mechanisms as well as the supply of information. Toread has endeavoured and succeeded in 
maintaining a relatively simple and transparent share ownership structure, particularly by its 
controlling shareholders. It does not have a controlling pyramidal structure which avoids the 
main concerns related to pyramids such as self-dealing and opaque related party transaction. 
There is also relative transparency regarding the investors that employ special purpose 
vehicles such as Leading Capital Fortune Limited in the figure above. 
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In terms of the internal governance structure, although Shen and Wang monopolise 
the key strategic positions, most of the top ten shareholders in the company either sit as  
directors on the executive board or have been appointed as (deputy) managers. The company 
does have an empowered supervisory board because Leading Capital Fortune Limited has a 
supervisor representative appointed. This is in addition to the Moreover; under certain 
restrictive circumstances the articles of association expressly prohibit Toread from making 
external investments, sales or mortgages or pledge of its assets, third- party guarantees and 
certain related party transactions. The express inclusion of not only provisions under 
Company Law but also regulations issued by the CSRC and the Exchange in the articles 
means that action can be brought by the company for violation of its articles. 
 Notwithstanding this, as a family, they appear keen to emphasise their recognition of 
international corporate governance standards as testified by the fact that the board secretary is 
a UK chartered certified accountant who also holds the key role of head of finance.272 The 
balance provided here of having a chartered professional as board secretary reassures that he 
will carry out his legal responsibilities for ensuring the circulation of information, especially 
to independent directors and the supervisory board, and regulatory disclosure of price-
sensitive information. This plays some part in attracting institutional investors in the 
secondary market. As a typical husband and wife family business, the equity structure also 
reflects the fact that equity financing was primarily sourced from private non-financial 
institutions, specifically from private individuals, which Shen refers to as ‗partners‘ in his 
introduction about the company. Four individual pre-IPO subscriber shareholders have 
maintained their investments in the company from the time of IPO to the publication of the 
company‘s 2012 annual report. Noticeably, the institutional shareholders figured in the top 
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ten holdings have changed in each annual report, demonstrating a lack of medium to long-
term investment strategy in maintaining large investments. Conclusively, it is worth 
mentioning that the fact that Toread has not been the subject of any violation, or legal or 
regulatory disciplinary action and the constant inflow and outflow of large institutional 
investments testifies to the robustness of its corporate governance so far. 
 
Insights and Analysis of Family Ownership 
A few brief insights and analyses can be made that will be expanded upon in the 
evaluation section of this chapter and other parts of this thesis. Firstly, and as will be 
indicated in the other case studies, related party transactions occur frequently in privately 
controlled listed companies. Secondly, pyramidal holding structures in the surveyed 
companies were rare. Finally, although Confucian ethics of filial piety do not apply to 
husband-wife familial relations, they do apply to the other types, e.g., between parent-child, 
siblings, and extended family to some extent. This has implications for issues of 
entrenchment. 
Firstly, the surveyed companies all displayed a clear rationale for the division of 
power and position among family members, striking a balance between ownership and 
control. In family-controlled companies on ChiNext, clear allocations of power and authority 
through appointments exist between family members. These divisions do not necessarily 
reflect the individual shareholdings of family members.
273
 
Secondly, in terms of how they hold their interests, more than half of family-owned 
companies hold shares through special purpose vehicles. However, problems attached to the 
use of special purposes vehicles (‗SPVs‘) by individuals and families arise where there is an 
absence of full disclosure of ownership. Of course, this problem is not limited to the use of 
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SPVs and remains a problem even in direct holdings, with some personages holding shares 
on behalf of others.
274
 Undisclosed shareholding potentially affects the reliability of related 
Party transaction identification and related disclosures, especially because of the enormity of 
its incidence. Failure to identify beneficial interests is directly linked to the problem of the 
rumoured insider trading, especially prior to IPO. The issue of insider trading is examined as 
a key challenge of ChiNext in the chapter on key challenges. 
Parent-child and even sibling controlling ownership structures potentially present less 
risk, but more so where stronger Confucian filial piety applies rather than in situations of 
marriage. Again, as previously demonstrated, it appears that personal relationship 
management and negotiations account for continued investment by individual investors, 
either as direct subscribers or indirect investors through an SPV - the majority of whom are 
again undisclosed, as in the previous case study. 
It bears noting here that the family and individual controlling shareholdings examined 
below have been treated as distinct for two reasons. Family and individual shareholdings 
have been distinguished from one another on the basis of two main points. Only individuals 
within the top ten shareholders of a company have been counted in the individual catagory, 
and, secondly, such individuals must be distinct from a family in having no relation on the 
executive board, supervisory board or in senior management.
275
 Most importantly, these two 
groups merit distinction specifically in the Chinese context because of the different impacts 
that social norms may have on a family compared to an individual. For instance, the Chinese 
family has rules that may act in much the same way as an internal governance system such as 
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filial constraints.
276
 Conversely, individuals have no such familial constraints but may be 
subject to constraints arising from ‗relationships‘, that is, guanxi, which plays an important 
role in the funding of privately controlled companies. 
 
B. Individual Controlling Shareholder 
As demonstrated in Section I, 27.50% of surveyed CSMEs have individuals as 
controlling shareholders.
277
 Individual controlling shareholders founded their businesses 
either as a start-up or acquired them from the state by privatisation. Individual controlling 
shareholders exercise control over appointments and removals from the executive board and 
the supervisory board, as well as senior management and management decision-making. 
In the surveyed companies, there was no separation of ownership and control as 
already indicated by the family ownership case study. In all surveyed companies with 
individual controlling shareholders, those shareholders held a combination of the multiple 
positions of chairman-CEO (or general manager or president), chairman-legal representative, 
or all three as chairman-CEO-legal representative. Consequently, individual controlling 
shareholders on ChiNext control not only the shareholders‘ meeting but also the board of 
directors, and partake in the operational management of the company. Furthermore, most 
individual controllers hold the majority of their shares directly in the company. Others hold 
shares indirectly through an SPV, or a holding company within a group of companies that he 
or she ultimately controls, resulting in pyramidal holding structures. 
 
Case study: Entrepreneur-founder 
Case study 2: Case study – Dinghan Tech Limited 
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 Later, in Chapter Six, it is argued that the Confucian tradition of xiaoshun (filial piety) plays an important 
role in family ownership and, therefore, has implications for corporate governance.   
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 See Table 1 on page 107. 
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Dinghan Tech Ltd., one of the most concentrated individual ownership structures in 
the companies surveyed, illustrates innovative corporate governance initiatives in relation to 
the composition of the executive board. Dinghan, one of China‘s successful hi-tech private 
start-ups, founded in June 2002 by Gu Qinwei, engages in the production, sales, installation, 
maintenance and research and development of power supply systems used in China‘s vast rail 
transit system. The company converted to a joint stock company in December 2007 with a 
view to listing. Below is a diagram of the composition of Dinghan‘s executive board. 
 
Figure 6: Beijing Dinghan Electric Technology Co. Ltd. ownership structure 
 
 
On IPO, and as of 31 December 2009, the largest block holder and controlling 
shareholder was Beijing Dinghan Electric Technology LLC (‗Electric‘), a company that 
supplies Dinghan with services, including the sales and distribution of spare parts, held 28.03% 
of the shares. Electric is, in turn, controlled by Gu, who holds 82.64% of its issued share 
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capital. Equally, as the second largest block holder in Dinghan, Gu directly holds 24.67%. 
Accordingly, he controls 52.70% % of Dinghan. 
 Gu controls the company through the shareholders‘ meeting by exercising all of its 
powers,
278
 including making amendments to the articles of association, since he holds more 
than one half of the issued share capital.
279
 The other three largest block holders after Gu hold 
7.01%, 2.52% and 2.38%, respectively. Although the senior management also hold shares, 
these holdings are on average under 2%. Neither other large shareholders nor shareholding 
members can individually or together act as a counterbalance to the controlling shareholder. 
Moreover, on IPO there were no venture capital or private equity investors in Dinghan. 
Nevertheless, several institutional investors that acquired shares from the market post IPO 
have relatively minor interests, with holdings ranging from 0.5% to 2%. As such, unlike 
many of the surveyed CSMEs, there is a lack of vested interest to spur on the monitoring of 
the company. Moreover, shares belonging to investors are free-floating, which means they 
were acquired on the secondary market. Consequently, investors can freely exercise their 
right to sell if dissatisfied with the performance or governance of Dinghan. The lack of 
venture capital investors and the low holdings of institutional investors may also indicate that 
there are no checks to Gu‘s control. 
An illustration of Gu‘s ability to control Dinghan is found in the report of the 
company‘s 2009 annual general meeting (‗AGM‘). Here, the voting rights represented at the 
meeting were 68.69 %, with ten shareholders attending in person, Gu and his SPV amounting 
to two of those shareholders with a controlling holding of 52.70%. At the 2010 AGM, the 
voting rights represented were 59.09% with six shareholders present, while at the 2011 AGM 
59.04% of voting rights were represented with only five shareholders present. Although 
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shareholder attendance of the annual shareholders‘ meeting has progressively diminished 
since IPO, this does not undermine the ability of the general meeting to be the forum of 
power as it merely reinforces the control of the controlling shareholder, that is, Gu. This 
control of the shareholders‘ meeting enables Gu to retain control over the company through 
his multiple roles as chairman, chief executive and legal representative. As chairman, Gu not 
only presides over the board meetings that convene shareholders‘ meetings but also has the 
authority to chair the shareholders‘ meetings himself. Additionally, he exercises the powers 
and remit expressed in Company Law, as well as those delegated by the executive board and 
in the articles of association. 
As with the previous case study, there is no separation of ownership and control in 
Dinghan, and this raises the question of who or what presents a check and balance against the 
controlling shareholder. It appears that shareholdings have been extended to key members of 
management in order to allay potential conflicts of interest between Gu and senior managers 
of the company. A high number of management personnel hold individual shareholdings of 
up to 2% so that their interests align with Gu‘s. The implementation in 2011 of an executive 
share incentive scheme provides further evidence of this governance strategy through 
incentives that align the interests of management with those of the controlling shareholder. 
The incentives of senior management are driven by the need to retain talent, especially since 
Dinghan operates in a hi-tech industry. Thus, any action by Gu, as either controlling 
shareholder or through his multiple roles with the company, that proves to be detrimental to 
existing senior management may result in them leaving due to the damage to their interests. 
 
Insight and Analysis 
Notwithstanding the above, where there are no venture capital investors or significant 
institutional investors, the key challenge of individual controlling ownership structures 
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remains. In such circumstances, the role of sponsor provided for under the ChiNext 
framework in advising and monitoring the company, and ultimately whistleblowing the 
company to regulators, is of significance. Chapter Five thus examines the effectiveness of the 
sponsor as a mechanism in corporate governance monitoring and enforcement on ChiNext. 
It is increasingly common on ChiNext for SPVs to be used by other investors as a 
convenient device for them to partake in a listed company without directly subscribing for 
shares. This raises the issue of transparency in ownership structures where these holdings 
remain undisclosed. 
 
C.  Affiliated Individuals as Controlling Shareholders 
In the surveyed companies, the size of holdings of unrelated persons acting in concert 
tends to be closely or evenly distributed with no one shareholder holding a majority of voting 
rights that gives control of the company. Here, they are referred to as ‗affiliated individuals‘ 
and tend to act pursuant to the articles of association, or a shareholder agreement or other 
undertaking. 
As noted above in Section I, they comprise 15.00% of the surveyed companies.
280
 
With the highest controlling holding at 48.17% and the average at 31.80%, this category of 
share ownership holds the lowest range of controlling blocks in any of the surveyed 
companies. Without the agreement to act in concert, all of these surveyed companies would 
otherwise be classified as widely dispersed companies with not one shareholder holding 20% 
or more of the total voting rights. 
In all of the surveyed companies, affiliated individuals hold their individual shares 
directly. A small number also hold shares together through a special purpose vehicle, but this 
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indirect holding is only in addition to holding their shares directly.
281
 One practical reason is 
that transparency remains crucial to ensure that none of them covertly takes control of the 
company or becomes a de facto controller without the knowledge of the other manager-
owners. Since, as shareholders, they must act as a consortium, it becomes imperative that 
each knows the total voting rights. In terms of board decisions, there does not appear to be 
any tacit agreement to act in concert. This reflects the fact that, to a large extent, their board 
positions within their agreements require them to act in concert.   
Most of these widely held ownership structures demonstrate that preference was given 
to employees during the privatisation process. This was perceived as the only way to 
overcome the problems, aptly described as ‗officials‘ fear of making political mistakes, 
managers‘ fear of losing power, and workers‘ fear of losing jobs‘.282 Whether private start-
ups or privatisations, the surveyed companies with no outright controlling shareholder each 
had all of the top or key shareholders agreeing to act in concert. 
 
Case study: Covenants to Act in Concert 
Case study 3: Wuhan Zhongyuan Huadian Science & Technology Co. Ltd. 
Wuhan Zhongyuan Huadian Science & Technology Co. Ltd (‗Zhongyuan‘) presents 
an example of more than two people acting in concert. It is also exemplary of the hi-tech and 
innovative SME that ChiNext was set up to assist in funding. It engages in the manufacture, 
sales and service of intelligent record analysis and time synchronisation products, which it 
also researches and develops. 
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 From the manner in which these SPVs were used, it may be surmised that it was a convenient mechanism for 
income by way of dividends to be accrued by SPV from the listed company. In turn, such dividend income by 
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which becomes significant because the ultimate investors already control one listed company.  
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The diagram below presents a snapshot of the top ten shareholders of Zhongyuan and 
their allotted roles in the internal governance of the company. 
 Figure 7: Multiple persons acting in concert - Wuhan Zhongyuan Huadian Science & Technology Co. Ltd. 
 
Source: Author‟s analysis 
 
Figure 7 shows that the top ten shareholders of Zhongyuan comprise nine individuals 
and one US venture capital investor, EZ Capital Inc., with individual shareholdings that range 
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from 3.74% to 9.00%. Consequently, no individual shareholder exercises control in terms of 
total voting rights, nor can they singly exercise the right under Company Law to requisition a 
shareholders‘ meeting since none of them holds 10% or more of the shares.283 
All of the seven highlighted in grey agreed to act in concert on matters put before the 
shareholders‘ meeting. 
 
Insights and Analysis 
They act in concert having entered into shareholder agreements, also referred to as 
subscriber agreements, present agreements on the capital structure, corporate governance, and 
ownership structure, purpose of the company and details of the rights and obligations of each 
participating shareholder. The agreements usually also detail cost sharing, liability for breach 
of contract and a process for dispute resolution. For corporate governance purposes, these 
shareholder agreements become important because, where there is a conflict between its 
terms and that of the articles of association of the company, the agreement takes precedence 
over the articles, unless to the detriment of an innocent party, presumably minority 
shareholders.
284
 
In line with other controlling shareholder types previously discussed, most, if not all, 
take an active role in the day-to-day management of the company by holding directorships 
and or management roles such as CEO or deputy CEO. Therefore, they have not only mutual 
protection in terms of shareholder meetings but also, to some degree, oversight and control of 
the day-to-day management of their investments. It does leave the question of protection of 
the other shareholders in the company. 
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D. State as Controlling Shareholder 
The state as controlling shareholder comes in two forms on ChiNext, and indeed on 
the other equity, either in a state-private partnership or where the state is the outright 
controlling shareholder. In this instance, this section presents a case study on state-private 
partnerships. 
 
1. State-private Partnerships 
State-private partnerships make up only 12.5% of the surveyed companies, with most 
of the partnerships existing between local government and individuals or families.
285
 The 
state may amount to a controlling shareholder regardless of how few of the voting rights it 
holds directly or indirectly, solely because of its sphere of significant influence where it 
enters into partnerships within the private sector. Sometimes the state has controlling interest 
in terms of the total voting rights it holds based on the 20% of voting rights threshold applied 
in this thesis. Other times, and more controversially, it holds equal or slightly less voting 
rights than its private sector partner, but because of its presumed and actual power and 
significant influence over resolutions of the shareholders‘ meeting and board of directors, it 
effectively becomes the controlling shareholder. 
 
2. State Ownership on ChiNext 
State ownership patterns are relatively transparent compared to private ownership 
structures in that they are readily traceable. This also applies to the 5% of surveyed 
companies that are effectively SOEs.
286
 Few SOEs with spin-offs have listed on ChiNext. 
This may be attributable to the fact that most such SOEs tend to be in old economy industries 
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and may find it difficult or are simply not interested in diversifying into technological 
development. 
The only two state-owned ChiNext companies, CISRI Gaona Co. Ltd. and Siasun 
Robot Co. Ltd. are directly owned and controlled by research and educational institutes, 
namely, by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the China Iron & Steel Research Institute 
Group, respectively. Education and research organisations dominate the SOEs listed on 
ChiNext because they can research and innovate products and services because of their 
intellectual resources. These organisations are located both at central and local government 
level. This also includes local branch affiliates of national level institutions as well as central 
and local government development agencies and commissions. The mechanisms for holding 
shares depend on the type of state-owned institution. State investment on ChiNext manifests 
itself in the guise of what may be broadly categorised as state-owned companies affiliated to 
central government state asset management bureaux, and state-owned companies directly 
controlled by local government.
287
 These are broad categories and subjective in so far as 
some SOEs may actually display characteristics belonging to both. When this occurs, the 
context and documents such as resolutions and websites help to ascertain the prominence of 
one characteristic over the other. 
A case study of a state-private partnership is presented below. 
 
Case Study: State-Private Joint Ventures 
Case study 4: Case study of board of directors on a state-private joint venture 
Lepu Medical Technology (Beijing) Co. Ltd. has five major shareholders and 
represents a unique ownership structure combining state and family ownership, in this case a 
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husband and wife combination. In this case study, both the state and private sector partner 
hold more than 20% of the total voting rights, and, thus, this presents an interest study on 
how the private partner protects its interests, and whether it or even the state can act as a 
mechanism to protect the investment interests of other shareholders. 
 
Figure 8: Lepu Medical Technology (Beijing) Co. Ltd. state and private joint venture ownership structure 
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The company has few minority shareholders. The Research Institute holds 28.92%, 
while Heavy Industry Development (Heavy Industry Science Investment Development Co. 
Ltd.) holds 18.53%. Both the institute and the limited company are wholly owned by China 
Shipbuilding Industry Corp., a large state-owned enterprise. As such, state authorisation for 
investment and capital management falls directly under the supervision of central government. 
The third major block holder is a foreign entity, Brook Investment Ltd., which holds 17.98% 
(an SPV of Warburg Picus, a US investment company); fourth is Pu Zhongjie with 14.89%; 
and last is WP Medical Technologies Inc. (‗WP Medical‘), another foreign entity, holding 
7.63%. Crucially, WP Medical is wholly owned by Pu Zhongjie and his wife Zhang Yue‘e. 
Thus, Pu in fact controls 22.52% of the total share capital. However, the state remains the 
ultimate owner, with 47.45% control of share capital. 
This means that the state ensures its control of the joint venture on three levels. First, 
with a controlling holding of 47.45%, it can control the AGM and, therefore, potentially the 
appointment of directors and supervisors. The second level of control relates to the board of 
directors. The third level of control is the board of supervisors, while the fourth relates to 
managers. However, Pu, with his own knowledge and expertise and the core technology used 
in the joint venture being held by WP Medical, potentially has control of the operational 
aspect of the business as a counterbalance to the state‘s control. 
The company‘s legal representative, Sun Jianke, appears to be neutral, which means 
that he is probably more likely to bow to pressure from the state. For Pu and non-state 
investors, the risk arises when their interests are not aligned with that of China Shipbuilding. 
Strategically, Pu has safeguarded his position by acquiring free-floating shares. Thus, in the 
event of a misalignment or conflict of interests he can freely sell his shares, subject to the 
usual timing and volume restrictions for the management of enterprises. However, in the 
meantime, Pu uses the same shares to bolster his position at shareholders‘ meetings. The 
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management structure is also well thought out as neither the state nor Pu is entrenched due to 
the appointment of a neutral person who is salaried in the position of legal representative. 
Moreover, Pu heads the research department of Lepu, which, to some extent, counterbalances 
the power of the legal representative. A positive element for governance is that Pu‘s interests 
are more aligned to those of the minority shareholders than to the state, which is ultimate 
owner, whom he is likely to monitor closely for changes in direction and policy. 
 
Insights and Analysis 
Overall, controlling state holdings on ChiNext tend to be through SPV rather than 
direct. Individuals and families who enter into state-private partnerships also mirror this 
structure. 
A key issue then remains as to how the state as controlling shareholder exercises 
control, and who acts as a check and balance to that control. The above case study has 
illustrated the power-broking among state investors and private partners in effectively 
protecting their interests in the distribution of roles in the internal governance structure. The 
state does so by appointing the head of the executive board, i.e., the chairman, along with a 
number of non-executive directors. 
Despite this, unlike in other equity markets, state-ownership on ChiNext is especially 
low because most state-owned CSMEs are located in traditional industries. Nonetheless, 
other manifestations of the state on ChiNext appear in the guise of non-controlling 
shareholders, including institutions such as venture capital investors, social security funds 
and pension funds, which are by definition and in fact institutional shareholders mostly 
wholly owned or run by the state. 
This Section has illustrated the profiles of controlling shareholders on ChiNext as well 
as the way in which they exert control through voting rights, and reinforce such control 
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through key executive board and senior management roles. This is also mirrored in state-
private partnerships, with the private sector also ensuring that it protects its investment by 
having not only key roles but also strategic knowledge and skills that the state lacks. 
Therefore, the private sector partner becomes a key mechanism in the protection of 
shareholders‘ investments in the event that the objective of the state veers away from 
providing a return on investment. 
 
II. Non-controlling Shareholders on ChiNext? 
This Section examines the profile of non-controlling shareholders and their capacity 
to act as a corporate governance check and balance against controlling shareholders. The 
figure below illustrates, in the year ending 31 December, the number of institutional investors 
(which include venture capital and private equity investors) compared to individual investors 
investing on ChiNext. 
 
Figure 9: Ratio of institutional shareholders to individual shareholders holdings in free-floating shares on ChiNext as of 31 
December 2009, 2010 and 2011 
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Source: author‟s analysis
288
 
Figure 9 shows an increase in the number of institutional shareholders as of 31 
December from 2009 to 2011. In 2009, institutional investment only amounted to 3.54% of 
total free-floating shares on the market, which fell well below expectations given the original 
intention of policymakers for ChiNext to be a venture capital market patronised by venture 
capital, private equity and institutional investors with a small number of highly experienced 
individual investors. The two-year experience eligibility criteria imposed on individual 
investors failed to stem their investment inflow, but it became a positive outcome for the 
listed companies, since, as demonstrated, institutional investors waited some time before 
investing on the secondary market. 
The Exchange has been keen to emphasise the increasing presence of institutional 
investors and their effective corporate governance role. According to the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange 2012 Performance Report, activity by qualified foreign institutional investors 
(‗QFIIs‘), insurance companies, mutual funds, enterprise annuities, brokerage houses, brokers‘ 
collective asset management plans, Social Security Fund (the most active of SOE investors) 
and trust companies apparently held an average of 9.86% of the total investors. Thus, of a 
total of 1,538 companies on SZSE (that is the Main Board, SME Board and ChiNext), 
institutional investors held stakes in 449 companies. Equally, they attended the general 
meetings of 164 listed companies, i.e., 37% of meetings.
289 
However, the following analyses demonstrate a mixed picture and also depend on which 
investors are counted as institutional investors. 
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A. Venture Capital Investors - Cornerstone of ChiNext Investment? 
 Venture capital investors (‗VCs‘) are not generally referred to as institutional 
shareholders, primarily because they invest at the early stages of growth that offer high 
potential but high risk.
290
 Essentially, they are pre-IPO investors and, importantly, have a 
defined exit strategy, usually upon IPO. In general, the overriding objective of a venture 
capital investor is to successfully obtain a return on investments.
291
 This assumes that the 
objective of such entities is to ensure the right share price and a smooth exit. 
This does not strictly apply in China where two types of VC exist: those generally 
referred to as ‗government-run VCs‘ (‗guanban VC‘) and privately run VCs. Government-
run VCs are usually readily distinguishable when they hold shares designated for state 
investors, either in the form of state-owned shares (guoyou chigu) or state legal entity shares 
(guojia gu).
292
 However, some difficulty arises in distinguishing them from privately-run 
VCs because they sometimes hold their investment in non-state legal entities, thereby giving 
no indication of the ultimate ownership being the state. 
Government-run and privately run VCs have different investment strategies and 
objectives. Nonetheless, overall, together VCs provided finance to 92.50% of surveyed 
companies with holdings ranging from less than 1% to as high as 20.25% of total voting 
rights. Revealingly, none of the VCs hold controlling shares in any of the surveyed 
companies. With such low holdings they do not overall present a key source of funding as 
may be expected. Technically, the higher the percentage of their holdings in the company, the 
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greater their interest and, therefore, the greater their ability and propensity to engage in and 
influence decisions at shareholders‘, executive board and supervisory board meetings. 
 
1. Government-run Venture Capital Investors 
Government-VCs do not have the return on capital as the fundamental basis for 
investment, whereas private VCs do.
293
 So-called government-run VCs generally dominate 
the venture capital industry, mainly because of their extensive access to funds. Likewise, 
there are also mixed reviews regarding their contribution to corporate governance and 
performance.
294
 
 Unsurprisingly, 52.5 % of the surveyed companies had state investment, whether in 
the form of state-owned shares or state shares, or just non-state legal entity shares. State 
shares figured as the most dominant avenue of investment. The holdings of government-run 
VCs are not very high, ranging from as nominally low as 0.03 % to as high as 18.47 %, 
which indicates that financing was not the sole priority for investing. Noticeably, when the 
pre-IPO subscribers register was compared to the publication of subscribers post IPO, a large 
volume of both state-owned share and state shares were subsequently transferred to other 
entities on IPO. The most identifiable beneficiary of the transfer was the Social Security Fund, 
which appears in several of the surveyed companies. Thus, government-run VCs cannot be 
entirely considered the cornerstone of financing for the surveyed companies. Nonetheless, 
from the research, they appear a key ingredient for a successful listing as their investment 
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 Liu Jiacheng, Huang Jinggui, and Lin Tao, Chuangyetouzi, Yunzuo Jizhi Yu Guoji Bijiao [Venture Capital 
Investment, Operational Mechanism with an International Comparison]. 
294Chinese media is sceptical. Xin Shanglun, ―Fengkuang Chuangyeban Touzi Caifu Shenhua Zhizaozhe: Dazao 
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the perspective that VCs, especially government-run VCs, enable performance and good governance. See, Ren 
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[Research on the Countermeasures of Funds Resulting from the Set-up of Government Venture Capital Firms by 
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however nominal symbolises the rubber stamp of (local or central) government approval of 
the company.
 295
 State-owned venture capitalist firms predominantly belong to state-owned 
banks such as China Construction Bank, which has a large number of investments in both 
listed and unlisted companies. 
In terms of corporate governance, most government-VCs in the surveyed companies 
take a hands-off approach to their investment management. Most do not have any 
representation on either the executive board or the supervisory board. This hands-off 
approach complements their nominal investment strategy and holdings prevalent in most of 
the surveyed companies. They have also being generally criticised as not being interested in 
the governance of the companies in which they invest due to general apathy. Liu, Huang and 
Lin found that government-run VCs interests were not necessarily about shareholder value - 
they have other value system, and their interests do not necessarily align with minority 
shareholders, or generally with other shareholders who just want a return on their 
investment.
296
 The multi-layered agency relationships in the state-owned governance system 
also mean that decision-making and engagement at company level is inevitably infrequent 
even though they are VCs with a purview to provide a suite of funding and management 
advice. Additionally, of course, their ability to exit on IPO by transferring to other 
government-run financial institutions means that they have nothing to gain from the IPO 
process per se because they do not partake in the huge gains that accrue; hence, the apathy. 
One noticeable trend from the survey was that few government VCs continue their 
investment after IPO, and this may be another reason why they do not tend to have 
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representatives on either board. This largely reflects their low level of investment in these 
companies and the fact most government VC shares are transferred before or on IPO. In the 
case of the surveyed companies, most of the shares went to China‘s Social Security Fund. 
 
2. Private-run Venture Capital Investors 
In contrast to government VCs, privately owned VCs are in the minority, largely 
because their pool of funds for investment comes from private individuals, businesses and 
institutions. Domestic venture capital investors include Shenzhen Capital Group. Tianjin 
Datong Investment Group Co. Ltd., a privately owned shareholding industrial group on IPO, 
held 27.82% of issued shares in Chasesun. On ChiNext, venture capitalists are less involved 
in the management of the enterprises they fund. As such, their representatives are more likely 
to be on the supervisory board than the executive board.
297
 Private VCs, which appear to be 
locked in by share dealing rules under Company Law, have IPO as the only exit, unlike 
government-run VCs. Therefore, they have more of an interest in partaking in the 
management and internal governance of companies in which they invest. 
Although private VCs tend to have larger holdings than their government counterparts, 
they do not take controlling holdings in any of the companies in which they invest, though 
they figure in the top ten block holders. 
Venture capitalists remain subject to a certain amount of criticism and cynicism in the 
financial press, which may suggest a certain lack of understanding of this very ‗capitalist‘ 
tool for economic development. Aside from the exceptions, most surveyed companies have 
benefited from venture capital, whether from the state or otherwise. 
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Private VCs hold their shares directly or through SPV. However, the level of 
transparency stops at firm level compared to state VCs, which makes it relatively easy to 
trace the ultimate investor. 
In terms of corporate governance, private VCs protect their investments by 
nominating representatives to sit on executive boards and sometimes supervisory boards. As 
such, they play a role in the management of the enterprise to ensure that they achieve their 
investment objectives, which is to ensure a return on their investment through IPO. As 
mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, the ChiNext framework emphasises good internal 
governance when a company seeks listing. 
Private-run VCs definitely have more of an impact in corporate governance terms. 
Firstly, they tend to use non-executive directorships to monitor the management and protect 
their interests. Some also have supervisor representatives on the supervisory board. Their 
ability to sit on either the executive board or the supervisory board depends on the volume of 
shareholdings and their influence. Secondly, they appear to only invest in companies in 
which they can exercise some measure of influence. For instance, of the surveyed companies, 
private VCs were less likely to invest where one individual held more than 30% of the total 
issued shares in the company. One key reason for this, as observed by an interviewee 
knowledgeable about the VC industry in China, was that VCs find it difficult to monitor their 
investments where individuals are controlling shareholders because pre-IPO entrepreneur-
managers are known to withhold information from and exclude external investors from key 
decision-making processes.
298
 Moreover, they embellish information.
299
 A registered public 
accountant who audited both listed and unlisted small and medium-sized companies also 
corroborated this view, observing that some companies tend to have different financial and 
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other reports specifically produced for the consumption of the regulatory authorities, 
investors and for their own personal use.
300
 The confidence of entrepreneur-managers and 
other owner-managers comes in part from the fact that the small pool of good, investment-
quality, hi-tech and innovative companies remains smalls, and, therefore, they are confident 
of their business idea and are likely to have a choice of VCs with which to engage.
301
 It is 
well documented that, in unlisted companies, key decisions about the company are taken at 
an operational level with the controlling shareholder as chairman/CEO. VCs tend to have 
employee representatives who may not necessarily have the clout to counterbalance the 
strong personality of an owner-manager. Nonetheless, as their interests align with the 
entrepreneur-manager and CSMEs offer a good return on investment as well as prestige and 
heightened social status for the entrepreneur, entrepreneur-managers will do their utmost to 
ensure the success of their application for listing, which requires meeting certain performance 
and corporate governance conditions. A key observation is that most of the VC 
representatives on the board of directors of the surveyed companies tend to be senior, with 
some being chairpersons of the VC firm itself. This largely reflects the privately run VC. 
Thus, it may be concluded that, as long as the listed company performs well 
financially and the VC receives dividends, it appears generally unconcerned. Here, it seems 
that executive board and supervisory board meetings are, at best, updating exercises. This 
correlates with Chen et al.‘s recent findings regarding these institutional shareholders.302 Post 
IPO, the role of VCs in corporate governance arguably becomes conflicted in that they are 
focused on their exit strategy. 
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B. Private Equity Investors 
As with VCs, private equity investors (‗PE‘) can either be state-owned or private and 
it can, therefore, be difficult to distinguish between the two. Few private equity firms invest 
on ChiNext because they continue to invest in traditional industries and companies that are 
mostly found on the main markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen due to the high-risk nature of 
ChiNext listed companies.
303
 A reason for not investing on ChiNext is that private equity 
firms in China traditionally choose medium to long-term investments with low to medium 
risks, which stands in contrast to the high-risk profile of ChiNext companies.
304
 The most 
active private equity investors also tend to be state owned rather than private. Hence, their 
concentration lies on main market listed companies, which entail a lower risk profile despite 
comparatively low returns. 
Analysis of the profile and investment patterns of private equity investors in the 
surveyed CSMEs shows that, strategically, these investors differ from venture capital 
investors in that their investment periods do not really correlate with the funding 
requirements of CSMEs. That is, most private equity investors tend to invest up to a few 
months just before the listing of a company. In this regard, they cannot possibly have any 
influence on the governance structure of the company, apart from perhaps adding their own 
representative. 
Guoxin H & S Investment Co. Ltd. (‗Guoxin‘) provides a typical example of such a 
state-controlled private equity investor used as an investment avenue by local government, in 
this case Shenzhen local government. Guoxin holds investments in five ChiNext companies, 
which it made less than six months before their respective IPOs. It forms part of the Guoxin 
Group, and Shenzhen local government holds a controlling interest in Shenzhen Investment 
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Holding Co. Ltd., an investment company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, which, 
belonging to the Shenzhen local government, holds 40% of the issued shares of Guoxin. The 
CRC Trust, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Shenzhen Municipal Government State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, holds a further 30%. Thus, the total 
holding of Shenzhen local government amounts to 70%, with the remaining 30% distributed 
among various minority investors. With this very powerful background, any company with 
Guoxin investment will undoubtedly be more likely than others to obtain listing approval. 
Such power does not require direct representation on the board to influence the company. 
Thus, private equity investors remain a small but influential fixture on ChiNext 
because many of them provide amounts to an alternative and indirect investment route for 
local government investment in China‘s equity markets. This perhaps signals a new form of 
investment and business strategy by local governments, whereby they can benefit from IPO 
overpricing, especially since they tend to invest just before IPO. They have gathered a rather 
bad reputation as being exploitative. Moreover, some have potential conflicts of interests 
whereby the same group of companies supplies both private equity and sponsorship services. 
In terms of corporate governance, they do not appear to be active in any of the 
companies in which they invest, i.e., they do not take up executive board or supervisory 
board positions. 
 
C. Institutional Shareholders 
The preceding sections have demonstrated that venture capital and private equity 
shareholders both have focused exit strategies post IPO, and, because of the inevitably large 
returns made on IPO, do not need to pursue any corporate governance strategy. This section 
examines the profile of institutional shareholders on ChiNext and assesses the extent to which 
they can act as a counter-weight to controlling shareholders. 
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The constituents of institutional investors include asset managers, insurance 
companies, investment funds, social security funds, ordinary institutions, QFII and 
stockbrokers. Although they can also be grouped into state and private institutional investors, 
a more relevant distinction here is between domestic and foreign institutional investors. 
Moreover, institutional investors tend to be widely held with a mix of state and private 
investors, with sometimes complex pyramidal chains of ownership. 
Overall, institutional investors remain depressed in both number and investment 
volume on ChiNext. The results from the surveyed companies suggest that they do not build 
substantial stakes, the reasons for which are discussed later in this section. Similarly, the 
surveyed CSMEs also reflect low investment from institutional investors in free-floating 
shares. There are various reasons for this. In terms of investment strategy, from the outset of 
their investment they have a medium-term strategy based on capital growth but are more 
focused on medium and long-term income growth. They are mainly concerned with 
generating income (pension funds) and the long-term prospects of the company. 
One of the key findings in this chapter is that institutional investors (a narrow 
definition excluding venture capital and private equity investors) play a very limited role in 
corporate governance in the surveyed companies. As mentioned earlier, state policymakers 
and the CSRC expected the majority of investors on ChiNext to be majority institutional 
investors along with a minority of seasoned individual investors. But, as illustrated in Table 2, 
the reverse occurred, with individual investors instead dominating the volume and number of 
shareholders in the secondary market. 
Table 2: Percentage of free-floating shares held by institutional investors on ChiNext 
 
Year 2009 2010 2011 
ChiNext    
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Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange
306
 
As this table (and the previous figure) illustrates, in the first three months of its launch 
there were only 3.34% institutional investors partaking in the secondary market of 
ChiNext.
307
 The table also shows incremental increases in institutional holdings on ChiNext 
year on year, with 2010 and 2011 increasing to 22.71 and 33.98%, respectively.
308
 However, 
this still falls below the overall average of over 55% across the boards of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. 
Whether an increase in institutional shareholders presents the capacity for increased 
corporate governance action remains to be seen. It may be that too much confidence and 
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Individuals  
3.34 
96.66 
22.71 
78.29 
33.98 
66.02 
Average for Institutional Investors on 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (including Main 
and SME Boards) 
 55.33 56.36 
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expectation is being transferred to institutional investors regarding corporate governance 
without acknowledging the fact that they may not wish to engage with the company but 
merely wish to invest. 
The low volume of QFIIs may also be attributable to perceived poor corporate 
governance on ChiNext due to unfamiliarity with family and individually controlled listed 
companies. This may fuel a short-term investment strategy. After all, empirical research 
suggests that QFIIs screen and improve the quality of the listed companies they invest in 
because they take a very rational perspective to investment and especially take the 
performance of companies into consideration.
309
 Naturally, this rational perspective will 
undoubtedly cause QFIIs to be reluctant to invest substantially and over the long term in 
listed companies in which they may feel marginalised, such as those controlled by families. 
Nonetheless, the findings of this research correlate with the occurrence of short-term 
and low investment volume by QFIIs. The findings of this author‘s research from the 
surveyed companies is further evidence of this phenomenon. This may account for their 
current low investment on ChiNext and the resultant efforts of the CSRC and the Exchange to 
demonstrate improvements in the selection of companies, as well as the fact that corporate 
governance appears high on their agenda. 
Institutional investors may be more confident that, however short or long term their 
investment strategy, their interests are aligned with the controlling shareholders who 
presently hold important appreciation in share value and income growth. In contrast, they 
actively monitor their investments in SOEs as a result of having more long-term investment 
strategies. The choice of long-term investment strategy and behaviour may reflect their 
sensitivity to appearing speculative in SOEs in which the government has tried constantly to 
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encourage long-term investment. With privately run companies, institutional investors can 
choose their investment strategies at will. Indeed, past research indicates that small retail 
shareholders have always chosen their investment strategies at will. Their highly speculative 
nature on ChiNext may be a result of the present social and economic atmosphere in China, 
where everyone is trying to capitalise on present opportunities because the future is unknown. 
This leads naturally to a discussion of the social and economic contexts in which ChiNext 
companies exist today. Promoting long-term investment strategies leads to more interest in 
the company by shareholders, which is the first stage before shareholders at all levels can be 
empowered to engage in the decision-making of the company. This results in more stability 
in the company and on the market. However, the problem is how to encourage institutional 
investors and retail investors especially to take part. For instance, recent empirical research 
on QFIIs presents no consensus as to whether or not QFIIs are long-term or speculative 
investors, which is of some significance since it is widely acknowledged that a long-term 
investment strategy usually comes with interest and activism in corporate governance. 
Empirical research suggests that QFIIs screen and improve the quality of the listed companies 
in which they invest.
 310
 However, an empirical study of QFII investments between 2005 and 
2010, analysing QFII investment behaviour, finds that, overall, QFIIs take short-term 
investments as their main investment strategy.
311
 In contrast, some studies find that QFIIs 
play the role of long-term investor rather than speculator.
312
 However, these studies remain 
limited as, although a long-term investment or speculative strategy may be applied in one 
market, it may not necessarily be applied to others. There remains no research on this issue 
on ChiNext. Studies have also found that, for QFIIs, corporate governance rather than size of 
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firm or profit have a substantial impact on the investment decisions of both domestic and 
foreign institutional investors. The result is that institutional investors are probably a more 
realistic corporate governance mechanism because they have greater incentives in monitoring 
and the resources to do so. In terms of corporate governance, qualitatively, the results of this 
research suggest that institutional investors play less of a role in corporate governance, at 
least in the surveyed companies. 
On examination of the top ten shareholders for 31 December 2009, 2010 and 2011, 
respectively, there was no stake building for a medium to long-term investment. There was 
no substantial change in the top ten block holders from the time of IPO. Correspondingly, 
there was also no substantive change in the constituents to include institutional investors as 
they do not and did not partake in the management of the company; that is, they do take an 
active interest in executive board or supervisory board roles. However, this is perhaps 
expected since many institutional investors do not build holdings large enough or for long 
enough for them to decide that they need a representative on one of the boards of a company 
to protect their interests. 
The next section examines foreign institutional investors specifically because they are 
expected to have a positive influence on corporate governance. 
 
1. Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
Foreign institutional investors must be licensed as ‗qualified‘ to invest in any capital 
market, including ChiNext and other permissible investments in China. This licensing makes 
them QFII. The QFII program was launched in 2002. QFIIs have long invested in the main 
Boards of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. All QFIIs in China tend to be large 
because of relatively high assets under management requirements, which appears to be a 
deliberate strategy to ensure that China gets the cream of international institutional 
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shareholders.
313
 The main types of QFII include asset managers, insurance companies, 
securities companies, commercial banks and other institutional investors. 
A key belief of the state and academics in China, as well as the key reason for 
establishing the QFII program, is that foreign institutional investors will naturally promote 
good corporate governance practices.
314
 However, investment by foreign institutional 
investors‘ remains low overall in Chinese stock markets. On ChiNext, both their numbers and 
volume appear lower than expected by the CSRC. Rather, as discussed below, retail 
shareholders instead dominate ChiNext. QFIIs have more than tripled their investment 
presence on the Main Board rather than on ChiNext. For example, according to the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange Market Performance Report of 2012, QFIIs held 1.83 and 0.68% on the 
Main Board and SME Board, respectively, but only 0.54% on ChiNext. This becomes even 
lower when compared to the fact that institutional investors overall hold 36.6% of directly 
held free-floating shares on ChiNext. As well as having only a small presence, there has been 
much media interest in the short positions and good profits made by QFIIs,
315
 none of which 
brings to mind an investor eager to carry out the arguably onerous and expensive monitoring 
of their investments. 
Studies find that, in turn, such international institutional investors screen and improve 
the quality of the listed companies they invest in because they take a very rational perspective 
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to investment and especially take the performance of companies into consideration.
316
 Thus, 
the existence of QFIIs appears encouraging for corporate governance on ChiNext. However, 
examination of the surveyed companies indicates that only a handful of QFIIs actively invest 
on ChiNext, and mostly in free-floating A shares, like their domestic counterparts. Some of 
the most active QFIIs on ChiNext include Goldman Sachs (UK), Martin Currie Investment 
Management Ltd. (UK), Temasek Fullerton Alpha Investments Pte Ltd. (Singapore), and 
Columbia University (US), reflecting the increasingly international characteristic of the 
market. 
Despite having a small presence in the ChiNext, there has been much media reporting 
of the good profits made by QFIIs, presumably because they have sold off.
317
 Columbia 
University is an example that is known to have made the most lucrative investments on 
ChiNext in 2011.
318
 
Secondly, none of the abovementioned investors featured in the top ten holders. 
Media reports suggest that QFIIs take a more speculative position when trading in ChiNext 
equities.
319
 Indeed, the low number of institutional investors engaging in ChiNext companies 
is unsurprising, especially in light of the research findings presented in Section III below. 
Overall, in terms of domestic and private institutional investors, the research indicates 
that institutional investors and private equity firms do not want control over ChiNext 
companies. An interviewee also corroborates this, citing the lack of good-quality companies 
as a key problem, as well as the risky nature of investing in hi-tech companies. He reiterated 
that the IPO market has reached saturation because the limited number of good-quality 
                                                 
316
 Teng Lili and Huang Chunlong, ―Woguo QFII chixu tezheng yanjiu - jiyu xuangu pianhao yu chigu qixiande 
shizheng fenxi (Characteristics of China‘s QFII: an Empirical Analysis of Stock Selection Preferences and 
Holding Period Features).‖ 
317
 Zhong Tian, ―QFII tegu mingxi puguang 9zhi chuangyebangu ru „fayan‟ [Clear and Detailed Exposé of 
QFII‘s Holdings; 9 ChiNext Stocks Enter the ‗Eye of the Law‘].‖   
318
 Ke Zhihua, ―QFII de‟er da fu jianchi dichan gu [QFII Huge Sell-off of Property Shares: Columbia 
University Loves ChiNext Most].‖ 
319
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companies restricts the number of investments in such companies.
320
 Equally, another 
interviewee, also a member of China‘s investment community, added that, in reality, 
institutional investors are powerless against founders and entrepreneurs who monopolise and 
conceal information about the company.
321
 The upshot of this is that individuals and families 
as founders or controlling shareholders possess an overall dominance through the monopoly 
of information, which has created a barrier to entry for institutional investors, at least before 
IPO. Post IPO, this trend of not taking up controlling holdings in companies continues, as 
purchases in the market tend to be speculative in nature. 
This section then leaves a key question as to which group of shareholders presents a 
counterbalance to private controlling shareholders and in which ways. The previous section 
demonstrated that venture capitalist investors do have a role and can have an influence when 
they have positions on the executive board. The next section examines the role of the pre-IPO 
individual subscriber and their role. 
 
D. Individual Investors 
On ChiNext, individual investors comprise three kinds: employees; people who are not 
employees but who subscribe for shares when the company is private, i.e., pre-IPO individual 
investors; and, the largest section of investors, retail shareholders who invest at IPO or in the 
secondary market. This section examines each type of shareholder and the findings regarding 
their role in corporate governance. 
 
                                                 
320
 Interview 2012-12.  
321
 Interview 2012-11.  
  
149  
 
1. Employees 
Over 50% of the surveyed companies had most members of management holding shares in 
the company. Share options have played a small role in compensation and aligning the 
interests of management with shareholders but it becoming increasingly with a strong trend. 
In 2009 none of the surveyed companies had a share option scheme before or immediately 
following IPO. But by the end of 2010 this had risen to 17.50% and then to 37.50%. Most 
plans are restricted to senior management, while others extended it to the middle management 
level. Moreover, on average the percentage of those that partake in the share option was less 
than 5% of the total number of employees, which reflects the cautiousness regarding dilution 
of holdings and the increasing need to attract and retain talent especially in hi-tech and 
innovative companies. 
 
2. Individual Pre-IPO Subscribers 
In most of the surveyed companies, individual pre-IPO subscribers (i.e., those who are 
not employees) hold small to large non-controlling interests in the company, usually less than 
10% but on average greater than 1%. This is unsurprising given that, on average, more than 
55% of the total issued shares of the company were restricted because they were mostly held 
by pre-IPO subscribers. It may also be a strategy by controlling shareholders to ensure that 
any individual non-controlling shareholder cannot, on his or her own, requisition a 
shareholders‘ general meeting, as discussed in the next section. 
They tend to directly hold their shares in the company. Strict regulatory restrictions to 
the sale and purchase of shares by the company, as discussed in the previous chapter, apply to 
this group of shareholders. For instance, pre-IPO subscribers must not transfer any part of 
their holding during the first 12 months following IPO of the company. This indicates that 
they are more likely to have been shareholders in the company prior to IPO than holders of 
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shares acquired during IPO or from the secondary market. However, this cannot be the case 
because there is no restriction on these shareholders‘ ability to sell unless there are covenants 
attached to the issue of shares. 
A key trend for pre-IPO subscribers in most of the surveyed companies is to partake 
in the management of the company, either as directors (executive and non-executive), 
supervisors, managers
322
 or employees, as also indicated in the earlier case studies. Because 
of their personal stake in the company, pre-IPO subscribers are concerned by the enterprise‘s 
presentation and strategy, and about the return on their investment. Some of these investors 
monitor their interests on the supervisory board, but rarely on the executive board. Having 
said this, not all of them are prepared for a post-IPO medium to long-term investment, as 
demonstrated by financial media reports of the sales of their shares. 
As proposed in Chapter Six, pre-IPO individual subscribers are arguably one of the 
most important yet overlooked mechanisms of corporate governance in privately controlled 
listed companies. Several factors expanded upon in Chapter Six contribute to this. In 
summary, they include their medium to long-term investment strategy, regulatory trading 
restrictions, directorships and supervisorship, and importantly, their role and influence as key 
providers of start-up funding to the company. 
3. Retail Shareholders: Large and Small 
A retail shareholder is an individual shareholder who buys and sells securities for his 
or her own personal account, and not on behalf of others or through an intermediary. 
Overall, retail shareholders present the largest group of investors on ChiNext. 
Compared to venture, private equity and institutional investors, and employee and pre-IPO 
individual subscribers, they have relatively small shareholdings, on average far below 0.5% 
of the total share capital. Individual shareholders on ChiNext can be divided further into large 
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 Per the definition under Company Law. 
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retail investors and small retail investors due to their relatively different investments. The 
distinction made between pre-IPO individual subscribers indicates that they did not buy their 
shares on IPO or from the secondary market. 
Large retail shareholders comprise a relatively small number of individuals who do 
not hold controlling interests but hold 1% or more of the issued share capital of a company. 
As of 31 December 2009, despite shareholdings as low as 0.01%, these individuals tend to 
figure in the top ten shareholdings of free-floating shares of companies. Although they are 
also minority shareholders, they have remedial rights under Company Law whereby they can 
exercise individually against directors and management.
323
 Large retail shareholders tend to 
hold 0.01% or more of the total share capital, and also tend to be less speculative investors. 
There is no way of knowing if the large retail shareholder shows speculative behaviour 
patterns as it is difficult to monitor individual share movements. Clearly, from the time of 
IPO to 31 December 2009 and the publication of the annual report, they remained the same, 
which amounts to at least a few months of investment and is in contrast to minority retail 
shareholders who are said to turn over shares on an almost daily basis. 
 Although small retail investors are the largest group of investors in terms of number, 
they are smallest in terms of their holdings. Thus, despite their abundance, their ownership on 
ChiNext remains highly concentrated. The ordinary retail shareholder who holds up to 
several tens of thousands of shares is the most recognised and often written about. In relation 
to issued share capital, they own a negligible minority in the company. 
Despite retail shareholders being a representative group of minority shareholders that 
policymakers, the CSRC and the Exchange aim to protect, they have a limited role in 
corporate governance, as will be demonstrated later in Section III of this chapter, which 
examines the methods of shareholder engagement in the surveyed companies. Indeed, their 
                                                 
323
 See Articles 152 and 150 of Company Law, together.  
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overall role in corporate governance is presently restricted to ‗voicing‘ concerns through 
votes.  
Nonetheless, the progressive decrease in retail shareholders‘ holdings of 96.66% of 
free-floating shares on ChiNext in 2009 to 66.02% by the end of 2011 not only reflects 
regulatory authorities‘ pro-activism in encouraging investment by institutions.324 Of course, 
the much-documented speculative behaviour of retail shareholders, as reflected, continues in 
media reports on ChiNext.
325
 But such behaviour, being transient in nature, cannot wholly 
account for the steady and significant decline of retail shareholders. 
The decline seems to largely reflect a withdrawal of retail investors with potentially 
medium to long-term investment strategies from those companies to which they subscribed 
for the IPO. Two main factors contributed to this withdrawal: first, the market was such that 
initial gains made on and immediately following IPOs tended to be lost if holdings were not 
sold promptly.
 326
 This follows from the seemingly inherent nature of the ChiNext IPOs to be 
overpriced. The problem of overpricing also reflects the negative narrative in the media about 
the newly listed companies, and the scepticism about their actual performance and long-term 
prospects.
 327
  Correspondingly, there also remained uncertainty about the truthfulness of 
published financial reports, performance and proprietary technology claimed.
 
In terms of 
corporate governance, the press especially believe that listing by companies is a ruse to gain 
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 See, Table 2: Percentage of free-floating shares held by institutional investors on ChiNext. 
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 For example, see Xinhua Guangzhou, ―‗Sangao‟ yousuo „tuishao‟ - Chuangyeban qidai baituo zijin tuidong 
xing sanhu shichang [‗The Three Highs‘ somewhat the ‗Recedes Fever‘ - ChiNext Expects to be Rid of its 
Capital Funding Style Retail Market],‖ Government News, Xin Hua, (October 23, 2012), url: 
http://www.gd.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2012-10/24/c_113471199.htm. 
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 Interview 2012-8; Interview 2012-11; Interview 2012-12. 
327
 In a review on the third-year anniversary of trading on ChiNext, the online financial magazine concludes that 
the ChiNext market has made RMB billionaires of pre-IPO subscribers; however, secondary market investors 
are subjected to the vagaries of the decline profitability of many companies. See, Caijing wang, ―Chuangyeban: 
dangchu „zaofuban‟ zhuanbian dagudong taoxian de „chouxueban‟ [ChiNext: The Initially ‗Wealth-Creating 
Market‘ Turns into ‗Blood-Sucking Market‘ for the Largest Shareholder],‖ Financial News, Caijing wang, (16 
October, 2012), url: http://stock.caijing.com.cn/2012-10-21/112212708.html. 
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funding from the public with no tangible long-term business strategy or sustainability.
328
 As 
will be illustrated in Chapter Five, most retail shareholders rely on the media for investigative 
analytical investment news, and journalists see this as part of their public obligation. 
Corporate governance as in issue was implicit in the responses from the interviews; however, 
the interviewees expressed their lack of trust.
329
 
 
E. Foreign Investors 
Both individual and institutional foreign investors can and do invest in A shares in 
ChiNext companies. However, only qualified (i.e., licensed) foreign institutional investors 
(QFIIs) can partake in placements, IPOs or just deal in ChiNext‘s secondary market, for 
example, such as Goldman Sachs and UBS Warburg. Foreign legal persons or individuals, 
public or private, can invest by making capital contributions in cash or assets, such as 
material goods or intellectual property rights, but this must take place prior to the public 
listing of a company, otherwise only licensed foreign institutional investors can do so. This 
complements China‘s general capital market policy of encouraging institutional and 
discouraging individual investors, as the latter is believed to pose problems for effective 
corporate governance. Thus, foreign ownership is low on ChiNext. Nonetheless, a key 
advantage of investing only in A shares is undoubtedly the better transparency, information 
asymmetry and liquidity in having one listed share class than on other boards where foreign 
investors invest only in B shares. 
 
                                                 
328
 For example, see Shan Shui, ―Chuangyeban cheng zhai tiaoban? (GEM: the Market for Benefit 
Transportation),‖ International Financing, January 2011. See also Xin Shanglun, ―28 chuangyeban gongsi 
qunian zhengli fuzengzhang  [28 ChiNext Companies post negative growth from last year],‖ Financial News, 
DF Daily, (3), http://www.dfdaily.com/html/136/2011/3/30/586369.shtml.  
329
 Interview 2012-08; Interview 2012-09; Interview 2012-18; Interview 2012-18; Interview 2012-18. 
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III.How Engaged are Shareholders of ChiNext Companies? 
The preceding case studies have illustrated that controlling shareholders readily take 
up the roles of director and manager. This dominant trend toward owner-manager, whereby 
the controlling shareholder-owner directly manages the privately listed companies, is 
developed further in the next chapter on management structures. Shareholders have only one 
key avenue to engage with the companies in which they invest: the shareholders‘ meeting. 
But in addition to the opportunity to engage with the company, shareholders too would need 
to actively engage.
330
 This section presents the results of a documentary survey of 
shareholder resolutions disclosed to the Exchange between 2009 and 2012, examining the 
extent to which shareholders actually engage with the company. The chosen indicators for 
this purpose include the number of shareholder meetings held during the year and the 
business conducted, the attendance of AGMs and the percentage of total voting rights 
represented, the requisition of a shareholder meeting, the issue shareholder proposals at a 
shareholders‘ meeting, and the provision and use of proxy voting and online voting. Together, 
these indicators assist in analysing the opportunity given by the company to shareholders to 
partake through the ultimate organ of power, the shareholders‘ general meeting, and, vice 
versa, the willingness and ability of shareholders to engage by attendance or using the rights 
given under Company Law. Despite the obvious activism exhibited by shareholders in the 
instances described below, the results of the survey strongly indicate an overall decline in 
shareholder engagement. 
 
A. Shareholders’ Meetings as a Forum for Engagement 
This section studies the extent to which shareholders in CSMEs engage in decision-
making in the company through the attendance of meetings and exercising voting rights on 
                                                 
330
 For a discussion of the ―free-rider‖ phenomenon in China see part IV. Evaluative Summary on page 184. 
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company matters, including how they do so ex ante. It remains to be understood how 
shareholders at all levels engage in the decision-making process of the company with the 
tools provided under Company Law. There is an overwhelming trend toward concentrated 
private ownership structures and the pervasive power of controlling shareholders over every 
aspect of decision-making to the exclusion of other non-controlling shareholders. In essence, 
this section studies the potential controls on controlling shareholders available to non-
controlling shareholders and whether they exercise these controls. 
 
1. Board Convening Shareholder Meetings 
A key issue with highly concentrated ownership is that, where possible, resolutions 
can be passed by the controlling shareholder without the need for the attendance of other 
shareholders.
 
Company Law does not actually require a quorum of physical attendance. 
Instead, the law only provides the thresholds for passing ordinary and special resolutions. 
Thus, the ChiNext framework emphasises the importance of the use of the 
shareholders meeting as a forum for shareholder engagement. The table below presents the 
number of shareholders‘ meetings, both annual and interim, held during the years 2009, 2010 
and 2011, respectively. 
 
Table 3: Annual and interim shareholders‟ meetings held by ChiNext companies 
 
Year 2009 2010 2011 
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The average number of meetings held by the surveyed companies doubled between 
2009 and 2011. An increase in regulatory and practical requirements for the approval of 
corporate actions accounts for the increases across all surveyed companies. For instance, the 
most common agenda items in meetings from 2010 onwards were amendments to articles of 
association, the approval of material contracts, related party transactions and share incentive 
initiatives. All of these transactions require approval at a meeting of the shareholders under 
Company Law and the Listing Rules. In the table below, the survey examined the number of 
shareholders‘ meetings to ascertain, firstly, the extent to which companies within the first 
year of IPO were making decisions that required shareholder approval. There is a positive 
correlation between the number of extraordinary shareholders‘ meetings and the high number 
of supervisory board meetings. This suggests either that the supervisory board may have 
advised that certain issues must go to the shareholders‘ meeting, or that the supervisory board 
should test the waters before specific proposals and projects are put before a meeting of 
shareholders. All of the companies surveyed declared holding an AGM for the year, although 
public announcements for such meetings on ChiNext were not available. 
                                                 
331
 The surveyed company failed to hold an AGM in accordance with Company Law. This highlights an 
enforcement issue, in that, presumably because the surveyed company was ‗theoretically‘ still a private joint 
stock company at the time, the CSRC (or the Exchange) has little jurisdiction to enforce or sanction the 
company. In this respect, any effective action falls to the shareholders requisitioning a meeting under the 
company‘s articles of association or Company Law. The literature indicates that shareholders in private 
companies tend to pursue matters that have a monetary impact on their rights.  
Average number of 
shareholders’ meetings 2.4 1.4 4.7 
Highest number 7 7 6 
Lowest number 0
331
 1 1 
 
Source: Author‟s survey 
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During 2009, Beijing Ultrapower Co. Ltd. held a total of seven shareholder meetings 
– one annual shareholders‘ meeting and six interim shareholders‘ meetings. There was an 
increase in shareholder participation in approving and authorising sensitive matters such as 
the award of share incentives related to party transactions and the issuance of bonds to 
individuals and third-party companies. These were the main reasons for the interim meetings. 
For the owner-manager of an SME who makes unilateral decisions, this represents an 
overhaul of the decision-making process. It also signals a willingness to comply and engage 
with other shareholders. It especially signifies the emphatic role that the Exchange and the 
CSRC are taking in engaging in a more company-specific manner, which ensures compliance 
with the form if not the substance of the law. 
. 
2. Requisition of Shareholder Meeting 
Under Company Law, with a minimum of 10% of the voting rights, a shareholder has 
the right to act individually or collectively to convene a shareholders‘ meeting when both the 
executive board and supervisory board fail to do so.
332
 
During the period 2009 to 2011, an examination of both interim shareholder meetings 
for the surveyed company showed that none were requisitioned by either shareholders or the 
supervisory board of the company. This amounts to an important right for minority 
shareholders, despite ample opportunities to flex their voting power in the light of a few 
management scandals. For example, during the period 2009 to 2011, no such meeting was 
called by shareholders, despite various highly publicised scandals, some resulting in new 
regulations, such as the resignation of directors and senior managers, challenges to the 
                                                 
332
 Article 102 of Company Law. This provision has been the source of some criticism because it excludes 
minority interests. Gan Peizhong recommends a range of 5% to 8 % as an alternative. See Peizhong Gan, Qiye 
yu gongsi faxue [Jurisprudence on Enterprises and Companies] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2012): 220. 
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authenticity of proprietary intellectual property, and various episodes of serious disciplining 
or sanctioning of companies by the regulatory authorities 
A practical reason for shareholders not requisitioning shareholders‘ meetings may be 
because most shareholders hold less than 10 % of the total voting rights. Thus, any 
requisition will require them to identify potential allies and then mobilise them. Moreover, 
once convened, due to the minority of their votes, the passing of their proposed resolutions 
for which the meeting was convened cannot be guaranteed. As passing of shareholder 
resolutions require 50 % or more of the total voting rights, they will undoubtedly need the 
support of the controlling shareholder, who may be reluctant given that most controlling 
shareholders also lead the executive board as chairperson. Thus, the use of the requisition can 
present an upward struggle that may antagonise the controlling shareholder and still prove 
futile. 
Indeed, large individual shareholders who are not interested in the day-to-day 
management curtail such problems by taking on non-executive director roles. As such, they 
have more leeway to propose matters as any other business at executive board meetings, as 
well as direct contact with the controlling shareholder. 
 
B. Increased Meetings Equal Increased Shareholder Engagement? 
 The rising number of shareholders‘ meetings described in the preceding section 
positively indicates increased compliance with Company Law and other legislation. However, 
it does not necessarily equate to increased shareholder engagement. It does demonstrate at 
least the effort made by the executive board to comply with Company Law in convening 
meetings for relevant decisions. 
Company Law does not require a quorum. Instead, total voting rights at the meeting 
must be enough to pass ordinary business, which requires 50% or more of the total voting 
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rights. This means that a controlling shareholder alone can attend a convened meeting and 
preside over the meeting in his role as chairperson once he controls 50% or more of the total 
voting rights. Of course, this rarely occurs. 
The majority of surveyed companies on average have more than 7,000 registered 
shareholders, including natural and legal persons; yet physical attendance is low. 
Table 4 illustrates the increasing decline in the attendance of AGMs by minority 
shareholders. This is because attendance has fallen faster and by bigger proportions than the 
volume of total issued shares represented at the meeting. 
 
Table 4: Percentage of companies with shareholders physically present at AGMs333 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
333
 For the years ending 31 December 2009, 2010 and 2011, the AGMs were actually held in 2010, 2011 and 
2012, respectively. 
334
 Analysis based on review of disclosed AGM resolutions. 
 
percentage attendance in 
surveyed companies  
Number of shareholders 
present 
AGM 
2009 
AGM 
2010 
AGM 
2011 
10 or less  30.51 47.46 52.54 
11 to 20 32.20 25.42 33.90 
21 to 30 16.95 13.56 10.17 
31 to 40 13.56 5.08 1.69 
41 to 50 3.39 0.00 1.69 
51 to 60 3.39 3.39 0.00 
more than 61 0.00 5.08 0.00 
    
 Average number present 19.56 17.41 12.12 
    
 Average percentage of total 
voting rights represented at 
AGMs
334
 
66.55 59.46 55.97 
    
 
Source: survey 
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At the 2009 AGMs, 69.49 % of the surveyed companies had more than ten 
shareholders present compared to 52.54 % at the 2010 AGMs and 47.46 % at the 2011 AGMs. 
The lowest AGM attendances in 2010 and 2011 had just two shareholders – a quorum to 
convene, even though across the board the average was 17.41 and 12.12 %, respectively. This 
indicates the potential for extreme variation in attendance across companies. Indeed, a good 
example of the possibility of consistently good attendance is Anhui Anke Biotechnology 
(Group) Co. Ltd., which consistently had over 50 shareholders in attendance at each AGM. 
This is remarkable and occurred despite the company having one shareholder who controlled 
29.92 % at IPO and throughout the three years. 
In the surveyed companies, on average, few minority shareholders attend AGMs and 
are unlikely to cast their votes unless online electronic voting is available, as will be 
illustrated later in the chapter. From the low numbers of attendance and the high percentage 
of total issued share capital represented at the meetings, it would appear that mostly 
controlling shareholders and majority shareholders are now in attendance. Indeed, year on 
year, the average number of shareholders increases faster than the average percentage of the 
issued share capital present at a meeting. 
Only two surveyed companies experienced an increase in the total voting rights 
represented at an AGM. One recorded a corresponding increase in shareholders, namely 
Chase Sun Pharmaceutical Ltd. Moreover, only 17 shareholders representing 63.97 % of the 
total issued share capital attended this company‘s 2009 AGM. This figure dropped 
dramatically by 50% to nine shareholders at the 2010 AGM, but without a corresponding 
drop in the total issued share capital represented, which was stable at 63.62%. However, the 
2011 AGM experienced another surge with shareholder attendance more than tripling to 31%, 
but again with only a comparatively small increase in the issued share capital represented at 
65.05%. Clearly, this demonstrates that incremental increases tend to be in relation to 
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minority shareholders, especially as Chase Sun does not have an outright controlling 
shareholder, but rather is widely held by individuals holding shares directly or using SPV. 
Another point of note is that, exceptionally, on IPO, Chase Sun did not have and continues 
not to have any institutional investors in its top ten shareholders. All such shareholders are 
individuals. 
The lowest attendance of an AGM was for Beijing CISRI Gaona Ltd., the 2010 AGM 
of which was attended by only two shareholders, with 54.06% of total voting rights 
represented, namely CISRI the controlling shareholder with 48.02% and another SOE 
holding 6.04%. 
 
C. Voting: One-share-one vote 
Voting is one of the three fundamental rights of a shareholder, the other being the right to sell 
and/or sue. Voting in China is increasingly important, as demonstrated when, in 2005, 
Company Law introduced the concept of shareholder democracy (gudong zhuyi) as 
imperative for the advancement of corporate governance in China.
335
 Listed companies only 
have one class of share, namely ordinary shares, otherwise referred to as A shares, which 
rank pari passu. Thus, much scholarship is devoted to the study of participation of 
shareholders and voting, especially empirical evidence.
336
 In China, voting has begun to 
matter more as a result of the corporatisation and privatisation of many of the operating arms 
of many SOEs,
337
 and the emergence of the private sector, as indicated earlier. 
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 Liu Junhai, Legislative and Judicial Controversies, (2006): 188. 
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 For empirical studies, see Chen, Firth, and Xu, ―Does the Type of Ownership Control Matter?‖. See also He 
Jun, ―Shangshi gongsizhili jiegou de shizheng fenxi [An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance Structures 
of Listed Companies in China],‖ Jingji yanjiu (Economic Research Journal), no.5 (1998): 50-57. Zi Zhong‘en et 
al., ―Zhongguo shangshi gongsizhili jiegou de shizheng yanjiu (An Empirical Study on Chinese Listed Firms 
Corporate Governance),‖ Jingji yanjiu (Economic Research Journal), no.2 (2005): 81-91. 
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 Chen, Firth, and Xu, ―Does the Type of Ownership Control Matter?‖ 
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On ChiNext, controlling shareholders do not necessarily monopolise the votes and, in 
fact, on average require the support of other shareholders with larger holdings. To pass an 
ordinary resolution, one half or more of the total voting rights is required for ordinary 
business. Equally, a special resolution requires two-thirds of the total voting rights in the 
company for special business such as amending the articles of association. Thus, when the 
average holding of controlling shareholders in the surveyed companies is 40.34%, all will 
need the buy-in of other shareholders to pass an ordinary resolution, with the exception of 
two companies that have the state and a family as respective controlling shareholders. 
Correspondingly, even more buy-ins will be needed for a special resolution, with the 
exception of one company with a family controlling shareholder. Thus, in practice, 
controlling shareholders in the surveyed companies do not have unfettered control of the 
company, as they too have to negotiate and create allegiances. But, less optimistically, this 
point highlights a corporate governance issue if the interests of the controlling and large 
shareholders are aligned, but, importantly, not aligned with those of the minority shareholders. 
This means that the interests of minority shareholders may be side-lined, which is 
exacerbated by the low physical attendance of shareholders‘ meetings by shareholders in 
general. Consequently, the use of voting mechanisms such as cumulative, proxy and online 
voting that effectively enfranchise shareholders, especially minority shareholders, becomes 
important. 
 
1. Cumulative Voting on ChiNext 
Cumulative voting presents a key exception to the one-share-one-vote rule, which 
otherwise sees controlling shareholders and their allies dominating the voting.
338
 Article 106 
                                                 
338
 English language literature on cumulative voting in recent years has been sparse. For a general overview of 
recent literature on the practice (or avoidance) of cumulative voting in the US, the UK, Germany, Japan, France 
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of Company Law gives joint stock companies the option of adopting cumulative voting 
systems in their articles of association or by resolution at a shareholders‘ meeting in respect 
of the election of directors and supervisors. It nonetheless sets out the use of cumulative 
voting for the election of directors and supervisors, the formula simply being that each 
shareholder has voting rights equal to the number of directors or supervisors to be elected. 
Crucially, Company Law also permits the concentrated use of all cumulative voting rights by 
a shareholder, thus, clearly tailored at empowering minority shareholders in concentrated 
ownership structures. It has been a source of some debate, and is gaining support even before 
its inclusion in Company Law.
339
 Very early on, China‘s Code of Corporate Governance340 
imposed mandatory cumulative voting on listed companies where a controlling shareholder 
holds 30% or more of the total voting shares in the company. However, the perennial 
problem of limited enforcement arises. Firstly, the CSRC has a reputation for weak 
enforcement. The CSRC encourages companies listed on ChiNext to embrace cumulative 
voting, especially for the election of independent directors, and makes efforts to explain the 
process to shareholders and stakeholders.
341
   
A review of enforcement of cumulative voting in the surveyed companies revealed in 
published results of ad hoc company ‗self-inspections‘ (‗zicha‘) ordered by the CSRC 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Italy, see  Reinier H. Kraakman, ed., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach, 2nd ed. (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 90-92. 
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 For example, see Wang Jijun, ―Gufenyouxian Gongsi Leiji Toupiao Zhidu Yanjiu [Cumulative Voting 
System in Joint Stock Companies],‖ Zhongguo Faxue (Chinese Legal Science), no.8 (1998): 83-87. (Argues the 
importance of adopting cumulative voting for the protection of minority shareholders as an effective mechanism 
to control on controlling shareholders.) cf Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, ―Voting in Corporate 
Law,‖ Journal of Law and Economics 26, no.2 (June 1, 1983): 395-427, url: doi:10.2307/725110. 
(Acknowledges the advantages of using minority shareholders gaining some protection through cumulative 
voting, but nonetheless points out the persisting controversy with shareholders with less votes (i.e., less capital 
contributions) being given an advantage over those with higher capital contribution). Of course, the ‗balancing‘ 
effect of cumulative voting depends on the formula used, and how concentrated or dispersed is the ownership 
structure of the company in question.  
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 See China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Economic and Trade Commission, ―Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China,‖ (2001), para. 31. 
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 Chapter Five illustrates this encouragement reflected in the type of questions asked in survey questionnaires 
sent to companies regarding corporate governance practice. One example is the CSRC Xiamen Office 
publication on the matter.  
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undertaken between January 2010 and December 2011.
 342
 On analysis, most of the surveyed 
companies (of this thesis) subject to the CSRC survey expressly undertook in their published 
response to employ cumulative voting in future selections of directors as a whole. Tellingly, 
many surveyed companies did not include supervisors in this undertaking, with only a small 
minority including independent directors. This reveals a lack of uniformity in implementation 
and even a lack of understanding as to whether to comply with Company Law, which 
requires directors and supervisors alike, or the Code, which primarily focuses on the election 
of independent directors. The problem with cumulative voting lies in its complexity, not in 
terms of formula but rather in terms of how votes should be cast by minority and controlling 
shareholders alike. 
In practice, however, most of the surveyed companies had not yet implemented 
cumulative voting in the election of their present tenure of directors and supervisors, who 
were largely appointed before the companies were converted to joint stock companies, or 
were not yet listed, so that the Code did not apply at the time.
343
 This clearly indicates that 
some surveyed companies did not adopt Company Law‘s permissive option into their articles 
of association. However, post IPO they appear willing because it is likely that they fall under 
the mandatory requirement of the Code. More interestingly, even surveyed companies with 
an aggregate controlling shareholding of less than 30% of total voting rights also indicated a 
willingness to adopt cumulative voting. Whether or not companies in practice apply 
cumulative voting in the selection of independent directors and other position on the boards 
of directors and supervisors remains to be seen. The delay in the implementation of 
cumulative voting may also be attributable to the fact that the ChiNext Measures require 
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 Information sourced from public disclosures made by surveyed companies compiled from individual 
company disclosure records searched on http://chinext.cninfo.com.cn/newmarket/gszx.html and using Chinese 
language search engines such as baidu.com. 
343
 Invariably, from 2012 onwards, it will be interesting to see how many implement it as most of the tenures of 
the boards would have expired. 
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companies not to have had any changes to the boards in the two years prior to IPO, with most 
of them renewing their three-year tenure on the executive board at least two  years before IPO, 
when the company is still private. On analysis of the prevailing minority shareholdings in 
surveyed companies, cumulative voting has a potentially empowering effect when the 
minority block is not highly dispersed into very small holdings. 
Notwithstanding the above, the lack of attendance and voting of shareholders at 
meetings in ChiNext companies compared to the number of registered shareholders per 
company remains a problem. The next section analyses the use of proxies by shareholders 
where they are unable to attend or cast their votes themselves.  
 
2. Proxy Voting 
Proxy voting remains an important facility for minority shareholder representation 
and enables them to cast their vote while avoiding the costs of attendance or even lack of 
adequate information. Article 107 of Company Law generally provides for the provision of 
proxy voting, but it is permissive rather than mandatory. In fact, the law does not expressly 
state the mechanism for authorising proxy voting for joint stock companies; that is, whether 
by inclusion in the articles of association or by resolution at a shareholders‘ meeting.344 
With such vagueness, it is unsurprising that the results of the examination of 
mandatory disclosures of resolutions for AGMs held in 2009, 2010 and 2011 demonstrate 
that the use of proxy voting in surveyed companies is limited. Two types of proxy were 
examined, categorised here as ‗external proxies‘, i.e., external representatives chosen by 
shareholders including corporate proxies, and ‗internal proxies‘, i.e., internal representatives 
such as independent directors. Most of the external proxies were corporate, such as 
                                                 
344
 This is in contrast to express provisions for limited liability companies. Some scholars believe that this was 
intended by the lawmakers to permit choice for joint stock companies. See Gan, Qiye yu gongsi faxue 
[Jurisprudence on Enterprises and Companies], 2012. An alternative perspective was that the lawmakers 
perhaps intended that regulations relating to public listed companies would naturally fill this gap.  
  
166  
 
institutional shareholders, and their attendance was demonstrably low. A negligible number 
of internal proxies were chosen during those years. No minority shareholders in surveyed 
companies utilised this facility during AGMs held for 2009, 2010 or 2011. Thus, not only do 
shareholder meetings suffer from a lack of attendance in person but also limited use of proxy 
voting by shareholders as a whole. A practical method to improve voting by shareholders has 
been the encouragement of online voting, discussed in the following section. 
 
3. Online Voting 
Online voting is arguably the most efficient way of enfranchising and giving a voice 
to minority shareholders, especially since almost half of China‘s population use the Internet. 
The CSRC provides for the voluntary use of online voting or any other convenient method to 
enable shareholders to take part in voting in listed companies.
345
 Gan Peizhong believes that 
online attendance with the ability to pose or ask a question by text or email should be 
permitted as a way of increasing the voice of shareholders, especially that of the minority.
346
 
As demonstrated in Table 5, only 5% to 10% of surveyed companies provided online 
voting to their shareholders in 2010 and 2011. Online voting was not available at the 2009 
AGMs because the companies were not listed.  
 
 
Table 5: Percentage of surveyed companies using online voting at annual general meetings 
                                                 
345
 For full details, see generally Chapter IV (and rule of CSRC, ―Shangshigongsi gudong dahui guize [Rules 
Regarding Annual General Meetings of Listed Companies]‖ (Chinese Securities and Regulatory Authority, 16 
March, 2006), url: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgf/ssgs/gszl/201012/t20101231_189783.html. 
346
 Gan, Qiye yu gongsi faxue [Jurisprudence on Enterprises and Companies], 2012: 224. 
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Already, the provision of the facility by surveyed companies to shareholders is a 
declining trend. Although over 10% of CSMEs used online voting in 2010, that number 
abruptly halved to just over 5% in the following year. Due to the controversial nature of 
providing a service, it was difficult to obtain reasons for the sharp fall in provision. It is also 
of note that those companies that provided an online voting service for the 2010 AGMs did 
not do so for the 2011 AGMs. As to reasons, it may simply be that these companies 
experimented and then decided not to provide the service. Cost is an unlikely reason, since 
the initial set up cost of the facility tends to be more expensive than its maintenance. A 
cynical analysis may be that companies removed the online voting due to the potential 
reputational risk and impact of minority shareholders voting in abstention or rejection of 
resolutions. Indeed, all companies that provided online voting were subjected to shareholder 
voting action ranging from abstentions to outright rejection of resolutions. This rarely 
happened in any of the companies that did not provide online voting. 
Also of note is that all of the surveyed companies that provided online voting were 
privately held with a mix of ownership of individuals or group of individuals. For example, 
the highest voting turnout of all was achieved by Beijing Ultrapower Software Co. Ltd. at its 
2010 AGM, where 82 shareholders voted. Of that number, 71 voted online and 11 attended in 
person. The representation of total issued share capital of these voters was relatively low at 
                                                 
347
 Details of online voting was gleaned from a review of the AGM resolutions published by companies 
published on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange website: www.szse.gov.cn.   
Percentage of CSMEs using 
online voting at AGMs
347
 
- 10.15 5.08 
Source: author‟s survey    
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52.96%. Nevertheless, this is arguably a high proportion considering that none of the 
shareholders had a controlling shareholding, with the maximum being 13.93%. 
Although the relative numbers of shareholders that vote online remain relatively low 
overall, the benefit of online voting in enfranchising cannot be understated since the largest 
turnout of shareholders for voting took place in those surveyed companies that provided 
online voting for shareholders. With an evident trend in decline in attendance by minority 
shareholders, online voting becomes especially important. However, what is certain is that 
controlling shareholders increasingly dominate shareholders‘ meetings. 
 The use of online voting is an excellent way of promoting so-called corporate 
democracy. However, it is not mandatory under the ChiNext framework or any corporate law 
or rules. 
 
4. Use of Shareholders’ Meetings by Scrutinisers 
Company Law does not expressly require the attendance of independent scrutinisers. 
However, under article 22, shareholders have the right to apply to the court to make 
ineffective any shareholders meeting resolution within 60 days of its passing if content or 
procedure relating to the resolutions was in violation of the law, administrative procedures, or 
damages the interests of the company or shareholders. 
Scrutinisers perform three functions. First, scrutinisers verify that registered 
shareholders were in attendance in actual fact: one of the key problems in China is that it is 
commonplace for individuals to borrow someone‘s name and identity card to open up trading 
accounts (done for a host of reasons, including privacy), and yet still want to attend and vote 
in person at meetings.
348
 Secondly, they confirm that the voting results including proxies. 
Finally, scrutinisers confirm that the business of the meeting was duly executed. The ChiNext 
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 Liu Junhai, Legislative and Judicial Controversies, (2006), 187. 
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framework requires the scrutiniser to publish an independent opinion confirming these three 
matters, among others. 
At the AGMs of the surveyed companies, each company‘s external lawyer performed 
the function of scrutiniser and published an independent report on the proceedings and results 
of the meeting. The corporate governance issue comes in the form of a potential conflict of 
interests because the company‘s external legal counsel cannot be defined as ‗independent‘. 
They are on a retainer from the company. Moreover, external legal counsel tends to have 
close links to management since most SMEs such as those listed on ChiNext tend to have 
small in-house legal departments. In individual and family-controlled listed companies the 
external counsel in reality acts as the ‗family lawyer‘ and so is not the most appropriate 
independent scrutiniser. 
 
D. Shareholder Proposals at General Meetings 
A shareholder‘s right to make a proposal at a shareholders‘ meeting presents a 
potentially strong curb on the pervasive authority of controlling shareholders over 
shareholders‘ meetings. It also serves as an indicator of shareholder activism. 
Article 103 of Company Law permits a shareholder, or a group of shareholders 
together, holding 3% or more of the total voting rights in the company to make provisional 
proposals for deliberation at a shareholders‘ meeting. Proposals must be submitted in writing 
to the executive board at least 10 days prior to the shareholders‘ meeting, the executive board 
has no discretion in the matter. They must, within two days of receipt of the proposal, notify 
all other shareholders and make a mandatory announcement to the market. The proposal is 
then placed as an agenda item for consideration at the shareholders‘ meeting. Sometimes the 
amended notice and agenda of the shareholders meeting is included in the announcement to 
the market. 
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Table 6 illustrates the percentage of companies in which shareholders invoked their 
right to propose resolutions at an annual shareholders‘ meeting. 
 
Table 6: Percentage of shareholders in attendance at meetings with attendance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examining the annual shareholders‘ meeting in particular, 11 proposals were made in 
11 different companies for the years ending 31 December 2009 (four proposals), 2010 (four 
proposals) and 2011 (three proposals), respectively. For 2009, almost 7% of the surveyed 
companies had shareholders issue article 103 proposals. This figure remained the same for 
2010 but then fell to 5% in 2011. However, and paradoxically, six of the total 11 proposals 
considered at AGMs were by controlling shareholders, and another four by pre-IPO 
individual subscribers. Surprisingly, only one legal person, in this casea venture capital 
investor issued a proposal; no institutional investors issued any. It remains unclear as to 
whether better corporate governance, antipathy or disaffection caused this decline. All the 
shareholder proposals identified arose only in privately held companies. 
Although Company Law article 103 empowers minority shareholders by curtailing the 
controlling shareholders‘ monopolisation of control over shareholders‘ meeting agendas, 
proposals made by controlling shareholders include amendments to articles of association and 
the nomination of candidates as directors, including independent directors, as well as the 
 
2009 
AGM 
2010 
AGM 
2011 
AGM 
Percentage of CSMEs 
where shareholders 
proposed a resolution at 
AGM 
6.78 6.78 5.08 
Source: author‟s survey 
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introduction of share incentive schemes, including giving the board extensive authority to 
implement and award share incentives. 
Non-controlling shareholders appear ready to use the shareholder right to propose 
corporate-governance-related matters at a shareholders‘ meeting. For example, Netac Ltd. 
illustrates the use of this right by two pre-IPO individual subscribers acting together within a 
few months of the company‘s listing on ChiNext. Two of Netac‘s shareholders, Deng 
Guoshun and Cheng Shaohua, acting in concert, controlled 39.63% of the total issued share 
capital. A relatively small block holder, Wang Quanyang, who directly held a total of 11.52% 
of issued shares, proposed a resolution for the approval and implementation of a ‗system for 
safeguarding against controlling shareholders and related parties misusing company share 
capital‘. The resolution was unanimously passed at the 2009 AGM. Perhaps also revealing is 
that Wang holds a non-executive director post in the company, which may indicate that the 
controlling shareholder, who also happens to be the chairman of the company, gave his tacit 
approval. This is perhaps evidenced by the fact that the resolution was passed. 
However, the implications of this right seem different when it is actually controlling 
shareholders that make article 103 proposals. While these examples stand as positive 
examples of shareholder engagement in companies by both controlling and minority 
shareholders, there remains the danger of shareholder actions being isolated and infrequent 
occurrences. Results from the survey demonstrate a clear decline in non-controlling 
shareholder engagement overall. 
Despite the paradoxical use of article 103 by owner-managers, the provision still 
remains a strategically important mechanism for non-controlling and minority shareholders 
for two reasons. Under China‘s Company Law, the executive board‘s role is merely 
procedural in being the appropriate forum to receive the proposal and then circulate it as an 
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agenda item to all shareholders.
349
 That is, it has no discretion whatsoever to review, 
negotiate, amend or even approve such a proposal. This potentially proffers an immense 
amount of power in the hands of shareholders. However, the key issue remains as to how to 
small and medium sized shareholder can effectively utilise it in an ownership structure which 
is relatively and commonly dispersed below the controlling shareholder level. Moreover, as 
the Netac example above demonstrated, tacit approval by the controlling shareholder may be 
required since ultimately the proposal will be put before the shareholders‘ meeting. The next 
section examines how controlling shareholders in ChiNext companies purport to impose self-
regulation by using covenants and undertakings. Thus, the key benefit for corporate 
governance and shareholders as well as stakeholders is that, through the analysis of 
shareholder proposals in China, the state of shareholder engagement and relations with the 
board can be unveiled. 
 
IV. Evaluative Summary 
The previous section have presented the results of this research, and due to the 
expanse of the topics examined, this section builds on the results and comes together by 
identifying and providing context to the key points and themes raised. They include share 
ownership patterns and the corporate governance issues they raise, the use of voting and the 
mechanisms that potentially present a check and balance on controlling shareholders. 
The surveyed companies all have concentrated ownership structures with a family, 
individual or group of persons or the state as controlling shareholders. Apart from the 
ownership structure of the state shareholder, there is no strong trend in the use of pyramidal 
                                                 
349
 Some CSMEs revised the initial notice with the added item while others merely made a single announcement 
of addition. Currently, there are no studies on the effect of the use of shareholder proposal rights on the 
company. Nonetheless, depending on the contents of the proposal and who it has been made by, there may be 
some reaction by the market in the form of other investors and analysts, as well as, perhaps, scrutiny from 
regulators. 
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structures. Most hold shares directly and occasionally through SPV so that there is only one 
intermediate legal entity between the ultimate shareholder and their investment in the 
surveyed company. This contrasts with the complex pyramidal structures found in other 
equity markets in China. Empirical evidence has highlighted the negative effects of 
pyramidal structures in giving controlling shareholders proportionally larger cash-flow 
rights.
350
 This is a widespread phenomenon in countries with concentrated ownership of 
listed companies, especially where family ownership dominates, such as in Europe, especially 
Italy.
351
 Thus, as will be seen in Chapter Five, the CSRC has been especially vigilant in 
refusing listing to companies that have ‗muddled ownership structures‘. 
 However, shareholder engagement through attendance of and voting at general 
meetings remains relatively low in the surveyed companies, resulting in controlling 
shareholders effectively monopolising shareholders‘ meetings. The use of cumulative voting 
has being adopted by most surveyed companies in their undertakings with the company, but 
has yet to be used in practice. However, even if used, the low turnout of minority 
shareholders will effectively undo the process. The current provision of online voting really 
bodes well for the effectiveness of cumulative voting in practice for the appointment of 
independent directors, and, indeed, for other positions on the boards. However, this relies on 
the provision of this method of voting by companies. The results of this research indicate that 
companies will only provide online voting of this type if it is a mandatory requirement. At the 
moment it only has regulatory permissive force under the auspices of the CSRC. Since it is 
not a Company Law provision, it is more a privilege than a right for shareholders as there is 
                                                 
350
 Wang Lijun, ―Jinzida, guanlianjiaoyi yu gongsi jiazhi - jiyu woguo minying shangshigongsi de shizheng 
yanjiu (Pyramid Control, Related Party Transaction and Corporate Value),‖ Zhengquan shichang daobao 
(Securities Market Herald), no.6 (2006): 18-24. (In a survey of 329 privately held listed companies between 
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 See, Luca Enriques and Paolo Volpin, ―Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe,‖ Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 21, no.1 (2007): 117-40. 
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no legal recourse if online voting is completely withdrawn by companies, despite it being the 
most convenient method of participation by minority shareholders. Indeed, the surveyed 
companies that stopped providing online voting were those that witnessed a relatively high 
number of ‗against‘ votes by minority shareholders. This indicates that companies may be 
sensitive to opposition and will avoid giving a forum for such opposition if to do so is within 
their power. Tellingly, empirical studies attest to the importance of online voting in listed 
companies, where they find that those votes tend to represent the opinion of small and 
medium-sized shareholders.
352
 The take up of proxy voting also remains woefully low and 
may perhaps be linked to lack of understanding of its uses, and, where understood, a lack of 
confidence in internal proxies. The irony is that both of these mechanisms cannot be a ‗voice‘ 
of minority shareholders if they are not used. 
The effectiveness of controlling shareholders, both state and private, in their role in 
corporate governance has traditionally been met with scepticism, with their ownership 
perceived as ‗unfettered‘.353 However, this has since being dispelled with empirical evidence, 
it suggests that private companies (especially family-controlled listed companies) are better 
managed than those that are widely held.
354
 An influential empirical study of companies 
listed in China undertaken by Xu Xiaodong and Chen Xiaoyue also indicates that, when the 
controlling shareholder is not the state, the performance and the spirit of corporate 
governance in companies improves.
355
 On ChiNext, controlling shareholders in the surveyed 
companies, regardless of their type, appear to be corporate governance savvy, and this 
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 Li Wenjing, Kong Dongmin, Liu Shasha, and Xing Jingping, ―Zhongxiao gudong jinneng „da bianche‟ me? - 
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Only Act as‗Free Riders‘? Evidence from Public Shareholders Online Voting of Shenzhen Stock Exchange).‖ 
Jinrong yanjiu (Journal of Financial Research), no.3 (2012): 152-63. 
353
 Feinerman, James, ―New Hope for Corporate Governance in China?‖ The China Quarterly 191 (September 
2007): 590-612. 
354
 For details, see Enriques and Volpin, ―Continental Europe,‖ 122. 
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appears to be a direct consequence of the corporate governance elements of the IPO 
application process. For instance, such controlling shareholders are more aware of ownership 
structures in avoiding pyramids, and make various undertakings to the company that 
effectively regard the use of company funds and certain types of related party transactions. 
Thus, the occurrence of a large gap in holdings controlling shareholders and second 
largest shareholders also occurs in the surveyed companies, but on a lesser scale than on the 
other equity boards in China.
356
 This results in the ownership structure below the controlling 
shareholder level being widely dispersed. The implications for corporate governance are that 
even would-be shareholder activists may have a difficult task in garnering enough support for 
a proxy contest where required. Having said this, most of the privately held surveyed 
companies have three or four shareholders that can together control 10% or more of the 
voting rights, which means, at least, that they can either requisition a shareholders‘ meeting 
or issue a shareholder proposal. 
 Key to this chapter has been the demonstration that controlling shareholders do not 
have unfettered voting control of the company. However, they do have the ability and 
influence to build and maintain alliances with other large shareholders to pass both ordinary 
and special resolutions at shareholders‘ meetings, which may not necessarily be in the interest 
of minority shareholders. The case studies also demonstrate the dominance of owner-
managers in the privately held surveyed companies. Additionally, as John Coffee observes, in 
such instances of concentrated ownership, an independent board may not suffice as a check 
on a controlling shareholder; therefore, alternative mechanisms will be required.
357
 
  The results of this chapter indicate that there are alternative mechanisms for checking 
the controlling shareholder, at least in the privately held surveyed companies. They are the 
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venture capital investors and the pre-IPO individual investors, but both must employ the 
boards as well as shareholders‘ meetings to be effective against controlling shareholders. This 
moves away from the natural inclination that institutional shareholders are the most effective 
mechanism. As demonstrated earlier, institutional investors on ChiNext largely invest in the 
secondary market with short and medium-term strategies. Furthermore, even when they have 
a long-term view, such as the Social Security Fund, they rarely have representatives on the 
executive board or supervisory board. This can be contrasted with venture capital investors 
who take a longer term view, have advisers and even occasionally make use of shareholder 
proposals to nominate a representative to one of the boards. In terms of the effectiveness of 
venture capitalists in corporate governance on ChiNext, this thesis finds them to be an 
effective mechanism. Of course, the limit to their effectiveness as a corporate governance 
mechanism lies in the fact that, post IPO, their exit strategy comes into force. Sometimes this 
has resulted in unfavourable effects on the share price, resulting in unfavourable financial 
media reports,
358
 when, objectively, the VC is merely divesting so that it can invest in other 
burgeoning enterprises. Having said this, there remain mixed assessments about the role and 
effectiveness of government-VCs in particular. Liu and Huang argue that the predominance 
of state-owned VCs means less competitiveness and even the partisan selection of companies 
to fund. Moreover, they have less discernible value systems than shareholder value. 
Therefore, their interests may not necessarily be aligned with minority or even other 
shareholders who want a return on their investment. In addition, the multi-layered agency 
relationships in state-owned companies means that decision-making and engagement with 
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companies at ground level is sparse.
359
 Nonetheless, it appears that the trade-off seems to be 
that government-VCs invest in the early stages that private VCs tend to avoid due to the 
higher risk profile.
360
 
The other, and perhaps most important mechanism that presents a check on 
controlling shareholders in the surveyed companies is the pre-IPO individual investor. This 
investor may not necessarily have a large holding, but this is not the only thing that acts as a 
check on the controlling shareholder. Rather, their economic guanxi, emanating from them 
providing funding for the business, makes them influential. It is the combination of all three 
factors that makes them potentially the most effective source of protection for shareholders if 
their interests are or can be aligned with those of minority shareholders. 
Lowering the cost of voting also empowers shareholders, for example, by making 
online voting and proxy voting available. Again, these devices are limited in effectiveness in 
that they merely perform the task of making known the opinions of the other shareholders. 
This brings the differences in objectives and direction of the firm to analysts who will deduce 
what they will. Disclosure on the market of such differences may impact the share price 
where it is known that there is strategy conflict. Furthermore, minority shareholders can be 
protected from controlling shareholders by ensuring that there are strict limits in deviation 
from the one-vote-per-share rule. 
Non-attendance of shareholders‘ meetings and not partaking in online voting are 
arguably symptomatic of a short-term investment approach. Corporate governance vis a vis 
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protection of their interests becomes less of an issue for such investors because they are 
speculative. This phenomenon is not limited to China, but was identified by John Coffee over 
20 years ago when he found that institutional shareholders undertook a control trade-off in 
favour of retaining liquidity. Consequently, the regulatory framework did not account for the 
sole reason for lack of institutional investor engagement in monitoring and decision-making 
in companies.
361
 
 On ChiNext, like other equity markets on in China, there remains an underlying 
assumption that institutional shareholders carry out a better governance role of monitoring 
and advising the companies in which they invest. But this assumption relies on two further 
assumptions. One seems to be that the institutional shareholder has an inherent interest to 
carry out a governance role. From this research on ChiNext, it appears that institutional 
investors that have short-term investment strategies tend to neither have motivation nor 
inclination to get involved in the management of the company.  Institutional investors still 
remain relatively low on ChiNext. For instance, in the first year of its operation, institutional 
shareholders only invested in three types of company on ChiNext, namely media and culture, 
electronic and mechanical equipment. The range of investment was also small, ranging from 
0.01% to 3.56%. 
 The other assumption linked to the first is that the company invested in is relatively 
large with relatively normal levels of investment risk. Companies with high risk and high 
return may never be the type that institutional investors choose for a long-term strategy. After 
all, why expend such time and resources on a company in which the risks are high and a 
relatively quick return can be made in the short term? 
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For hi-tech, innovative and high-return SMEs publicly listed, the type of institutional 
investor and the timing of the investment bears on the robustness of its internal governance 
structure. The venture capital investor remains best positioned for such companies as those 
listed on ChiNext. Crucially, because the timing is pre-IPO, they can be very influential in 
ensuring that the company has the right internal governance structure and external 
governance compliance. Their incentive will be the returns once the company is listed. The 
only issue that may hamper this process is where substantial returns on investment are made 
on listing regardless of the performance or the corporate governance of the company. As 
discussed earlier, currently, this has been the phenomena on ChiNext due to the current 
system for IPO pricing, which is now in the process of reform. 
The above demonstrates that perhaps the type of institutional investor and the timing 
of investment may be important. 
In China, many corporate law scholars believe that the key problem with medium and 
small shareholders in listed companies remains the free-rider phenomenon, and not 
necessarily speculative behaviour by the shareholders.
362
 However, the question is whether 
these two issues are mutually exclusive. Analysis of the survey results points to the fact that 
these two issues may be inter-related. 
Empirical research by Xu and Wang over a decade ago reveals that, in contrast to 
institutional investors, China's small retail shareholders tend to have a short-term approach to 
investment and they have little positive effect on the performance or corporate governance of 
listed companies in China. They also rarely attend shareholders‘ meetings.363 Nonetheless, 
this research demonstrated that, where online voting was provided, voting by minority 
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shareholders increased greatly. Moreover, shareholders appeared more vocal with dissenting 
votes appearing on resolutions where voting was by proxy or in person. This can be attributed 
to the lower costs in time and expense compared to physically attending meetings. At present, 
the provision of online voting remains voluntary, that is, it is only recommended by the 
regulatory authorities. The results of this research demonstrate that, if mandatory, and given a 
certain degree of marketing to and training of shareholders, online voting may reduce the 
free-rider phenomenon. There is, as yet, no research relating to shareholder activism on 
ChiNext; but why turn up if one‘s vote is ineffective? 
Empirical evidence supports the notion that family-controlled companies are better 
managed than those widely held companies because as dominant shareholders they have the 
power and incentive to both motivate and discipline management.
364
 The rationale being that, 
because shareholders are so dispersed, they cannot co-ordinate to share monitoring and 
control costs, thereby allowing managers to take benefits or act to the detriment of 
shareholders.
365
 Thus, individual and family owner-managers eliminate the vertical agency 
problem of managers appropriating shareholder. 
Family control fails to protect the interests of other shareholders from abuse, whereas 
controlling owners are also the managers, as is often the case on ChiNext, and generally in 
China‘s SMEs. On ChiNext there have been many media reports of alleged expropriation of 
minority shareholders,
366
 the details of which are unsubstantiated due the lack of disclosure. 
Internal management mechanisms on ChiNext are limited by the fact that controlling families 
cannot be ousted by replacing the board of directors. They are entrenched by self- 
representation and/or appointing directors on the board of directors and supervisors. As there 
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is at present no market for control on ChiNext, they cannot be challenged by outside investors. 
There is unlikely to be a market for control any time as ChiNext is the government‘s policy 
market, focused on financing selected companies as its key economic development objective. 
Takeovers, mergers and acquisitions and such market behaviour are likely to jeopardise that 
by making the market less regulated. Nonetheless, this raises the concern of how to protect 
the interests of outside investors who are likely to move away from ChiNext, back onto the 
more traditional markets. This will be a priority for the government once the market starts to 
lose confidence, thereby risking an important source of financing of industry. 
 
Closing Remarks 
This chapter demonstrated the trends in ownership structure on ChiNext characterised 
by the diminishing role of the state as controlling shareholder. The private sector in the form 
of private controlling shareholders comprising individuals, families and groups of individuals 
now dominate one of China‘s equity markets. The role of the state as shareholder through 
VCs and PE investors also appears limited, which indicates a diminishing role for political 
influence. 
Moreover, with the emergence of owner-managers, a more complicated corporate 
governance issue than ‗principal-principal‘ agency problems arises. The merging of 
separation of ownership and control means that private controlling shareholders are 
potentially more powerful since, as managers, they literally do not have an ultimate interest to 
account to other than themselves. This contrasts with SOEs where strides have been made by 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) to make management not only accountable to the state but to the shareholders. 
Finally, the use of SPV may present a problem for identifying related party transactions or 
undesirable transactions for the sole benefit of the controlling shareholder to the detriment of 
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the company and shareholders. This is expanded upon in Chapter Four, but the next chapter 
first examines the role of the executive board, the supervisory board and independent 
directors in presenting a check and balance to owner-managers. 
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Chapter Four – Internal Governance Mechanisms on ChiNext 
 The preceding chapter demonstrated that although the predominance of concentrated 
ownership in China‘s listed companies continues, families, individuals and groups of 
individuals have emerged as the controlling shareholders of these companies rather than the 
state. Thus, the key question here is how effective the board is as an independent 
counterbalance against controlling shareholders who also take part in the management of the 
company. 
It is well documented and recognised by the regulators that due to China‘s 
predominantly highly concentrated share patterns it has suffered from the prevalence of 
‗insider control‘.367 In recent years there has been much debate about how best to improve the 
effectiveness of the executive board in particular.
368
 At company level, insider control 
manifests itself in three ways. First, by decisions being arbitrarily made by certain individuals, 
with resolutions of the board being procedural rather than strategic thereby alienating the 
board of directors in its decision-making role.
369
 Second, the power and influence of certain 
individuals as or representing controlling shareholders is such as to diminish the 
independence of the board in decision-making.
370
 Last, exercise of control and influence over 
the supervisory board which effectively alienates its constituents and its castrates its 
monitoring function.
371
 
However, as will be demonstrated, the results of this chapter indicate that ChiNext 
listed companies present a marked improvement in the corporate governance functionality 
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and effectiveness of internal mechanisms. Of course, there remains much to be improved in 
term of corporate reporting upon which the substance of this thesis relies upon. Adopting an 
institutional approach, this chapter examines specific indicators of board effectiveness such 
as the size and composition of the executive board and supervisory board, the number of 
meetings held and attendance, which assist in determining the nature of internal governance 
and the effectiveness of the executive board and supervisory board, independent directors and 
board secretary in their functions as envisaged under both Company Law and the ChiNext 
Rules. Again, case studies and examples provide insights into company level corporate 
governance. 
 
I. Emerging Management Structure Trends on ChiNext 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the first noticeable trend in management 
structures in ChiNext companies is the dominance by private owner-managers. That is, in 
82.50% of the surveyed companies, the controlling shareholders held key positions on the 
executive board and senior management.
372
 The case studies in the preceding chapter also 
illustrated this trend toward the merging of ownership and control in the surveyed companies. 
The remaining 17.50% of surveyed companies comprised state-private ventures and SOE 
controlling shareholders. In the former, the private partners, either individually or as a family, 
sit on the executive board along with representatives of the SOE(s), while in the latter, SOEs 
appoint representatives on the executive board. SOEs also have representatives sitting on the 
supervisory board in some of the surveyed companies. Inevitably, this means that there 
remain varying degrees of separation of ownership and control due to the state appointing its 
representatives, or, as in semi-private companies, a mutual appointment of industry or 
management professionals. Of course, the participation of private non-controlling but major 
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block holders in semi-private companies limits the extent of separation of ownership and 
control. Nonetheless, executive board and key management positions both have management 
and industry professionals appointed to the executive board and senior management team. 
This lack of separation of ownership from management raises certain concerns. 
Foremost are the type of corporate governance issues that arise from owner-managed listed 
companies. This leads to questions as to whether China‘s corporate law and corporate 
governance laws and rules, which historically purported to deal with issues arising in listed 
SOEs where ownership and control are separate, can actually be effectively applied to private 
owner-managed listed companies. Bearing in mind that it was concluded in Chapter Two that 
the ChiNext framework aimed to deal with ‗agent-principal‘ conflicts, which do not wholly 
arise where no separation of ownership and control arises. Prior to examining the 
aforementioned issues, this chapter first examines the nature of internal governance 
mechanisms. 
 
II. How Engaged is the Board in Decision-making and Monitoring? 
A fundamental corporate governance issue of how engaged the board is arises in both 
concentrated and dispersed ownership structures, whether with one-tier or two-tier board 
structure. The controversy remains on how best to judge the engagement of the board of 
directors (executive board).  On ChiNext, ensuring the increased engagement of the executive 
board in decision-making and monitoring of management remains a key objective of the 
Measures and Rules discussed earlier.  
This section examines the extent to which the board is able to perform its functions 
effectively where controlling shareholders in concentrated ownership structures or affiliated-
individuals in an otherwise widely held ownership structure actively participate in the 
running of the business, as described above.  
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However, first, a summary of the remit of the board is required in order to highlight 
decisions that are specifically reserved for the board and not intended for delegation to 
individual directors or members of senior management unless expressly mandated by the 
board.
373
 
Company Law requires the board as a whole to engage in ten main functions in 
addition to those functions and powers specifically bestowed under the articles of association 
of the company.
374
 The executive board is responsible to the shareholders‘ general meeting 
(SGM) and for convening SGMs where it reports its work to shareholders, and then 
implement SGM resolutions. The executive board decides on business and investment plans 
and formulates the basic management system of the company. It further formulates plans for 
the financial budget and final accounts, for profit distribution and making up losses, for 
increases and reductions to the registered share capital or for the issuance of bonds and 
formulation of plans for merger, division, dissolution or transformation of the company. In 
addition, the board may appoint the members of the liquidation committee of the company. 
Finally, the executive board appoints, dismisses and remunerates the manager of the company. 
Of course, as will be seen, some of these functions are delegated to other constituents of the 
board of directors, notably to board committees. 
 
A. Size and Composition of the Executive Board 
This section examines the size and composition of boards of directors in line with 
literature that perceives it as key effective board decision-making.
375
 Company Law makes 
                                                 
373
 Article 104(10) of Company Law.  
374
 Article 104 of Company Law.  
375
Some research has indicated the importance of the size of the board; that is, the smaller the better. See, David 
Yermack, ―Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors,‖ V Governance: An 
International Perspective no.1 (2005): 150-76. (As boards increase from small to medium in size the 
incremental costs are greater than if they increase from medium to large.)  Cf Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. 
Daniel, and Lalitha Naveen, ―Boards: Does One Size Fit All?‖ Journal of Financial Economics 87, no.2 (2008): 
 
  
188  
 
two stipulations regarding the size and composition of the executive board. In size, the 
executive board can have between five and 19 directors, which must include a chairman, with 
at least one-third of the board comprising independent directors. 
 
1. What Dictates the Composition of the Executive Board? 
In terms of composition, Company Law recognises the general term ‗director‘ 
(dongshi),
376
 and specifically independent directors (dulidongshi) because of the specific role 
afforded in corporate governance. However, in practice, execboards of listed companies in 
China, including those listed on ChiNext, companies also broadly comprise executive 
directors (shixingdongshi) and non-executive (or external) directors (feishixingdongshi) as 
well as independent directors. State-owned enterprises also have Chinese-styled external 
department directors (waibudongshi), though this is not necessarily the case in semi-private 
companies.  
Company Law further distinguishes between the chairman of the board and other 
directors. However, there remains no guidance in the ChiNext Framework on whether the 
chairman‘s role is executive or non-executive.377 In practice, chairmen of listed companies in 
China are rarely regarded as non-executive or even independent on appointment because they 
tend to take an interest in the day-to-day management.
378
 This correlates with the fact that 
nearly all of the surveyed companies had the controlling shareholder or representative (in the 
case of SOEs) appointed as chairperson of the executive board. Moreover, most of them 
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concurrently hold the position of legal representative.
379
 Thus, in listed companies in China 
the chairperson importantly remains the first and main port of call for any corporate actions.  
The figure below offers a snapshot of the composition of the board of directors on 
ChiNext referred to in the parts that follow. 
 
Figure 10: Average composition of the board of directors 
 
 
 
The table below further presents the main constituents found in the surveyed 
companies (to the exclusion of external department directors) with a synopsis of ownership 
and control in ChiNext companies by examining the constituents of the executive board that 
are shareholding. 
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Table 7: Ownership and control of the executive board of surveyed companies 
 
Source: Author‟s survey 
 
As illustrated above, most executive directors have holdings in the company or 
represent shareholders or creditors. In the majority, they directly hold these shares and 
represent their own personal interests.
380
Those non-executive directors without shareholdings 
tend to contribute in terms of expertise or contacts or they act as a counterbalance, 
presumably in favour of controlling shareholders. However, the aforementioned determinants 
apply mostly pre-IPO. Post IPO, the composition of ChiNext executive boards has remained 
fairly stable. Directors tend to be contracted for a fixed three-year tenure with the average 
being over three years. Moreover, any increase in directors will likely require a proportionate 
increase in independent directors since all listed companies must always have one-third of the 
constituents of the board as independent. Equally, any decrease in the size of the board may 
amount to a waste of resources where the board has more independent directors than required 
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under law. Thus, the associated costs of recruitment and remuneration may deter any increase 
or decrease in size. 
 
a. Shareholding Executive Directors 
The executive boards of the surveyed companies are dominated by executive directors 
with an average representation of 34%. Most executive directors hold the role of manager or 
deputy manager, also referred to as ‗general manager‘ or ‗chief executive‘. As mentioned 
earlier in Chapter Three, although the role reports directly to the board of directors, it remains 
powerful in its own right due to its statutory remit.
381
 Executive directors take part in the 
operational management in roles such as chief executive, general manager and vice president 
(president tends to be the equivalent of chairman). Crucially, they also typically earn a salary.  
Just under 85% of the total number of executives in the surveyed companies as a 
whole either directly or indirectly hold shares or represent shareholders in the surveyed 
companies.
382
 The remaining 15% do not have any shareholdings and can be described as 
professional managers with a high wage to compensate. More evident of the general 
prevalence of owner-managers on ChiNext, 80% of controlling shareholdings in the surveyed 
companies were controlled either directly or indirectly by executive directors. The prevalence 
of the owner-manager becomes more apparent in that the average number of shareholding 
executive directors per board is 2.85 directors, compared to the overall average of 3.40 
executive directors (including those without shareholdings). 
There are some anomalies where directors have executive positions in the company 
but are not compensated. Although there is not much information available, there is some 
indication that the assumption of the executive role is to enable the person holding it to 
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exercise the powers of that position, which a non-executive director is unable to do. For 
instance, with an executive position they are able to interact relatively freely with members of 
staff and even attend operational and senior management meetings to which non-executive 
directors do not have access. These hybrid executive directors commonly own shares in the 
company.
383
 There are also those that have an executive position and are paid nominal wages 
in that they earn a lot less than the non-executive directors. Of course, it may be the case that 
they are altruistic but this is highly doubtful when their wages are compared to those of other 
executive directors. Moreover, the number of other executive directorships indicates that they 
are less likely to be able to take part in the daily running of the company in reality. These 
types of quasi-executive are difficult to gauge in terms of their function and, therefore, 
interest in the company. Corporate governance is about transparency and accountability. On 
one hand, such directors may be useful as a very active internal monitoring at below board 
level; however, this is only the case if they represent or have in mind the interests of the 
shareholders and stakeholders and not just their own interests. This is mostly down to 
personality and, therefore, not easy to judge. 
 
b. Non-executive Directors: Shareholding and Non-shareholding 
The surveyed companies each have a mix of shareholding and non-shareholding non-
executive directors. Due to the dominance of controlling shareholders in executive director 
positions as explained in the preceding section, it may be expected that non-controlling 
shareholders will equally dominate non-executive appointments in order to oversee their 
investments.  
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However, this was not the case. Instead, the more dominant trend on ChiNext is to 
have non-executive directors who neither have nor represent shareholdings in the company. 
That is, 70% of the surveyed company executive boards comprised non-executive directors 
(‗NEDs‘) without shares compared with 57.50% of boards having NEDs with shareholdings. 
Those without shares were more likely to be remunerated. In terms of skills and expertise, 
NEDs with shares did not necessarily have industry-specific experience or networks as their 
shareholding was sufficient to justify their appointment. On ChiNext, NEDs (also termed 
external directors) are not independent and participate in the operational running of the 
company. It was found that most NEDs in the surveyed companies either represented 
personal shareholdings in the company or those of others, and very few received 
remuneration from the company. Clearly, on ChiNext, shareholding NEDs sit on the board in 
order to represent and monitor their interests in the company. 
A number of individuals are appointed as non-executives, although they have no 
shareholdings in the company. There may be two reasons for appointments that do not fall 
under either category. One is that the guanxi, i.e., the contacts and influence that they have in 
industry or government, is an important driver in their appointment. Another reason, which is 
more probable, is that this sort of non-executive director appears to be appointed to act as a 
buffer or to neutralise the balance of power for the executive directors. Such a buffer is 
needed against the increasingly powerful independent directors whom executive directors 
must not and do not want to be seen as directly interfering with. As demonstrated below, 
independent directors on ChiNext boards are gradually morphing into a collegiate of their 
own, which sees them less as individual independent directors. Moreover, this institution is 
further enhanced due to their very strong right to information from the company, and also 
their external regulatory responsibilities to publish their opinions on certain matters affecting 
the company. 
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c. External Department Directors and Employee Representative Directors 
Only one ChiNext company has so-called external department directors, and it is an 
SOE. The norm of external department directors did not arise from Company Law or 
corporate governance rules but rather out of SOE practice. External department directors are 
representatives from entities in the same group of companies or state departments. So they 
are ‗external‘ directors in so far as they are not employees of the company; so in reality they 
are synonymous with non-executives, except that the term is used mostly in state-related 
listed companies.  
One key breakthrough of Company Law, when revised in 2004, was that it permitted 
the appointment of employee representatives on the executive board.
384
 However, none of the 
surveyed companies have appointed any, and instead mandatory employee representation to 
the supervisory board remains the norm.
385
  
 
2. What Dictates the Size of the Executive Board on ChiNext? 
Company Law in general only stipulates that boards of listed companies have between 
five and 19 members.
386
 Similar to most regulatory regimes, the ChiNext framework does not 
specify an optimum size for the SMEs listed on its market. 
Analysis of the surveyed companies indicates that the average size of executive 
boards on 31 December 2009 was approximately 8.9 members with a range of six to 13 
directors. From 2009 to 2011, it remained stable with no changes, with all surveyed 
companies keeping the same number of directors in 2011 as they had in 2009. The largest 
number of directors was at Anke Bio with 13 members, and the smallest was Toread with six 
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members. On ChiNext, most privately owned and privately run companies have smaller 
boards. Large boards tend to be in state-owned companies and this is largely a reflection of 
multiple state interests within state-owned companies. 
The size of the executive board in the surveyed companies is driven by financing 
considerations (i.e., shareholder representation), legislation (e.g., minimum number of 
independent directors) and practicalities of operation. Despite the flexibility to increase their 
board size after IPO, the size has remained stable from IPO to the end of 2011. Most 
privately owned and privately run companies have small boards, while SOEs, despite being 
SMEs, on average have large boards and tend to be in state-owned companies. This reflects 
parties with multiple interests and sometimes disparate interests participating in state 
enterprises with each wanting to protect their interests. Several dynamics contribute to the 
size and stability of the boards in ChiNext companies. One is that Company Law requires a 
quorum of more than half of the members before a meeting is quorate.
387
 Naturally, the more 
directors on the board the more likely the meetings are to be quorate, even if one or two 
members are absent. 
 
3. How Engaged is the ChiNext Executive Board? 
Decision-making is increasingly taking place in the boardroom in ChiNext companies, 
rather than arbitrarily by owner-managers, as may be feared. The table below presents an 
illustration of the number of meetings held by the executive board in a given year. 
 
                                                 
387
 Article 112 of Company Law. 
  
196  
 
Table 8: Number of meetings of the board of directors during the year of surveyed companies 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2009, the average number of meetings of boards of the ChiNext companies 
surveyed was 6.1 meetings, which exceeds the minimum of two per year required under 
Company Law by three times.
388
 By 2010, the average number leapfrogged to 8.9 meetings. 
The lowest number of meetings was five and the highest was 14, indicating a positive trend 
toward increased decision-making at board level, which is a positive indicator for the 
engagement of the whole executive board in the decision-making process. Thus, the number 
of meetings of executive boards in ChiNext companies is gradually increasing, and moving 
very much toward the number to be found in China‘s top 100 listed companies.389 A key 
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ChiNext companies Percentage  
Number of board meetings during the 
year 
2009 2010 2011 
2 times 3.39 - 1.69 
3 to 5 times 38.98 1.69 5.08 
6 to 8 times 11.86 40.68 38.98 
9 to 11 times 5.08 42.37 30.51 
12 or more times 1.69 13.56 23.73 
Average number meetings of ChiNext 
companies  
6.1 8.9 9.0 
 
Source: author‟s survey 
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driver of this increase in meetings for CSMEs is the number of projects put before the board 
for approval as a result of the large surpluses they achieved on IPO. 
As noted previously in Chapter Three, the number of meetings does not necessarily 
indicate engagement of the board or good corporate governance. Consequently, the agenda 
items indicate the efficiency of the board process, which in itself is an indicator of good 
corporate governance or efficiency, both of which are interlinked. For instance, in an 
expectedly busy year for decision-making prior to IPO, Bolton Belt Ltd. had the lowest 
number of meetings at two, while Huayi Brothers Ltd. had the highest at 12. On close 
examination of the published resolutions of each company, in just one meeting, in July 2009, 
Bolton‘s board passed ten resolutions relating to its IPO. In contrast, in four separate 
meetings during the period 3 November 2009 to 23 December 2009, Huayi passed six 
resolutions, five of which were related to its IPO while the other was for the approval of an 
operational funding proposal. Just from the numbers, Huayi appears to have an engaged 
board. In terms of its board process, Bolton appears more efficient in getting the right items 
on the agenda at one meeting, thereby minimising the number of meetings. Equally, Huayi 
also appears more transparent and accountable in terms of engaging the board in the decision-
making process about a funding proposal. There is no evidence of Bolton doing so during 
2009. Thus, examining figures is not a wholly reliable practice. 
Nonetheless, considering the fact that ChiNext companies are SMEs, they are 
performing remarkably well for their size and resources compared with the top 100 listed 
companies in China, where the average number of meetings is 10.52. The majority of 
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2009 2010 2011 
Top 100 listed companies in China 10.52 10.52 9.52 
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companies tend to have between 6 and 11 meetings a year. The figures demonstrate that 2010 
saw an increase in transactions. What is most noticeable is that there is an increase in the 
number of companies that have over 12 meetings a year. 
 
4. Who Selects and Appoints Constituents of the Executive Board? 
The selection and appointment of directors on the board as mentioned earlier seems 
determined by the resources they contribute rather than at the impulse of controlling 
shareholders.  
Company Law requires all listed companies to have selection and appointment 
procedures for directors. But neither Company Law nor the ChiNext framework require the 
establishment of a nominations committee. Nonetheless, some CSMEs have gone a step 
further than legally or regulatory required by voluntarily establishing nominations 
committees. Thus, surveyed companies indicated the existence of a nominations and 
appointments committee in their annual reports. However, none indicated whether or not 
meetings were held or the terms of reference. The danger is that it becomes a box ticking 
exercise. A few surveyed companies had new appointments to the executive board, but not 
through the committee. For those that appointed new directors, the published resolutions do 
not indicate by whom they were nominated or even the use of cumulative voting.
390
  
 
a. Executive Directors 
In terms of who selects and appoints executive directors, inevitably the controlling 
shareholders dominate the selection and appointment process. As indicated by the case 
studies in Chapter Three, executive directorships tend to be monopolised by the families, 
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Company Law right of proposal. 
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individuals and affiliated groups of individuals who founded the surveyed companies. In 
addition to the aforementioned cluster of controlling block holders, there are non-controlling 
shareholders, either as employees
391
 who have contributed to the capital of the company, 
whether monetarily or in terms of intellectual property or other property, or investors who 
subsequently take on both a directorship and a managerial role at the company. Thus, a clear 
trend for non-controlling shareholders or their representatives being availed of the 
opportunity to sit on the executive board is illustrated, and, effectively, the non-controlling 
shareholders have the opportunity to oversee their investments. Indeed, by the same token, 
some appointments of family members to the executive board may not entirely be a matter of 
skill and expertise or because of the funding they provide, but a combination of both, plus the 
fact that family representation on the board permits control of the board due to Chinese 
family rules of loyalty and hierarchy manifested in the Confucian tradition of xiaoshun (filial 
piety).
392
 Notably, family members are more likely to be executive rather than NEDs; so they 
are either hands on or just remain shareholders. This suggests that controlling shareholders 
may not have carte blanche over the selection and appointment of directors on the executive 
board. This is especially important evidence that CSME executive boards may not just be 
decorative, as the literature indicates for other listed companies.
393
 
 
b. Non-executive Directors 
The pool from which NEDs are appointed to the surveyed companies comes from 
four main sources: those who hold shares directly in the company, those who represent 
shareholders, those who represent creditors and those selected for their connections or 
                                                 
391
 This commonly occurs in management buy-outs of former SOEs. See Stoyan Tenev and Chunlin Zhang, 
Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building the Institutions of Modern Markets 
(Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2002), chap. 3. 
392
 See Chapter Six for an analysis of the implications of xiaoshun for corporate governance. 
393
 See Chapter Six analysis for a discussion on the implications of such relationships for corporate governance. 
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expertise. The selection and appointment process of the first three is clear as it is directly 
linked to the capital contribution (or finance in the case of a creditor such as a bank) 
complemented with shareholder agreements and covenants.
394
 Non-controlling shareholders 
tend to nominate themselves or representatives as directors using their right under article 103 
of Company Law to make proposals at a general meeting to be convened.
395
  
Most venture capital and institutional shareholders have representatives with whom 
they have a contractual relationship, either employment or other. Examples include 
Goldstone Investments, which held 5.40% of the share capital of Siasun Robot Ltd. 
Appointments tend to be based on pre-IPO agreements. Again, some shareholders are able to 
nominate themselves or others to the board, which may not be commensurate with their 
voting rights, for example, where they only hold 1-2% or more of the share capital. They are 
naturally given the opportunity to represent their interests via the board of directors. 
However, the study finds that some individual non-executives holding less than 3% of 
the share capital hold directorships. Some NEDs have holdings of less than 3% of the share 
capital, which seems less easy to explain. There are two explanations proposed for their 
directorships. One explanation is that they may have obtained support from other 
shareholders in selection and election; but this still requires the support of the controlling 
shareholder to be elected since, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, their control ranges from 
30% to 67%. A more plausible explanation may be found in the Chinese tradition of guanxi, 
i.e., ‗relationships‘ that simply require reciprocity.396 That is, at start-up, funding for private 
enterprises tend to be difficult to obtain. In addition to or at the risk of potentially less 
                                                 
394
 The prevalence of shareholding agreements between controlling and non-controlling shareholders in CSMEs 
is evidenced by the incidence of voluntary covenants discussed in the preceding chapter. 
395
 See Chapter Three, Section III on ―Shareholder Proposals at General Meetings‖ on page 161. 
396
 See earlier discussion in Chapter One under the theoretical framework, page 38. 
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attractive sources of informal finances,
397
 entrepreneurs and founders as controlling 
shareholders rely on informal private finance from individuals in their family or network.
398
 
In the surveyed companies, clearly as well as capital and income appreciation, those that 
offered finance at start-up are also rewarded with non-executive directorships that afford the 
opportunity to also monitor their investments. As such, appointments occur usually on 
incorporation or when shareholders increase their holdings, but in any event pre-IPO. Chapter 
Six expands this discussion and proposes that social norms play an important role in 
corporate governance in so far as that they align the interests of controlling shareholders with 
non-controlling shareholders, with the exception of small retail shareholders. They may even 
act as a monitoring and self-enforcing check on the power of controlling shareholders.  
 
B. How Professional is the ChiNext Executive Board?  
The examination of the skill and expertise of constituents of the executive board 
indicates the level of professionalism. Company Law, the Measures and the Rules do not 
expressly state any particular requirement on the skill and expertise of NEDs themselves, 
though there are requirements for independent directors, which are discussed in more detail 
below. This has translated into the recruitment of more professionals and academics on  
executive boards. The survey indicates that most NEDs, especially independent directors, 
have a master‘s or higher qualification, with PhDs or MBAs being the most common. In 
order to avoid falling foul of the requirement for skill and expertise on the board, most NEDs 
are recruited from academia. However, in reality the eligibility of qualification of directors 
                                                 
397
 Informal finance comprise ‗small, unsecured, short-term loans […] households, individuals or small 
entrepreneurial ventures…‘ Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic, ―Formal 
versus Informal Finance: Evidence from China,‖ Review of Financial Studies 23, no.8 (1 August, 2010): 3049, 
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq030. They note that informal finance relies on relationships and reputation to monitor and 
enforce repayment.  
398
 See, generally, Neil Gregory and Stoyan Tenev, ―The Financing of Private Enterprise in China,‖ Finance and 
Development 38, no.1 (2001): 14-17. Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, ―Formal versus Informal 
Finance.‖ 
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sitting on ChiNext privately held executive boards largely relate to their personal 
shareholdings or their nomination by a shareholder. Ironically, it remains more in SOEs that 
education (in addition to the necessary political gravitas) appears to be of most importance. 
Company Law proscriptively details individuals not eligible under articles 147 and 
149. Accordingly, appointments announcements to the market only state that the appointee 
does not fall into any of the articles. No biographic detail is given except the position on the 
board, which defeats the same announcements stating that the information is honest and 
complete. They include those with limited civil ability or a criminal conviction in the last five 
years. Individuals are prohibited from companies that were liquidated or were bankrupt in 
that last three years, or had a business license revoked in the last three years and where they 
were found personally liable, or if they defaulted on a debt. There is strict application of 
Company Law and ChiNext Measures to prevent such individuals from being directors of 
companies listed on ChiNext. China‘s corporate governance rules make specific mention of 
the type of experience required. Otherwise, this matter by default falls within the discretion of 
the board of directors and SGM. 
 
C. Board Committees 
As stated in Chapter Two, the ChiNext Measures only require the establishment of an 
audit committee. The establishment of remuneration and nomination and review committees 
is optional. Thus, it is of significance to point out that most companies on ChiNext have set 
up four sub-committees reflecting the requirements of the Main Board Listing Rules. They 
include a strategy committee, an audit committee, a remuneration and appraisal committee 
and a nomination committee. A few companies have made the remuneration committee and 
appraisal nomination committee into one. 
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The ChiNext framework makes it mandatory for all CSMEs, regardless of size, to use 
the tripartite committee structure. ChiNext companies increasingly use sub-committees such 
as audit, remuneration and nomination and appraisal, predominantly composed of 
independent directors. There remains no express mandatory requirement under Company 
Law, the Code or ChiNext framework for companies to establish sub-committees of the board. 
Overall, the study demonstrates that, except for the average size, board committees 
number three, with independent directors in the majority and chairing the committees. A few 
companies have four members with three independent directors represented. Thus, 
independent directors are always in the majority. 
Most of these companies have appointed a senior member of management with 
relevant expertise. Overall, ChiNext companies have embraced the use of the audit committee 
despite no mandatory requirements under Company Law, the Code or ChiNext regulatory 
framework. The increasing number of audit meetings indicates that overall there must be 
added (commercial) value to the company by having an audit committee, or at least an 
increased perception of it being a key indicator of the level of corporate governance oversight 
in the company. 
 
1. Audit Committee 
The ChiNext Rules requires the submission of a special opinion of the audit 
committee after it examines the company‘s periodic corporate reports such as annual and 
quarterly reports.
399
 The audit committee is, for all intents and purposes, subordinate to the 
executive board, even though its constituents are a majority of independent directors. 
Moreover, the audit committee is voluntary and not mandated under Company Law or any 
tertiary legislation. This is in contrast to the supervisory board, which transforms itself into an 
                                                 
399
 Rule 6.10(2) of ChiNext Rules. 
  
204  
 
almost executive arm of the shareholders' meetings where one or more shareholders or their 
representatives sit on it. The audit committee theoretically poses less issues with conflicts of 
interest because it is made up of a majority of independent directors. However, as pointed out 
in Chapter Two and discussed in the next section, the ‗independence‘ of independent 
directors remains a key source of controversy and debate. The audit committee is selected 
because it is widely recognised as one of the key indicators of effective internal governance. 
All companies have gone beyond the mandatory requirement in having sub-committees, 
especially the audcom. Most companies have reported the details of the business of audit 
committees. This reporting is especially important in light of the potential overlap between 
the remit of the committee and the board of supervisors. Due to the reports that they have to 
produce as a collegiate, one can conclude that the independent directors are a body of their 
own. Moreover, the audit committee has no policy approval as all decisions are put to the 
board of directors. 
There is less disclosure about the remuneration committee. There is, however, a 
potential for conflicts of interest in that the supervisory board also examines remuneration, 
including share incentive, which is the remit of the company. The question is which takes 
precedence, the remuneration committee composed of a majority of independent directors or 
the supervisory board composed of shareholder (representatives) and employees? There is a 
clear pattern of convening nomination and appraisal committees where the survey companies 
had directors or senior management who resigned. New appointments tend to be disclosed by 
independent directors in their appointments. 
Conclusively, the case study above not only points to a wider problem of directors‘ 
resignations for the purpose of drawing on their investments but also the reputational dangers 
of having a director who is perceived to have done so, as illustrated below. 
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D. Corporate Conduct 
The matter of corporate conduct does not only apply to the executive board but also 
the supervisory board and senior management such as the company secretary. However, the 
ramifications of undesirable corporate conduct at executive board level justify its discussion 
here, especially before the case study, which provides a company-level example of the issues 
that arise. Regulating corporate conduct remains a key challenge of Company Law and 
corporate governance. The amendment of Company Law in 1999 introduced the mechanism 
for piercing the corporate veil under certain circumstances. Importantly, the amendment 
imposes liability where a shareholder abuses his rights and causes loss to the enterprise. 
Equally, controlling shareholders, de facto controllers, directors, supervisors or senior 
executives of the enterprise were liable to compensate the company if their abuse of rights 
has caused loss to the company.
400
 The 2005 Company Law amendment brought more 
comprehensive reforms by regulating related party transactions, providing for information 
rights for minority shareholders and the supervisory board, and reinforced the power of the 
supervisory committee.
401
 It further imposes a fiduciary duty of loyalty and diligence on 
directors, shareholders, supervisors and senior managers, and in effect, shifts away from 
criminal and administrative penalties to private ordering. The law also provided for a more 
general meeting, so that interim and ad hoc general meetings can be used to constrain the 
board and managers. However, what happens where corporate conduct becomes undesirable 
yet is not in violation of any legal duty and has no criminal implication? Such is the case with 
the scandal of directors and officers resignations that occurred soon after IPO of their 
companies. 
 
                                                 
400
For a detailed exposition see Bradley C. Reed, ―Clearing Away the Mist: Suggestions for Developing a 
Principled Veil Piercing Doctrine in China,‖ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 39 (2006): 1643. 
401
 See, Feinerman, ―New Hope for Corporate Governance in China?‖ (September 2007), 607. 
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1. A Grey Area: Directors and Officers Resignations soon after IPO 
The present state of ChiNext is that many directors and officers tend to resign from 
companies within a few months of IPO. Many of the resignees hold key positions such as 
chairman, chief executive (or general manager). There are various reasons for such 
resignations, but it became a scandal when two years in a row a noticeable trend of executive 
resignations emerged. Investigative reports and surveys by the media indicated that these 
resignations allegedly took place to avoid stock exchange restrictions on cashing out on time 
restricted pre-IPO shares.
402
 As of 31 May 2011, there were 327 resignations of directors and 
senior management from 224 companies listed on the market. This amounts to 8.6% of the 
total 3,800 directors and senior managers in ChiNext companies.
403
 On examination of the 
327 resignations, Ni finds that the main reasons given include job transfers (gongzuo 
diadong), retirement (tuixiu), end of tenure (renqi jieman), simply resignation (cizhi), new 
employment (jiepai), health and personal reasons.  Personal reasons ranked the highest, 
amounting to over a third of stated reasons, followed by job change at a quarter, while the 
other reasons were evenly distributed. 
404
 
  Although this may not appear to be a high number, when considered in context 
of the resignations occurring within the first six months of IPO, it naturally rings alarm bells, 
especially with China‘s financial press.405 Importantly, the resignations bear more 
significance given the strategic role in the companies – though it must be noted, if not 
                                                 
402
 For example see, Liu Guofang, Shi Guangyao, and Cao Chuhua, ―Chuangyeban Gaoguan Cizhi Mizhu  [The 
Puzzle Surrounding the Resignations of ChiNext Executives],‖ Capital Markets, no. 11 (2010): 40–43. See also 
21yi shiji, ―Chuangyeban Gaoguan Zhe Liangnian: Cizhi Gonggao Chaoguo 170fen [Senior Management on 
ChiNext in the Last Two Years: Resignations Exceed 170],‖ Financial News, Yicai Wang, (October 9, 2011), 
http://www.yicai.com/news/2011/10/1124237.html.  
403
 Ni Bingbing, ―Chuangyeban Shangshi Gongsi Gaoguanli Lizhi Taoxian Wenti Fenxi [An Analysis of the 
Problem of Senior Executive Resignations from ChiNext Listed Companies],‖ Shangye Wenhua [Business 
Culture (first Half)], no.12 (2011): 97. 
404
 Ni Bingbing, ―Chuangyeban Shangshi Gongsi Gaoguanli Lizhi Taoxian Wenti Fenxi [An Analysis of the 
Problem of Senior Executive Resignations from ChiNext Listed Companies].‖ 
405
 For example, Liu Guofang, Shi Guangyao, and Cao Chuhua, ―Chuangyeban Gaoguan Cizhi Mizhu [The 
Puzzle Surrounding the Resignations of ChiNext Executives],‖ Capital Markets, no.11 (2010): 40-43. 
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reassuringly, that only a few resignees were board secretaries. Nonetheless, the resignation 
scandal raises the issue of how to distinguish between opportunistic and undesirable conduct, 
and how to regulate if indeed it is to be regulated against. A discussion of fiduciary duties and 
their suitability falls beyond the remit of this thesis.
406
 However, some thoughts are expressed 
with regard to this in the next chapter. 
Notably, none of the state-owned companies had any of their directors and senior 
managers resign, and a few reasons can be given for this. Firstly, directors and managers of 
SOEs rarely hold shares in the listed companies as demonstrated on ChiNext. Secondly, 
reputational and career sanctions may act as a deterrent. The State and the Party have their 
own norms for directors and officers, and, importantly, have their own enforcement 
mechanism, most notably the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the 
Communist Party of China (Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Jilu Jiancha Weiyuanhui), 
which is extremely powerful and has been responsible for rooting out the corruption and 
malfeasance in Party cadres.
407
 If enough minority shareholders were to report ‗jubao‘ of a 
director or officer, then at the very least there would be an investigation, which, even if it 
amounted to nothing, would be a signal to the Party and the director or officer concerned to 
be careful. Thus, this system has the capability of dealing with matters that are not violations 
of the law but may bring the Party into disrepute. For SOEs and other enterprises in which the 
Party plays an important role, the Commission for Discipline Inspection plays a key corporate 
governance role as a norm creating and enforcing organisation. This system does not exist for 
companies that fall out of the remit of the Party and State, that is, privately held companies. 
                                                 
406
 But for detailed discussions on fiduciary duties generally and in China see, Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. 
Stout, ―Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law,‖ University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 149, no.6 (1 June, 2001): 1735-1810, doi:10.2307/3312898. Kingley T. W. Ong and Colin R. 
Baxter, ―A Comparative Study of the Fundamental Elements of Chinese and English Company Law,‖ in 
Comparative Corporate Law: United States, European Union, China, and Japan: Cases and Materials, ed. 
Larry Catá Backer (Durham, N.C: Carolina Academic Press, 2002). 
407
 Of course, investigations and prosecutions of suspect party cadres are carried out confidentially and are 
importantly separate from legislation and law enforcement. Only when they get to trial do they become public. 
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The small number of SOEs listed on ChiNext does not pose a factor because the resignations 
were not only a phenomenon on ChiNext but also on other exchanges. Indeed, some 
commentators have described it as ‗individuals‘ effectively behaving like venture capitalist 
and private equity investors in having an exit strategy.
408
 
This issue harks back to a major theme of this thesis, that, in general, China‘s model 
of corporate governance has its roots in SOEs and, therefore, works on a macro level 
incompatible with ChiNext companies where the relationship with the State and Party 
disciplinary machinery remains distant. ChiNext companies and companies with their 
particular features on other boards of the stock exchange need more company-specific 
supervision in corporate governance. 
 
Case study: To Resign or Not to Resign 
Case study 5: Wangsu Science & Technology Co. Ltd. 
Wangsu Science & Technology Co. Ltd. (‗Wangsu‘) was one of the first CSMEs 
listed on ChiNext on 3 November 2009. Wangsu, like most companies listed on ChiNext, has 
a mixed ownership structure of founder-owners, institutional investors, individuals and 
employees who are subscribers, and then the general public who make up retail investors and 
other institutional investors. It has no overseas investors. There is no state-ownership, and 
none of the members of either the boards of director or supervisors are members of or 
affiliated to the Party. 
The troubles of Wangsu started shortly after listing, on 9 March 2010, when 
Wangsu‘s President, Qing Peng, unexpectedly resigned, first citing personal reasons but then 
                                                 
408
 See media reports that coincide with the first anniversary of listings, which symbolises the lifting of trade 
restrictions for non-controlling shareholder subscribers. Ge Jia, ―ChiNext First Reductions in Executive 
Shareholdings.‖ See also, Xin Shanglun, ―Fengkuang Chuangyeban Touzi Caifu Shenhua Zhizaozhe: Dazao 
Chuanyeban „Fubai Chanyesuo‟ [Mad Venture Capitalist Mythify Wealth: Creating ChiNext‘s ‗Industrial Chain 
of Corruption‘],‖ News, Dongfang Zaobao [Eastern Morning Paper], (29 October, 2010). 
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citing dissatisfaction with the company‘s 2009 results. This was apparently the only clear 
justification for the steep fall in performance and the resignation of some of the senior 
management.
409
 However, these accusations remain unsubstantiated and neither ChiNext nor 
the CSRC have taken action. To compound matters, on 3 November 2010, when the share 
dealing ban on subscriber shares was listed, East Shenzhen Fiscal Fortune Venture Capital 
Management Co. Ltd. sold half of its holdings in the company.
410
 This was followed by 
further trades by Shenzhen Capital Group Co. Ltd. and Shenzhen Innovation Capital 
Investment Co. Ltd., both venture capital investors. The financial media strongly criticised 
the large volume trades made by the venture capital investors, as if forgetting that the main 
purpose of venture capitalism was to ultimately exit and reinvest in another burgeoning 
enterprises. The problem here is that such criticisms ignorantly perceived this as a corporate 
governance violation, when in fact it was a matter of investment strategy and the choice of 
the company to employ venture capitalism in its funding structure. Wangsu‘s reputation hit a 
low when its executive management also tried to cash in and sell their shares. Wangsu 
investors were not the only catalysts that led to share prices rising dramatically. ChiNext then 
announced a ban on share dealing in any shares that had risen above 5% of the opening price. 
Nonetheless, the press questioned the speed with which Wangsu‘s major shareholders were 
cashing out.
411
 The press insinuated that companies like Wangsu amounted to financial and 
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 Liang Yu, ―Fupai lingdie chuangyeban Wangsu Keji bei ‗shazhu‘ [A Return to Trading on ChiNext Results 
in Slump - Wangsu Keji ‗Duped‘],‖ Financial News, Stockstar, (June 27, 2010), 
http://stock.stockstar.com/SS2010062730006385.shtml.Chen Dao, ―Wangsu keji „bianlian‟ [Wangsu 
Techology‘s Turns Adverse],‖ News, YCWB, (25 March, 2010), url: 
http://www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwb/html/2010-03/25/content_783057.htm. 
410
 Ge Jia, ―ChiNext First Reductions in Executive Shareholdings.‖ 
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 Li Tong et al., ―Zhaiqu chuangyeban (Cash out from GEM),‖ Shangjie (Business Review）, December 2010, 
http://china.eastview.com/kns50/detail.aspx?dbname=CJFDTEMP&filename=SJZG201012021&filetitle=%e6
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business white washes and were packaged for listing (beibaozhuang) so that the original 
investors could use the stock market as their path to wealth.
412
 
 Wangsu poses the perennial agency problem of the expropriation of value by 
majority shareholders. Wangsu is typical of problems existing but with no evidence of 
wrongdoing. Indeed, the only regulatory action was to ‗stabilise‘ the market by imposing a 
share dealing ban on all ChiNext listed shares that appreciated above 5% of the opening 
market price. Nonetheless, the trick as one financial commentator noted was to ensure to deal 
just before the ceiling. Thus, such sanctions are inadequate for company-specific compliance 
but effective in ensuring China‘s policy of ensuring that the market does not overheat itself. 
Wangsu‘s failure to make a timely disclose  of its results exacerbated the media and 
market‘s perception of it This was then compounded by the resignation its chairman Peng 
Qing so soon after IPO. The media accused Peng of being in league with ‗crazy venture 
capitalists‘.413 It created a lack of confidence in the company and its senior management. The 
company‘s performance and its products were as widely reflected in media reports.414 
However, a fundamental malaise in China‘s corporate governance is the lack of transparency 
and, therefore, paucity of information on the exchange. Consequently, alleged wrong-doings 
remain just that. Secondly, the lack of investigative enthusiasm by both ChiNext and the 
CSRC hampers enforcement. 
                                                 
412
 The evidence is the fact that executives and large shareholders have sold out. See Zeng Fubin, ―Wangsu Keji 
Share Option Plan‖; See also Ye Tan, ―Who Are the Vermin of ChiNext?‖; ibid.; Ge Jia, ―ChiNext First 
Reductions in Executive Shareholdings.‖  
413
 Xin Shanglun, ―ChiNext‘s ‗Industrial Chain of Corruption,‘‖ (29 October, 2010). 
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 Chen Dao, ―Wangsu keji ‗bianlian‘ [Wangsu Techology‘s Turns Adverse],‖ News, YCWB, (March 25, 2010), 
http://www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwb/html/2010-03/25/content_783057.htm. See also Liang Yu, ―Fupai lingdie 
chuangyeban Wangsu Keji bei „shazhu‟ [A Return to Trading on ChiNext Results in Slump - Wangsu Keji 
‗Duped‘],‖ Financial News, Stockstar, (27 June, 2010), url: 
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Insight and analysis 
There is a trend to make corporate governance issues out of normal market behaviour. 
Perhaps this is down to the application of a socialist mentality to capitalist behaviour. Only 
with better disclosure rules and the use of second order institutions on ChiNext can we find 
out the true corporate governance answers to the following questions. Was there a breach of 
any (fiduciary) duty in Peng Qing resigning? It raises the question of the limitation of the law 
in not being able to deal with grey areas where there is no clear breach of law. Was there a 
breach of fiduciary duty in the executive management selling their shares once the ban was 
lifted? Conclusively, the mandatory rule of boards composing a third of independent directors 
does influence the size of the board, with easy multiples being chosen. Research illustrates 
that the higher the number of non-executives, the greater the potential for diverse interests on 
the board. This is true of companies that are either state owned or have a significant state 
interest. Companies can be further distinguished in terms of who is leading the management 
of the organisation. The following factors are taken into consideration: the ownership, and the 
identity of the person in the role of CEO. Interestingly, the position of CEO is more of an 
indication of power in the company than the role of chairman. 
 
III. How Independent is the ChiNext Board of Directors? Independent Directors 
In this section, three key areas are gauged to ascertain the effectiveness of the 
independent non-executive directors (‗INEDs‘) in the surveyed companies. One is the level 
of independence they bring to the board, thereby balancing out the power and influence of 
manager-owners. Another is the effectiveness of their representation of minority interests. 
The last is the quality of the independent opinions they provide about the company. Opinions 
are perhaps the most difficult to gather empirical evidence on, as they require the disclosure 
of engagement with minority shareholders. Also, as indicated in chapter Three, a large 
proportion of minority shareholders have short-term investment strategies and, therefore, do 
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not appear to engage with the company. Unfortunately, this can only be assessed 
retrospectively when it transpires that the opinion does not reflect the negative reality of the 
company‘s performance or corporate conduct of its controlling shareholders, directors, 
supervisors and senior management. Interestingly, the majority of the board have an 
independent director who is also an active member of the Party. By active, they tend to hold 
positions such as secretary, deputy secretary of grassroots, academic or local Party 
organisations. 
Within this, INEDs mandatorily comprise one-third of the executive board as a whole, 
50% or just under where the board number is not a multiple of three; most boards tend to be a 
multiple of three, composed of 6, 9 or 12, or 15 as the highest.
415
 These multiples indicate 
that in most companies (especially those that are entrepreneur-owned or family-owned with 
little or no interest held by an investment company) a multiple of three seems to be 
conveniently chosen as the board size, with nine members being the most common. 
 
A. Who are the INEDs in ChiNext Companies? 
In accordance with the Guiding Opinion, INEDs must be independent, and 
independent is defined as: 
…a director who does not hold any position in the company other than 
director and who has no relationship with the listed company engaging him or 
its principal shareholders that could hinder his making independent and 
objective judgments.
416
 
Academics of professorial level overwhelmingly comprise the body of INEDs in the 
surveyed companies, with business and law-related academic disciplines dominating. The 
                                                 
415
 See Establishment of Independent Director Systems by Listed Companies Guiding Opinion issued by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission on 16 August 2001, (the ―Guiding Opinion on Independent 
Directors‖). 
416
 Article 1 of Guiding Opinion on Independent Directors. 
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exceptions tend to be industry experts in areas specific to the company. The choice of a 
professor already lends prestige and gravitas to that knowledge. Any other means of 
recruitment and selection used by independent agencies may be quite taxing on the time and 
resources of an SME. One interviewee holding independent directorships explained that the 
choice in engaging academics was not only because of their availability but also because of 
their capacity to digest copious amounts of board and committee papers.
417
 Equally, 
academics have (at least in theory) the ability to learn new subjects due to their learning 
culture. So, for instance, law academics and economics academics sitting on the same board 
tend to share their knowledge as relevant to examining board papers.
418
 
The case study later in this section raises the issue of INEDs vigilantly carrying out a 
level of due diligence before accepting a position, at least to protect their reputations.
419
 The 
speed of resignation by Wang, the chairman of Wangsu,
420
 suggests that there was due 
diligence but that it was somewhat too late for him to extract himself from the scandals and 
controversies that befell these companies. The research suggests that, due to the heavy 
workload of being an independent director, individuals who already have a full-time vocation 
may only be reasonably expected to have up to two independent director roles at the same 
time. 
The remit, that presents the prescribed role and responsibilities of the independent 
director of a ChiNext company, is listed simply but has very wide implications in terms of 
impact on the company. This makes the role exceeding challenging if a full-time professional 
independent director wishes to have more than two appointments. It means that they are 
likely to spread themselves thinly. It may be worthwhile to recommend to companies that in 
the selection of INEDs they may need to impose (not prescribe) a limit of up to two roles for 
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those candidates in full-time positions. Conversely, individuals who have independent 
directorships as their main vocation may be allowed more. The latter ensures that the positive 
of sharing and propagating good corporate practice is at least continued through the 
professional INEDs. 
 
B. Skill and Experience 
To fulfil their role effectively in protecting the interests of minority shareholders, 
INEDs are required to have ‗operational expertise‘ (yunzuo zhishi) and be familiar with the 
relevant laws, administrative law, rules and regulations.
421
 They must have at least five years 
legal, economic or other experience of being an independent director.
422
 They must also be 
appointed in accordance with any other requirements provided by the articles of association 
of the company. 
There is no formula for assessing whether a director is independent. However, the 
Guiding Opinions indicate that those directors that are not deemed to be independent. A 
director is not considered independent under Chinese law under the following circumstances. 
Firstly, they are not eligible where they are related to the company or its personnel through 
direct kin or important social networks in the last year. Kin refers to direct relatives such as 
parents, children and siblings, while important social networks include in-laws. The rules are 
very detailed to counteract China‘s cultural natural inclination to privilege Confucian 
relationships, i.e., filial links, at the potential expense of those that are at arm‘s length. 
Whether or not they are effective is another matter, which the case studies will demonstrate. 
Secondly, they should not hold more than 1% of the total issued share capital of the company 
or, alternatively, they must not be listed within the top ten natural person shareholders of the 
                                                 
421
 Zou Jian, Zhongxiaoye chuangyeban shangshi shiwu [Small and Medium-sized Enterprises on ChiNext：
Listing Practice]: 139. 
422
 See, Guiding Opinion on Independent Directors. 
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company in the last year. Thirdly, they must not directly or indirectly have a position in an 
organisation that holds more than 5% of the company‘s total issued share capital or be a 
direct relation of such person in the last year. Fourthly, they must not have provided financial, 
legal, consultancy or other services to the company or the industry to which the company 
belongs. Fifthly, they do not meet the criteria for the type of personnel stipulated in the 
articles of association of the company. Finally, the CSRC has recognised someone else for 
the role. This effectively allows the CSRC to intervene in the internal management processes 
of any company where it sees fit. 
 
C. Bringing Independence to ChiNext Board 
In concentrated ownership, especially where the company is privately-run in China, 
the number of meetings and attendance of independent directors are important indicators of 
the extent to which decisions are arbitrarily taken by the board. The table below illustrates the 
percentage level of attendance of INEDs of executive board meetings held during the year in 
the surveyed companies. 
Table 9: Average percentage attendance of board meetings of ChiNext listed companies by INEDs 
 
The table shows that attendance of INEDs at executive board meetings was on 
average above 90%, which equates to INEDs missing 0.3 meetings. Indeed, it is the ‗not‘ 
 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
Average percentage attendance in surveyed companies’ board 
meetings 89.00 86.90 89.80 
Highest attendance 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Lowest attendance 80.00 61.00 88.00 
Average attendance of audit meetings 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author‟s survey    
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independent constituents of the board that have a low attendance rate. The survey 
demonstrates an overall increase in putting more decisions to the board and ensuring that 
there is a spirit of ‗independence‘ and accountability. This has little to do with the strict 
internal governance requirements of companies. The companies surveyed were particularly 
eager to demonstrate the ‗independence‘ of their executive boards in annual reports. 
Predictably, in 2009, the year of IPO, the attendance rate for INEDs was at its highest 
with 80% of the surveyed companies having 100% attendance at meetings by INEDs. In 2010, 
the percentage of companies with 100% attendance fell dramatically by 50%, with 2011 only 
registering a slight increase at 57%. The high attendance in 2009 can be attributed to the strict 
internal governance requirements of the IPO Review Panel before they granted permission. 
Clearly, members of the board made efforts to ensure that their attendance was optimum 
before, during and immediately after application for IPO as the panel reviews all types of 
internal governance documents, including board and shareholder resolutions. Without 
detracting from the positive nature of the results, they cannot be taken for granted to wholly 
reflect the independence of the executive board. For instance, in one surveyed company, an 
INED sent a proxy in his stead to attend a meeting. This surely defeats the whole point of an 
INED, who has presumably gone through vigorous scrutiny to ensure his independence as 
well as appropriate skill and expertise. 
Equally, the surveyed companies ensured to comply with the requirement of having 
an independent opinion disclosed to the market to demonstrate that information and projects 
were duly laid before the two internal monitoring bodies, namely the INEDs at board and 
committee meetings and the supervisors at supervisory board meetings. 
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D. Monitoring and Provision of Independent Opinions 
As discussed in Chapter Two, under the ChiNext framework INEDs provide their 
opinion on the following areas of selection, appointment and dismissal of directors, 
employment and dismissal of senior executives and remuneration of director and senior 
executives; as such, SMEs do not need a remuneration committee. To effectively carry out 
each of its roles, the ChiNext Rules provide INEDs with rights of information and working 
conditions similar to those of directors of the company.
423
 Neither the company nor relevant 
personnel must not refuse, obstruct or conceal or interfere with the independent director‘s 
performance of his role.
424
 This is of particular significance when considered that, according 
to the Code, the main role of INEDs is to represent the interests of minority shareholders and 
ensure that their legitimate rights are not encroached on by either the directors and officers or 
controllers. Compared to UK and US INEDs, the obligations of those in China, especially on 
ChiNext, are far more reaching. Moreover, responsibility is on individual terms and not in the 
collective terms, as is the case in the UK and US where INEDs are not required to 
individually issue reports on certain operational matters of the company and its board of 
directors or where the independent director considers there is potential damage to the 
interests of minority shareholders. 
 
Case Study - How many are too many independent directorships 
Case study 6: Wang Kaitian 
A persistent matter of debate in China concerns who can be an independent 
director.
425
 Therefore, this case study details the scandal of Wang Kaitian, an accounting 
                                                 
423
 ChiNext Rule 3.1.15. 
424
 ChiNext Rule 3.1.15. 
425
 The leading voice in this debate remains Cheng Siwei who opposes academics and economists being 
independent directors due to a lack of commercial acumen. See Jiang Guocheng, ―Cheng Siwei: Bu Zancheng 
Jingji Xuejia Daliang Danren Gongsi Dulidongshi Cheng Siwei: Bu Zancheng Jingji Xuejia Daliang Danren 
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academic at Nanjing University, who, at one point, was concurrently independent director of 
four companies, two of which were listed on ChiNext.
426
 Unfortunately for him, each of these 
companies attracted controversy in terms of their performance and internal governance. 
Consequently, the financial media then raised questions of the effectiveness of INEDs and 
what, in reality, is a practical number of boards to sit on concurrently, using Wang as a case 
in point. 
On ChiNext, Wang was director of Wangsu and resigned on 18 March 2010, soon 
after Peng‘s resignation on 9 March 2010, and less than six months since the listing of 
Wangsu.
427
 The other was Goldengreen, which, under extreme circumstances, had its listing 
licence revoked due to inaccuracies in its prospectus regarding its core business patents, 
China‘s so-called ‗patent-gate‘ (‗zhuanli men‘).428 The SME board company was Nanjing 
Textiles Import & Export Corp. Ltd. Shortly afterward, Wang was named in the IPO 
prospectus of Nanjing Sciyon Automation Group Co. Ltd. as an independent director. The 
company was already engulfed in controversy about its level of debt, a rare phenomenon for a 
privately controlled listed company. 
The first issue raised here is that clearly in each of these companies an obligation to 
publish an independent opinion regarding each of their problems arose; however, it was not 
carried out. Due to the paucity of information regarding the treatment of independent 
directors, ambiguity emerges regarding whether the independent directors themselves are 
                                                                                                                                                        
Gongsi Dulidongshi [Cheng Siwei: Disapproves of Economists Being the Majority of Independent Directors],‖ 
Government News, Xin Hua, (7 January, 2006), url: http://news.xinhuanet.com/stock/2006-
01/07/content_4022625.htm. Guan Xiaofeng, ―Gongsi Zhili: Beijingshi Fayuan Shenli Gongsi Jiuzheng de 
Jidian Sikao (Corporate Governance: Some Trials on Company Disputes by Courts in Beijing),‖ in Gongsizhili 
Zhuanlun (Studies on Corporate Governance), eds. Gan Peizhong and Lou Jianbo, Di 1 ban (Beijing: Beijing da 
xue chu ban she, 2009), 223-32. (Believes professionalising the role of independent director, similar to that of 
auditors, is the way forward.)  
426
 See Yicai wang, ―Wang Kaitian: Dudong Zhuanyehu Shougu Duo Jia de Wenti Gongsi [Wang Kaitian: The 
Independent Director Specialist Employed by Many Problem Companies],‖ News, Yicai.com, (14 May, 2013), 
url: http://www.yicai.com/news/2010/04/333507.html. 
427
 See the Wangsu case study on Case study: To Resign or Not to Resign 212. 
428
 The next chapter presents a case study of this company, which had its listing license revoked. 
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failing or whether the mechanism for independent opinions is failing them. Furthermore, the 
integrity, accuracy and completeness of the information provided to INEDs may not be 
adequate for them to make informed decisions. This may be due to the controlling 
shareholders and management screening and vetting information that is relayed, meaning that 
they are making decisions based on misinformation. This leads to the next issue of how best 
to supply INEDs with information. Under the law and Rules, there are provisions that provide 
information rights. However, there needs to be a management insider responsible for this, and 
the ChiNext Measures and ChiNext Rules have nominated the board secretary in this 
important role, which is examined in the next section. The case study further raises important 
concerns about who should be an independent director and whether INEDs are 
disproportionately blamed for the woes and misfortunes of the company of the board on 
which they sit. There does not appear to be any discussion about the independent director in 
relation to expectations of the role in practice. 
 
E. Attendance as an Indicator of Effectiveness? 
It is a challenge to ascertain the effectiveness of INEDs in contributing to the 
independence of the board. The proxy used here is the average attendance by INEDs, which 
is based on the total number of board meetings and their attendance either in person or by 
electronic and online means such as video conferencing. However, it excludes attendance 
through proxies because INEDs are selected for their personal independence, perspectives 
and experience, which, by virtue of their crucial role in corporate governance of the company, 
is not transferrable. Thus, attendance by proxy is taken as non-attendance. Below is a table 
indicating the attendance of INEDs in the first 40 companies listed on ChiNext, providing 
their average attendance over three years for the period 31 December 2009 to 31 December 
2011. 
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Table 10: Percentage attendance of executive board meetings by independent directors (INEDs) in surveyed companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table demonstrates that the INEDs are very devoted, with most attending in 
person. As indicated earlier, the only anomaly arose when an independent director had a 
proxy attend in his stead. Attendance fell a little from 91.1% to 88.3% from 2009 to 2010, 
and then dramatically rose to 93.3%. Conversely, the dramatic rise in 2011 may be attributed 
to the ad hoc corporate governance-focused (self) investigations issued by CSRC regional 
offices on companies, which focus on board effectiveness and attendance, among other 
matters, as examined in the next chapter. 
 
Case Study – Independent Directors in SOE Group Structures 
Case study 7: Varying notions of independence in an SOE 
CISRI Gaona Co. Ltd. (‗Gaona‘) presents an example of a ChiNext company in which 
all the directors, especially the INEDs, supervisors and senior management, have concurrent 
or past positions with the company‘s controlling shareholder. China Iron and Steel Research 
Institute Group Ltd. (‗CISRI‘), a wholly owned limited liability research and investment 
company of the State Council, indirectly controls 48.02% of Gaona. Established in 1952, Iron 
and Steel started as a regional research work unit (danwei) and transformed into an enterprise 
when, in 1999, the central government designated it as one of China‘s large science and 
technology enterprises. 
 
 Number of meetings and 
INEDs’ attendance - to 
demonstrate independence on 
the board 
 
 2009 2010 2011 
Average attendance 91.1 88.8 93.3 
 
Source: Author‟s survey 
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Figure 11: State-owned ownership and asset management structure of CISRI Gaona Co. Ltd. 
 
Source: Annual report and author‟s interpretation
429
 
In 2000, CISRI underwent the corporatisation process to be registered as a state-
owned limited company. In 2004, it fell under the auspices of the newly established SASAC. 
In May 2009, the SASAC transformed CISRI into a wholly state-owned company (guoyou 
duzi gongsi). Importantly, wholly state-owned companies do not have shareholders‘ meetings, 
and instead a state asset management entity, in this case SASAC, performs all the functions 
ordinarily empowered to the shareholders‘ meeting under Company Law.430 SASAC 
supposedly monitors and manages CISRI and at the same time indirectly controls the 
shareholders‘ meeting of Gaona. For example, SASAC‘s policy on the selection, nomination 
                                                 
429
 The arrows indicate equity shareholdings while the dashed lines indicate administrative and supervisory 
hierarchy. 
430
 In terms of the size and composition, the board of directors mirrors that permitted from limited liability 
companies under Company Law. An asset management company can delegate its shareholder functions to the 
board of directors of the company.   
State Council 
China Iron and Steel Research 
Institute Group Limited 
(CISRI) 
Cisri Gaona Co. Limited 
100% 
48.02% 
 
State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) 
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and appointment of directors, supervisors and senior management applies to Gaona even if it 
does not have direct holdings in the company. In the annual report of the company, the State 
Council is referred to as the de facto controller, although SASAC has closer control. 
Insight and analysis 
This section sdemonstrates the practical limitations of SASAC in enforcing certain 
corporate governance practices such as ‗independent‘ directors who are independent of the 
parent company. Secondly, the appointment of the same independent director on the listed 
parent company to the listed subsidiary is arguably in violation of the ChiNext principle that 
companies must be ‗independent‘ of external influence, be it the executive board and 
supervisory board, assets, employees and so on.
431
 The IPO Review Panel did not perceive it 
as an issue, and this raises the question of how it applies the principle of independence. From 
the perspective of the company, the rationale appears to be that the independent director of 
the parent company board should and can be independent at both parent and subsidiary level. 
Moreover, it enhances the INEDs‘ knowledge of the key companies and businesses of the 
group, which will enhance board judgment and decision-making. The problem here is that it 
effectively morphs the role of the independent director to an almost ‗internal audit‘ function 
representative of the parent company. This singularly undermines the role of INEDs to 
provide their independent skill and expertise that should be specifically for the benefit of the 
listed company, rather than for its listed parent or the group as a whole. Indeed, what might 
be for the benefit of the parent or the group may not necessarily be for the benefit of the listed 
company. One can understand the challenges of finding appropriate INEDs at that level. 
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IV. Supervisory Board 
As part of China‘s two-tier board system, the supervisory board monitors the 
executive board. Since corporate governance took a foothold in China‘s policy making in the 
early 2000s, there has been much debate on how the supervisory board fits into China‘s 
corporate governance system
432
, its suitability and its effectiveness. Indeed, the supervisory 
board is notoriously referred to as ‗deaf man‘s ears‘ (longzi de erduo) because it has failed to 
live up to expectations as an effective monitoring mechanism of the executive board.
433
 
In contrast, the supervisory boards of the surveyed companies, unexpectedly, do 
appear to provide monitoring and oversight envisioned under Company Law, which results 
from the increased appearance of shareholders and ‗external supervisors‘ on the supervisory 
board. There are three types of supervisor in ChiNext companies, namely shareholders or 
their representatives, employee representatives and what can be referred to as external 
supervisors. The first two are provided for under Company Law and within ChiNext 
regulatory framework, while the external supervisor appears to be a bottom-up innovation out 
of pragmatic need. 
The table below illustrates this from 2009 (pre-IPO) to 2011. 
 
Table 11: Average number of meetings of supervisory board of surveyed companies 
 
 
                                                 
432
 Xi, Corporate Governance and Legal Reform in China, 2009. (Examines the path dependence of the 
Supervisory Board existence in spite of heavy criticism.)  
433
 Gan Peizhong, Qiye yu gongsi faxue [Jurisprudence on Enterprises and Companies]. 
    
 
Average number of meetings 
per year 
 
2009 2010 2011 
Board of supervisors  2.4 5.6 6.3 
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Clearly there has been a marked increase in the matters put before the supervisory 
board, as indicated by the increase in the average meetings held year on year. The increased 
activity by the supervisory board suggests an important role as a corporate governance 
mechanism. There is a trend of increased activity by the supervisory board of ChiNext 
companies, which suggests that it is an increasingly important corporate governance 
mechanism. One of the main reasons for this increase is the matching of increases in 
meetings of the board; after all, the supervisory board is meant to monitor the board. Another 
reason is the board using the supervisory board as an ‗independent‘ eye or rubber stamp on 
certain types of project that need shareholder approval such as share incentives and related 
party transactions. Interestingly, share incentive schemes, generally perceived as a matter for 
the remuneration committee, are also reviewed by supervisory boards of the surveyed 
companies. In SOE companies on ChiNext, the constituents of the supervisory board suggest 
that they are mostly used as a mechanism in companies with state ties. 
 
 A. Composition and Appointment 
The other constituents stated under Company Law are shareholders or their 
representatives. A key criticism of the supervisory board is that it is not independent enough 
of the controlling shareholder with the dominance of employees and shareholders. The lack 
of independence is the crux of the problem with supervisory boards so that, no matter what 
initiatives are taken to improve or powers given, it remains ineffective because it is not 
Source: Author‟s survey 
   
  
225  
 
independent of the controlling shareholder. The problem is most prominent in non-listed 
companies.
434
 However, this appears to be a criticism arising from the examination of listed 
SOEs and unlisted joint stock companies. 
1. Shareholder and Employee Supervisors 
The shareholder constituent largely dictates the size of the board: the higher the 
number of shareholders on the supervisory board the more employee representatives are 
required. 
Under Company Law employee representatives must represent at least one-third of 
the number of members on the supervisory board. The employee is usually an elected official 
of the trade union, especially if the company has factories. Likewise, where there are no 
shareholder constituents, the supervisory board is largely dominated by employee 
representatives, including non-union representatives. The further away companies move from 
traditional industries, where trade unions are, the less effective that the supervisory board will 
be in its current form as a representation of employees. The powers of the trade union are 
acknowledged and potent when represented on the supervisory board. However, where there 
is no representative of the trade union on the supervisory board, it means that the employee 
appointment does not speak with any authoritative voice or backing that will make other 
supervisors or the board of directors listen. Significantly, as employees make up the majority 
of constituents on the supervisory board, it means that their agreement will most likely be 
required because half of the board‘s vote is required to adopt a resolution.435 
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 Gan Peizhong and Wang Dongmei, Feishangshi gufen gongsi yunying yu zhili falu zhidu yanjiu [Research on 
the Operational and Governance Legal Framework of Non-listed Joint Stock Companies]. 
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 Article 120 of Company Law. 
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2. Bottom-up Innovation: External Supervisors 
Although Company Law only provides for shareholders or their representatives and 
employee representatives on the supervisory board, in reality there are also supervisors who 
do not fall into either category. These supervisors can be referred to as external supervisors. 
Many of the surveyed companies have external supervisors. They are so called because, 
firstly, they are neither current shareholders nor current employees of the company. Some are 
retired former employees while others are retired professionals from the same industry. They 
may have other indirect relationships with the company by virtue of having interests in the 
same industry, but they do not exist under any legal or regulatory provision; therefore, no 
obligation arises to disclose in detail their (possibly indirect) relationships with the company. 
Although there is no requirement under Company Law, external supervisors sit on the 
supervisory board. One observation from the survey was that external supervisors appeared 
where individual shareholders or their representatives sat on the supervisory board. This 
raises questions regarding their function, that is, whether they provide an independent skill 
and expertise, or whether they function as a counterbalance to any shareholder views on 
behalf of the controlling shareholder. 
 
B. Size of the Supervisory Board 
Company Law requires that the supervisory board can be any size, as long as its 
composition is such that at least one-third of its constituents are employee representatives. It 
is this statutory requirement that mostly drives the nature of compliance in most companies 
on ChiNext. Naturally in line with the ethos of statutory minimum compliance, the average 
size of supervisory boards on ChiNext is three members. SOE companies are more likely to 
have larger supervisory boards, but meetings are not necessarily as many. The size merely 
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reflects the various interests − shareholders and stakeholders − that one SOE company has. It 
also reflects the politics of different departments of the same agency. 
 
C. Skill and Experience 
Company Law and the ChiNext framework do not expressly state the type of skill and 
expertise that supervisors require. However, shareholder and external supervisors alike in the 
surveyed CSMEs tend either to have investment experience and qualifications or business or 
industry experience relevant to the CSME. Nonetheless, few supervisors have the 
professional finance or legal knowledge implicitly required in the terms of reference of the 
supervisory board, including, in particular, examination of financial affairs of the company 
and supervision of acts of management that violate laws.
436
 Moreover, the remit of the 
supervisory board involves annually issuing an independent opinion on the performance of 
the financial year, verifying the truth, accuracy and comprehensive nature of the company‘s 
finances. This includes a declaration that the board and senior management and controlling 
shareholders have not acted in a manner that causes damage or loss to the company or its 
shareholders. Consequently, the constituents of the board also require some modicum of 
gravitas and influence to carry out these duties, especially in relation to conducting an 
investigation and engaging an accountancy firm if they believe the company‘s circumstances 
appear abnormal.
437
 Thus, the key role here is that of the external supervisor who is not 
(apparently) affiliated to the shareholders or, if an employee, more familiar with the strengths 
and weaknesses of the organisation. As an industry expert, they are also able to consciously 
benchmark the company‘s performance within its comparator group. The role that employees 
play on the supervisory board or how they report back is not very clear. Company Law and 
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regulations do not expressly state the type of skill and expertise that supervisors are required 
to have. This makes us question the liability of the supervisors for misstatement, especially 
since the majority are usually employees. There will have to be some analysis in terms of 
their liability as supervisors and whether there is some limit to their liability because they are 
employees. However, there appears to be no literature dealing with this. 
On ChiNext, the supervisory board appears to take a much more active role in 
monitoring and vetting the work of the board of directors. There are two consequences. 
Firstly, the supervisory board is seen as a concentrated version of the shareholders‘ meetings 
without the inconvenience. Another is that the board can feel confident in its policies once 
they have been passed. In most ChiNext companies the supervisory board appears to take the 
role of second in command to the general meeting. There is a definite trend in increased 
activity of the supervisory board. It is performing like an executive of the shareholders‘ 
meeting. The supervisory board is again more influential because of its constituents. Where 
shareholders and their representatives are in the majority, the supervisory board becomes a 
better mechanism for corporate governance. This does not necessarily make it a better 
mechanism for corporate governance. The power of the supervisory board lies where it is 
composed of shareholders and their representatives. They appear to be more powerful in 
privately owned enterprises than in state-owned or supported enterprises, the reason being the 
usual conflicts of interests that arise on such a board. 
For SOEs, results from the case study indicate that the supervisory board plays a key 
role in succession training. Controlling and majority state shareholders tend to consolidate 
power in the company by having both representatives on the board of directors and on the 
board of supervisors. In this schism, the board of supervisors remain subordinate and not 
equal in hierarchy to the board of directors. As discussed in Chapter Three, directors (with 
the exception of the chairman) tend to serve only one three-year tenure, unlike in privately 
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controlled listed companies examined. At the end of the tenure, it is not uncommon for the 
supervisors to be ‗promoted‘ to the executive board, evidenced by their appointment and a 
new person being appointed to the supervisory board. 
V. Board Secretary 
This section examines the type of board secretary necessary to carry out the enhanced 
role under the ChiNext framework. Under Company Law all listed companies in China must 
have a board secretary with the role designated as senior management level.
438
 In contrast, 
under Company Law the role has more of a procedural focus in preparing for board and 
shareholders‘ meetings, keeping company records, managing materials relating to 
shareholders and handling straightforward information disclosure matters. 
As discussed in Chapter two, the ChiNext framework, however, increases the 
corporate governance responsibilities of the role by awarding it information rights, making it 
responsible for the circulation of information to the board, especially INEDs, making it 
responsible for investor relations, and, importantly, imposing a duty of disclosure of price-
sensitive information and other certain types of information to the Exchange. These duties 
require judgment calls in first identifying price-sensitive information and liaising with INEDs 
and investors. 
The perceived importance of secretaries in ChiNext companies cannot be overstated, 
as demonstrated by the devotion of 15 sub-rules detailing their obligations and 
responsibilities. 
To appraise the effectiveness of the board secretary of ChiNext listed companies, four 
aspects of the role prove important: their selection and appointment, skill and expertise, 
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quasi-independence from the executives and controlling shareholders and their disclosure 
obligations discussed below.
439
  
 
A. Selection and Appointment 
The results of a survey of 40 companies revealed that only a minority of board 
secretaries have an accountancy or law qualification in higher education or university. 
In China, the Party and at central and local government level, the title of secretary is 
one of power and influence due to its close proximity to the leaders and control over records 
of meetings and information. 
In ChiNext companies, the role of board secretary is one of prestige and respect given 
the close proximity of the role to that of the chairman, CEO and other directors. Board 
secretaries are privy to all board discussions and major transactions. Although they do not 
have any authority, they wield influence by virtue of being gatekeeper to the board. Their 
prestige is thus because they are privy to the decision-making process of the board. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that the drafters of ChiNext Rules perceive the board secretary as a 
strong enough role to award external disclosure obligations in addition to the disclosure 
obligations that the company has by virtue of being listed. For all intents and purposes, in 
ChiNext companies, the fact that the board secretary is a member of the management team is 
important because that avails the position and power to carry out previously mentioned 
obligations under China‘s corporate governance laws and rules. However, there is potential 
controversy in whether or not the role in reality is independent. This largely depends on the 
interpretation of the laws and rules. At present, there are two interpretations of the role of 
                                                 
439
 The role of the company secretary has largely being underated with extant literature on how to measure the 
effectiveness of the role. Nonetheless, it may be anecdotally and generally concluded that the ability of a 
company to effectively navigate through the complexities of corporate governance is at the very least anecdotal 
evidence of the effectiveness of the company secretary who facilitates the process under the oversight of the 
board (including the chief executive and finance officers). 
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board secretary as senior management and each has implications for the benchmark in 
assessing the independence of the board secretary, which is very much required. One 
interpretation is that the post of board secretary is of itself a senior management role within 
the organisation. The alternative interpretation is that the board secretary role is one that must 
be chosen from senior management or that it is senior management by virtue of its holder 
being one of the senior managers of the company. The choice of interpretation has 
implications for the independence of the role. So far, most ChiNext companies have 
subscribed to the latter interpretation, therefore, choosing the company secretary from the 
ranks of directors. 
The selection of the board secretary from existing executive directors weakens the 
efficacy of the relationship with the board secretary, and can result in the executives or the 
controlling shareholder being able to waylay the secretary before any report is made to the 
regulators. Another point of note is that board secretaries are unlikely to be controlling 
shareholders of the company. In the surveyed companies, only three companies out of 40 
have a board secretary who is also a controlling shareholder – and, importantly, they are joint 
controllers. 
B. Skill and Expertise 
Although Company Law does not indicate the necessary skills and expertise, the 
ChiNext Rules require a board secretary to have the, 
necessary financial, management and legal expertise for performing his duties, 
have good professional ethics, and have obtained the certificate for secretaries 
issued by the Exchange.
440
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 ChiNext Rule 3.2.4. In the UK and Hong Kong and most commonwealth countries, the Institute of Chartered 
Secretaries and Administrators is a non-governmental professional awarding body that requires the passing of 
professional examinations at the equivalent level of ACCA and CIMA. 
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Only ChiNext Rules have such a requirement. A key issue, then, is what amounts to 
expertise in this context; however, there remains little guidance in the ChiNext Rules. Despite 
an unequivocal requirement for expertise provision, when surveyed, the expertise and 
education of board secretaries in the surveyed CSMEs do not suggest any uniform 
compliance in ensuring that there is financial, legal or management expertise. Under 
Company Law, the very narrow remit of company secretaries means that they do not require 
knowledge of corporate governance, or company law or financial management. No credible 
way exists to measure the good professional ethics of those appointed as board secretary. In 
2012, only 52.50% of board secretaries in the surveyed companies had obtained the required 
practice certificate awarded by the Exchange before or immediately after taking office.
441
 
This amounted to a two-year delay in the remaining 47.25% obtaining a practice certificate, 
which to some extent reflects its relative unimportance as a priority, not only for companies 
but also for the Exchange itself. It also illustrates the perennial issue of law on paper and law 
in action.   
In terms of qualifications, some board secretaries have financial expertise such as 
China-certified public accountants while a small number have an Executive Master‘s in 
Business Administration (EMBA). Few secretaries have legal, governance and compliance. 
This may be because the demand for such expertise means better opportunities available with 
more lucrative pay. Thus, the majority of appointees tend to have general managerial 
expertise primarily obtained through experience. 
Among the companies where the board secretary is not chosen from the ranks of the 
board of directors there is a growing trend in recruiting graduates of EMBA, which indicates 
that even below board level the dual combining of roles may still be required – this is perhaps 
more of a cost-efficiency strategy as well as to aid access to information. Less than half of the 
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surveyed companies have a board secretary that attended the special training provided by the 
Exchange. The publication of attendance does not appear to encourage those missing the 
qualification. But their level of skill and expertise is still unknown. 
 
C. Quasi-independent Role 
As discussed in detail in Chapter Three, under ChiNext Measures and ChiNext Rules, 
the role of the board secretary is enhanced by awarding it information rights, making it 
responsible for investor relations, and, importantly, imposing a duty of disclosure of price-
sensitive and certain types of information to the Exchange. This disclosure obligation has 
more of a whistleblowing element when the words of the rules are read plainly. The 
obligation requires and presumes a certain level of independence from the influence of the 
board and senior management of the company. In order to carry out this obligation effectively, 
the board secretary will require a certain level of objectivity and independence from the board 
secretary. Unfortunately, the study demonstrates that, in reality, the role of the board 
secretary is not one of independence and cannot exercise the objectivity required for it to be 
an effective corporate governance whistleblower. One half of the board secretaries of the 
surveyed companies were also executive directors of the companies. It is, thus, highly 
unlikely that such a board secretary will whistle blow a matter that he or she is involved with 
by virtue of his or her directorship. Common sense dictates that it is better to take the risk 
because, in the end, when caught out, he or she will also be culpable as part of the board of 
the company. 
The seniority of the role strategically provides a certain measure of independence. 
Thus, it appears that the intention behind China‘s corporate governance laws and rules is that 
the board secretary is independent of the board. Here lies the contradiction in that over 50% 
of surveyed companies selected an executive director as board secretary. There are practical 
  
234  
 
reasons for this difference in the plain reading. In China, the higher up the hierarchy a person 
is the more power and influence they wield. The survey and case study below indicate that 
the only way a board secretary can effectively be independent, enhance communication 
between the board and shareholders and, importantly, exercise the right to information is by 
holding a concurrent senior management position. Such roles include executive director, 
general manager (or assistant) or head of finance. Indeed, in several of the surveyed 
companies, the board secretary is also the deputy chairman, in reality and effect outranking 
all staff and fellow board directors except for the chairman of the board. Consequently, 
through this concentration of power and influence, the board secretary in China is arguably 
more powerful and more influential and, therefore, more independent than perhaps a board 
secretary without a position on the board. Indeed, it must be remembered that, apart from the 
one-day training session provided by the Exchange, anyone can be appointed board secretary 
once they have five years‘ work experience. 
 
D. Disclosure Obligations 
As the disclosure obligation of board secretary to some extent amounts to an 
obligation to whistle blow, it presumes a certain level of independence from the influence of 
the executive board and senior management of the company. That is, a certain level of 
objectivity and independence is required of the board secretary to report unfavourable 
internal governance matters to the regulators. In order to assess the potential for relative 
objectivity and independence of the board secretary on the board, the percentage of company 
secretaries who also held the position of director of the company is examined. 
The study revealed that one half of the board secretaries of the surveyed companies 
also held executive directorships of the company. The survey of 40 companies from 2009 to 
2011 suggests that, on average, over 50% of board secretaries are also executive directors 
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with some holding posts as senior as deputy chairman. Moreover, as executive directors they 
tend to have responsibility over a key business unit of the company since the study 
demonstrates that the board secretary may not be an effective corporate governance whistle 
blower. It is expected that this managerial gravitas makes them more powerful and influential 
on the board and among their colleagues. But the flipside is that they are arguably less 
independent in crucial circumstances when the board as a whole may be culpable. However, 
the plain reading of Company Law, ChiNext Measures, Listing Rules and the Rules and 
Regulations regarding the Work of Board Secretaries (‗Board Secretary Rules‘) match the 
former interpretation that the role of board secretary is of itself a senior management post. 
However, in practice the seniority of the secretary depends on the position in the hierarchy, 
which, in turn, affects the ability to carry out duties, especially in terms of controversial 
aspects. 
 
Case Study – A Senior Management Role? 
Case study 8: Empowering the role of the board secretary 
Beijing Ultrapower Software Co. Ltd. (Ultrapower), a company with multiple 
individual owners, is an illustrative example of a holder of the role of board secretary being 
selected from the pool of executive directors of the board. Thus, Huang Songlang, the board 
secretary, is also deputy chairman of the board. For all intents and purposes he reports 
directly to the chairman. In terms of qualification, he has five years‘ work experience, though 
none were previously related to the regulatory and compliance work, but he has attended the 
training program for board secretaries provided by the Exchange. In line with growing trends 
in China, Huang has an EMBA from a US university. Thus, his eligibility is without doubt. 
Ultrapower has an above average sized board of 11 members. Six of them are 
executives, including Huang, with one non-executive director and four independent directors. 
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As illustrated in the diagram below, all six executive are major shareholders in the company, 
which indicates that ownership and control is concentrated on the board of directors. 
 
Figure 12: Ultrapower Software Co. Ltd. ownership structure 
 
The non-executive director sits on the board and is rightly a major shareholder, taking 
an active role in decision-making and monitoring his investments in so far as board meetings 
allow. The ownership structure also includes several institutional shareholders in the form of 
banks, each holding less than 2% of total issued shares. There is a supervisory board of three 
members who are all employees. None have any financial qualifications or experience but are 
chosen from engineering and administration departments of the company. Although this a 
stereotypical demonstration of the weakness of supervisory boards in the internal governance 
structure, it is of note that one of the independent directors, Wang Keming, was awarded the 
Golden Award for Listed Companies.   
Three observations can be made from this case study about the selection and role of 
the board secretary in Ultrapower and more generally on ChiNext. First, in order to perform 
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its obligations, it is not enough that the board secretary is declared as senior management 
under corporate governance laws and rules. Huang‘s appointment to deputy chairman testifies 
to the fact that the only key influential roles on the executive board are chairman and CEO. 
The role of deputy chairman effectively empowers Huang to collate information required 
from (subordinate) executive directors and circulate it to other constituents, importantly, the 
independent directors. Second, the role of board secretary is used by many companies in 
balancing out power where there is no outright controlling shareholder of the company. Thus, 
Huang‘s appointment may be construed as a strategic method of providing an entrenched 
executive with an alternative appointment. In comparison to other members of the board who 
have a technical, business or finance position. Research into the company suggests that 
Huang is instrumental in modernising the company, which is a former state-owned SME 
privatised in the mid to late 1990s. He relatively recently joined the company, in 2007 
compared to other executive directors have worked in the company for a range of ten to 15 
years, his. 6.13% holding in the company readily accounts for his immediate seniority despite 
his late entrance into the company. However, it does mean that since corporatisation Huang 
has effectively entrenched himself on the executive board. He is unlikely to forfeit the 
opportunity that being an executive affords in decision-making and the monitoring of his 
investments, as well as the remuneration. 
Insights and analysis 
 A key insight from this Section is the general trend in listed companies on ChiNext to 
appoint not a chartered company secretary, qualified lawyer or accountant as board secretary, 
but business management generalists. This indicates the extent to which the private listed 
company environment holds business management and commercial experience more useful 
than regulatory professional experience. Moreover, as there is no precise professional 
qualification expected or expressed under legislation or regulation, it naturally falls on 
  
238  
 
business culture to dictate the skill and experience of the board secretary. This also may 
simply reflects the (lack of supply in the) market for the other professionals. 
As discussed earlier, the express requirement under the ChiNext framework that the 
board secretary be a member of senior management has two interpretations: that the board 
secretary is chosen from an existing body of senior management or that the role of board 
secretary in itself is a senior management role. From the surveyed companies, it appears that 
many companies have taken the former interpretation. Hence, the earlier indication in this 
section that the role of the board secretary will conflicted especially as regards it disclosure 
obligations to the regulators. By virtue of their non-speaking yet active attendance through 
minute taking, the board secretary can observe and assess the temperament of the board and 
others in attendance. This skill is lost in part when the role is annexed to another executive 
role. The board secretary has an inside perspective, but from an observational point of 
view.
442
 
VI. How Engaged is the Management Structure of ChiNext Companies? 
This section examines how engaged overall the above constituents are in the internal 
governance of the surveyed companies. Before proceeding with the findings from the 
surveyed companies, some historical context is required in order to highlight internal 
governance. The question of how engaged the executive board, supervisory board and senior 
management are in decision-making is important not only for corporate governance purposes 
                                                 
442
 The role of the ChiNext board secretary can be contrasted with the UK system of company secretary where 
most are chartered company secretaries and therefore their quasi-independence is assured by their obligations 
and integrity required of the Institute in ensuring that the act in the interest of the company and not one 
particular constituent of the company. However, it still remains that the role has limitations since it is still a 
member of management and usually the reporting line is to the chief executive officer. Nonetheless, a recent 
report on the role of the company secretary in the UK finds that chartered secretaries are better suited 
professionally in facilitating an effective board. For further details see Andrew Kakabadse and Nada Kakabadse, 
―The Company Secretary‖ (ICSA and University of Reading Henley Business School, 2013), 
https://www.icsa.org.uk/products-and-services/knowledge-and-guidance/research/the-company-secretary-report. 
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but also to ensure that the executive board (and its committees) and the supervisory board 
fulfil their internal governance roles as prescribed under Company Law. 
Research and the media have identified two phenomena that detract from effective 
independent decision-making of the executive board and its committees and the supervisory 
board of companies listed in China, namely the ‗yibashou‘ (i.e., ‗a good hand‘), and ‗yigeren 
shuole suan‘ (‗a law onto himself or herself‘). 443 There are subtle differences in the way each 
type execute their decisions which can be simplistically explained as the former relying on 
experience rather than expertise or professionalism, while the latter execute their own agenda 
creating or disregarding rule. Both types refer to a person in the guise of chairman, CEO or 
controlling shareholder who concentrates power in their person.
 444
 The chairman achieves 
this by controlling the board or the majority of the board of directors while CEOs do so by 
the flow of information in the company and to the boards.
445
 As illustrated in Chapter Three, 
controlling shareholder influence by either being chairman or CEO or appointing or 
supporting whoever holds these posts.  
 
A. Increased Engagement in Decision-making 
Partaking in decision-making and the monitoring of managers becomes very 
important in companies where the controlling shareholder also manages the company. As an 
indicator, the increasing number of executive board meetings convened in the surveyed 
CSMEs suggests progressively more use of the board meeting as the arena for the decision-
making of CSMEs. Company Law only requires a company to have at least two meetings a 
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 The implication for corporate conduct are further discussed on page 329ff. 
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 Gi [Ji] Guanglin, ―Guanyu Zhongguo Tese Dongshihui Zhidu de Yanjiu [Regarding Research on Chinese-
Style of the Board of Directors System],‖ ed. Wu Shaohong, Anhui Ligong Daxue Xuebao (Journal of Anhui 
University of Science and Technology (Social Science)) 12, no.4 (December 2010): 40. 
445
 Gi [Ji] Guanglin, ―Guanyu Zhongguo Tese Dongshihui Zhidu de Yanjiu [Regarding Research on Chinese-
Style of the Board of Directors System].‖ 
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year.
446
 In 2009, the average number of meetings of boards of ChiNext companies surveyed 
was 6.1 meetings, more than three times the statutory minimum. By 2010, the average 
number increased to 8.9 meetings, with a marginal average increase in 2011 to 9.0 
meetings.
447
 The lowest number of meetings was five and the highest was 14, therefore, 
indicating a positive trend toward increased decision-making at board level. Nonetheless, the 
number of meetings does not necessarily indicate the engagement of the board or good 
corporate governance. Consequently, the agenda items indicate the efficiency of the board 
process, which in itself is an indicator of good corporate governance and efficiency, both of 
which are interlinked. 
Table 12: The average number of meetings of the boards of directors and supervisors and audit committee per year of 
surveyed companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s survey 
 
The common items on the agenda demonstrate compliance with corporate governance 
laws in putting certain matters to the board. In 2009, board agendas commonly included 
approval of IPO documentation, proposals for convening shareholders‘ meetings for 
authorisation of the board to carry on matters relating to IPO, share capital increases, 
engagement of advisers, set up of subsidiaries and conversion to a joint stock company.
448
 By 
                                                 
446
Article 111 of Company Law. 
447
 See Table 8 on page 191. 
448
 The lower meetings average may also be attributable to companies only recording the meetings held as newly 
incorporated or converted joint stock companies.   
Year  2009 2010 2011 
Board of 
supervisors  2.4 5.6 6.3 
 
Audit committee 1.1 2.1 3.0 
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2010, published resolutions regarding increased share capital, incentive plans, and large 
contracts dominated. The 37% leap in meetings in 2009 from 2010 suggests spending on 
projects of money raised on IPO, as well as the incentivising of existing members of 
management at different levels.
449
 
Moreover, on average, not less than 80% of executive board members attended these 
meetings, with the highest attendance reaching 100% throughout the year in some surveyed 
companies.
450
 This indicates increased engagement as these figures exceed the minimum 
quorum of half or more required under Company Law.
451
 The increasing attendance of 
executive board meetings demonstrates the willingness of owner-managers to be less 
arbitrary in decision-making. This remains especially poignant in family-held CSMEs where 
other members of the board tend to have less or no holdings in the company. In turn, it also 
implicitly, if not explicitly, demonstrates the occurrence of a certain amount of monitoring of 
owner-managers, and consequently the implicit, if not explicit, monitoring of managers. 
A key question would be how engaged the executive board members are, especially 
the independent directors, in remuneration matters. However, few of the surveyed companies 
actually disclosed details of their remuneration committee or its meetings. On face value, this 
may be an indication of the limited role of the board as a whole, and independent directors 
specifically, in considering and advising on remuneration, with such decisions left to the 
controlling shareholder in his or her multiple roles on the executive board.  
 
B. Confucian Ideals and Board Governance 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, there is much debate in general about the skills 
and expertise of the constituents of the executive board and the supervisory board. One key 
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issue that has emerged of late is the recognition that, in practice, when selecting constituents 
of the executive board, the ability to be erudite remains favoured over professionalism. 
 
1. Erudite vs Professionalism 
Acknowledging the favouring of a broad education compared to professionalism 
remains crucial to understanding the dynamics of most Chinese boards, especially in 
understanding corporate governance practice on ChiNext; in particular, the preference for a 
broad education rather than a professional one is prevalent in state-owned and semi-private 
companies. Indeed, in terms of understanding this approach the European humanist 
movement presents the closest analogy, with Faust as an example of an erudite individual as 
close to that which the Chinese require of their directors. This is why, given a choice of 
professions, they will choose the law or accountancy because these are the closest in practical 
need for corporate governance. 
 The inability to disclose big problems and transparently discuss them appears to be a 
recognised problem of Chinese boards.
452
 Consequently, venture capital investors and other 
institutional investors remain reluctant to invest in a company in which the 
founder/entrepreneur undertakes multiple roles. As one interviewee put it, institutions will be 
reluctant to invest unless it is clear that, even without any monitoring input on their part, they 
will make a handsome return on IPO; this is almost guaranteed, given the pricings system on 
ChiNext.
453
 Gao Wuqing warns that the qualifications of the board of directors cannot be 
assessed in terms of scholarliness or profession.
454
 He argues that broad learnedness remains 
more valued over professional qualifications. Indeed, this notion is arguably reflected in the 
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fact that legislation still, at all levels, makes no requirement of qualifications for being a 
director. Nor can one find a perfect match of qualification. The companies that do adopt 
accountants and lawyers tend to be export-focused companies where the influence of foreign 
corporate governance systems and international corporate governance systems demand an 
almost mirror image of integrity. 
Hitherto, most efforts in controlling or deterring undesirable conduct focused on 
SOEs that are publicly listed on China‘s equity markets.455 Consequently, the focus has been 
on how the state as de facto controller effectively controls the controlling shareholder (in 
effect its representative in the company) to limit interference and expropriation from the 
company. 
 
2. Dual and Multiple Management Roles 
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, controlling shareholders tend to partake in 
management. In turn, this chapter has indicated that they tend to take on two or more 
concurrent roles, the most prevalent combination being the chairman-CEO. Interestingly, the 
assumption of multiple roles is not necessarily counter-balanced by INEDs, rather by NEDs 
that have shareholdings in the company. These multiple roles on the executive board and in 
management by controlling shareholders cannot be divorced from the phenomena of the 
expert and sole decision-maker, which illustratively manifest themselves in the multiple 
statutory roles controlling shareholders have as chairman and manager. As such, protection of 
their interests only explains part of the reason for the multiple roles, even where they may not 
have professional managerial experience or acumen to be a CEO. One of the legacies of 
China‘s SOE culture remains the leadership style of SOEs manifested in the mantra of the 
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 Chang Xiaoyan and Wen Yajuan, ―Gongsizhili Jiegou Wanshan de Falu Sikao [Legal Thoughts on the 
Perfection of the Management Structure of Companies],‖ Government, Zhongguo Faxuewang [China Law 
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‗one leader system‘, which derives from the state administrative leadership system (zhengfu 
xingzheng lingdao tizhi) of the socialist big family culture that continues in the board 
room.
456
 
The implications for corporate governance are twofold. Company Law 1993, before it 
was revised in 2005, also reflected this cultural phenomenon, with the chairman having 
powers of veto and casting votes among other pervasive statutory rights. Most of its statutory 
powers were either removed or watered down in what at least on paper amounts to the 
democratisation of the board. This means in practice that all of the directors, whether 
independent or otherwise, are part of the ‗chairman‘s team‘, despite Company Law and 
regulations carving out a specific monitoring role for INEDs. 
On ChiNext, despite the multiple roles taken by owner-managers, there remain limits 
to their authority. The circumvention of their authority does not arise from the effectiveness 
of INEDs but rather from the effectiveness of shareholding NEDs who attend board meetings 
in order to protect their interests. 
 
C. Undesirable Corporate Conduct 
Controlling shareholders in privately held companies monopolise the managerial role 
of the CEO to ensure continued control of all aspects of the day-to-day management of the 
company. This emerges at a time, perhaps ironically, when overly powerful managers in 
SOEs have been relatively successfully reigned in. Also, almost all managers holding the post 
of general manager or CEO in SOE CSMEs and in most semi-private CSMEs surveyed have 
a management or business professional. It is usually the chairman who remains a figurehead 
appointment from the state and politically influential, limiting the political influence of the 
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manager outside of the company. Secondly, almost all CEOs in SOE CSMEs and all CEOs in 
semi-private CSMEs also hold shares in the company, from as little as 0.01% to the heights 
of over 20% or more of the issued shares. 
This ensures that their interests become aligned with those of the controlling 
shareholders. This shareholding is less for the sake of aligning interests than it is a tangible 
incentive for such individuals to manage the company or partake in the joint venture. Indeed, 
private individuals are unlikely to directly benefit economically from the variant goals such 
as performing public duty and effecting political gain through the success of the company, 
although these may be by-products of their success that they can exploit when appropriate. 
Thirdly, the boards of directors and supervisors tend to be dominated by external department 
directors and supervisors (excluding the employee appointees of the company). As 
demonstrated in Chapter Five, in SOEs only one executive director sits on the board while the 
rest are non-executive, independent or external department directors. 
Arguably, the choice of the erudite over professionalism means that it becomes 
difficult to require a code of conduct across the board, even on a company-specific level. 
 
D. Independence of the Board 
In corporate governance, the independence of the board of directors from insider and 
controlling interests remains a key issue, whether in concentrated or dispersed share 
ownership or unitary or two-tier board systems. All corporate governance systems strive to 
ensure and improve the independence of the board so as to avoid insider control, as does 
China‘s. Hence, the appointment of INEDs has become a key element of law and policy 
around the world and in China.
457
 Having said this, each country takes its own approach to 
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measuring independence on the board of directors and defining an independent director. In 
the US and the UK, an independent prima facie board has the majority of the directors 
defined as independent. 
 
1. INEDs: Ineffective for Listed SMEs? 
A key finding from this chapter is that INEDs may not be as effective as NEDs, 
especially shareholding NEDs in listed SMEs. As noted earlier in Chapter One, the literature 
on corporate governance mechanisms largely focuses on the role in large listed enterprises 
where there is a separation of ownership and control. The privately held surveyed companies 
on ChiNext do not have any separation of ownership and control. Generally, there remains 
dissatisfaction with the role of INEDs as they are perceived to be too susceptible to the 
control of controlling managers. 
As illustrated earlier, on ChiNext and in China generally, the board comprising a 
minimum of one-third of INEDs amounts to an independent board. On ChiNext, most 
companies keep to this ratio, with just a few having more. The same also applies in the top 
100 companies listed in China.
458
 Interestingly, this research finds that some listed companies 
engage the same INEDs as their listed parent company. This leads to the question of how 
INEDs are defined. Of course, there have been mixed results in both qualitative and 
quantitative studies. Much research has taken place regarding the role of INEDs as it is 
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 Professional corporate governance agencies now operate in China and benchmark companies. See Protiviti, 
2011 nian Zhongguo shangshi gongsi 100 qiang gongsizhili pingjia [2010 Corporate Governance Evaluation of 
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symbolic of the independence of the board.
459
 Unsurprisingly, empirical evidence based on a 
survey of privately held companies listed in China between 2004 and 2010 suggests that the 
higher the number of controlling shareholders, the less independent the board is likely to 
be.
460
 
 
2. More Effective: Shareholding NEDs 
As demonstrated in the surveyed companies, the vast majority of NEDs are 
shareholders or their representatives. In privately held companies, in much the same way, 
controlling shareholders represent their interests, especially on the executive board; non-
controlling shareholders mostly comprising pre-IPO subscribers, i.e., individual, venture 
capital and private equity investors, also represent their interests on both boards. 
NEDs are not necessarily independent. However, they contribute to the effectiveness 
of the board with their skill and expertise all the more when they do not hold shares because 
they tend to be accomplished in the industry in which the company operates. 
 
3. Persistence of Communist Party of China in CSMEs 
The previous section examined independence in relation to the controlling shareholder. 
This section examines the independence of the boards and the management in relation to the 
Party-state. One to the key areas of research in recent years with regard to executive boards in 
China has been their relationship with the Party-state.
461
 This thesis takes a broader approach 
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by examining the prevalence of Party members since they will not only include current and 
former members of central and local government but also those from the private sector that 
have taken on membership.
462
 Naturally, such relations become of primary importance to 
assist in understanding the motives behind appointments and decision-making. 
Chapter Three demonstrated that, although the State, only holds a controlling interest 
in 5% of the surveyed companies, it still holds varying interests in most of surveyed 
companies through government-VCs and SPVs. Equally, members of the Communist Party 
of China (‗the Party‘) remain strongly represented in the surveyed companies, with 62.50% 
of companies having directors with current membership of the Party. The chart below shows 
the distribution of Party members in the 40 surveyed companies as of 31 December 2009. 
 
Figure 13: Communist Party of China members on board of directors 
 
Source: Author‟s survey 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
between 1993 and 2001 found that those companies with politically connected CEOs underperformed. They 
used a narrow definition of ‗politically connected‘ as meaning a current or former officer of the central or local 
governments or the military.) 
462
 For an examination of the relationship between private sector entrepreneurship and membership of the Party, 
see John Garrick, ed., Law, Wealth and Power in China: Commercial Law Reforms in Context, Routledge 
Contemporary China Series (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2011). 
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In order of dominance of membership of the Party, INEDs dominate with 32%, 
followed by NEDs with 28%, executive directors with 23%, and supervisors with 23%. There 
is a suggestion that the more institutional investors and investment companies represented in 
the company, the more likely it is that the company does not have or does not indicate who is 
a Party member. This puts into perspective the arguably slow but nonetheless decreasing 
spiral of memberships on China‘s dynamic listed SMEs. Perhaps this is a sign of the times 
and a result of the government‘s initiatives in wanting to promote private enterprise and 
innovation. 
Close analysis indicates that Party membership prevailed in the surveyed companies 
that are based in traditional economy industries such as machinery, metals and non-ferrous 
metals, petrochemicals, printing and paper, petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals. There is 
bound to be greater Party membership as these companies tend to be SOEs or privatised. 
Moreover, these industries are also more regulated and, therefore, not only industry experts 
are required on the board as a necessity but also those that have Party connections within the 
industry. Moreover, these industries, except for pharmaceuticals, do not require innovations. 
In contrast, so-called new economy industries such as IT, media and electronics have 
directors or supervisors who are members of the Party. On the one hand, the stark difference 
between Party membership of those in traditional industries and those in the new economy 
indicates that membership may only be needed where business is relatively highly regulated, 
to the extent that Party connections are likely to be of assistance. Moreover, most new 
economy surveyed companies are start-ups and, therefore, do not have the Party legacy that 
remains in SOEs and privatised companies. This may be because they mostly fall within the 
core of China‘s strategic industry enterprises and, therefore, merit is almost enough to gain 
them the listing and then the funding. For example, the surveyed companies in the heavy 
machinery industry have the highest concentration of Party members in each company. Over 
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a quarter of the companies have three or more Party members who are executives, non-
executives, INEDs or supervisors. However, the full picture remains slightly incomplete 
because the survey depends on disclosure of Party membership in biographies in the 
companies‘ annual report. For instance, some surveyed companies in the new economy 
industries deliberately do not disclose the Party membership of their boards‘ members. This 
may be intentional to divorce themselves from links with the Party-state. This indicates that 
being a member of the Party is not as important as may be thought or compared with 
companies on other markets. 
Predictably, those surveyed companies with the highest number of Party appointments 
were SOEs and privatised companies. As mentioned earlier, privatised companies on 
ChiNext were mostly management buy-outs with the ultimate owner(s) providing the bulk of 
capital or know how. These managers, during their time in SOE employment, are members of 
the Party as a matter of course, especially in the industries that require factories where the 
Party structure is even more pronounced and all staff are unionised, or even in the bottom-
heavy companies where the majority of the workforce and jobs are semi-skilled. 
 
Closing Remarks 
 The key issue raised at the beginning of this chapter was how effective the executive 
board in particular will be in monitoring not only controlling shareholders but also, 
importantly, owner-managers. A key finding in this chapter is the ability for private 
companies to innovate the corporate governance mechanism, such as the introduction of 
external supervisors. The chapter has provided further insights into the dynamics of internal 
governance, where non-controlling shareholders protect their investments by either taking on 
executive director or senior management roles, or acting as NEDs. Thus, the presence of 
individual shareholders, in particular, within the management structure acts as a monitoring 
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mechanism. In particular, most of these ‗shareholding managers and directors‘ in the 
surveyed companies are further empowered by the strong guanxi between them and the 
controlling shareholder that flows from them being early providers of funding for the 
business at start-up, thus, becoming a key mechanism in shareholder protection, assuming 
their interests are aligned with other shareholders. Venture capital and private equity 
shareholders also have a presence on the executive board, but not proportionate to the amount 
or number of companies in which they invest. This is because the large majority are run by 
the government and tend not to hold executive board or even supervisory board roles. 
Independent directors appear efficient in carrying out their obligations by attending meetings 
and issuing independent reports. The only problem is that their independent reports are 
always favourable, even when the company clearly has governance or performance problems. 
A case study in the next chapter illustrates this problem. 
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Chapter Five – Enforcement Mechanisms on ChiNext 
The expropriation of company funds has historically been a problem with controlling 
shareholders more than with management. A continuous body of literature attests to the weak 
corporate governance enforcement practices of Chinese stock markets.
463
 
This chapter assesses the extent to which a legacy of weak compliance and 
enforcement has transferred to ChiNext. The chapter is divided into five sections. Section I 
assesses the trends in compliance by companies and its constituents with regard to 
disclosures, related party transactions, third-party guarantees and insider trading. Section II 
examines enforcement by the CSRC and the Exchange on ChiNext. Section III examines the 
roles of the press and how it supports (or hinders) the regulators. Section IV introduces 
China‘s public whistleblowing system as a mechanism of corporate governance and assesses 
its role in ChiNext. Finally, for a comprehensive analysis, Section V examines the role of 
private ordering. 
 
I. Trends in Corporate Governance Compliance 
Chapter Two demonstrated that the ChiNext framework focuses on regulating disclosure and 
particularly related party transactions, the issue of guarantees by companies and insider 
dealing. It hopes to achieve this by reinforcing the role of INEDs and empowering the board 
secretary. Following on, this section assesses compliance by companies and the effectiveness 
of regulators and ChiNext framework in these areas, with the key focus on illustrating the 
trends rather than an evaluation of the law. This examines two key corporate governance 
issues, namely related party transactions and guarantees. 
 
                                                 
463
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A. Disclosure Compliance 
Strengthening disclosure compliance has always being a particular challenge for the 
regulatory authorities in China, especially the publication of false information. Disclosure 
obligations, though existent under law, were lax in compliance by companies and lax in 
enforcement by the CSRC. Donald Clarke notes that, from 2002 to 2007, the CSRC issued 
211 punishment decisions (chufa jueding), of which less than half related to disclosure 
violations by listed companies or their directors, officers or supervisors.
464
 An especially big 
problem was the publication of false information, illustrated by the 1997 national scandal of 
Hainan Qiongmin Yuan Modern Agricultural Development Co. Ltd. The company declared, 
among other matters, a capital surplus of US$79 million in its 1996 annual report that caused 
its shares to rocket by 1,059%.
465
 The CSRC found the company guilty of false accounting. 
Unsurprisingly, from the outset, there has been a stricter approach to disclosures 
required from ChiNext companies than from companies listed on other boards in China. All 
of this suggests an increasing ability, with some success, in the regulators‘ achievement of 
their key goal of protecting small and medium-sized investors in China‘s capital markets. The 
prospectus as the most important document for IPO contains the requisite disclosures. It is 
then for the Exchange to review the periodic reports published by CSMEs against the 
requirements of the ChiNext Rules. For corporate governance purposes, the annual reports of 
ChiNext companies provide the most comprehensive information. All companies have also 
adopted quarterly reporting. 
On review of the annual reports for 2009, 2010 and 2011, all surveyed companies 
declared their related party transactions, guarantees to third parties, takeover and merger 
activities, litigation and arbitration actions as well as administrative sanctions incurred each 
                                                 
464
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465
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year – the latter two are discussed in more detail below. A comparative review of the annual 
reports published in 2009, 2010 and 2011 also indicates a marked improvement in the detail 
of disclosure. Disclosure in all surveyed companies was uniform, with all companies 
providing information on these areas, among others. However, there remains the danger of 
using templates and such reports becoming a box ticking exercise. The production of detailed 
annual reports also has costs in terms of collation of information as well as the cost of 
publication. ChiNext companies, on the whole, provide uniform information in accordance 
with the ChiNext framework when in compliance with mandatory provisions. 
 
1. False Accounting 
The focus was made with the purpose of protecting investors‘ rights and interests, 
raising the quality of accounting and auditing standards, and improving the transparency and 
disclosure of public companies. A well-known case that highlights Cheng Siwei‘s misgivings 
relates to false records and accounting to the listed company, Yin Guangxia. The external 
auditors, Shenzhen Zhongtian Accounting Firm, issued a favourable audit report for the 
company even though, from the period 1999 to 2000, it announced a false profit of US$89.6 
million based on fabricated purchase and sale contracts, export declaration forms, tax-free 
documents, financial bills and value-added tax invoices.
466
 It was not uncommon for 
enterprises of small, medium and large sizes to produce an audit report within just a few days 
of carrying out the site audit of the enterprise.
467
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2. Uniformity in Disclosures, Timeliness and Quality of Disclosures 
There is uniformity and timeliness in most aspects of disclosures. However, there 
appears to be confusion when it relates to permissive aspects of disclosures such as an audit 
report. The audit disclosure aspect of annual reports displays disparate levels of reporting 
across the board from 2009 to 2011, suggesting persistent confusion regarding the 
requirements. 
Difficulty remains in judging the quality of disclosure. Nonetheless, the audit 
committee report presents an example of form over substance. Some surveyed companies 
replicated the tables of audit framework found in large listed companies such as Baoshan 
Steel, but with little explanation of the implementation or results. Other surveyed companies 
merely stated the existence of an audit function and confirmed that the internal control system 
of the company complied with relevant laws and rules. Another set of companies rightly 
outlined the audit policy, then specified fees paid to external audits for non-audit-related 
consultancy. 
Tellingly, this disparate reporting persisted over the three consecutive annual 
reporting periods reviewed, i.e., 2009 to 2011. It suggests that neither the CSRC nor the 
Exchange recognises this as an issue or that it is the least of their problems. However, this is 
not so, because, based on such reporting, the CSRC and the Exchange have been able to 
identify various violations of the ChiNext framework. There may be some argument that not 
imposing very strict disclosure obligations may facilitate better infringement detection as 
companies cannot necessarily follow a script that acts as a veil. This may be because such 
disclosure is not mandatory but permissive, in so far as it relates to an audit report. 
Companies only need to confirm the functioning of the internal control systems. If so, this 
undermines the function of presenting an audit report and, arguably, companies are better off 
not volunteering to disclose such details if they do not understand how to do so. 
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There appears to be a vicious cycle of corporate reporting leading to corporate 
governance issues. For instance, the ChiNext framework requires quarterly corporate 
reporting on results. But this rule was adopted from the Listing Rules originally geared at 
large state-owned and privatised enterprises established in their sectors. Such reporting has 
been to the benefit of the State and institutional investors keen to keep an eye on their 
investments. However, quarterly reporting poses a problem for hi-tech and innovative SMEs. 
Firstly, it exaggerates underperformance and this is reflected by the constant media reports 
each quarter analysing why a company did well in the last quarter.
468
 It is not plausible for a 
growing company to constantly have updates on technological developments or exploitation 
of proprietary intellectual property. There remains evidence that this may lead to the 
resignation of shareholding senior managers, so that they can pre-empt any downward spiral 
in the share price. An example is Wangsu, where several executives left the company for the 
purpose of cashing in on their shares earlier when it became evident that the company was 
having problems in clarifying the proprietary and competitive nature of its technology. Media 
reports were scathing and unrelenting in accusations that the company was engaging in fraud, 
which affected the share price.
469
 
There remains some issue with the quality of disclosures. ChiNext Rules do not 
specifically provide for the quality of disclosures overall. Specific requirements for audited 
annual reports require an appointed Certified Public Accountant
470
 to ensure that a company‘s 
audited annual report conforms to the quality control standards and national accounting 
standards.
471
 However, the level and success of regulatory monitoring of disclosures remains 
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unclear with regard to ChiNext, which arguably requires even more monitoring due to the hi-
tech and innovative nature of these companies. 
 
2. Specialised Disclosure for Hi-tech and Innovative Industries 
ChiNext companies present a relatively high level of transparency. The disclosure 
methods on ChiNext reflect Company Law and Securities Law requirements. The improved 
disclosure on ChiNext has not occurred in a vacuum. However, there remains much 
controversy in the accounting malpractices of Chinese companies listed domestically and 
abroad. Conjecture, rumour and truth persist in the media, with some companies referred to 
as ‗companies packaged for listing‘ (‗baozhuang gongsi‘). As demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, although the regulators attempt to deal with the issue, enforcement against 
perpetrators appears alarmingly low. It is either that this presents a true picture of the level of 
violation or that the media and other stakeholders are being alarmist in their noisy and 
continuous cautioning in media reports. Indeed, the development of China‘s Accounting Law 
attests more to the latter. 
Accounting legislation in China presents the backbone of disclosures in periodic 
reports of all listed companies in China. In 1985, the first Accounting Law
472
 of 
contemporary China was promulgated to apply to all enterprises. It laid out the framework for 
accounting standards and subordinate legislation, as well as implementing certain 
international accounting standards. The autonomy of enterprises from the state and the 
encouragement of investment from state organs and individuals, as well as growing numbers 
of foreign-domestic joint ventures brought demand for financial disclosures to aid the 
                                                 
472
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monitoring of investment. To enhance disclosure in listed enterprises, the statutory 
accounting system for listed enterprises was issued in the Provisional Accounting Standards 
for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises by the Ministry of Finance in 1992. However, this did not 
stem the tide of earning manipulations through related party transactions and there were calls 
for more detailed accounting standards.
473
 The 2005 amendment of Accounting Law 
incorporated, consolidated and expanded the financial disclosures, especially under Company 
Law and Securities Law and other complementary provisions. It also ensured that Accounting 
Law in China conformed to the International Accounting Standards in another step toward 
the internalisation of China‘s enterprises and stock exchanges. 
Recent and continued dialogue between the US and China in relation to accounting 
implicitly suggests that Chinese regulators unwittingly acknowledge the deficiencies of 
China‘s accounting practices and disclosures, specifically because China wishes to facilitate 
the ability of its emerging financial institutions to partake in the lucrative US financial 
markets. Although this issue may not appear directly to affect or reflect ChiNext companies, 
there are clear similarities in the types of home grown new economy company that seek 
listing in the US that can be found on ChiNext. The only difference is that they decided to list 
abroad. 
 
B. Related Party Transactions 
Related party transactions (‗RPTs‘) have become the most common method of 
(controlling) shareholders expropriating company funds.
474
 Problems arise where, for 
instance, the transaction price is negotiated, influenced or even set by the shareholder that the 
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company purports to transact with. Here, the benefit of the discount transfers solely to 
controlling shareholder or de facto controllers of the shareholder‘s company. This was the 
most popular method used, especially in SOEs. The main piece of regulation for related party 
transaction is Chapter X of the Administration of the Initial Public Offering and the Listing of 
Share Measures 2006 issued by the CSRC, which builds on the limited RPT provisions laid 
down in Company Law.
475
 China has taken the middle ground where RPTs are allowed, but 
to a prescribed maximum with board and shareholder approvals required. For instance, where 
the transaction with a related party amounts to more than RMB 3 million (approximately 
£300,000), a board resolution or shareholder meeting resolution must approve it. 
The ChiNext framework seeks to limit the number of RPTs undertaken and builds on 
the aforementioned law and regulation. The issue of RPTs has been put under the shareholder 
protection section because research demonstrates that such transactions tend to be with 
parties related to controlling shareholders and sometimes de facto shareholders. Related 
parties of ChiNext companies can either be with legal persons or natural persons.
476
 Under 
the ChiNext Rules, RPTs include:
477
 transactions in which an obligation to disclose arises; 
purchasing raw materials, fuels and power; selling products and commodities; providing or 
accepting labour services; selling by consignment or selling on commission; and co-
investment between two related parties. It also includes any matters that would lead to the 
transfer of resources or obligations through agreement.
478
 Further detail given on the type of 
legal persons and organisations that are deemed to be related parties is important for ChiNext 
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companies due to their source of funding.
479
 Of note is that a listed company under common 
control of SASAC is not deemed to be a related party relationship unless the chairman, CEO 
or more than half of the directors of the company are also directors, supervisors and senior 
management of the other company.
480
 This is one of the most important areas for regulation 
given the occurrence of concentrated ownership and the rise in family ownership. 
With no clear guidelines for disclosures, confusion and difficulties in ascertaining 
which CSMEs are compliant or in violation arise. Indeed, some surveyed CSMEs declared all 
RPTs, and some did not disclose themselves as having RPTs if they fell within the limit 
permitted under law. Nonetheless, the fact that the Measures make this a pre-IPO condition 
means that companies or their controlling shareholders must put their transactions in order. 
The regulators are interested in the RPTs in so far as they have the potential to distort the 
profitability (chixu yingli nengli) of the CSMEs. Thus, paragraph 14, among other 
requirements, as a condition of IPO, provides that all issuers must ensure that their business 
revenues or profits of the last year are not a result of being heavily dependent on an RPT or a 
large undefined customer.
481
 This further complements the requirement for CSMEs to be 
‗independent‘ (‗dulixing‘).482 
It is not clear whether VC investors are the force behind the low occurrence of RPTs 
in the surveyed CSMEs. VC and institutional investors seem particularly concerned about the 
potential for RPTs; consequently, there appears to be less of an occurrence in the companies 
in which they invest.
483
 All of the surveyed CSMEs that have venture capital, private equity 
or intuitional investors with disclosable interests, which is more than 5% of the total issued 
share capital, had no RPTs whatsoever, at least in 2009, the year of IPO. 
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There appears little violation of RPT provisions in Company Law, Securities Law and 
the ChiNext framework. However, this does not mean that it does not occur, only that it 
remains undetected. This is not to reduce the achievements already displayed by ChiNext 
companies in the reduced number of RPT and the almost full disclosure of those that have 
undertaken such transactions. Highly concentrated ownership in China inevitably leads to 
more probabilities of violating laws relating to RPTs.
484
 Indeed, RPTs have become the most 
common method of (controlling) shareholders cashing in on company funds.
485
 That said, 
Professor Gan cautions that RPTs may not always necessarily be detrimental to small and 
medium-sized shareholders of a company, listed or otherwise. Problems arise where, for 
instance, the transaction price is subject to negotiation but influenced or even set by the 
shareholder with whom the company purports to transact. Here, the benefit of the discount is 
transferred to the shareholder‘s company. In this circumstance, certain preventative measures 
such as independent external valuations may be helpful. It is worth mentioning that without 
uniform disclosure being enforced there remains difficulty in gathering information about 
RPTs and drawing comparisons, such that disclosure is not uniform. All the more so because 
disclosed board and shareholders‘ meeting resolutions only indicate those transactions that 
are presented at the meetings for approval. 
 
C. Guarantees 
Company Law prevents a company from taking on the liability of other companies 
through investment or guarantees without the approval of the board of directors as a whole or 
the shareholders at a general meeting.
486
 The directors, in turn, have further individual 
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obligations that are actioned once the company has listed. For instance, independent directors 
must ensure and make a report to the effect that the interests of minority shareholders have 
not been compromised. This is probably the most important monitoring organ on the board of 
directors. Where a listed enterprise seeks to provide security for a third party, the Regulating 
Provisions of External Security by Listed Companies Circular promulgated in 2006 mandates 
for approval by shareholders at a general meeting.
487
 
 Prior to IPO, a company must specify the authority and process by which it awards 
external guarantees.
488
 No illegal guarantees must have been granted to the company‘s 
controllers or any enterprise under their respective control. These rules make sense for 
family-owned and state-owned companies. There are also limits to the type of investments or 
guarantees that can be given by a company.
489
 Moreover, where the guarantee is to be granted 
to any shareholder, de facto controller or their related parties or a shareholder under the 
control of a de facto controller, the Party must not participate in the vote. A total of 50% of 
the voting rights held by shareholders at the meeting are required to approve a guarantee.
490
 
The ChiNext framework aims deter (as opposed to control) the issue of guarantees by 
listed companies to subsidiaries and third parties. Guarantees present one way in which those 
in control of a listed company can obtain private benefits of control or otherwise expropriate 
value from the company and its shareholders. The CSRC expects that, prior to application for 
listing, CSMEs have provisions in their articles of association that clearly lay down the limits 
on the authority to grant guarantees and a process for auditing compliance. As a mandatory 
                                                 
487
 The Circular was pursuant to Article 21 of Company Law. See Guoli Liu, ―Economic Development, Political 
Stability and Social Harmony: Can All Good Things Come Together?‖ in China in Search of a Harmonious 
Society, eds. Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008): 414-415. 
488
 Paragraph 23 of ChiNext Measures. 
489
 Paragraph 15 and 16 of ChiNext Measures. 
490
 ChiNext Rule 9.1. 
  
263  
 
rule, controlling shareholders, de facto controllers and other controls must not have been 
granted or be granted guarantees that violate the law.
491
 
An examination of guarantees awarded to internal subsidiaries and external parties did 
not indicate a consistent trend in the rise or fall in guarantees. Instead, similar to RPTs 
discussed above, there again appears to be an odd trend in there being a fall in guarantees in 
one year and a rise in another, as illustrated in the Table 13. 
Table 13: Percentage of companies disclosing an engaging in RPTs and issuing guarantees surveyed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, between 2009 and 2010, the number of companies issuing any guarantee fell 
by 40%, but then in 2011 there was a steep rise of 57.14%. On closer examination, of the 
surveyed companies, those CSMEs that issued guarantees in 2009 did not do so in 2010. 
However, the majority of those that had issued guarantees in the previous two years 
continued to issue, and in 2011 four companies added to the tally with first-time issue 
guarantees post IPO. For example, Huayi Bros‘ issue guarantees as and when the listed 
company‘s wholly owned subsidiaries require it for a broadcasting project, which only 
occurred in 2009 and 2011. 
 
                                                 
491
 Paragraph 23 of ChiNext Measures.  
492
 Percentage of companies that issued guarantees to subsidiaries and third parties. 
 
 
2009 2010 2011 
% % % 
RPTs 82.5 70.0 77.5 
Issued guarantees
492
 12.5 10.0 10.0 
Source: Author‟s survey    
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D. Insider Trading 
The process of buying and selling shares was rife with insider trading behind the 
counter deals with no benchmark for corporate conduct on directors and officers.
493
 Taking a 
wider view, prosecution for insider trading and market manipulation has increased due to the 
legislative developments. In 1997, the Criminal Law first promulgated in 1979 was amended 
to recognise insider dealing and market manipulation as offences.
494
 A further corporate-
governance-related amendment was made in 2006 that detailed further offences, including 
disclosure breaches, non-disclosure of major information and breach of trust and damage of a 
listed enterprise‘s interest, as well as leakage of insider information.495 These changes 
reflected the need for complementary criminal offences to reinforce the importance of 
corporate governance under the amended Company Law and Securities Law. The amendment 
of the Criminal Law demonstrated the gravity with which China‘s leaders would deal with 
anyone who compromises the economic ascension of China. 
The ChiNext Rules particularly endeavour to deal with the problem of inside 
information leakage and also guanxi. Prior to any information disclosure, the directors and 
officers of the company, and insiders must minimise the scope of access to such 
information.
496
 The controlling shareholder and de facto controllers each have an obligation 
to maintain confidentiality.
497
 Moreover, to avoid the frequent instances when the controller 
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is more powerful than the enforcing regulatory officer, the rule further requires that 
controllers must not only actively clarify any media report or rumour relating to it, but must 
do so with accuracy, hence, narrowing any leeway for ignoring or omitting to disclose 
matters relating to their interests in the company when pertinent. The ChiNext Rules also 
empower the Exchange to counter the persistent problems of the past, whereby participants in 
a company were politically more influential than the regulatory department. 
Directors, supervisors and senior managers and anyone privy to insider information 
must ensure that the scope of people privy to such information remains limited.
498
 The same 
rule requires timely disclosure by the company (via the board secretary) once any subsequent 
leak, market rumour or unusual share movement occurs. 
Initial funding for SMEs was scarce as banks were either riddled with bad debts or 
focused on the large SOEs. The rules were already inadequate for promoting better protection 
of minority shareholders and improved oversight by the board of directors in low-risk 
manufacturing ventures, not to mention potentially high-risk ventures. The common view 
remains that insider trading on Chinese equity markets is rife.
499
 
The Exchange has being particularly focused on cracking down on insider 
information, with the passing of inside information within families, especially between 
spouses. This may be because they are easier to identify. The main sanction given for insider 
trading is a notice of criticism (tongbao piping). 
 
                                                 
498
 Rule 2.9 of ChiNext Rules.    
499
 China Securities Regulatory Commission, ―Jiada chachu lidu yanda neimu jiaoyi 加大查处力度 严打内幕
交易 [A Vigorous Crackdown on Insider Dealing],‖ China Securities Regulatory Commission Official Bulletin 
no.11 (2010). 
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II. Reality Enforcement of Corporate Governance on ChiNext 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the ChiNext framework attempts to deal with two 
general issues. One is to ensure optimum disclosure for an efficient and sustainable market. 
The other is the protection of small and medium-sized shareholders. As will be seen later in 
this chapter, enforcement action has focused on those activities deemed to undermine these 
objectives, in particular, false recording and insider dealing. 
This section examines the key method used by the regulatory authorities to aid the 
monitoring and discovery of violations of corporate governance rules, or indeed monitoring 
RPTs and guarantees. Thus, the key objective of the ChiNext framework includes 
strengthening disclosure, deterring the expropriation of company assets, insider dealing, 
market manipulation and false accounting, as discussed below. Notably, the ChiNext 
framework does nothing toward increasing the direct liability of directors, senior managers, 
supervisors and controlling shareholders. 
The CSRC has declared controlling shareholders and de facto controllers to be the key 
perpetrators of expropriation of company funds, and this has swayed their focus of regulation 
to permit listing and the regulation of listed companies on ChiNext.
500
 The Measures 
stipulate, as a pre-requisite for listing an internal control requirement, that issuing companies 
must rigorously (yange) manage their funds.
501
 This is another provision that remains even 
after approval for listing. These laws work together with Accounting Law, Negotiable 
Instruments Law and Industry Accounting Regulations. 
In carrying out enforcement on ChiNext, one key challenge for the CSRC remains 
that of obtaining information about the corporate governance practice of companies. That is, 
                                                 
500
 For instance, the CSRC reported that listed company assets were expropriated by controller shareholders and 
de facto controllers of listed companies in 2001 amounted to just under US$4 billion and reached a peak in 2003 
at US$7 billion. See China Securities Regulatory Commission, ―Zhongguo ziben shichang fazhan baogao   
[Report on the Development of China‘s Capital Markets].‖ 
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 Article 22 of the Measures. 
  
267  
 
discovering which companies to investigate or sanction for violations. Sources of information 
about company conduct to the CSRC include examination of the annual reports and 
announcement of companies, public whistleblowing (jubao) on the company or its 
constituents, employees, press tip-offs directly to the regulators and press exposés, as well as 
its surveys and investigations. The press facilitates a less formal sourcing of information, 
which better protects informants. 
 
A. CSRC and Enforcement Tools on ChiNext 
 On ChiNext, the CSRC focuses most of its efforts on monitoring and supervising the 
internal corporate governance of companies listed on ChiNext. Before IPO, it does so through 
its Review Panel‘s approval and rejection of applications for listing. After IPO, its regional 
offices, through monitoring, inspection and investigation, ensure that internal corporate 
governance complies with regulations. Thus, on ChiNext, the CSRC takes on an anticipatory 
enforcement role. This role of pre-emptive intervention exists alongside its authority to 
enforce Company Law and Securities Law against companies in violation. The following 
sections outline the key methods of regulation and enforcement employed by the CSRC on 
ChiNext. 
 
1. Approval and Rejection of Listing Applications 
 When applying for listing on ChiNext, in addition to complying with revenue and 
profit thresholds, companies need to display corporate governance compliance with Company 
Law and the Measures. However, the problem remains for the CSRC to reconcile the low 
business performance and corporate governance of companies listed on ChiNext, which is 
reflected in the Panel‘s decision, below.  
Enforcement Decision/Action 1: Rejection of a listing application on ChiNext 
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Shanghai Haohai Biological Technology Co. Ltd. engages in the research, 
development, production, supply and sales of bio-pharmaceutical products. It applied for 
listing on ChiNext, but, on 28 September 2012, the IPO Review Panel announced that less 
than five of the panel members approved the application.
 502
  
The Panel refused the application because of potential future disputes arising from the 
ownership structure and its lack of independence (the occurrence of RPTs, as well as being in 
competition with its major customer). In its decision, the Panel noted two key issues. First, 
most of Haohai‘s business came from a company called Shanghai Qisheng Shengwu 
Corporation (‗Shengwu‘). In addition, three of the notable shareholders at Shengwu were also 
shareholders in Haohai. Second, a key material used in Haohai‘s production came from 
another company called Shandong Furui Da Shengwu Yiyao Corporation (‗Furui‘). However, 
Furui was also a key competitor of Haohai in certain product lines. In respect of each matter, 
the Panel decided, first, that the entangled relationship of shareholder and customer between 
Haohai and Shengwu would give rise to significant disputes in ownership and control rooted 
in pricing. In terms of Haohai and Furui, the competitive nature of their production lines 
would potentially put Haohai at risk since Furui is a key supplier. The relationships were such 
that the Panel believed they raised questions regarding the full extent of disclosures and 
explanations by Haohai. Therefore, the Panel rejected the application, basing its decision on 
paragraph 14 of the Measures.  
The decision illustrates the full extent to which the CSRC holds corporate governance 
as important. It does so through the Panel‘s decision on corporate governance issues, notably 
not permitting listing for companies in which there may be a dispute amongst shareholders 
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 See ChiNext IPO Review Panel, ―Guanyu Buyu Hezhun Shanghai Haohai  Shengwu Keji Gufen Youxian 
Gongsi Shouci Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Bing Zai Chuangyeban Shangshi Shenqing de Jueding [Regarding the 
Refusal of Authorisation of Shanghai Haohai Biological Technology Limited‘s Application for the Initial Public 
Offer on ChiNext]" (2012): 1382. Government, China Securities and Regulatory Commission, (19 October, 
2012), url: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306202/cyb/201301/t20130109_220277.htm. 
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arising from RPT to the detriment of the company and other shareholders. It also reflects an 
agenda to track and keep in check potential cross-shareholdings in companies that have RPTs.  
In terms of keeping relatively clean ownership structures, Chapter Three illustrated 
how the regulatory authorities have managed, with relative success, to keep the occurrence of 
complex pyramidal structures.
503
 More importantly, none of the sample private companies 
have cross-shareholdings. SOEs within the sample have SASAC as controlling shareholder or 
a representative SPV. One of the key reasons for this lack of cross-shareholding and the small 
number of corporate pyramidal structures may be attributed to the regulatory requirement that 
the companies be independent. This has some implications for the locating of this emerging 
type of private concentrated ownership, which does not appear to follow the orthodoxy of 
complex pyramidal ownership structures and cross-shareholding by listed companies. This is 
especially magnified in family-held companies. As stated earlier, one of the most effective 
mechanisms for the empowerment of shareholders is the market for control. It can be 
effective both in concentrated and dispersed ownership structures. 
Recently, a survey of applications for IPO by an online financial news provider 
indicated the top ten recurrent reasons for rejection of an application by the IPO Review 
Panel. In order of frequency, they include unclear or disputable ownership structures, 
fluctuating company performance, over-dependence on a controlling shareholder, evidence of 
false accounting, immature business model or transformation, lack of innovativeness, 
investment attraction and longevity, unclear use of capital to be raised or lack of need for 
funding, fake issuer (company) or falsification of the scale of presence in the market or 
market share, incomplete disclosure or unrealistic research figures or serious whistleblowing 
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matter by a competitor.
504
 Conclusively, over 50% of recurrent reasons for rejections directly 
relate to corporate governance matters. 
The rejection and refusal of listing applications by far comprise the most common 
sanctions employed by the CSRC in relation to corporate governance violations of the 
Measures. The CSRC publishes its reasons for the rejection of applications for listings on its 
website. In doing so, it unequivocally portends the types of company that will be rejected (if 
not listed). Moreover, the publication of rejections also forms part of the general move 
toward increased transparency in the listings process. In August 2013, for the first time, the 
CSRC also published the total applications for the year. It included companies that had 
applications accepted, those under review, those rejected and those on the waiting list for 
review. 
An analysis of the reasons for the rejection of applications suggests that corporate 
governance issues dominate. The CSRC rejects outright applications that do not meet the 
standards laid out in the Measures. There also appears to be room for some discretion as in 
some cases some companies‘ applications appear to meet the standard, but because of 
suspicious circumstances the IPO Review Panel rejects it. The number of companies rejected 
because of poor disclosure compared to other infractions is indicative of this strict approach. 
It suggests that, as well as company performance, the corporate governance practice of the 
companies plays a deciding factor in the success of the application process. The most 
common basis for rejection includes unclear or disputable ownership structures. Of particular 
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 See, ―25% chuangyeban gongshi shangshiqian bei jubao [25% of ChiNext Companies have Jubao Prior to 
Listing],‖ Entrepreneur [Chuangyezhe] (2011), url: 
http://money.163.com/11/0412/16/71F0HP1G00252EEK.html>. 
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note appears to be the wariness of the CSRC in permitting the listing of companies that 
already form part of listed or unlisted groups of companies.
505
 
The CSRC remains keen to demonstrate the reasons for listing rejections more so in 
order to ensure that companies and their sponsors become aware that demonstration of good 
company performance is now a given requirement. However, corporate governance issues 
may cause a rejection of an application. Thus, through its IPO Review Panel, the CSRC plays 
a key role in corporate governance as a norm creator on ChiNext, crucially indicating what it 
deems as corporate governance irregularities that may not necessarily violate any law or rules 
per se. Through the application review process it creates further corporate governance norms 
not necessarily found in the Measures, Company Law or Securities Law.
506
 The publication 
of the companies applying for listing may also be seen as a direct response to criticism from 
the press and investors of the number and undesirable quality of companies that pass the 
application process. 
 
a. Removal of IPO Application from Waiting List 
The CSRC also ‗removes‘ applications of companies from the waiting list before they 
come under review of the panel. Between January and June 2013, the CSRC removed 134 
companies from the list before they reached the IPO Review Panel. However, no reasons are 
specified in the list regarding the removals, that is, removals by the CSRC or those 
voluntarily removed. In addition to removal from the list, the CSRC has authority to refuse to 
process a company‘s documents if it decides that the company has violated one of its 
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 For an insight into the CSRC‘s general policy in discouraging backdoor listings that used to be the norm with 
SOEs, see ―Chuangyeban Bu Zhichi Jieke Shangshi [ChiNext Does Not Encourage Backdoor Listings],‖ May 
28, 2013, http://www.ccstock.cn/chuangye/cybyaowen/2011-12-16/A654781.html.  
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 Indeed, to some extent some of these irregularities remain recognised flaws, in the legislation of which 
companies and their advisers seek to take advantage, for example, ownership structures that include the same 
shareholders as in the Haohai decision, page 256. 
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provisions. Thus, the removal of an application from the list does amount to the refusal to 
process an application for IPO on ChiNext. 
 
b. Suspension and Withdrawal from IPO 
The CSRC can suspend an approved IPO and has done so on ChiNext. The main 
issues that may lead to suspension include the discovery of contradictions or inaccuracies in 
the prospectus and listing applications or failure to amend a disclosure to reflect a dramatic 
change in a company‘s circumstances. 
 
2. The Soft Approach: Opinions, Inspections, Investigations and Orders 
On ChiNext, during the year, CSRC local offices carry out surveys and onsite spot 
inspections of company books and corporate conduct. The audits and spot inspections 
sometimes result in correction orders being issued. Whether or not these correction orders 
amount to formal remonstrations remains unclear. Indeed, only a few companies disclosed 
these correction orders in their annual reports under actions by the regulatory authority. 
Disclosure appears to depend on the gravity of the corrections required and whether the 
CSRC indicates a requirement to publish in any order it issues, which it can. 
With the rising importance of corporate governance as a state policy, the CSRC must 
demonstrate to the State Council its success in fulfilling its role in not only developing the 
securities markets but also protecting shareholders, the majority of whom remain individual 
local Chinese. The CSRC also uses these surveys to gather information about compliance 
used in producing reports to the government on the actions it has taken and its success in the 
protection of shareholders. Nonetheless, the CSRC must balance protecting shareholders with 
ensuring that ChiNext companies have leeway to undertake the business that allowed them to 
be the chosen few to be listed on the Exchange. This may be a reason for the emphasis on 
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using soft enforcement tools. This sense of responsibility feeds through to the CSRC local 
offices that carry out the surveys and investigations, as well as disciplinary actions against 
companies registered in their regions. The table below details the number of self-
investigations disclosed by the first 40 companies listed on ChiNext. 
 
Table 14: (Self) investigations imposed by CSRC on ChiNext companies as disclosed in annual reports of surveyed 
companies 
 
Source: 
author‟s survey507 
 
In 2010, the CSRC local offices carried out ten surveys and three onsite investigations. 
All were issued correction orders with all pertaining to corporate governance ‗irregularities‘. 
Although the CSRC correction orders remain undisclosed, CSMEs (and other listed 
companies) are obliged to disclose all CSRC actions, including remedial actions by the 
company in the annual report. The results of corrective orders published by companies 
include those relating to ownership structure, the use of cumulative voting at shareholders‘ 
meetings and attendance of independent directors at both board and shareholder meetings. 
Each office monitors and supervises all companies domiciled in their regions and this 
includes the issue of notices of self-inspection, (paper) audits and onsite investigations and 
the implementation of sanctions against companies domiciled in their region. 
CSRC Enforcement - Notice of Onsite Inspection 
For example, on 12 May 2011, the CSRC Supervisory and Administrative Section 
Jiangsu office issued a Notice of Onsite Inspection to Wuxi Boton Belt Co. Ltd. (‗Boton‘). 
On 18 May 2011, less than a week after the notice, CSRC Jiangsu visited the offices of Boton, 
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 Information from review of ChiNext company disclosures of surveys and correction orders from the internet. 
 2009 2010 2011 
Number of 
investigations 
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which resulted in the issue of a rectification opinion to the company and an undertaking by 
the board of directors as a whole, supervisors and senior management to study and implement 
the remedial opinions.
508
 From the disclosure made by Boton to confirm its compliance with 
the correction order, clearly the scope of the inspection focused mainly on corporate 
governance issues. The approach equals the process of a review of a listing application. It 
included inspection of Boton‘s internal controls, the system for independent director‘s annual 
reports on their work, the formulation of an audit committee and terms of reference, corporate 
governance status quo, information disclosure, shareholdings of directors, supervisors and 
senior management, the previous year‘s business performance, the system for personnel privy 
to inside information, the establishment of responsibility for serious errors in annual reports 
and its implementation, capital funding and surplus capital funding situation and the 
company‘s ability to adapt to changes in the market. 
 
a. Supervisory Opinions and Correction Orders 
CSRC local offices issue supervisory opinions
509
 (jianguan yijian) and correction 
orders (zhenggai yijian) to companies registered within their jurisdictions. Supervisory 
opinions require remedial action or disclosure on specific aspects of a company‘s corporate 
governance practice. These opinions state, in unequivocal terms, the problems found and give 
the company a directive and period of time in which to correct them. However, the CSRC 
rarely announces the details of correction and supervisory orders. Nonetheless, listed 
companies are obliged to publish any remedial actions undertaken to comply with them, or 
recommendations, as is more often the case. Issued by CSRC local offices, correction and 
supervisory orders may result in an investigation. 
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 The issue of recommendations by external auditors to a company‘s management seems the closest analogy, 
the difference here being that management has no choice but to concede and implement as a matter of regulation 
whether or not they agree. Again this remains an area that lacks transparency. 
509
 Also referred to as a supervisory order. 
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An order of self-inspection (zicha) often precedes an onsite inspection by the CSRC. 
The relevant local office of the CSRC first notifies the company of a spot check or survey, 
which tends to be carried out within a week. The notification contains details of the aspects of 
corporate governance that are subject to spot checking. In essence, this amounts to 
completing a survey-type questionnaire, the responses to which are then published to the 
market.
510
 The CSRC rarely publishes the correction orders or supervisory opinions; however, 
companies are obliged to publicly disclose their responses to the questionnaires. It remains 
unclear why the CSRC does not publish the orders but rather leaves this to the company to 
disclose in a ‗correction implementation report‘, or, less obviously by the disclosed board, 
resolutions regarding corrections made pursuant to a CSRC correction order or supervisory 
opinion. 
 
b. Surveys 
Surveys tend to have 20 to 40 questions on various corporate governance matters, 
including ownership structure and implementation of cumulative voting. The surveys tend to 
be randomly issued to various companies. These surveys perform three functions. One 
function is that it allows the CSRC to less labour-intensively monitor internal governance and 
to pre-empt violations, in pursuance of its duty to protect investors. It also enables the CSRC 
to glean information on the compliance of companies with not only mandatory laws and 
regulations but also best practice, which the CSRC wishes to promote. Lastly, the information 
from the survey also forms the basis of reports by the CSRC to the State Council regarding its 
own function and achievement in terms of corporate governance.  
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In 2010, the CSRC used a random survey to assess the level of corporate governance 
compliance in ChiNext companies. It was a corporate governance survey for which all 
ChiNext companies were required to supply information. The results of the survey also 
culminated in further investigations where there was indication of irregular corporate 
governance practices. Investigations have always, in theory, being a mainstay of 
administrative enforcement. During 2010, the local offices of the CSRC each carried out ad 
hoc investigations of ChiNext companies registered in their jurisdictions. These 
investigations were a result of a combination of spot checks or were based on information, for 
instance, from the survey and complaints (jubao) by shareholders and stakeholders. Between 
31 December 2009 and 31 December 2011, 12 companies were subjected to ad hoc 
investigation by presiding local offices of the CSRC. The form of investigation is similar in 
structure to the IPO review process. In all of the investigations, remedial reports (gaizheng 
baogao) were issued. The dramatic fall to only two
511
 indicates that the ad hoc investigations 
were perhaps more planned and based on information about each company‘s internal 
governance. Equally, it may simply indicate an overall improvement. 
 
3. The Hard Approach: Fines, Suspensions and Bans 
a. Fines 
The CSRC plays an active role in meting out fines to companies and individuals 
pursuant to article 193 of Securities Law. Fines for companies range from RMB 300,000 to 
RMB 600,000 (GBP 30,000 to GBP 60,000), while for individuals it ranges from RMB 
30,000 to RMB 300,000 (GBP 3,000 to GBP 30,000). The CSRC rarely imposes fines on its 
own. They tend to issue a warning along with a fine. 
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Enforcement Action - CSRC Fine 
As of December 2012, the management and sponsor or only one company on ChiNext 
have been fined by the CSRC and they received the maximum punishment as a warning 
against the falsification of records. Wanfu Biotechnology (Hunan) Agricultural Development 
Co. Ltd. is principally engaged in the research, development, production and sales of rice 
deep-processing products, and remains the only company that the Exchange has referred to 
the CSRC for further sanctions, having already being issued two public condemnations and 
one notice of public criticism by the Exchange. This time, the CSRC issued fines and bans on 
the sponsor, Ping‘an, and its representatives. The CSRC fined Ping‘an double the sum of the 
professional fees it made from the IPO of the company, that is, RMB 25,550,000. It further 
issued a warning and fined Ping‘an‘s three representatives the maximum fines under 
Securities Law of RMB 300,000, and revoked their eligibility to trade in the securities market 
and their eligibility to represent a sponsor, as well as issuing lifetime bans for engaging in the 
securities-related profession. The Exchange issued a warning to Ping‘an Securities, withheld 
its listing fees payment of RMB 25.5m due from Wanfukesheng, imposed a double fine, and 
a three-month suspension of Ping‘an‘s license to be a sponsor. Ping‘an‘s representatives, 
those responsible for the relationship with Wanfukesheng, and key personnel were each fined 
RMB 300k. They each also had their eligibility as representatives of sponsors cancelled and 
their licenses to engage in the securities market cancelled, in addition to lifetime bans from 
China‘s equity markets. The personnel of the sponsor who assisted in the IPO of Ping‘an did 
not avoid punishment as they were issued warnings, a RMB 100k fine and cancellation of 
their securities eligibility. 
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b. Suspension and Banning from Capital Markets 
The banning of an individual symbolises the severest sanction as the ban does not 
only relate to the market in which the violation was committed but pervasively China‘s 
capital markets as a whole. Increasingly, the CSRC bans individuals in relation to their 
corporate governance violations and not only in relation to general Securities Law infractions 
such as fraud. Under article 233 of Securities Law, the CSRC has authority to ban individuals 
from involvement in activities related to the stock market or from being a director, supervisor 
or senior manager of a listed company. So far, on ChiNext, there has been only one reported 
case of the banning of an individual by the CSRC, and that was the ban of the controlling 
shareholder and chairman/Chief Executive of Wanfukesheng.
512
 A ban tends to be imposed 
when the violation involves large sums of money, continuous denial by the accused or 
persistent offending by the individual. Thus, the CSRC tends to look not only at the 
seriousness of the consequences of the violation but also the culpability of the accused. It 
acknowledges that many investors and participants in the stock market in China may not be 
aware of the law or may just be naïve, which is evidenced by the numerous initiatives being 
taken to educate investors as well as the senior management of ChiNext companies. The issue 
of self-regulation notices to companies may not appear to be a serious sanction; however, by 
virtue of the fact they are issued by the CSRC (local office) makes it a serious sanction. Any 
subsequent investigation and finding of culpability means that the sanction of banning or 
court proceedings may be imposed against the company or its personnel. A ban by the CSRC 
can be appealed or challenged by judicial review under China‘s Administrative Law. 
However, it remains unlikely as companies do not like court cases because of the expense. 
Moreover, the CSRC‘s decisions are rarely challenged by judicial review. A review of bans 
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 See, CSRC, ―Zhongguo Zhengjianhui Shichang Jinru Juedingshu (Yi Shengze) [CSRC Decision to Ban from 
Capital Markets (Yi Shengze)],‖ Official, China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC), (31 July, 2012), 
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suggests that the most frequent tenures for bans include three, five, eight and ten years. The 
bans do not pertain to just one market but to all of China‘s capital markets in any senior 
management or advisory capacity. Bans, therefore, rank as the highest sanction against an 
individual, and are perhaps worse that civil litigation, which may not necessarily result in a 
ban. No punishment other than a warning accompanies a ban, unless a disgorgement is made 
or an account for profit is requested. 
Before an individual can be a participant in China‘s capital markets, they must 
undergo the approval process of the CSRC, which then publishes the results on its website. 
Although the CSRC does reject individuals, there is no clear indication of the numbers or 
which companies, and the stock exchange to which their applications related. Thus, it remains 
unclear whether any potential participants in the ChiNext market have been rejected. 
This section has demonstrated that the CSRC focuses on and directly intervenes at 
company level in regulating the internal corporate governance of companies. It also tends to 
emphasise a soft line approach, using its monitoring and supervisory powers rather than 
sanctioning and disciplining. 
 
4. Challenges of the CSRC 
Increased expertise and streamlined running of capital markets in China remains a key 
challenge of the CSRC. It has been acknowledged that a previous lack of expertise and 
immaturity of the market resulted in a chaotic state.
513
 As early as 1992, in one of its reports, 
the State Council admitted this failing and demanded improvements in expertise.
 514
 Although 
the national stock exchanges were established in 1991, it was only in March 1998 that the last 
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vestiges of ‗independent‘, ‗local government‘ and ‗informal‘ unauthorised exchanges 
engaged in the trading of unlisted companies and considerable assets was finally effected.
515
 
In those days, corporate governance still did not figure as an aspect of stock market 
regulation. Over a decade later, there appeared little improvement in 2004 when the State 
Council demanded it.
516
 However, by this time, corporate governance had become a fixture 
on the regulatory agenda, and the CSRC had gradually re-built its reputation. Thus, it takes 
violations that potentially also bring it into disrepute very seriously. 
The CSRC has had a number of scandals associated with its Listing Review Panel, the 
most damaging being that of the Xin Dadi scandal that resulted in the suspension of listing 
for ten months while the CSRC investigated not only the company and its advisers but also 
the IPO Review Panel. Xin Dadi Shengwu Keji Ltd. was the first company that was 
discovered to have obtained listing based on false disclosures. The media played a key 
investigative role, affecting the length of the suspension of trading and the resultant purge of 
the IPO Review Panel members, and, crucially, a new policy of increasing the participation 
of external experts on the panel. Indeed, one of the main aims of the ChiNext framework is to 
increase regulatory expertise. This is done in two ways. The CSRC has increased the number 
of its personnel who are experts not only in regulation but also in the various industries that 
ChiNext companies fall within. This better positions them to assess the merits of IPO 
applications as well as post IPO performance. Indeed, as illustrated in Chapter Six on 
enforcement, the CSRC and the Exchange may decide and subject some companies to the 
same level of assessments and review used during the pre-IPO process, and take action 
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against them where the listed companies have failed. Suzhou Greenwood is an extreme 
example and, arguably, a scapegoat as it was effectively delisted by revocation of its listing 
license. This approach aims to combat the problem of packaged companies, but obviously 
failed to some extent as demonstrated by the Xin Dadi scandal. It does, however, attempt to 
allay concerns, especially the constant clamouring in the financial media. Hence, the 
increasing transparency of the CSRC and the Exchange in relation to the actions and 
sanctions against companies in violation of the ChiNext framework, Company Law, 
Securities Law and other corporate governance rules and standards. However, there has been 
some opposition. Shenzhen Venture Capital Association president, Wang Shouren, argues 
that the audit requirements in preparation for IPO are too onerous and believes the real focus 
should be on whether a company has continued innovation, growth and standardised internal 
governance. If it does not, then the delisting regime should be swift in getting rid of such 
companies.
517
 
The CSRC has also become more sensitive and reactive to financial media reports and 
public opinion, clearly reflected in the speed with which it reacts to criticism scandals. A key 
area has been the increase in transparency keenly directed at countering criticism, especially 
from the press, regarding the quality of companies being listed. A prominent corporate 
governance activist magazine reported that the IPO Review Panel, on average, approved over 
80% of applications made to the CSRC, which it believed contributed to the high number of 
underperforming companies. This thereby implied that the policy considerations in promoting 
ChiNext as a market precede the protection of shareholders. Of course, the CSRC, without 
choice, took three actions to counterclaim that policy consideration rather than investor 
protection took precedence. Firstly, it now publishes the list of companies applying for listing 
                                                 
517
 Xinhua Guangzhou, ―‗Sangao‟ yousuo „tuishao‘ - Chuangyeban qidai baituo zijin tuidong xing sanhu 
shichang [‗The Three Highs‘ somewhat the ‗Recedes Fever‘ - ChiNext Expects to be Rid of its Capital Funding 
Style Retail Market],‖ Government News, Xin Hua, (23 October, 2012), url: 
http://www.gd.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2012-10/24/c_113471199.htm. 
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in a given period, noting the reasons for rejections. Secondly, it published advice reminding 
and encouraging investors to be better advised and aware of investment risks and be prepared 
for losses. Finally, the CSRC has increased the basic eligibility qualification of people who 
can partake in investment on ChiNext. They have to sit a short test before they can open a 
trading account. 
 
5. Issue of Uniformity in Enforcement 
The CSRC local offices carry the brunt of enforcement of corporate governance 
norms set out by the CSRC. There does not appear to be any specific uniformity in the survey 
or spot inspection initiatives by the CSRC. A review of the remedial reports published by 
companies suggests that the local offices initiate and dictate the surveys and spot inspections 
of companies that belong to their regions. The differences in the use of the law, regulations 
and rules used in issuance of correction orders for a spot inspection suggest that these 
enforcement initiatives are not directives from the main CSRC. 
As identified earlier, a key problem with disclosures and their enforcement remains 
the lack of uniformity, which ultimately can only cause uncertainty. Only the surveys of 2010 
and 2011 appear uniform. It remains unclear as to how this lack of uniformity in the citation 
of rules affects the implementation of corporate governance, if it does so at all. Significantly, 
it demonstrates the relative autonomy of the CSRC offices at local level. It also indicates a 
certain measure of discretion from the local offices.
518
 Some commentators believe that not 
enough has been done to increase the profile of corporate governance, which they perceive as 
both an important and sensitive aspect of China‘s capital markets.519 
                                                 
518
 There exists literature that illustrates the potential of enforcement discretion at local level that influences 
regional difference in the levels of compliance with corporate governance laws and rules.  
519
 See Hu Ningfei, ―Shangshigongsi dongshihui zhili bibing [Corporate Governance Malpractice of the Board 
of Directors of Listed Companies - An Interview with Shanghai Stock Exchange Head of Research Centre, Hu 
Ruying].‖ (Hu Ruying believes that concentrated ownership, the legacy of yesteryears, intermediaries taking 
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B. Role of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
As suggested earlier, on ChiNext the Exchange takes on a more punitive role in 
dealing with corporate governance infractions of companies and individuals on ChiNext than 
the CSRC. The Exchange plays a dual role on ChiNext as both a watchdog and punisher of 
companies that transgress, their internal governance structures, controlling shareholders and 
advisers. The next sections examine the key tools availed by the Exchange in enforcing the 
ChiNext framework. 
1. Issue, Suspension and Revocation of Listing License 
The Exchange does not have unilateral authority to delist a company. However, it can 
summarily suspend or revoke a listing license. Company Law and Securities Law provide for 
delisting rules; however, the detail is left to the CSRC. Indeed, the first effective delisting of 
a company on ChiNext was through a revocation of its listing licence rather than through a 
listing regime initially. However, a detailed delisting regime was only introduced in January 
2011. There has been no delisting since its introduction. Perhaps this testifies better 
compliance by ChiNext companies, or, cynically, only that companies have many ‗second 
chances‘ to improve. In a calculated effort to give listing companies and their advisers a 
reminder of the robustness, the Exchange summarily revoked the listing licence of Suzhou 
Goldengreen Technologies Ltd. due to key disclosure failures. Article 26 bestows the CSRC 
with authority to cancel or suspend listing where it is discovered that the issuer has not 
complied with the law and legal process.
520
 Examined below is the first and only company 
that has had its listing cancelled by the Exchange for lack of disclosure, which, depending on 
                                                                                                                                                        
short positions, i.e., voting with their feet rather than their hands, and general cultural on the stock market 
hamper corporate governance.)  See also Cui Qinzhi, ―Dui Woguo Gongsizhili Jiegou de Fali Fenxi [A 
Jurisprudential Analysis of the Corporate Governance Structure of China],‖ Government, Zhongguo Faxuewang, 
(19 January, 2006), url: http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showArticle.asp?id=1239. (Calling for greater scrutiny of 
controlling shareholder powers and the protection of minority shareholders.) 
520
 Article 26 of Securities Law. 
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one‘s perspective, may or may not amount to a corporate governance issue; it does for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
Case study 9: Suzhou Goldengreen Technologies Ltd. 
On 26 February 2010, Suzhou Goldengreen Technologies Ltd. (‗Goldengreen‘) 
received its final approval for listing from the CSRC. On 18 March, Goldengreen made 
disclosures to the market regarding the legal status of five existing patents and two 
applications regarding its core technology. However, the disclosures proved false because, on 
24 February, just before IPO, the State Intellectual Patent Office had notified Goldengreen 
that four of its five patents were revoked. These patents were not only used in all of 
Goldengreen‘s product but encompassed the company‘s uniqueness. Initially, the sponsors of 
Goldengreen were asked by the CSRC to investigate. As a result of a media tip-off and an ad 
hoc spot check by the regulators on 11 June, the CSRC ChiNext Issuing Audit Committee 
(‗CCIAC‘) commenced a retrospective due diligence exercise of Goldengreen‘s IPO 
application. The committee found two issues. Firstly, the five patents and two pending 
patents‘ legal statuses were not true. Secondly, most of Goldengreen‘s products used four of 
the terminated patents, while 50% used the fifth patent. The decision of the committee on 13 
June encompassed two aspects: one related solely to the company while the other related to 
intermediaries. Indeed, it transpired that Goldengreen assumed that, once listed, it was able to 
convince the patents authority to reinstate the revoked patents. However, clearly, between 24 
February and the CSRC investigation on 11 June it failed to do so. In terms of corporate 
governance, the independent directors were only appointed to the board on 8 March 2009. As 
there were only so many board meetings they were undoubtedly handicapped in knowing 
about the problem. Moreover, the revocation of patents may not have been a matter they were 
likely to know about as this is an operational matter. 
Goldengreen had its listing license withdrawn with directions to reimburse investors 
the issue price plus interest in accordance with Securities Law. Thus, the company 
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reimbursed investors RMB 20 million at the IPO price of RMB 20,080. Those responsible for 
signing the prospectus were subjected to supervision by the CSRC, which included attending 
supervisory talks (jianguan tanhua) and putting up warning notices (chushi jinshi) about 
them. In addition, the CSRC banned each person from signing or taking part in an IPO for 12 
months. Although short, the ban signified a loss of reputation. In terms of the intermediaries, 
the lawyers, the firm and its representative lawyers were sanctioned to attend supervisory 
talks and warning notices about them were issued. They were also banned from engaging in 
IPO activities for 12 months. The CSRC committee‘s decision to cancel Goldengreen‘s 
listing was in accordance with article 26 of Securities Law. 
Goldengreen raises many issues relevant to this chapter. It raises issues not only about 
disclosing but about the quality of disclosure. Here, Goldengreen did not expressly deceive 
regarding the current legal status of the patent, but it did so implicitly. Equally, the fact that 
this implicit deception was caught by the media rather than the CSRC committee raises 
questions about the CSRC‘s level of expertise and comprehensive nature of due diligence 
pre-IPO. Another issue relates to achieving a balance between performance and good 
governance in companies seeking a ChiNext listing. Sometimes the overemphasis on 
company performance can be to the detriment of companies with good governance. But the 
new listing regime indicates that a balance will be drawn in that, once a company has good 
corporate governance, delisting may be avoided by ensuring minimal performance. However, 
no matter how well a company may perform it may still be delisted where it has three public 
criticisms imposed within a 36 month period. In terms of enforcement, Goldengreen 
demonstrates stricter enforcement than any exchange. Indeed, it is only the third company to 
ever have its listing license withdrawn. Other issues pertain to the role of the board and other 
members of senior management in ensuring good governance. It was the media that originally 
revealed the inconsistencies in Goldengreen‘s disclosures and which prompted the CSRC to 
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take action. The due diligence exercise by the CSRC demonstrates the increase in both 
professional and specialist advisers. Commentators such as Zhao Chunhua noted in the 
Securities Daily that the CSRC‘s dealing with Goldengreen demonstrates a determination to 
protect the legal rights of investors and the principle of the strict supervision of companies. 
Based on the detailed listing regime in operation on ChiNext, it may be argued that 
the delisting of Goldengreen may have been an excessive response in its arbitrary and 
perhaps too speedy revocation of the listing license. Alternatively, it may be that the response 
to Goldengreen remains proportionate, the problem being that the new delisting regime has 
less bite and overly extends a process of exit that needs to be swift and uncompromising for 
those in violation of the laws and rules. It may have less bite because ChiNext, after all, 
amounts to the Chinese government‘s policy of promoting domestic industry and 
consumption in which delisting needs to be avoided unless the company‘s continuous floating 
on the market becomes indefensible. 
 
2. Soft Approach: ‘Greetings’ and ‘Admonishment’ Telephone Calls 
The CSRC takes a ‗paternal‘ and coercive approach to enforcement by encouraging 
companies to take responsibility for their own corporate governance performance. 
Administrative actions include the so-called ‗greetings‘ telephone calls (wenhou 
dianhua) and admonishment calls (quanjie dianhua). Greetings telephone calls, in practice, 
involve the CSRC central or local offices telephoning to check on the company with no 
particular purpose in mind but to raise awareness that the regulator continues to monitor even 
after IPO. Key contacts for the regulators include the legal representatives, executive 
directors, and board secretaries and securities representatives of companies or whoever is 
identified as such by the regulator. Greetings calls may include conversation updates on the 
internal governance of the company post IPO. The first call amounts to an enquiry but the 
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second becomes a warning. In contrast, admonishment calls specifically demand a certain 
conduct. This type of inquiry by the CSRC dictates whether the central or local offices make 
the next call. The CSRC central office does not only call listed companies but also other 
participants in the market, including advisers and investors. CSRC local offices narrowly 
focus on companies listed on ChiNext. 
Both greetings and admonishment calls are not well received by some market 
participants. They consider these telephone calls to be theatrical and predict that they will 
become unsustainable as the number of companies on ChiNext increases. One of Shenzhen 
Stock Exhange‘s large account holders revealed that even before 3 November 2009, the first 
day of trading of ChiNext, several investors received greetings calls from the Exchange in 
which it was stated that purchases of new shares should not exceed 10,000 shares. Those that 
went over this number of purchases received admonishment calls.
521
 
These calls demonstrate the adoption of a pragmatic company-specific approach by 
the CSRC borne of a realisation that the companies, especially newly listed companies, 
cannot be left on their own. Although time and resource intensive, this approach perhaps 
drives the lower than expected number of sanctioned companies and illustrates the success of 
a pragmatic company-specific approach to regulation. 
However, this criticism may be too harsh and does take into consideration that such 
calls are made by the CSRC local office. Moreover, the call facilitates the creation of a more 
positive and interactive relationship between the company and the regulators. This becomes a 
particularly important relationship given the cynicism that private individuals, who now head 
these companies, have for officialdom. These telephone calls also complement the principle 
of self-regulation whereby companies can, for instance, request the temporary suspension of 
                                                 
521
 For an account of the different types of disciplinary telephone call, see Kuang Zhiyong, ―Chuangyeban 
Chaozuo de „Miaoshu Youxi‟ Chufa Jieshi Yuelaiyue Yan [The ChiNext ‗Cat and Mouse‘ Hype: More Rigorous 
Measures],‖ First Financial Daily (Shanghai), (31 December, 2009), url: 
http://money.163.com/09/1231/02/5RR24J2F00253B0H.html. 
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trading in the company‘s shares. The regional offices of the CSRC implement the pragmatic 
company-specific approach to regulation. 
The next step up from an admonishment call becomes the correction order and 
supervisory order, from which the resulting corrective actions must be published by CSMEs. 
These are further discussed under reputational sanctions in the next section. 
 
3. Hard Approach: Public Condemnation and Notice of Public Criticism 
Public condemnation remains the strongest sanction against a company, other than 
suspension and delisting from the market, or other than a ban against a person. However, the 
CSRC make less use of public condemnations. As will be demonstrated further, the use of 
such enforcement has increasingly become the purview of the Exchange under its self-
regulatory powers. The CSRC reprimands but uses lower sanctions such as warnings, mostly 
verbal. Except for serious violations of Company Law or Securities Law, the regulator 
appears to have developed more of a company-level supervisory role through its local offices. 
 
a. Notice of Public Criticism 
The Exchange issued four notices of criticism for insider dealing and dealing within 
prohibited trading periods between 2009 and 2012. Examples of the types of infraction that 
occurred on ChiNext are as follows: 
Trading in a Prohibited Period 
On 7 March 2012, the Exchange issued Gu Zhenqi, a director of Staidson (Beijing) 
Biopharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. (300204), with a notice of public criticism because of his 
violation of dealing in the company‘s shares during prohibited trading periods by directors, 
supervisors, senior management of the company and their spouses. In this case, the decision 
was based on finding a violation of paragraph 3.7.13 of the ChiNext Operational Standards. 
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On 6 January 2012, Staidson announced that performance had substantially improved, with 
projected net profits increasing by 70-90%. That same day, without his knowledge, Gu‘s wife 
bought 4,300 at RMB 56.86 per share of the company‘s shares. Crucially, the night before, 
Gu had happened to shared price-sensitive information with his wife, particularly stating that 
the company‘s results were better than 2011, and so amounted to a good investment. The 
public criticism issued pursuant to rule 17.3 of the ChiNext Rules does not facilitate an 
account for profits. Nonetheless, under Company Law, the company and board of directors 
must disgorge the offender of any profit made, that is, the difference between the purchase 
and any gain made. As such, Staidson and its board of directors had a duty to ensure that Gu 
accounted for any profits to the company. Notice of criticisms are publicised with a summary 
of decisions on the ChiNext pages of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange website. 
In another example, the Exchange issued Bai Li, a member of the supervisory board 
of Liaoning Julong Financial Equipment Corp. (300202), with a notice of criticism because 
her husband traded during a prohibited period. The published decision did not mention 
whether she had knowledge; however, Bai was also found to be in breach of her duties to 
comply, including fiduciary and due diligence duties,
522
 which was not so in Gu‘s case. Her 
duty here was to ensure that she and her spouse were aware of the trading prohibitions and 
comply with them. 
 
Dealing in Breach of the 25% of Shareholding per Annum Rule 
A breach of a covenant, for instance, expressed in a company‘s listing prospectus may 
also result in the issue of a notice of criticism and the entering of name(s) onto the dang‟an 
(‗performance and attitude record‘). Thus, earlier, on 17 January 2012, the Exchange issued 
Guo Shen, a director of Lanzhou Haimo Technologies Co. Ltd., with a notice of public 
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 Rule 3.1.5 of ChiNext Rules.  
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criticism for failure to comply in good faith and due diligence with ChiNext laws and rules.
523
 
In this instance, Guo was found to be in breach because he had exceeded the 25% per year 
limit for directors wishing to deal in shares they hold in the company. Guo held 7.37% of 
shares directly and another 8.40% through a SPV, with an aggregate holding of 15.77%. 
Between 20 May and 5 September 2011, the SPV sold shares in the company but the 
aggregate sale amounted to more than 25% of Guo‘s aggregate holding, and was, therefore, 
in breach of the ChiNext Rules. 
The cases above demonstrate the Exchange‘s focus on ensuring that management in 
companies and their families comply with the ChiNext Listing Rules. 
 
b. Public Condemnation 
Public condemnation
524
 as an enforcement tool of the Stock Exchanges in China has 
been in existence since 1999. However, only ChiNext has formulated specific rules on its 
application. During the period 2009 to 2012, only five public condemnations were issued. 
They either related to illegal RPTs or the publication of false information and records, which 
demonstrates the severity with which such violations will be dealt. 
 
Illegal Related Party Transaction 
In one of the first investigations by the Exchange, a public condemnation was 
imposed for three counts of illegal RPTs. 
                                                 
523
 Rule 1.4 of ChiNext Rules. 
524
 In this thesis, ‗public condemnation‘ is preferred to ‗public criticism‘. Firstly, ‗condemnation‘ is closer to the 
semantic and translation than ‗criticism‘ (piping) in the Chinese language, with the latter holding less force. 
Secondly, public condemnation as an enforcement tool has a higher reputational impact than the word ‗criticism‘ 
implies in the ChiNext Rules and the Public Condemnation Rules themselves. This approach contrasts with 
Liebman and Milhaupt‘s translation of the term gongkai qianze because they reflect the reputational effects of 
using them. See Liebman and Milhaupt, ―Reputational Sanctions in China‘s Securities Market,‖ (1 May, 2008): 
947 at fn. 66. 
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As illustrated in the figure below, the first violation arose when Zhendong 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (‗Zhendong Pharmaceutical‘), through its wholly owned subsidiary 
Shanxi Taishen Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (‗Taishen‘), entered into a car manufacturing 
contract with Shanxi Construction Co. Ltd. (‗Construction‘), a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Shanxi Industry and Commerce Co. Ltd (‗Industry and Commerce‘), which, in turn, is the 
controlling shareholder of Zhendong Pharmaceutical, holding 59.08% of total issued shares. 
Crucially, Taishen paid Construction RMB 107.6m, of which a deliberate overpayment of 
RMB 30m was included; this is identified as ‗violation 1‘ in the diagram below. Construction 
only reimbursed this overpayment in April 2012.
525
 The second violation also occurred in 
2011; this time, Zhendong Pharmaceutical entered into what would have been a regular (as 
opposed to illegal) RPT with Shanxi Wuhe Health Products Co. (‗Wuhe‘) to the value of 
RMB 291,600, but, in fact, Zhendong Pharmaceutical paid Wuhe RMB 6.5m. The Exchange 
concluded that, even when objectively taking into consideration the debts (based on the end 
of term value, so including interest) owed by Zhendong Pharmaceutical to its controlling 
shareholder, Industry and Commerce, the RPT still amounted to an appropriation of RMB 
3.836m. The final violation, again in 2011, was similar to the preceding transaction, except 
that Zhendong Pharmaceutical entered into a contract with Shanxi Zhendong Installation Co. 
Ltd., another wholly owned subsidiary of Industry and Commerce, and paid it RMB 8.343m 
for goods. 
Figure 14: Illegal RPTs by Shanxi Zhendong Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 
                                                 
525
 The published Shenzhen Stock Exchange decision on its website does not give the exact date of the initial 
infringement only when the monies were repaid. But it is fair to say at least four months elapsed before 
repayment. 
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Source: Author‟s impression 
The Exchange decided against each of the parties separately and also awarded 
separate public condemnations to Shanxi Zhendong Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (‗Zhendong 
Pharmaceutical‘) listed on ChiNext: its chairman and de facto controller, Li Ping‘an; its 
director and chairman of Shanxi Taishen Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., its wholly owned 
subsidiary, Liu Anping; its company secretary and head of finance, Tai Zhengguo; one of its 
independent directors, Chen Qun; and another head of finance, Zhao Yanhong. 
The company was found to be in breach of violation on all counts paragraph 1 of the 
Notice Concerning Some Issues on Regulating the Funds between Listed Companies and 
Associated Parties and Listed Companies' Provision of Guaranty to Other Parties, which in 
summary prohibits a wide range of transactions between listed companies, their controlling 
shareholders and related parties. It also gives the regulator discretion to decide a breach. The 
company was further found to be in breach of rule 4.1 of the ChiNext Rules for failing in its 
duty to act in good faith and with due diligence in complying with the relevant laws and rules. 
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It was also in breach of both paragraph 6.9 of the ChiNext Guide to Operational Standards 
(‗ChiNext Operational Standards‘) detailing provision for the true and fair use of company 
funds, and paragraph 7.3.9 detailing provision for the board of directors to take legal action, 
protect property and take measures to either avoid or minimise loss to the company arising 
from RPTs misappropriation or transfer of company funds or other resources causing loss or 
likely to cause damage to the company. The Exchange also issued the controlling shareholder, 
Li Ping‘an, with public condemnation based on his breach of good faith and due diligence as 
a director,
526
 breach of his respective declarations and undertakings as a director and de facto 
controller of the company to comply with laws, rules and articles of association of the 
company,
527
 as well as violation of the ChiNext Operational Standards prohibiting controlling 
shareholders and de facto controllers from using RPTs, guarantees or other methods to 
directly or indirectly misappropriate company funds, assets causing harm to the company and 
interests of other shareholders.
528
 
In addition, the Exchange ordered remedial action, which included the setting up of 
measures regarding the scope of RPTs and the use of capital funds of the company by the 
controlling shareholder. The controlling shareholder, Industry and Commerce, was further 
obliged to undertake not to use the company‘s capital funds.529 The names of all parties were 
recorded on a ‗good faith file‘ (chengxin dang‟an).530 The Exchange considered its decision 
lenient because it took into account that the RPT did not result in serious consequences, 
although, from the annual report of 2011, it was discovered to have existed for approximately 
                                                 
526
 Rule 1.4 of ChiNext Rules. 
527
 Rules 3.1.5 and 3.1.7 of ChiNext Rules. 
528
 Paragraph 4.2 of the Guide to ChiNext Operational Standards (‗ChiNext Standards‘).  
529
 Regardless of whether a covenant arises directly as a result of enforcement action, its violation will also be a 
violation resulting in  the issue of another public condemnation. 
530
 In practice, the Shanxi CSRC local office and the Exchange‘s Supervisory Office keep a record of the names, 
now published online in Chinese language on the Shenzhen website: 
http://www.szse.cn/main/disclosure/bulliten/cxda/cxday/ 
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six months. Upon investigation, the Exchange further discovered that those culpable lacked 
knowledge on the illegality of RPTs using capital funds of the company. 
The violation was discovered by the Exchange during its examination of annual 
reports published by companies on ChiNext. 
The Exchange also directed the whole company to undergo training on ‗law abidance‘, 
as was done in Zhendong case when appropriate. It must be noted that Zhendong 
Pharmaceutical, incorporated in 1993, is one of the oldest companies to be listed on ChiNext 
and arguably reflects the listing strategies that have taken place in the last 20 years on 
China‘s stock markets. That is, a parent company prepares (packages) a subsidiary for listing 
so that it can benefit from cash raised. On ChiNext, the CSRC and the Exchange do not care 
for complicated group structures or for companies that are not independent because of the 
possibilities of illegal RPTs, illegal guarantees and insider trading. Although it remains a 
wonder that the IPO Review Panel permitted the listing of Zhendong Pharmaceutical, since, 
arguably, it did not meet the requirement for being an independent company, there may be 
policy considerations. For example, the pharmaceutical industry remains one that China 
wishes to enter, but barriers to entry remain extremely high as demonstrated by constant 
negotiations and trade agreements with the UK, which do not result in the exchange of 
information. 
 The regulatory authorities appear clear on the type of behaviour they want to deter 
from developing on ChiNext. The case of Zhendong Pharmaceutical illustrates some of the 
anathemas of the CSRC and the Exchange, which include illegal RPTs and pyramid 
structures. Given the IPOs Review Panel‘s strictness in not listing companies that had a 
holding company, it is surprising that the company was listed and perhaps reflects a 
loosening of the rules to ensure it reaches its quota of IPOs on ChiNext. 
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C. New Delisting Regime to Suit Profile of ChiNext Companies 
To incorporate a new and detailed delisting regime, among other amendments, the 
ChiNext Rules were revised and reissued to take effect from 1 May 2012 (2012 ChiNext 
Rules). The whole of Chapter 13 of the 2012 ChiNext Rules, as in the previous version, lays 
out the new delisting regime encompassing initial suspension from trading (part I), relisting 
(part II) and then delisting (part III) and the conditions precedent for each. 
The ChiNext Listing Rules were revised to include a detailed delisting regime aimed 
at delisting companies that violate the key pressure points of the regulators discussed above 
in Section I: disclosure of information, RPTs, guarantees and insider trading. Indeed, the 
introduction of detailed Listing Rules was partly a reaction to the effective delisting of 
Goldengreen by revoking its listing license. The Committee applied the broad principles of 
the law in sanctioning Goldengreen and demanding reimbursement to investors. Thus, the 
main objective of the Exchange in implementing a new listing regime is to protect investors. 
This is described effectively because, at the time, there was no detailed delisting process for 
ChiNext companies; consequently, the CSRC‘s only recourse was to action the Exchange‘s 
revocation of the company‘s listing license. 
Undoubtedly, corporate governance practice on ChiNext focuses on the protection of 
shareholders, though that protection does not necessarily equate to delivery of shareholder 
value as the paramount objective for corporate governance practice and enforcement on 
ChiNext. Instead, the stability and long-term sustainability of ChiNext and the companies 
listed on it are important engines of growth in China‘s remodelled economic growth model, 
mainly based on SME domestic productivity. This cannot be achieved without the continuous 
investment of individual large and retail shareholders who together hold 62% of the total 
investment on ChiNext. However, if these investors feel or perceive that private controlling 
shareholders within ChiNext companies have free reign to do as they please to the detriment 
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of other investors, then there may be a perception of an emergence of a feudal corporate 
society that somewhat mirrors or reminds public investors of Chinese society prior to the 
Mao era, when money and influence dictated the application of the law rather than justice and 
equity. 
The milestone represented in the ChiNext delisting regime manifests in the theoretical 
possibility of a company being delisted for persistent corporate governance transgressions. 
The key delisting features of the ChiNext regime include direct delisting with a short 
delisting regulation period, and no more so-called advance warnings of delisting; instead, a 
company will be relegated to a designated ‗delisting market‘. 
1. Suspension of Listing 
There are five potential instances in which a ChiNext company may have its listing 
suspended. Three instances relate to the veracity of the financial statements of a company, 
while the other two allow the Exchange some discretion in the kind of circumstances in 
which a suspension may be imposed: firstly, where significant errors or false records exist in 
previous financial statements that resulted in consecutive losses in the previous three years;
531
 
secondly, where significant errors or false records in the company‘s financial statement have 
resulted in a negative audit opinion; 
532
 thirdly, when a company has failed to make 
appropriate and timely disclosures to the market regarding the periodic audited financial 
statements
533
 (this provision also includes a failure to disclose financial statements and 
related audit report in accordance with the ChiNext timetable
534
 or failure to amend or correct 
significant errors or false records in the financial statements required by the CSRC or the 
Exchange within the given deadline
535
); fourthly, the Exchange has discretion where it deems 
                                                 
531
 Rule 13.1.1 (2) of ChiNext Rules as amended in 2012 (‗ChiNext Rules 2012‘). 
532
 Rule 13.1.1 (3) of ChiNext Rules 2012. 
533
 Rule 13.1.1 (4) of ChiNext Rules 2012. 
534
 Rule 12.4 of ChiNext Rules 2012. 
535
 Rule 12.6 of ChiNext Rules 2012. 
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the company has committed a significant violation of the law or rules;
536
 last is a catchall 
provision that the Exchange can impose a suspension where it deems fit.
537
 So corporate 
conduct here may not necessarily be illegal, nor does it need to have resulted in serious 
consequences, which is the usual benchmark for judging the serious nature of a violation of 
ChiNext rules. So far, no companies have been subject to a suspension in listing.
538
 If a 
company is unable to meet the conditions for relisting then it will be delisted.
539
 
2. Delisting Process on ChiNext 
The key provision in the Listing Rules that lays open a delisting for persistent 
corporate governance infraction is rule 13.3.1 (16), which states that any company that has 
three public criticisms within a 36 month period will be delisted. The provision does not 
specify the type of public criticism; therefore, in theory, any type of public criticism can 
make up the tally of three, but it must be a condemnation that the company has imposed on it. 
So far on ChiNext, three public condemnations have been imposed on companies and certain 
members of their management for corporate governance infractions relating to illegal 
RPTs,
540
 false financial records,
541
 and false financial records together with failure to disclose 
significant change in the company‘s circumstances.542 
Jiangsu Pacific Precision Forging Co. Ltd. (‗Precision Forging‘) presents an example 
of a company that already has two public condemnations and this was imposed within a short 
period of six months. Consequently, Precision Forging may only have one last change before 
it receives delisting orders. However, the question then remains of how far the Exchange and 
                                                 
536
 Rule 13.1.1 (10) of ChiNext Rules 2012. 
537
 Rule 13.1.1 (11) of ChiNext Rules 2012. 
538
 This is the case as of 1 May 2012 to date.  
539
 Rule 13.3.1 (13) of ChiNext Rules 2012. 
540
 Decision to Impose Public Condemnation on Shanxi Zhendong Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (300158) and 
Concerned Parties, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 25 May 2012.  
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indeed the CSRC will carry out the threat of delisting once three public condemnations have 
been imposed on a company. Precision Forging is also an example of the Exchange holding 
fire on delisting and instead escalating the issue to the CSRC. Indeed, this indicates that it 
will be more likely that, on the achievement of a second public criticism, a company may be 
given one final chance, because, rather than making a decision on a third transgression, the 
Exchange will refer it to the CSRC, which will decide on a punishment. This effectively 
means that the company will not be delisted on three transgressions, but maybe four or even 
more, depending on how much time the Exchange sees fit to escalate a case to the CSRC, 
rather than deal with it. The intention is, presumably, to avoid responsibility for the issue of a 
third public condemnation, which, according to the guidance, results in automatic de-listing 
from ChiNext. There are a few plausible reasons for these positions. Firstly, the Exchange 
does not want to delist a company that the CSRC has not itself investigated and has found to 
have committed violations. This can be viewed from two perspectives. It may be seen as the 
Exchange giving the CSRC notice of companies that will potentially be delisted, in effect, 
giving the CSRC an opportunity to investigate and punish the violating company. Or it may 
simply be that the Exchange remains subordinate in power to the CSRC and, therefore, does 
not want to or cannot in practice exercise control over the exit of companies from ChiNext. 
Secondly, the CSRC has the ability to impose penalties pursuant to Securities Law, which the 
Exchange appears unable to do, or, at least, there is neither a rule nor precedent that permits it 
to do so. Thirdly, ChiNext remains a market crucial to China‘s current economic model. The 
companies listed arguably present the best of strategic industry enterprises that wish to list on 
ChiNext, for which the CSRC must report directly to the State Council. This process, to some 
extent, mirrors the culture of the Party in relation to the National People‘s Congress, where 
the latter as lawmakers still revert to the Party for guidance in relation to final decisions. 
543
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Finally, delisting a company from ChiNext will set a precedent that others must follow and, 
therefore, in practice the Exchange needs to confer with the CSRC to ensure a uniformity of 
approach or that it implements the rules in accordance with the policies of the CSRC. 
The Exchange must be sure of its approach and that the company‘s listing on ChiNext 
is untenable. This becomes even more important since the Chinese Special Treatment (‗ST‘) 
regime permits companies to continue listing but warns investors that they ‗may‘ be delisted 
soon. This system does not apply on ChiNext. As stated earlier, the delisting regime does not 
allow for such uncertainty and companies can be delisted within a few months. Here, again, 
the Exchange may be perceived as having powers in theory, but in practice the process of 
delisting becomes more protracted. 
 
3. Delisting Regime and Public Condemnation Rules 
Any company that has three public condemnations within a 36 month period will be 
delisted from ChiNext. In recognition of the occasional key roles intermediaries play in 
corporate governance, the Exchange‘s remit to impose sanctions also extends to sponsors, 
registered accountants and auditors, lawyers and other securities firms. However, the 
Exchange can only sanction them in so far as they have failed in a specified duty or 
obligation under a provision that falls within the remit of the Exchange. For example, the 
Exchange issued the sponsors of Precision Forging with public condemnation for failure to 
supervise, investigate and report the corporate governance issues of Precision Forging to the 
Exchange in a timely manner.
544
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Legal Reform in China (London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Pub, 2009). 
544
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4. Overlap in CSRC and Exchange Roles? 
Not on ChiNext, as it appears the CSRC and Exchange have complementary rather 
than undifferentiated regulatory roles for the market. They have decidedly split their function, 
so that the Exchange becomes more of a quasi-state entity to meet demands for independent 
regulators. The role of the Exchange in corporate governance on ChiNext appears less in 
relation to company-level monitoring as with the CSRC, but appears to take more of a 
sanctioning approach. That is, the Exchange appears to carry out punitive enforcement. This 
may be attributed to the fact that the Exchange remains the first port of external enforcement 
mechanism on ChiNext. The CSRC takes more of a remedial enforcement process, which 
seems odd as it should be the final port of enforcement within the ChiNext framework, to 
which the Exchange escalates a matter. But, as mentioned earlier, the CSRC‘s intervention at 
company level pertains to its self-interest in ensuring control in discovering any corporate 
governance infractions by companies since it approved them for listing. 
The CSRC‘s current capacity builds in other matters such as external relations with 
overseas securities regulatory authorities. It is also building capacity at local level through its 
local offices to understand the dynamics of corporate governance on a regional basis.
545
 
Another capacity-building exercise is the apparent dominance of the Exchange in punitive 
enforcement actions, which also demonstrates the CSRC‘s encouragement of self-regulation 
by the stock exchanges. As discussed below, this manifests in more enforcement action by 
the Exchange and increased authority to delist companies. The CSRC appears to be taking a 
reflective approach. 
The Exchange also embraces this capacity building as demonstrated by the 
publication of its first comprehensive report on enforcement, not only on ChiNext but also on 
                                                 
545
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the Main Board and the SME Board of its stock exchange. This, perhaps, signals a new era 
for enforcement whereby the CSRC and the Exchange do not duplicate roles in practice. 
However, as indicated above, this does not appear to be the case due to the company-level 
interest the CSRC takes in ChiNext companies. Nonetheless, they still seem to complement 
one another, though it remains unclear the extent to which both regulators communicate 
about companies, not only since CSRC local offices are geographically far from the 
Exchange but also in terms of administrative reporting lines. One apparent issue in the 
regulation of corporate governance of ChiNext companies as indicated above remains the 
unclear demarcation in the remit and authority of the CSRC and the Exchange. Overall, the 
CSRC takes a very cautious and conservative approach to activity that may jeopardise the 
stability of the market.
546
 It asserts control where it considers it to be required; hence, the 
unexpected areas in which the CSRC may take control but which might ordinarily be under 
the remit of the Exchange, such as, in this case, delisting. 
 
D. Missing Link: Role of Intermediaries in Enforcement: Sponsors 
Sponsors, registered auditors and lawyers are intermediaries with corporate 
governance obligations under the ChiNext framework. From the above, it can be seen that 
there is an increasing focus on and expectation of intermediaries as enforcers or contributors 
to good governance. The focus of enforcement appears to be on emphasising the role of 
intermediaries. The Goldengreen case exemplifies the CSRC‘s increasing scrutiny of 
intermediaries. There have been four occasions when intermediaries have been specifically 
sanctioned on ChiNext, with three relating to the same company, Goldengreen. Some 
commentators suggest that the real problem relates to the honesty and conscientiousness of 
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intermediaries. Some recommend that publication of their expert opinions is the way forward; 
however, this is already the case on ChiNext. 
Commentators believe that improvements in the conduct of securities professionals, 
such as lawyers, sponsors and brokers, play a key role in improving the integrity of the 
market.
547
 This integrity is particularly important in light of the increasing trend toward the 
owner-managers internal governance structure, which presents new challenges, especially 
regarding conflicts of interest. 
1. Gatekeepers - (Ir)reputable Intermediaries 
There has been much written about the importance of intermediaries (otherwise 
described as gatekeepers) in corporate governance in literature in general
548
 and those 
focused on China.
549
 Gatekeepers are defined by John Coffee as 
…reputational intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to 
investors… The professional gatekeeper essentially assesses or vouches for the 
corporate client‘s own statement about itself or a specific transaction.550 
Examples of gatekeepers include independent auditors who verify a company‘s 
financial statements, securities analysts who evaluate the company or a specific transaction or 
lawyers who provide services. In emerging economies, market intermediaries that provide 
credible information are either underdeveloped or missing.
551
 For instance, security analysts 
supply information to shareholders on the performance and governance of listed companies; 
equally, investment banks identify and assess targets for corporate control, while high-end 
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head-hunters supply information on the track records of top executives.
552
 Where strong 
market institutions such as the aforementioned are missing, it is more costly for not only 
minority shareholders but also controlling shareholders to gather reliable objectives to assess 
top management opportunism.
553
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, sponsors have monitoring and disclosure obligations 
under the ChiNext framework. They also have an obligation under Securities Law not to take 
advantage of undisclosed information obtained in the course of performing their duties under 
the ChiNext Rules, for the purposes of insider trading for themselves or for other parties. On 
ChiNext, the conduct of gatekeepers has fallen below par, as evidenced by the disciplinary 
action issued by the Exchange, as well as media reports and media reports (though 
unsubstantiated). 
This section has examined the ways in which the Exchange carries out its regulatory 
and punitive function. Clearly, it does not have the resources in expertise and capacity to 
continuously be on ground level investigating, at times, vague leads on corporate governance 
infractions. Thus, the media plays a key role in gathering the evidence of violations, which 
cannot always be gleaned from documentary evidence. As one interviewee, a registered 
public accountant and auditor, based on experience opined, in dealing with domestic SMEs in 
China there remains a persistent culture in companies having two or more sets of accounts. 
One set contains the ‗real‘ figures for the consumption of the owner(s) and ‗insiders‘554 of the 
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enterprise while other sets of accounts contain embellishments for the purposes of investors 
and regulators.
555
 
The low number of such sanctions correlates with the overall low figures reported by 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. There continues to be criticism of these low figures by the 
press. Interestingly, jurisdictions with higher numbers of ChiNext companies reassuringly 
have a correspondingly higher number of sanctions and actions. Further insight into these 
sanctions and actions can be gleaned from the geographical locations of the companies. 
 
III. Role of the Press 
It is well acknowledged that the financial media play an important role in capital 
markets,
556
 especially in corporate governance.
557
 The media plays an indispensable role as a 
corporate governance mechanism on ChiNext and on other equity markets in its capacity as 
investigator, watchdog and whistleblower because of its capacity to penetrate deep at firm 
level and below. Clearly, taking on these multiple roles inevitably gives rise to concerns of 
the rule of law. In fact, media agencies in China remain mostly owned or supported by the 
state, whether in central or local government. This section defines the role of the media in 
corporate governance practice on ChiNext. 
Unique to China, the financial media has three roles. Firstly, it provides financial 
news on companies, whether as independent analysts or part of a public relations project of 
companies or the regulatory authorities. Secondly, a large proportion of the media in general 
reside within China‘s political and legal framework with a formal troubleshooting and 
                                                 
555
 Interview 2012-11. 
556
 Brian J. Bushee et al., ―The Role of the Business Press as an Information Intermediary,‖ Journal of 
Accounting Research 48, no.1 (2010): 1-19. (The press plays a role in reducing information problems.) 
557
 Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2002), url: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9309. 
  
305  
 
watchdog role in providing public opinion supervision (‗POS‘) (‗yulun jiandu‘).558 Finally, 
media agencies provide avenues by which public whistleblowing (jubao) can be made by any 
member of the public anonymously or confidentially regarding the actions of public officials 
and companies. In enforcement of corporate governance, information about company-level 
practice remains key for enforcement authorities to monitor, supervise and, where appropriate, 
punish those that violate corporate governance laws and rules. 
At firm level, the media amount to a powerful corporate governance mechanism for 
sourcing information through not only formal networks such as company and industry 
functions but also more importantly through snippets gathered and shared in very informal 
and confidential settings where regulators have no reach.
559
 Some of the most active media 
agencies in relation to ChiNext include ifeng.com, an online magazine, and Boards and 
Directors, both an online and a print magazine. Journalists gather information through 
attendance of company and industry functions, snippets gathered and shared in corridors by 
affected parties. Importantly, unlike the regulators, the press has access to informal sources of 
information. Journalists also cultivate internal sources within companies at various levels.
560
 
External sources include rival companies and public whistleblowing.
561
 
The financial media, in particular on ChiNext, and the media in general play an 
important role in exposing corporate governance malpractice. A typical example of the role 
of the media in corporate governance on ChiNext relates to the resignation scandals of 
directors, supervisors, company secretaries and senior management. Various media agencies 
have carried out exposés on individual companies.
562
 For example, Sina Finance, a privately 
owned media agency that crucially sources information mostly from state news media such as 
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the People‟s Daily and Xinhua from other sites, has unprecedentedly assumed for itself a 
watchdog role in relation to ChiNext. So in 2010, to celebrate the one-year anniversary of the 
establishment of ChiNext, it also ran an extensive analysis of directors, supervisors, company 
secretaries and senior management who had resigned, analysing their reasons and labelling 
them as either resigning for good reason or to exploit their shareholdings.
563
 This was the 
beginning of the ‗director-senior management resignation‘ (‗gaoguan cizhi‘) scandal, and it 
continues.
564
 Similarly, it was also the media that exposed Suzhou Goldengreen Technologies‘ 
failure to have registered its core proprietary patents disclosed in its listing prospectus; now 
famously referred to as ‗patent-gate‘ (‗zhuanli men‘), it led to the effective delisting of 
Goldengreen by revocation of its license to list. 
 
A. Media and Corporate Governance 
 The media‘s role in popular opinion supervision makes China‘s media particularly 
powerful. On ChiNext, the financial and corporate media remain active in investigative 
journalism and uncover corporate governance misconduct and scandals. This section 
discusses the latter two roles. The media acts as a mechanism for better corporate governance 
of ChiNext companies for fear of reputational sanctions in the form of bad publicity and a 
scandal that may ultimately affect achieving listing approval pre-IPO or a good share price 
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post IPO. It also acts as a mechanism for better regulation by providing the regulatory 
authorities with information, access to which their limited resources do not allow them. 
Moreover, it also has a lobbying element in bringing to the attention of regulatory authorities 
loopholes and flaws they may wish to turn a blind eye to. Media investigations into 
resignations by directors, supervisors, company secretaries and senior management have 
presented in-depth analysis for resignations and unrepentantly identifying those whom it is 
believed resigned from companies to take advantage of loopholes in legislation. Interestingly, 
one of the journalists interviewed noted that competitors of listed companies remain a source 
of information. 
B. Public Opinion Supervision and Corporate Governance on ChiNext 
 Apart from the literal translation into public or popular opinion supervision, there 
remains no precise definition of yulun jiandu. Sinologists agree that it ‗…connotes the use of 
critical media reports to supervise government officials‘.565 The former definition of yulun 
jiandu can be expanded upon to include the exposure of official wrongdoing or inaction, 
demand for arrest or harsh punishment of alleged criminals, writing confidential internal 
reports on unfairly decided cases to Party-state leaders, and referring popular complaints to 
government actors. Chinese scholars also ideally perceive yulun jiandu as an integral part of 
contemporary China society used for the construction of a ‗harmonious society‘.566 Thus, it is 
with very strong mandates that the media is able to execute its obligations under POS. 
 On ChiNext public opinion supervision entails exposing corporate misconduct and 
malpractice. In terms of ChiNext, research demonstrates that public opinion supervision 
extends to listed companies, their constituents, i.e., directors, supervisors and senior 
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management. Effectively, in the role of public opinion supervisor, the financial media morph 
into corporate governance investigators, whistleblowers and watchdogs. Journalists gather 
information by attending shareholder meetings. It is also not rare for journalists to be invited 
to attend actual board meetings of companies.
567
 Although at the invitation of the company, 
journalists still expose where they think there to be appears a problem. Indeed, the journalists 
interviewed all perceive the role of the media as an indispensable societal (more than a 
financial advisory one) in monitoring and revealing corporate governance practice on 
ChiNext. 
C. The Press, Public Whistleblowing, CSRC and Exchange 
 Of the three institutions of the state, the media remains the most effective and 
experienced in sourcing information and investigative reporting. The media works with the 
CSRC and the Exchange on an informal basis to identify issues and companies of corporate 
governance concern.
568
 
 
1. CSRC Reaction to Media Exposés 
The CSRC issued the Special Checks on 2012 Financial Statements of Enterprises 
Subject to IPO Review with the aim of carrying out checks on companies undergoing the IPO 
application review process. Again, this may be seen as a reaction to the media/press, which, 
to date, have been more proactive in their exposés of companies that appear eligible on paper 
but with dubious credentials in practice. This remains a keen example of how the press plays 
a key role in influencing CSRC behaviour. This attests to the relative authority and influence 
of the press in China, even in regulatory frameworks in which it does not have a formal or 
recognised role. 
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In this chapter, from a process-based perspective, we examine further how and why 
the media in China carries out its de facto role as a corporate governance institution. 
Perhaps one of the most important roles the media has played is in the disclosure of nefarious 
or dubious dealings of CSRC officials in the IPO application review process. This becomes a 
corporate governance issue because the listing of companies that may not be eligible because 
of false information ultimately has an impact, to the detriment of shareholders. The CSRC 
tries to avoid a recurrent scenario of the past, mostly used by SOEs. Companies are given 
(loaned) by their parent company or related company for the sole purpose of achieving listing. 
Ordinarily, they do not have any substantial business activity but crucially they are 
effectively a vehicle by which, once listed, the parent or related company can benefit through 
intra-group transactions from the capital market funding by the backdoor. Although the 
Measures in themselves should effectively deter companies, it appears that some merely 
adapt their modus operandi so that they cannot be detected on paper. The press, being on 
ground, have been successful in piercing through the paper screen. Hence, this new initiative 
by the CSRC intends to devote 300 experts to undertaking checks of all companies that apply 
for IPO. This may amount to a deterrent of sorts, but it remains unclear what the penalty will 
be for violation; it may be a rejection. Perhaps the CSRC also issues penalties to companies 
that waste its time and resources and recoup some of the financial resources used in checking 
the violating company‘s financial books. 
 
D. Limitations of the Media in Corporate Governance 
The media does have its limitations in corporate governance. Firstly, it has no legal 
mandate in corporate governance enforcement, and is not even part of the process. Secondly, 
as a result, of the first, it raises potential rule of law issues. The third limitation are issues 
concerning potential conflicts between being newsworthy and carrying out investigative 
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journalism.
569
 Fourthly, with all of its ground level connections, as one journalist noted, the 
media cannot really know the inner workings of the board or the company. Journalists rely on 
public complaints and snippets of information gathered in professional and industry circles, 
which, to all intents, remain circumstantial.
570
 Fifthly, conflicts of interest arising where 
competition between media agencies exist means that reporting may be in terms of that which 
is deemed newsworthy rather than investigative journalism. The liberalisation and 
commercialisation of the media has been blamed for this conflict.
571
 Finally, protection of 
whistleblowers remains a keen problem.
572
 In terms of ChiNext and other markets, the 
pervasive powers of controlling shareholders as well as the hierarchical structure means that 
whistleblowers‘ anonymity cannot be guaranteed, resulting in the loss of their jobs, and, in 
the worst but rare cases, violence to the person.
573
 Undoubtedly, the pitfall of demonising the 
innocent also arises.
574
 This may be attributed to the on-going ideological struggle to accept 
capitalistic market behaviour because of the overt display of individualism and profit-seeking. 
There also remains the inescapable fact that no matter how much investigation is done, it 
remains very difficult to know what happens in board rooms. 
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IV. China’s Public Whistleblowing System (jubao) 
For over a decade, internal whistleblowing policies and procedures have formed an 
expressed and integral part of the remit of audit committees in both the US and the UK.
 575
 In 
contrast, in China, there remains no designated formal corporate whistleblowing system for 
listed companies. Jubao means to inform against an offender to the police or regulatory 
authority or appointed agency.
576
 This has mainly been, firstly, because of the existence of a 
public whistleblowing system and, secondly, because the Party-state has its own 
whistleblowing and disciplinary procedure that proved adequate during a period when most if 
not all listed companies were directly linked to the Party-state. The whistleblowing system 
has not yet been formalised but it may be a process that is required. 
A. Origins of Jubao 
In the absence of a legal or regulatory internal corporate whistleblowing system, 
jubao remains the foremost source of information about corporate governance violations for 
regulators and the press. Generally, in China, it is an important information-gathering tool for 
the state recognised under law. 
China‘s public whistleblowing system is actually a transplant from Hong Kong. The 
Shenzhen City Procurate first adopted the system from the Hong Kong Independent 
Commission against Corruption following a fact-finding mission in Hong Kong in 1988.
577
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The first public whistleblowing system related solely to economic activity, and specifically 
reported corrupt officials.
578
 In view of its success, it was rolled out nationally. This has 
expanded to include privately controlled, listed and unlisted companies and individuals. 
Increasingly, the utility of public complaints in crime prevention as well as in administrative, 
civil and criminal law enforcement is recognised by lawmakers, regulators, academics and 
commentators. 
Public whistleblowing is recognised under Chinese law. Article 84 of Criminal Law 
cites jubao as a method of reporting alleged criminal acts or suspicion about someone in that 
regard.
579
 As with all whistleblowing systems, the great risk of making a public complaint 
can be the backlash or loss of employment. Apparently, since 1993, no serious backlash has 
occurred against whistleblowers.
580
 Anyone person or unit that makes a public complaint can 
do so without concern of exposure as they have a right to anonymity and confidentiality.
581
 
 
B. Role of Jubao in Corporate Governance: Potential Voice of (Retail) Shareholders 
Shareholders, employees, creditors and business counterparts, both listed and unlisted 
companies, as well as members of the public, have evoked the jubao system to report alleged 
corporate governance.
582
 For corporate governance, jubao has two strong advantages for 
shareholders, especially retail shareholders. Firstly, the process of reporting is straightforward 
                                                                                                                                                        
evidence are not automatically referred to the procurator; instead the relevant administrative or regulatory 
agency such as the CSRC may elect to decide the matter itself. As demonstrated in this chapter, this falls well 
within the remit of its authority. Another law that protects public complaints whistleblowers is the Security 
Administration Punishment Law.  
578
 An example of jubao is a clue written on the inside of a cigarette box, which led to key information in a 
criminal case against former vice chairman of Qinghai County Standard Committee, Han Fucai. 
579
 A work unit (danwei) or person has a right and duty to report a criminal act, in fact, or someone suspected of 
criminal acts to the police, the public security bureau, procutorate or the courts or jubao. 
580
 Yin Chuan, ―Jubao, Rang Zuifan Zhushou [Public Complaints, Stop the Criminals],‖ Gongmin Daokan 
[Citizen Tribune], no.3 (2000). 
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 See Wang Sanshou, ―100duo chuangyeban shangshigongsi zeng bei jubao [Over 100 ChiNext Listed 
Companies Previously Subject of Public-Whistleblowing],‖ Financial News, sina.com.cn, (4 November, 2011), 
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and simple. It can be done in writing or online on the website of any relevant regulatory 
authority or press agency. Secondly, the protection of anonymity is afforded (although not 
guaranteed) the person making the complaint. The unique point about jubao is the access at 
the grassroots level that is available to ordinary members of the public with protection of 
anonymity. This contrasts with legal and regulatory processes that do not afford anonymity if 
a shareholder decides to report or provide evidence against a company insider. Moreover, the 
regulatory agencies to which a complaint is submitted must investigate it. In enforcement of 
corporate governance, information about company-level practice remains key for 
enforcement authorities to monitor, supervise and, where appropriate, punish those that 
violate corporate governance laws and rules. Many exposés arising due to public complaints 
on ChiNext appear to be made by employees of companies to the press, the CSRC or the 
Exchange.
583
 
 
C. Limitations of Jubao 
Although there are many references to jubao as the initial source of information about 
corporate governance actions taken by the regulatory authorities, academic studies on the 
effectiveness of jubao remain sparse. The CSRC and exchanges do not publish the number 
and types of jubao received. This perhaps relates to the need for confidentiality in the event 
that the complaint proves unfounded. Information gleaned so far has been a result of 
investigative journalism and leaked documents to the press.
584
 
In 2005, the chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
called for the formulation of a public whistleblowing law (‗jubaofa‘), but to date there has 
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been no suggesting of one.
585
 The need for such a law may increase with the emergence of 
family and individual controlled listed companies that may naturally have a fairly opaque 
decision-making structure. In this scenario, the regulatory authority as well as the media will 
have to rely more on individual (public) whistleblowers who will require adequate protection. 
 
 
V. Wither the Market for Control and Private Ordering 
This chapter and the previous two have examined the corporate mechanisms internal 
and external to the company. Two final mechanisms described here are the market for control 
and private ordering. 
 
A. Market for Control 
Plainly, ChiNext has no internal market for control, although ChiNext companies 
actively participate in the acquisition of unlisted companies outside of the Exchange, and 
even companies listed on stock exchanges abroad. In 2009, only five surveyed companies 
acquired a substantial number of or the total issued shares of one or more domestic unlisted 
companies. In response to successful listing and fundraising on ChiNext, the number of 
surveyed companies acquiring such interests increased from five to 23 by 2010 and then to 28 
by 2011. Except for one, all the acquisition transactions concerned the takeover of non-listed 
domestic Chinese companies. An exception to the trend of acquiring domestic unlisted 
companies, Geeya Co. Ltd. acquired a foreign listed company, namely Harvard Instruments 
Ltd., listed on the UK‘s AIM. The government encouraged Geeya‘s takeover of Harvard 
Instruments by facilitating the transaction through encouraging policies. This suggests that 
                                                 
585
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ChiNext may be a policy market in so far as certain activities are screened. The foreign 
market for control brings more kudos to ChiNext companies as it demonstrates the ability to 
comply with international and foreign requirements. Thus, although ChiNext companies are 
SMEs, they are fast becoming holding companies with complex group structures. The 
disclosures of directors of their concurrent roles in other companies are a testimony to this. 
Evidenced by a lack of takeover activity, there is no active market for control on 
ChiNext. This stands to reason given that the market was established to achieve a specific 
policy objectives of the State, namely the financing of China‘s hi-tech, innovative and high 
growth SMEs within a consumption-led economy, as discussed earlier in chapters one and 
two. This suggests that ChiNext as a policy market is unlikely to have any active market for 
control. Moreover, the government tends to discourage dispersed ownership, which is the 
ownership structure in which takeovers are most effective.
586
 The IPO Review Panel‘s 
rejection of applications from companies that have complicated or multi-tier ownership 
structures or a history of ownership issues.
587
 Furthermore, an equity market full of aspiring 
entrepreneurial ―owner-managers‖ also dampens the market for control. Finally past 
experience of takeovers of controlling shareholdings in privately held companies seem riskier 
than that of SOEs because the new controlling shareholders may be subjected to bullying 
tactics by both senior and middle managers remaining in the business, which may include the 
withholding of key information, for example.
588
 
 
B. Private Ordering: Litigation and the Courts 
As briefly discussed in the chapter on regulation, private enforcement in China has 
four forms: courts, arbitration, mediation and arb-mediation. Under the ChiNext framework, 
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companies must report the existence of any court or arbitration cases. Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange only reports on the administrative actions and sanctions against companies on their 
exchanges. This limitation means that such information must be gleaned from annual reports. 
Table 15: Percentage of companies with enforcement actions disclosed in annual reports of surveyed companies 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s survey 
The occurrence of private enforcement in Company Law matters remains relatively 
low in China, especially with regard to publicly quoted companies. This is definitely reflected 
in the fact that in 2009 only 10% of the surveyed companies were parties in litigation. By 
2010, it increased by 50% to 15% of the surveyed companies and settled back to 7.5% in 
2011.
589
 It was particularly noticeable that none of the litigation disclosed in annual reports 
relate to company law matters. Instead they range from sale and purchase matters to 
intellectual property disputes. The findings here correlate with the fact that the courts in 
China play a more prominent role in legislative interpretation.
590
 Nonetheless, in terms of 
contractual enforcement of shareholder rights under shareholder agreements there trend is 
markedly different overall in China as the next chapter suggests.
591
 
 
 
                                                 
589
 Author‘s survey. 
590
 See Section II. Legal Governance Mechanisms and Framework of ChiNext on page 60. 
591
 See Sub-Section 5. Shareholder Agreements on page 349. 
 
2009 2010 2011 
 
% % % 
Administrative sanctions 5.00 25.00 12.50 
Litigation  10.00 15.00 7.50 
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Closing Remarks 
So far, this chapter has illustrated the overall enforcement regime in relation to 
corporate governance. The CSRC, the Exchange, the media and public whistleblowing 
together encompass the true corporate governance external regulatory framework, not only 
for ChiNext but also for other equity boards in China. They have a symbiotic relationship, 
whether admitted or not. Its routes can be traced back to the Communist era of public 
criticism. 
Four main points can be gleaned from this chapter. Firstly, the external governance 
landscape in which companies listed on ChiNext exist comprises more than just the regulator 
and regulated. The immense role of the press in public opinion supervision powers and that of 
company stakeholders through the use of the public whistleblowing system has been either 
under-examined or completely ignored, yet they are integral mechanisms of corporate 
governance. Secondly, the CSRC‘s proactive regulation at company levels suggests two 
matters of importance to the institution. One appears to be a pre-occupation in proving that its 
judgment and expertise in approving listing applications remains correct. The other is that it 
wishes to be the first to discover any discrepancies between a company‘s internal governance 
pre-IPO and post IPO. This intention has become poignant in the context of the rising power 
of the financial media in revealing scandals before and after IPO, tantamount to indirect 
criticism of the partiality and expertise of the CSRC. In the past, the CSRC has been 
criticised on how it implements its decisions and a lack of uniformity. The CSRC not only 
imposes self-regulation on the stock exchanges it supervises, but also it too must impose self-
regulation on itself. As discussed later, the news media plays an important role in providing 
information not only to investors but also to the regulatory authorities. Thirdly, the Exchange 
has also adopted a pragmatic approach in regulatory enforcement by identifying issues and 
then regulating for them. Some scholars argue that corporate governance can only be 
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effective in the securities market, where the market rather than non-state organisations that 
will have a bottom-up approach in regulating will make the rules that fill the gaps left by 
legislation.
592
 But then again, few of these markets have a press that has legal, moral and 
political authority, as the Chinese press do, to undertake investigative journalism that also 
assists the regulators. Finally, state institutions dominate the regulatory environment on 
ChiNext with little or no private ordering occurring, or market for control. The role of 
intermediaries who present the most likely non-state institutions for enforcement remains 
limited in regulatory impact. Instead, intermediaries are less likely to be reputable and more 
likely to be the subject of criticism and accusations of corruption and conflicts of interest by 
the financial media, or disciplinary action by the Exchange. This certainly does not bode well 
for proponents of the development of non-state regulation. 
 At this juncture, it is important to reiterate that the environment in which this 
enforcement occurs is one dominated by privately controlled listed SMEs and not large listed 
SOEs. The next chapter pulls to the fore the changes in corporate governance dynamics in 
shareholder activism, internal governance and regulation wrought by this change. 
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Chapter Six – Corporate Governance Practice on ChiNext 
The main research question of this thesis is to understand the nature of the corporate 
governance practice of ChiNext. We have already seen how related corporate governance and, 
indeed, China‘s legal system is attached to the nature of its polity, so that using a political 
science theory to understand the institutional dynamics of corporate governance is not an 
unnatural development.
593
 The preceding chapters have examined in detail the officially 
sanctioned channels: shareholders meeting, boards of directors and supervisors and the legal 
and regulatory authorities, as well as the market. The case studies in the chapters on 
ownership and management have indicated that there appear to be other forces rather than 
law and legal obligations that motivate investment in listed companies controlled by 
individuals and families, despite the inherent risks.  
A key objective in identifying ‗informal‘ institutions of corporate governance is to 
understand better the risks and constraints arising as well as the limits of law. Formal 
institutions include state institutions (courts, legislatures and bureaucracies), state-enforced 
rules (constitutions, laws and regulations) and organisation rules that govern companies, 
political parties and interest groups.
594
 Weak market institutions result in the increase in the 
role of ‗informal norms‘ such as trust and obligation being substitutes for weak formal 
institutions with the effect of reducing agency costs that stem from the operation and 
performance of the company.
595
 Several studies have found that informal relationships and 
norms serve as substitutes for market intermediaries in emerging markets; they provide 
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quality and timely information.
596
 Weak market institutions result in there being less 
incentives for family controlling shareholders to pay mind to the interests of external 
shareholders.
597
 The family, consequently, has more power to pursue its private interests in 
the company. 
This Chapter is divided into four sections. Section I examines further the Chinese 
traditions of ‗relationships‘ (guanxi) and Confucian filial piety (xiaoshun) both become 
important in understanding the dynamics of internal governance and the protection of 
investors in listed companies. The dynamics of board governance and effectiveness become 
inevitably influenced by social traditions. Section II proposes that for privately run listed 
SMEs individual shareholders with board non-executive positions are most effective 
corporate governance mechanisms and the role of social norms in empowering them. In turn 
Section III illustrates how this group of shareholders can contribute to board effectiveness 
and empower independent directors.  Finally, Section IV examines the use of covenants and 
shareholder agreements to control, limit or positively influence the corporate conduct of 
controlling shareholders.  
 
I. What is the Most Effective Type of Shareholder for ChiNext Listed SMEs? 
This section debunks the assumption that institutional shareholders are generally the 
most important corporate governance mechanism in a listed company, and far more effective 
than individual shareholders. This entails a discussion of the corporate governance limitations 
of institutional shareholders in the context of individual and family-controlled listed SMEs. 
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A. Limitations of Institutional Shareholders in Privately Controlled Listed SMEs 
Based on the results of the study, this thesis proposes that large individual 
shareholders, specifically those that invest in the company prior to its IPO, are better and 
more efficient corporate governance mechanisms. Of course, some training and obligations 
might be required to effectively align their interests with those of the rest of minority 
shareholders represented by small retail shareholders. 
In the context of the surveyed companies, several limitations of institutional 
shareholders were observed that arguably may apply in other privately held listed SMEs on 
China‘s equity markets. Firstly, the results from this research largely indicate that 
institutional investors are not necessarily a crucial corporate governance mechanism for 
privately held listed SMEs, as with the surveyed companies in this thesis. The research has 
demonstrated thus far that institutional investors (excluding venture capitalists) on ChiNext 
take speculative positions. Corporate governance becomes less of an issue for them in the 
protection of their interests because they are speculative. This phenomenon is not limited to 
China, but was identified over 20 years ago when it was found that institutional shareholders 
undertook a control trade-off in favour of retaining liquidity.
 598
 Thus, regulatory framework 
did not account for the sole reason for the lack of institutional investor engagement in 
monitoring and decision-making in companies. Secondly, institutional investors appear to 
have less influence on owner-managers and perhaps this reflects their reluctance to invest 
pre-IPO. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, there also appears to be some reluctance from 
institutional investors to engage with private individual and family controlling shareholders, 
which also presents a potential limit to their effectiveness, at least for individual and family 
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control. It also reflects their relative reluctance to invest substantial amounts of equity in one 
company, even post IPO. Thirdly, the well-documented limitations posed by disclosure 
obligations imposed for those holding 5% or more of total voting rights in turn hamper the 
building of a stake post IPO, also appears to apply on ChiNext. Fourthly, institutional 
investors that invest in the secondary market remain particularly weary of building a stake 
once disclosure obligations kick in. They then run the risk of being grouped as ‗insiders‘ with 
all the obligations that arise from that which includes certain restrictions on share dealing. 
Conclusively, for institutional investors to be effective mechanisms of corporate governance 
they require a substantial holding in the company in order for their voice to be heard. 
 
B. Proposing Pre-IPO Individual Subscribers as Effective Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms 
Large individual pre-IPO subscribers are a more effective corporate governance 
mechanism for the protection of minority and shareholders‘ rights as a whole in privately 
controlled small and medium-sized listed companies. A key reason that lends them control 
factor are the guanxi obligations of controlling shareholders to those shareholders that first 
invested in their company. The importance of guanxi stems from the scarcity of funding from 
financial institutions such as banks for the average private enterprise in China. Privately held 
companies tend to be funded mainly through familial connections and guanxi, so that in 
privately held companies the effectiveness of the large individual shareholder may be limited 
in a state-owned or state-private joint venture, where, indeed, their funding proves irrelevant 
as the state can afford the start-up and to prop up the business activities of the companies, 
once there is a will. 
The first key result of this thesis is that, in the context of ChiNext listed companies, 
large retail shareholders/individual majority shareholders appear to be more effective 
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corporate governance mechanisms than institutional shareholders, specifically in the context 
of listed SMEs, where they present a check and balance on private controlling shareholders. 
This proposition has credence in the context of how private enterprise raise their funds prior 
to IPO and the interlinked cultural implications of sources of funding when from private 
individuals in China. 
 
C. Confucian Filial Piety (Xiaoshun) and Corporate Governance 
This section presents the Chinese tradition of Confucian filial piety as a mechanism of 
internal governance within family ownership structures, with the exception being the husband 
and wife partnership.
599
 Examining the role of Confucianism in the development of Chinese 
private enterprise has taken hold in the last decade and continues to develop. There is some 
recognition in Chinese language scholarship of the importance of Confucian thought in 
enterprise development, particularly the Confucian family system (rujia jiazu zhidu), for 
example, in business management scholarship.
600
 In particular, the literature suggests that 
filial piety plays a key role in Chinese family enterprises,
601
 and generally in business 
practice in China.
602
 
The effect of Confucian thought in corporate governance manifests in the emphasis on 
person-to-person relationships. This means that such governance depends on such persons 
being identifiable. A key limit in trying to utilise Confucian thought to rationalise protection 
of minority investors is that this pool of investors are mostly anonymous to the controlling 
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shareholders. The next section examines how it plays a role in China‘s enterprise system, so 
as to potentially have an impact on the corporate governance of listed enterprises. 
 
1. Filial Piety and China’s Enterprise System 
In terms of China‘s whole enterprise system, including the public and private, Wu 
Zhipan, an expert in both company and financial laws in China, cautions that corporate 
governance in China has to be taken in the context of thousands of years of ancient 
tradition.
603
 In particular, he quotes, saying ‗cultivate yourself, [then your] family will be 
regulated, [your] country well governed, [and] the world peaceful‘ (xiushen, qijia, zhiguo, 
ping tianxia),
604
 which has a profound effect. At national level, the slogan is loosely 
translated as ‗the nation and family being of one‘ (jiaguo tonggou), and then is whittled down 
to enterprise level to the slogan ‗enterprise becomes the family‘ (qiye wei jia). As Lee Yan 
Phou observed: 
The child…if he is taken to task for anything he has done he must never 
contradict, never seek to explain. The Chinese take no explanations from those 
subject to them. They deem this method absolutely necessary for the 
preservation of authority. 
605
 
  Thus, the key link between China‘s enterprise and Confucian filial piety becomes the 
fact that every family has a head, whether nominal or de facto, and, therefore, the principles 
of filial piety come into play at both country and enterprise level. Consequently, at national 
and enterprise level people were expected to behave as in a family.
606
 This perspective has 
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received the most attention in the discipline of business management, which proposes the 
importance of certain aspects of Confucianism in business culture.
607
  
 
2. Implications for Corporate Conduct 
The preceding section has focused on the positive force that guanxi plays in 
empowering non-controlling individual shareholders to effectively monitor their personal 
investments. This section examines the definition of filial piety and its role in China‘s 
enterprise system, and discusses the challenges it poses in corporate governance, in particular 
for board effectiveness, and what mechanisms may work to mitigate its effects. 
Corporate law and corporate governance are concerned with facilitating desirable 
corporate conduct and deterring undesirable corporate conduct. Distinctions between 
desirable and undesirable conduct may vary from country to country or culture to culture.
608
 
In contrast to a conventional analysis of corporate governance practice, this thesis proposes 
that, for privately controlled listed companies on ChiNext, though Chinese polity plays a role, 
more pressing challenges to corporate law and rules come in the form of social norms that 
have the force of law in China, which complicates the corporate governance landscape. 
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a. Counterbalancing ‘Chairperson Control’: a Challenge to Board Effectiveness 
China‘s corporate governance model, though very much shareholder-orientated in 
terms of outcome, has a stakeholder feature in terms of who can contribute to the governance 
of the company by permitting the public whistleblowing system to be part of the process. Yet, 
in the board, the Confucian concept of hierarchy becomes the rule of engagement.
609
 
Strict hierarchy with the chairman of the board at the helm exists. Confucian filial 
piety plays a key role in board culture in which there appears to be a strict hierarchy with the 
chairman of the board at the top. This board culture was complimented by 1993 Company 
Law, which gave the chairman of the board a huge amount of legal power.
610
 Most of the 
companies listed on ChiNext, were first incorporated before 1 January 2006 that is under 
1993 Law. The implication thus being that, although the revision of Company Law in 2005 
removed the unilateral powers of the chairman, a legacy has been left where all power and 
influence over the company resided in the chairman. This whether intended or not naturally 
complements and reinforces Confucian filial piety where the head of the family, work unit 
(danwei) or country leads without reproach. This control by the chairman can be referred to 
as ‗chairman control‘ in that it exceeds the powers of veto and management of the executive 
board. This control extends beyond the boardroom with the chairman being able to partake in 
the organisation at every level with the capacity to liaise, and direct even the most junior 
employees without reference to senior or middle management.
611
This board culture is most 
noticeable in SOEs.
612
 As such, in SOEs, chairperson appointments tend to be as non-
executive representatives of the controlling shareholder. 
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This chapter presents the analytical conclusions of the case studies of the last few 
chapters on the identified corporate governance mechanisms on ChiNext. The multiple case 
studies undertaken have resulted in four key results for this thesis. Some key traits in Chinese 
companies that have long been identified by management scholarship as affecting managerial 
decision can also affect corporate governance where the controlling shareholder also partakes 
in the day-to-day running of the company. This is an inherent challenge that will continue to 
undermine the effectiveness of the board regardless of its composition and this can be 
attributed to the strict hierarchy to be found therein. Confucian filial piety is not only limited 
to family-controlled companies but can be extended to non-familial private and even public 
ownership. 
This focus on Confucian thought, particularly filial piety, in this thesis contrasts with 
previous literature that, as a result of the predominance of state-owned listed enterprises, 
focused on the role of political governance systems. Through these four obligations, a system 
of governance parallel and in some ways complementary to that set out in Company Law and 
the regulatory framework arises. Parallel in this sense suggests that a key effect of Confucian 
thought in governance manifests in the emphasis on person-to-person relationships. This 
means that such governance depends on people being identifiable and having a filial 
connection, rather than being anonymous, as is mostly the case with most investors in equity 
markets, e.g., retail shareholders. 
Social norms such as filial piety, personal connections and hidden rules need to be 
analysed in the context of the corporate governance mechanism because they play an 
important regulatory role. Social norms have force of law. For ChiNext, this can be directly 
related to the sources of funding of these privately controlled companies. Social norms are 
important in promoting continued investment in companies, despite the high risk of bad 
performance and expropriation. This also indicates that privately controlled listed companies 
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with several large individual investors who are not institutional investors may have better 
corporate governance, not because of the laws and rules but because of fear of social 
sanctions in breaching social norms. This is not to say that there are no breaches of social 
norms, but what is clear from the literature is that social norms are less likely to be ignored 
than legal rules. Thus, in some instances social norms as a force of law are more effective 
than legal and regulatory rules. 
 
b. ‘A Law onto Him/Herself’ (yigeren shuole suan) 
A pervasive culture in many private non-listed companies, and as a result in some 
ChiNext companies, remains the culture of one person making the decision or more 
colloquially, being a law onto himself or herself ignoring established rules (yigeren shuole 
suan).
613
 This is based on the culture that each person is a member of a leader‘s group (in 
other words, the family), which scholars perceive as a pervasive mind-set in China.
614
 In 
practice, in terms of the company as a whole, it translates that the chairman of the board as 
leader of the group amounts to the head whose leadership decisions must be followed. This 
also replicates on the board of directors, in that all the directors, whether executive or non-
executive (including independent) will be expected to toe the line.
615
 They are part of the 
chairman‘s team, despite Company Law carving out a monitoring role for independent 
directors. Boardroom culture reflects a socialist big family system culture of the boardroom. 
The leadership style of SOEs manifests in the mantra of the ‗one leader system‘. 
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Ultimately, they all belong to the state administrative leadership system (zhengfu 
xingzheng lingdao tizhi), which is where the socialist big family system culture continues in 
the board room.
616
 Importantly, the erudite remains favoured over the professional and this 
affects the selection and nomination of the constituents of the executive board. The favouring 
of a broad education compared to professional experience remains crucial to understanding 
the dynamics of most Chinese boards.  For instance, Quqing argues that broad learnedness 
remains valued over professional qualifications.
617
 Indeed, this proposition is arguably 
reflected in the fact that still legislation at all levels makes no requirements of the 
qualifications needed for being a director. Nor can you find a perfect match of qualification. 
The companies that do adopt accountants and lawyers tend to be export-focused companies 
where the influence of foreign corporate governance systems and international corporate 
governance systems demand an almost mirror image of integrity. 
 In this thesis, we refer specifically to the Confucian concept of filial piety (xiaoshun). 
In China‘s Company Law of 1993, the chairman had a very powerful role that implicitly 
complemented and reflected Confucian norms in terms of every unit having a hierarchy. Thus, 
the rigid hierarchy effectively undermines the practical effectiveness of the independent 
director. 
 
c. ‘A Good Hand’ (yibashou) 
A ‗good hand‘ (yibashou) has a lot of wide-ranging experience, but may not 
necessarily be an expert or professional. The phenomenon of the old hand especially arises in 
relation to founders and entrepreneurs who manage every facet of the company. 
618
 This is 
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regardless of whether or not they have the requisite skill and expertise for the positions(s) 
they hold. They are usually the controlling shareholder, the chairman of the executive board 
or the CEO.
619
 They commonly strategically control through controlling information flow, 
620
 
and this is the key impact on corporate governance as it means that even the most dedicated 
shareholding non-executive directors (‗SNEDs‘) and INEDs will be hampered in partaking in 
decisions. The result of such managerial style for corporate governance has revealed itself in 
the inability to disclose and transparently discuss problems in the company.
621
 Earlier, it was 
noted that venture capital investors and other institutional investors remain reluctant to invest 
in a company where the founder/entrepreneur undertakes multiple roles, and this is a key 
reason. As one interviewee expressed, ‗institutions (investors) will be reluctant to invest 
unless it is clear that even without any monitoring input on their part they will make a 
handsome return on IPO; which is almost guaranteed given the pricings system on 
ChiNext‘.622 
 
D. Relationships (Guanxi) and Corporate Governance 
One of the effects of the rise in privately held enterprises due to their funding sources 
and business development initiatives remains the influence of relationship networks, i.e., 
guanxi. Through guanxi, most privately controlled enterprise source funding for business 
activities. Chinese ‗relationships‘ (guanxi) acts as a key corporate governance role between 
large and medium-sized shareholders and the controlling shareholder. In this thesis, and in 
the context of corporate governance, guanxi may be defined as a mechanism by which the 
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actions of insiders may be controlled, limited or deterred, thereby facilitating continued 
investment and confidence in the company. This section argues that guanxi, in context of the 
surveyed companies, and, indeed, in general for privately controlled SMEs in China, plays an 
important role in protecting shareholders due to the constraints it imposes on controlling 
shareholders. 
1. Guanxi: Positive or Negative Mechanism? 
There is recognition of the role guanxi plays in law and governance as reflected by the 
debate of whether guanxi is a positive or negative force in itself. There have been negative 
connotations to guanxi.
623
 In a socio-legal analysis, Garrick observes it has been ‗hijacked by 
opportunists‘ to change ‗the rules of the game mid-game‘.624 Su, Mitchell and Sirgy take 
pains to distinguish between good and bad guanxi, and explain what they term effective 
guanxi as that which, 
…works as a relationship based cultural mechanism that draws on Chinese 
cultural ethics of cooperation (e.g. mutual assistance) gathers necessary 
resources for business performance and better enables the survival of firms.
625
 
This thesis concerns itself with effective guanxi, which has a positive empowering 
effect on shareholders vis a vis the controlling shareholders. Undoubtedly, any context in 
which mechanisms that fall outside the realms of formal law and regulations raise questions 
of the rule of law, and this will be examined toward the end of this chapter. 
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The resignation of many directors in order to cash in on their shares was unlikely to 
be something that the controlling shareholder could control in the sense that it was more than 
likely that there existed a tacit agreement that, once floated, will entitle these directors, 
supervisors and senior managers to cash in on their investments. Guanxi, of course, remains a 
double-edged sword. One reason for the influence of pre-IPO individual subscribers as 
corporate governance mechanisms is their strong relationship, i.e., guanxi with the 
controlling shareholder and the company. 
 
2. Implications for Corporate Conduct 
Guanxi complicates corporate governance because it remains difficult to draw the 
boundaries of who can be classified as, what is termed in this thesis, a guanxi insider. The 
difference between the regulatory ‗insider‘ and a guanxi insider lies in the social norms that 
dictate the relationships of the latter, in addition to whatever framework is implemented. It is 
proposed that the guanxi insider is potentially more powerful and has more information than 
the insider as defined under corporate governance laws have definitional boundaries that 
make constituents readily identifiable They include de facto controllers, controlling 
shareholders, , directors, managers, supervisors and majority shareholders. If insider dealing 
legislation is included, then the scope of insider extends to spouses and affiliated companies. 
However, the definitional boundaries of who can be a guanxi insider is broader and less 
traceable or identifiable. Indeed, the opacity of ownership structures on ChiNext highlights 
the potential issues that may arise for insider dealing detection or lack thereof. More 
pressingly, if guanxi forms the basis of an investment, then protection of such investments 
will also be based on guanxi dynamics, arguably to the exclusion of whoever falls outside the 
guanxi web or network. 
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Consequently, the effectiveness of guanxi as a corporate governance mechanism 
requires that the interest of the Party that has guanxi with the controlling shareholder is 
aligned with the rest of the minority shareholders of the company. As demonstrated by the 
resigning directors, most of whom held medium-sized holdings, their interests were not 
aligned. This may be expected since the definition of their interests preceded the existence of 
those of minority shareholders. The dilution of guanxi can only be achieved by making 
available more formal funding resources for the private sector. However, the negative 
implication of guanxi remains that those minority shareholders will continue to be 
unrepresented if their interests cannot be aligned with guanxi-holding, pre-IPO director-
shareholders in ChiNext companies. Thus, a key challenge of how to effectively align the 
interests of minority shareholders and director-shareholders arises. The next section proposes 
key ways in which such alignment can be achieved. 
This thesis proposes that medium-sized individual shareholders ensure more effective 
corporate governance in providing a better check and balance of private controlling 
shareholders than institutional shareholders, at least in the context of ChiNext listed 
companies. There are several reasons for this. The first is the cultural constraint imposed on 
private controlling shareholders as a result of obtaining private funding through Chinese 
relationships, i.e. guanxi. The second is the ability of individual shareholders to evoke guanxi 
to effectively monitor the internal governance of the company. The last reason is their 
attendance of shareholders‘ meetings and exercise of rights. Of course, there are also cultural 
limitations to their effectiveness in all three aspects and this will be examined toward the end 
of this review. 
 If guanxi can be harnessed through large individual shareholders receiving training on 
corporate governance principles, especially those that aim to promote the protection of 
shareholders, and particularly minority shareholders, then the risk of the negative potential 
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and effects of guanxi will be reduced. Of course, the problem then arises as to why a large 
shareholder would want to represent the interests of the minority shareholder. The key here 
has to be that their interests must be aligned, and they are in practice in so far as the large 
individual shareholder wishes to see income (dividend) and capital returns on their 
investment. 
 
II. What Accounts for the Influence of pre-IPO Individual Subscribers cum 
NEDs? 
This thesis proposes that the effectiveness of pre-IPO individual subscribers as 
corporate governance mechanisms in the surveyed companies arises as a result of their 
inherent need and willingness to personally monitor their investments, combined with a 
strong guanxi
626
 with the controlling shareholder, which effectively protects them. In this 
instance it is proposed here that guanxi has positive cultural constraints that act to limit the 
potential of private controlling shareholders to act in their self-interest or expropriate from 
the company. To build this argument further, this section defines guanxi in generality and, as 
this thesis perceives, its relationship with corporate governance, as well as demonstrating 
how it manifests. 
 
A. Effectiveness of pre-IPO Individual Subscribers cum NEDs 
Five key traits make pre-IPO individual subscribers cum NEDs, particularly effective 
in monitoring their investment interests, more involved in decision-making than other types 
of shareholders, and they are discussed as follows. 
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1. Readily Identifiable 
Large individual shareholders in ChiNext companies are readily identifiable, 
especially those that hold non-executive directorships because they are relatively small in 
number. Specific training and development to enhance them as effective monitoring 
mechanisms is feasible. Moreover, as only a few of them have multiple large investments that 
may require their presence on numerous boards, it means that they will be able to devote their 
time and experience. 
2. Effective Board Monitoring 
It was found that large individual shareholders in ChiNext companies tend to partake 
in management and monitor the companies in which they invest to varying degrees. Large 
individual pre-IPO subscribers bring more effective board monitoring, especially in relation 
to the actions of the chairperson. Large individual pre-IPO subscribers attend executive board 
meetings and, thus, meetings of executive board change from being a routine. Granted that 
many pre-IPO subscriber hold executive director or senior manager positions, they also 
contribute to the monitoring of the controlling shareholder. However, their limitation and 
conflict in being true monitoring mechanisms arises from their being subject to the power and 
influence of the controlling shareholder cum CEO on an almost daily basis. Thus, the type of 
pre-IPO subscriber that will be an effective corporate governance mechanism is the non-
executive director who, apart from attendance of board and shareholders‘ meetings, has no 
other formal access to the internal governance and decision-making of the company. This 
importantly lends the ability to evaluate the performance of the executive board and the 
company from a more detached point of view than executives or senior managers may have. 
This presents a key element in the potential alignment of their interests with those of the rest 
of the shareholders in the company. 
 
  
336  
 
3. More Involved Shareholder Engagement 
As well as engaging as shareholders through their non-executive roles on the board, 
pre-IPO individual NEDs also engage as shareholders by attending meetings. This occurs 
despite the fact that they can validly use the executive board as the forum for representing 
their interests. Importantly, many of them hold enough shares to make shareholder proposals 
and, therefore, have the potential to ensure that their voices become heard not only on the 
boards in the company but also, importantly, in the market. Whether or not the proposal 
results in a resolution being passed becomes academic as the reputational consequences of a 
would-be challenge to the owner-manager. However, in some companies, attendance was low, 
perhaps because the resolutions were already approved in principle when the executive board 
resolved to convene a shareholders‘ meeting. 
 
4. Stabilising Effect of Large Retail Shareholders Medium to Long-term Shareholding 
Strategy 
SNEDs present a relatively stable group of medium to long-term investors in the 
company and are, therefore, most likely to have a stabilising effect.
627
 As many of them have 
five or more investment years in the listed companies, they have a relatively deep and 
comprehensive understanding of the investments. Above all, they have demonstrated the 
tenacity for patience. The extension of this investment time-span is further enhanced by the 
general rules that pre-IPO subscribers of the company under the Listing Rules cannot trade in 
the shares within the first 12 months of IPO, and thereafter can only divest up to 25% of their 
existing holdings in any given year. They are thus not only focused on share price capital 
gains but on income generation through dividends, which requires the companies to be 
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successful to have a profit. This interest means that they are more likely to monitor the actual 
performance of the company rather than the market itself. 
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, shareholder agreements and undertakings have 
been such that some companies have extended the share trading restriction from 12 months to 
36 months. More research needs to be done on large retail shareholders who acquire large 
volumes of shares on the secondary market. 
5. Mitigate Effects of Entrenchment of Controlling Individuals and Families 
The emergence of owner-managers has corporate governance implications, one being 
the agency problem of entrenchment. Entrenchment occurs where, despite the inefficiency or 
lack of qualification of directors or senior managers, they remain in their role on the board or 
in the company by virtue of their power and influence through shareholding or otherwise.
628
 
The agency problem of entrenchment has not received much attention as an issue for 
corporate governance in China because it seldom occurs in SOEs, which, to date, have been 
the main focus of research. SOEs appointments to director and senior managerial roles tend 
to be in fixed tenure with rotation that also includes succession training starting from 
supervisory board level. Although they may not have the ability to stop entrenchment of 
individuals and families who are controlling shareholders, large retail shareholders offer a 
more efficient check and balance to the pervasive control that Company Law provides. They 
can promote the employment of professional managers into the company. 
As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, undoubtedly the entrenchment of 
individuals and families in the surveyed companies is clear. This may be seen as one of the 
consequences of culture entwined with the rise in family ownership. Empirical evidence 
supports the notion that family-controlled companies are better managed than widely held 
companies because, as dominant shareholders, they have the power and incentive to both 
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motivate and discipline management.
629
 In this paper, shares are widely held where there is 
more than one majority shareholder (i.e., of 5% or more) thus, no outright control or where 
ownership is dispersed. Because shareholders are so dispersed, they cannot co-ordinate to 
share monitoring and control costs, thereby allowing managers to take benefits not shared or 
take actions to the detriment of shareholders.
630
 It is thus argued that individual and 
concentrated owners eliminate the vertical agency problem of managers appropriating 
shareholders. However, family control fails to protect the interests of shareholders from abuse 
where the controlling owners are also the managers, as is often the case on ChiNext, and 
generally in China‘s SMEs. To date, there have been many reports of the alleged 
expropriation of minority shareholders.
631
 The details of this are unsubstantiated due to the 
lack of disclosure. Internal management mechanisms on ChiNext are limited by the fact that 
controlling families cannot be ousted by replacing the board of directors. They are entrenched 
by self-representation and/or appointing directors on the board of directors and supervisors. 
As there is, at present, no market for control on ChiNext, they cannot be challenged by 
outside investors. There is unlikely to be a market for control any time as ChiNext is the 
government‘s policy market focused on financing selected companies as its key economic 
development objectives. 
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6. Overcome Limited Market for Control 
As stated earlier, one of the most effective mechanisms for the empowerment of 
shareholders is the market for control, both in concentrated and dispersed ownership 
structures. One of the key issues in China‘s listed companies is the limited market for control, 
and as discussed earlier this state of affairs appears to be supported and actively promoted by 
the government.
632
The highly concentrated ownership means that takeovers through tenders 
are unlikely as it can be done by private mutual agreement of the controlling shareholder. So 
far, this is the predominant model of takeovers of listed companies in China. Different types 
of ownership also display varying attitudes to takeovers. For instance, SOEs tend to transfer 
control off-market,
633
 while family-controlled listed companies rarely transfer control.
634
 
Thus, it may be concluded that with ―owner-manager‖ companies dominating ChiNext, such 
takeovers unless hostile are highly unlikely on the market. 
In line with the other equity boards, the market for control as a corporate governance 
mechanism on ChiNext remains limited in scope. At present, and as evidenced by a lack of 
takeover activity, there is no market for control on ChiNext. ChiNext was established to 
finance SMEs so as to achieve the specific policy objectives of the Party and the state. This 
suggests that ChiNext as a policy market is unlikely to have any active market for control. 
Moreover, acquiring a controlling shareholding in privately held companies seem riskier 
where previously ‗owner-managed‘635 because the new controlling shareholders may be 
subjected to bullying tactics by both senior and middle managers who have remained. For 
instance, they may withhold key operational information.
636
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B. Pre-IPO Individual SNEDs vs INEDs 
 In order to highlight the effectiveness of the SNEDs as mechanisms of corporate 
governance, this section compares and contrasts the roles of SNEDs with those of INEDs 
based on the key premise that the role of the INED is providing independence, monitoring the 
board and representing minority interests. It is contended here that SNEDs, particularly 
individual SNEDs, have the capacity to carry out this role more effectively than INEDs in 
China‘s privately held listed SMEs, like the surveyed companies. To this end, it examines 
their selection and nomination, alignment of interests and monitoring of controlling 
shareholders. 
Firstly, there remains some opacity in the election and nomination of INEDs 
compared to SNEDs. The nomination and appointment of individual SNEDs is by virtue of 
their capital contribution to the company. The findings from the survey in the previous 
chapters indicate a loose link between the level of shareholding and the holding of a 
directorship by a shareholder. That is, it is not unknown for a shareholder holding a low 
percentage of voting rights to be a SNED while another with more shares is not. The 
controlling shareholder arguably has less control on these appointments because they occur in 
exchange for the financing they provide to the company. Moreover, apart from any 
shareholder agreement that gives such rights, the controlling shareholder is further 
constrained by what is referred to as economic guanxi. By contrast, by definition, 
independent directors have made no capital contribution. 
 Secondly, SNEDs interests are generally better aligned with those of shareholders as a 
whole, including minority shareholders, than INEDs in so far as they seek a return on their 
investment. Independent directors‘ interests are not naturally aligned with shareholders as a 
whole because they have, by definition, made no capital contribution. Instead, they are 
selected mostly from academia, with few having any industry recognition or influence that 
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may act as a counterbalance to the chairman or controlling shareholder. A large proportion 
are recruited from mainly economic disciplines followed by business administration, 
accountancy and law. Thus, even the key obligation to represent the interests of minority 
shareholders reportedly proves difficult for them to carry out in practice. After all, although 
they may be elected by cumulative voting, their actual selection and nomination for election 
lays at the door of the board of directors, undoubtedly the chairman, who is the controlling 
shareholder or represents the controlling shareholder that leads the board in such decisions. 
The nomination committee does not have the express remit to preside over the selection and 
nomination of independent directors as this is a matter for the board as a whole. Indeed, 
problems persist with the role of the independent directors in presenting a check and balance 
in that they invariably rarely ever disclose an adverse independent opinion, as noted in an 
interview with Liu Huiqing, the Assistant to the Chief Executive of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange.
637
 Moreover, SNEDs have readily identifiable interests, namely either income and 
or capital appreciation, that align them with the average shareholder. Nonetheless, the 
alignments of individual SNEDs‘ interests still pose challenges, mostly in the form of RPTs 
and insider trading. As mentioned in the previous chapter, RPTs are not necessarily illegal, 
and in many instances contribute to the growth of both listed and unlisted SMEs by 
encouraging close stable business relationships. The problem here arises where the private 
rents from RPTs dis-align the interests of SNEDs from the interests of the company and its 
shareholders. 
Thirdly, the results of the research indicate that SNEDs and INEDs equally have a 
high attendance at meetings. Individual SNEDs attend board meetings with very high 
attendance levels, which makes it difficult for insiders to overlook their interests. SNEDs, in 
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contrast, have a vested interest in personally monitoring their investments and, therefore, 
monitor owner-managers or professional managers by attending executive board meetings. It 
means that decisions reserved to the executive board cannot be taken without their input. The 
key improvement in terms of internal governance has been that owner-managers cannot 
arbitrarily decide important matters reserved for the board. It further suggests that, depending 
on the implications, proposals, policies and decisions of the controlling shareholder will not 
go unchallenged at first instance on the executive board. Moreover, since the average 
holdings on private controlling shareholders usually amount to less than half of the total 
voting rights, they will need the buy-in of other relatively large shareholders at shareholders‘ 
meetings. It is not unknown for large shareholders to litigate against the controlling 
shareholder, but such occurrences tend to be pre-IPO.
638
 
Fourthly, SNEDs tend to have less potential for conflicts of interest with controlling 
shareholders and CEOs because they are rarely remunerated by companies. The research 
finds that most SNEDs in the surveyed companies did not receive any remuneration from the 
company itself, and where they did, it was mostly a nominal sum. Thus, they are not obliged 
to perform to the bidding of those that dictate the level of remuneration as with independent 
directors. 
 
III. How Individual SNEDs Contribute to Executive Board Effectiveness? 
In line with a process-based analysis of corporate governance, this section presents the 
overall findings of this thesis and assesses the different mechanisms that contribute to the 
effectiveness of the executive board in ChiNext listed companies. 
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A. An Empowered and More Effective Supervisory Board 
Earlier, Chapter Four demonstrated how privately held surveyed companies have 
invented a new category of external supervisor who is neither a shareholder nor an employee 
of the company, as required under Company Law. However, whether the appointment of 
external supervisors will benefit shareholders as a whole in corporate governance terms 
arguably largely depends on the nature of their relationship. In other words, it will depend on 
whether they are ‗independent‘ of the company and its ownership and internal management 
structure. It has been demonstrated in Chapter Four that external supervisors comprise a mix 
of those associated with and those independent of internal management.
639
 This is an area for 
further research, especially in terms of their role and effectiveness. Moreover, as Company 
Law only provides for the latter two types of supervisor, and does not preclude such 
innovation, it will be interesting to see if a shareholder (most likely) decides to challenge the 
legitimacy of the external supervisor, especially since there does not appear to be any 
provision under the law, except if the challenge is on the validity of the shareholder 
resolution appointing the external supervisor. 
Firm level innovation has begun to take place in privately held listed companies due 
to the flexibility in appointing and revising the roles and the occupants of such roles, which 
SOEs cannot because of the stringent appointment process that is largely dictated by the 
government policy. A key example of a company-level innovation is the emergence of 
supervisors on the board of supervisors who are neither employees nor shareholders (or their 
representatives) as required under China's Company Law. They are less policy focused than 
SOEs and therefore have room to innovate. Moreover, failure is not an option, otherwise it 
could lead to personal financial loss, unlike in SOEs where ultimately the state foots the bill 
of expropriation, mismanagement and corruption. 
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The main observation here is that the more shareholders represented on the 
supervisory board, the more influential and more effective it appears in executing its 
monitoring role. The traditional control of the company according to law is in the 
shareholders‘ meeting. 
Corporate governance innovation is observable on two levels. The results of this 
research suggest that, in privately-run and controlled listed companies on ChiNext, corporate 
governance innovation appears to be driven by the need for monitoring and third-party 
opinions. In contrast, the innovations observed in the state-owned listed companies appear to 
be driven more by a public policy focus, which, for example, sees the introduction of 
minority shareholder representatives on the supervisory board. 
This observation can perhaps only be extended in so far as it relates to listed SMEs 
than with large privately-run and controlled listed companies. The reason for this is that most 
large privately controlled listed companies, due to their original history as state-owned 
enterprises, still retain the legacy of SOE culture in which little corporate governance 
innovation toward efficiency and protection of shareholders has occurred. Having said that, in 
SOEs some corporate governance innovations for the protection of minority shareholders 
take place
640
 as a public policy objective, despite decidedly not having profit as the main 
objective. 
Indeed, without a survey of all private listed companies in China, it remains difficult 
to determine when this innovation of the supervisory board started, which re-empowers the 
supervisory board‘s representation of shareholders. This may be largely due to the focus on 
SOEs, which tend to have representatives from shareholders or within the group of 
companies on the supervisory board. Moreover, as mentioned earlier in Chapter Four, the 
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supervisory boards in SOEs also have a succession planning function as well as a balancing 
of interests function, which leaves little room for the use of or need for external supervisors. 
The increase in privately held listed companies in a regulatory environment that has 
focused on protecting the state as the controlling shareholder has resulted in the bottom-up 
innovations in corporate governance to effectively balance interest and power. One reason for 
firm-level innovation in private listed companies may be to increase efficiency. The larger the 
number of privately run and controlled listed companies in China, the more innovation on the 
premise that the private sector is the best for innovating in law, at least economic and 
business law. China‘s corporate governance still remains at the evolutionary stage. It is naïve 
to conclude that transplants will work, as evidenced by the initiatives regarding shareholder 
protection. It is not clear to what extent regulators and policymakers are aware of this 
innovation, but it is an innovation that strengthens the independence of the supervisory board, 
on the proviso that regulators and policy makers do not restrict this. 
B. Empowering Independent Directors 
Independent directors tend to work very hard in listed SMEs due to the number of 
transactions and decisions that require their independent opinion. In the literature, there does 
not appear to be an express recognition that the key way to empower independent directors is 
through improved and constant engagement with non-controlling (including retail) 
shareholders. 
Individual SNEDs benefit from engaging with controlling shareholders as a result of 
their guanxi and ability to engage and partake in decision-making in the company. As such, 
they become better placed to empower the independent directors as their representatives. 
Indeed, independent directors need to be empowered by those they purport to represent. The 
black letter of the law and regulations cannot achieve this, especially in the face of a powerful 
and influential controlling shareholder. The law can enable such empowerment by providing 
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a forum for independent directors to meet with non-controlling shareholders, in the first 
instance, separate from the controlling shareholder and senior management of the company. 
A further forum can be provided for them to engage with minority shareholders. This can be 
in the form of online questions and answers, which is employed by quite a few CEOs during 
investor road shows. 
IV. Self-regulation by Controlling Shareholders 
One way of controlling shareholders generally, and specifically controlling 
shareholders, is through the use of shareholder covenants or undertakings. In general, they 
provide that the relevant shareholder should pay any fine or sanction, and compensate the 
company for loss or damage suffered by the company. Some go as far as to require the profit 
earned to be relinquished to the company. One of the key question remains regarding 
enforceability and remedies if a breach of covenant arises. With regard to regulation-based 
covenants, all surveyed companies disclosed what they felt were the most important 
covenants. All surveyed companies had such covenants with most, if not all, controlling 
shareholders. 
 
A. Legal, Regulatory and Contractual Undertakings 
Undertakings or covenants provide a key mechanism for checking and enhancing the 
corporate conduct of controlling shareholders on ChiNext, and generally in China‘s equity 
markets. Covenants can be legal as provided under Company Law or Securities Law, or 
regulatory as imposed by the regulators rules and decisions or contractual under the articles 
of association or other agreement (e.g. a shareholder agreement). Covenants can be further 
categorised as either mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory ones tend to be legal or regulatory 
while voluntary are by agreement or even self-imposed on them. Mandatory covenants can be 
taken as strong indications of the corporate governance risk the regulatory authority perceives 
  
347  
 
is posed by the controlling shareholder and other shareholders made subject to mandatory 
covenants. Equally, voluntary covenants become even more potent indicators of future 
corporate conduct to be expected because they arise from a voluntary recognition by the 
covenanting shareholder of the potential risk their decision-making poses to the company, 
especially as private rather than State controlling shareholders. Therefore, they seek to 
reassure and persuade existing and future investors, the regulatory authorities and other 
stakeholders that they are aware of certain internal governance risks and are usually willing to 
bear any financial loss arising from it. Of course, a key question that arises pertains to who 
can enforce these covenants, and who can seek redress and impose a remedy of disciplinary 
action. As was seen in Chapter Five, the regulatory authorities have a clear mandate to take 
action in the event of a violation, but it remains unclear as to who has authority over 
voluntary covenants. In theory, the CSRC would have authority, especially if the covenant 
was given in the listing prospectus of the company. 
For the purposes of analysis here, this section descriptively categorises covenants into 
four namely: pre-IPO liability covenants, post-IPO covenants, reputational covenants, and 
covenants to act in concert. A brief discussion of shareholder agreements completes this 
section.  
 
1. Pre-IPO Liability Covenants 
Another common function of covenants in ChiNext companies is for controlling 
shareholders to bear any liability arising from administrative sanctions or investigations 
against the company in matters of potential dispute that occurred prior to IPO. They also 
typically undertake to compensate the company for any loss or damage incurred as a result of 
such a matter. A common example is that of tax liability incurred prior to IPO. Thus, for 
instance, Bestway Ltd. admitted to being subject to tax investigations in 2007 and 2008, prior 
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to IPO. Consequently, Liu Nan, the controlling shareholder, made a covenant to bear personal 
liability for any administrative sanctions or investigations and compensate the company for 
any loss incurred. A similar example but pertaining to a state-held CSME can be found in 
respect of Lepu Medical Ltd., where the controlling SOE made an undertaking to cover any 
tax liabilities and compensate the company for any loss. 
2. Post IPO Covenants 
Covenants under Company Law serve as a formal agreement between the company 
and shareholders (enforceable by the CSRC). The mandatory covenant not to transfer or deal 
in the shares of the company in the first 12 to 36 months following IPO applies to pre-IPO 
subscribers, whether individuals or legal entities with an annual dealing cap of not more than 
25% of total holdings in any 12 month period. The length of the dealing cap depend on the 
percentage holdings with for instance, controlling shareholders not been able to deal in shares 
in the first 36 months of listing. Shareholders with a holding of 5% or more of the issued 
share capital of the company have a minimum prohibited period of 12 months. The prohibited 
dealing period can be voluntarily extended to the whole 36 months. Some surveyed 
companies also had shareholders with low percentage holdings party to an extended 
prohibited dealing covenant. Other common and important covenants imposed by the 
regulators include covenants not to compete with the company and not to steal the company‘s 
corporate opportunity, effectively a repetition of provisions under Company Law but which 
technically become directly enforceable by the CSRC as covenants provided under its listing 
regime.  
In the surveyed companies, the CSRC also imposed covenants that reflect its potential 
corporate governance issues of individual companies. For instance, on the use of a capital 
surplus, ownership of proprietary intellectual property, existing RPTs such as rental of office 
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accommodation by controlling shareholders to the company, and the continuous provision of 
staff benefits such as accommodation. 
3. Reputational Covenants 
These are also covenants undertaken by controlling shareholders that effectively lay 
their reputations on the line. Importantly, these types of covenant are not a direct spin-off 
from a duty under law nor do they relate to potential liability that occurred pre-IPO. They 
include covenants against the misuse of company funds. 
A noteworthy voluntary covenant was entered into by the controlling shareholder of 
Daiyu Water Ltd. Wang Dong, the controlling shareholder with 52.77%, covenanted to make 
up 75% of the difference between the profit forecast of 2009 and the actual result. The 
remaining 25% was to be covered by the second largest shareholder, Gansu Dacheng 
Investment Ltd., which holds 7.61%. Unlike other types of covenant, these covenants entail 
no statutory offence or potential violation of law or rules, nor is there, in any pure sense, any 
loss or damage caused to the company. Another example of a reputational covenant is the 
undertaking made by Beilu Bellona Ltd.‘s controlling shareholder, Wang Daixue, holding 
21.13%, to use the capital surplus for specific projects and to ensure that there were financial 
safeguards for the company. It is interesting to note that the next three highest holdings in the 
company were held by venture capitalist investors with relatively high holdings of between 
10 and 15%, which meant that if they decided to act in concert they would have been 
extremely powerful. This covenant appears to have been given in order to infuse confidence 
in existing and potential investors that the company is not of the packaged variety. As alluded 
to earlier, ChiNext companies are generally considered with some degree of cynicism, 
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especially given that the financial press continually waits for evidence of miscreant behaviour. 
Just looking at the headlines of financial news reports is evidence of this.
641
 
 Such covenants do stir up a certain amount of curiosity as to why they have been 
made in the first place. That aside, the real issue is how they can be enforced. We already 
know against whom they will be enforced, but the question remains as to who will be 
expected to enforce them and using what process. Consequently, as well placed and positive 
in corporate governance terms as these covenants are, there remains little information 
regarding enforcement against the giver. Of particular note is that covenants to act in concert 
tend to be entered into in companies where there are no clear ultimate owners – that is, no 
shareholder who controls 20% or more of the voting rights, they are widely held. 
4. Covenants to Act in Concert 
Shareholder agreements form a very important aspect of corporate governance on 
ChiNext. They can be pervasive wherein groups of individuals agree to act in concert to the 
effect that together they amount to a single controlling block holder of the company. 
Shareholder agreements need not be pervasive however, and can simply relate to specific 
obligations or circumstances. These types of covenant occur in highly concentrated CSMEs 
such as Wangsu Co. Ltd., where the ultimate owner agrees to act in concert with another, 
albeit major shareholder. This suggests that a strategic alliance exists between these 
shareholders, especially since venture capital and institutional investors make up the top ten 
investors. Thus, it is a decidedly strategic alliance to contain the controlling shareholding. 
5. Shareholder Agreements 
Shareholders bear mentioning because they present an important mechanism used by 
pre-IPO individual subscribers to curtail the risk of investing in a company controlled by an 
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individual or a family. It is also an essential part of controlling blocks that have two or more 
shareholders acting in concert. 
In terms of providing practical restraints, shareholder agreements are all the more 
important due to the advanced Contract Law litigation process. Indeed, China has a very 
sophisticated contract law enforcement system. Remedies available for breach of contract are 
more readily pursuable and cost effective under contract law than bringing an action under 
Company Law.
642
 Matters included and excluded from the articles of association still remain 
relevant as articles of association takes precedence in the event of a conflict between the 
articles and any shareholder agreement.
643
 Before litigating in the courts, there are various 
options available, including court-based mediation, arbitration and arb-med (a hybrid). Since 
enforcement under contract is between the respective parties privy to the contract, the 
enforcement process is straightforward without recourse to any regulator.
644
 
 
Firstly, ownership structures in companies on ChiNext display relatively simple 
ownership structures with no strong trend toward the use of pyramidal structures by either 
individuals, families or those acting in concert. However, opaque ownership and control 
structures persist in that, where SPV holds controlling shares in a company, not all of the 
constituents have been disclosed. The importance here is that these SPVs are not financial or 
investment institutions ordinarily considered as widely held due to the large number of 
beneficiaries on whose behalf they invest. As was seen in chapter five, the IPO Review Panel 
plays a key role in ensuring that only privately controlled companies with relatively simple 
ownership structure are approved for listing on ChiNext. This appears to be a key but 
unexpressed strategy in keeping opaque ownership structures away. 
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Closing Remarks 
This chapter has demonstrated that there is a need to examine corporate governance 
practice in listed SMEs more closely, especially in relation to which types of shareholder and 
combination of directors on executive boards contribute to effective corporate governance. 
The key conclusion here remains that individual pre-IPO subscribers who take on non-
executive directorships (individual SNEDs) tend to be more active in governance than 
institutional shareholders, after IPO. It was also demonstrated that the Chinese culture of 
guanxi and Confucianism play important roles in promoting corporate conduct for better or 
worse. In particular, it was demonstrated how Confucian concepts and culture remains a 
binding and influencing force of hierarchy and behaviour that may undermines legal and 
regulatory monitoring functions because of the natural subordination of the ‗monitor‘ within 
the hierarchy, with the chairman and controlling shareholder being at the precipice. The 
second conclusion was that the dynamics of enforcement have changed positively in 
empowering the Exchange because of the predominance of individual and family-controlled 
listed companies. A third conclusion was that, due to China‘s Company Law being principle 
based, there are sometimes gaps in regulation that allow for bottom-up innovation as seen in 
relation to the emergence of external supervisors. Finally, the importance of non-legal and 
non-regulatory institutions embedded in China‘s ancient culture have been highlighted. There 
are several implications for these findings and the secondary implications were discussed in 
the preceding chapters. 
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Chapter Seven – Conclusion 
The previous chapters each summarised the findings of this thesis. Thus, this chapter 
serves three functions. Firstly, it presents the key and secondary contributions this thesis 
makes to the literature. Secondly, it presents key recommendations resulting from this 
research. Finally, it concludes the research. It is in this order that the chapter is divided into 
three parts. 
 
I. Contributions to Literature 
The key objective of this research was, through the case study method, to unveil the 
nature of corporate governance practice on ChiNext, which is largely characterised by no 
separation of ownership and control. There is extensive research on the nature of corporate 
governance in listed companies in different countries, which indicates varying levels of 
concentrated ownership and shareholder protection.
645
As noted earlier in Chapter One, the 
studies in China focus on the large listed companies, which also happen to be state-owned in 
the majority.
646
 They routinely find a separation of ownership and control, which gives rise to 
both vertical and horizontal agency costs because the controlling shareholder does (can)not 
directly partake in the management of the company.
647
 Despite the phenomenon of private 
owner-managers being prevalent on China‘s stock markets, there remains a gap in the 
literature, especially in terms of listed SMEs. Addressing this gap, this thesis examined the 
nature of corporate governance practice and enforcement using ChiNext as a case study. The 
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rest of this section presents the key findings that ultimately contribute to creating the 
corporate governance landscape on ChiNext. 
A. Privately Controlled Listed Companies 
 The thesis adds to the literature relating to corporate governance institutions and 
mechanisms by specifying the important role that private non-market mechanisms and 
institutions play in privately controlled listed SMEs. Research has identified legal, regulatory 
and market-based institutions of corporate governance, which largely reflects the US 
approach to corporate governance.
648
 The literature on comparative corporate governance 
also uses this taxonomy in examination of institutions in different countries, including 
China.
649
 Both schools leave a gap in identifying and examining private non-market 
mechanisms, such as filial piety and guanxi, as the literature is sparse, which limits 
understanding on the implications of such mechanisms on corporate governance.
650
 This 
study addressed this gap by examining the role of guanxi and its implications for corporate 
governance practice. Consequently, a few observations arose from the study. 
B. Family-controlled Listed Companies 
The thesis makes a key contribution to the understanding of the dynamics of corporate 
governance in family-controlled listed companies. Research on family-controlled listed 
companies has, until recently, being the sole arena of management studies.
651
 Recently, 
research in corporate governance in family-controlled listed companies has appeared but 
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remains sparse.
652
 Regarding China, the literature has focused on financing and control 
structures.
653
This thesis enriches the existing literature by providing case studies on and 
examining internal governance mechanisms in family-controlled listed companies. 
Several insights emanate from this research. A key insight that expands on current 
literature is the important role that private mechanisms, in this instance filial piety, play in 
internal governance and the implications for corporate governance practice and enforcement. 
Filial piety with its own rules and sanctions has the potential to side-step, compete with or 
exclude through substitution public mechanisms and institutions of corporate governance. 
This has been found to be the case in terms of the management of companies. The 
implications for corporate governance in such instances may prove dire because filial piety 
does not privilege interests that fall beyond filial ties or apply to strangers. Consequently, the 
interest of non-familial and anonymous investors such as institutions and retail shareholders 
become secondary interests, which goes against the key policy objective of corporate 
governance, the protection of shareholders. A secondary insight with family-controlled listed 
companies, and not necessarily because of filial piety, is that the agency cost of entrenchment 
arises.
654
 The case studies demonstrated how senior roles such as chairman and CEO are 
strategically shared among family members, most of them evidently qualified according to 
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their biographies, some of them not. This reveals a chink in Chinese Company Law, which 
proscribes who cannot be a director or manager rather than prescribing a threshold for skill 
and expertise. A final insight regarding family-controlled listed companies in China is that 
guanxi can play a key role in mitigating the effects of filial piety. This is due to the reciprocal 
nature of guanxi where favours and actions are reciprocated, otherwise it results in a loss of 
face for the family. This proposition leads to the next key contribution of this thesis, namely 
the role of the individual pre-IPO subscriber. 
C. Individual pre-IPO Investor as a Key Corporate Governance Mechanism 
 The thesis adds to the literature regarding mechanisms that efficiently monitor 
management and controlling shareholders, by specifying key mechanisms that specifically 
suit privately controlled listed SMEs. The literature has identified institutional shareholders 
as the key mechanism for monitoring corporate governance, citing their expertise and 
resources as key beneficial attributes.
655
 Research on China also attests to these attributes and, 
in particular, note that retail shareholders are free-riders.
656
 However, there remains a gap in 
the literature regarding the role of large and medium individual pre-IPO subscribers who also 
hold non-executive director positions. Crucially, this gap relates in particular to listed SMEs. 
Addressing this gap, in the preceding chapter, the thesis explored such individuals as an 
effective corporate governance mechanism, thus making an essential contribution to research 
on the role of the ownership structure in corporate governance. 
This thesis offers a few insights. Firstly, a key insight is that large and medium 
individual pre-IPO investors are reasonably savvy investors who take a personal interest in 
monitoring their investments by taking on non-executive board roles, some paid, some unpaid. 
Importantly, they attend meetings and, therefore, partake in the decision-making process and 
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the monitoring of management, especially owner-managers. Secondly, as providers of early 
finance providers to the company and long-term investors, they have strong guanxi with the 
controlling shareholder(s), which, in practice, acts as a restraint on undesirable corporate 
conduct by the controlling shareholder, otherwise social sanctions such as loss of face and 
loss of reputation come into play. Finally, perhaps most importantly, their interests in getting 
a return on their investment align them with other non-controlling shareholders in the 
company. Their function in monitoring the company and the protection of shareholders will 
depend on ensuring they are corporate governance savvy and their interests remain aligned 
with shareholders. 
 
D. Enforcement Mechanisms with Chinese Characteristics 
The thesis adds to the literature regarding the governance of equity markets, 
specifically corporate governance enforcement, by identifying the key roles played by 
China‘s press and the public whistleblowing system. The research has thus far focused on the 
legal and regulatory enforcement institutions laid down under Company Law and Securities 
Law. 
1. China’s Press 
There has also been acknowledgement of the financial press as watchdog and its role 
in corporate governance.
657
 Research on the role of the press in China focuses either with 
regard to the legal system,
658
 public opinion supervision
659
 or its impact on the securities 
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market.
660
 Thus, a gap exists in terms of the role of the press in the enforcement of corporate 
governance. Addressing this gap, this study examined how the press‘s is the watchdog and 
how it supports the CSRC and the Exchange in carrying out corporate governance 
enforcement. 
 
2. China’s Public Whistleblowing System 
In terms of enforcement mechanisms, the study adds to the literature on public 
whistleblowing, specifically in the securities market. Research has largely focused on the 
whistleblowing systems set up by financial regulatory authorities.
661
 There remains a gap in 
the literature regarding the role of public whistleblowing systems that apply to all facets of 
life. Addressing this gap, the role and effectiveness of China‘s public whistleblowing system 
was assessed. 
II. Recommendations for Policy and Practice 
A. Specific to China 
In addition to the main points made in the preceding sections, corporate governance 
policy and practice can be further enhanced in China in three ways. One is for the external 
corporate governance whistleblowing mechanism to have its own standalone law that states 
clearly the rights and obligations as well as gives protection to whistleblowers such as 
confidentiality and anonymity, and in particular employee whistleblowers. Another 
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recommendation is to have a requirement for a registered public board secretary qualification 
to ensure that members of the board of directors and supervisors, respectively, have a 
qualified and knowledgeable first point of contact for corporate governance issues before 
reverting to external advice. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, there appears to be a growing 
trend for recruited board secretaries on ChiNext to have a clear requirement for this as some 
companies employ candidates with EMBAs. The curriculum of EMBAs pragmatically 
ensures that professional have a mix of management, finance and law content, such as 
chartered secretary exams in the UK and Hong Kong. 
A final recommendation is that online voting should ideally be provided for under 
Company Law. The survey earlier in the thesis testifies to the convenience by the increased 
voting of (mostly minority) shareholders who would otherwise have not been able to attend. 
B. Specific to Growth Enterprise Markets 
The observations made during the case studies of the companies listed on ChiNext 
can also be expanded into general observations relevant to emerging economies that decide to 
establish a growth enterprise market, similar to that discussed. Of course, the usual caveats of 
complementarity and culture apply, but nonetheless, there are some general lessons to be 
learnt from China‘s experience, as follows.  
Firstly, corporate governance policy and practice for SMEs will naturally differ in 
some respects from that of large listed companies because of the high prevalence of owner-
managers. Secondly, high-risk and hi-tech SMEs require more industry-specific disclosure 
requirements that promote information symmetry and undermine issues such as insider 
trading. Thirdly, distinctions must be made as to whether corporate governance rules promote 
long-term or short-term shareholder maximisation. The distinction remains especially crucial 
for growth enterprise markets where businesses are immature, high risk and high growth. For 
instance, quarterly reporting requirements in growth enterprise markets may adversely affect 
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corporate governance. SMEs are listed on growth enterprise markets for the purpose of giving 
them funding to achieve long-term sustainable growth; however, quarterly reporting 
promotes even entrepreneur-founders to take a short-term profit maximisation view. After all, 
the published financial statements and business review of companies, i.e., records of their 
performance do have an impact on companies in terms of investor confidence and share price. 
At worst, anxiety at adverse market conditions may mean that even entrepreneur-founders 
will seek quick ways of gaining a return on their investment. Finally, the listing rule 
requirement of quarterly reporting particularly undermines any intention for long-term 
shareholder value as an objective of a growth enterprise market. 
C. Implications for Methodology 
The use of a multi-disciplinary approach of examining empirical evidence to identify 
trends and case studies to obtain company-level and company-specific information leads to 
richer information about practice. These are then enhanced by interviews. 
D. Limitations of Research 
The limitation for this particular case study is the inability to undertake certain types 
of surveys within the ‗public‘662 arena in China without permission from the relevant 
authority. With the exception of Tenev and Stoyan, whose research was sponsored by the 
World Bank, scholars of corporate law and governance in China have largely employed 
documentary text analysis and interviews, as employed in this thesis.
663
 Thus, although 
respondent-based survey results remain desirable, they do not reduce the relevance or 
legitimacy of a library-based study. Even if the respondents had replied, they may have 
cautiously done so in accordance with already publicly available information to avoid 
                                                 
662
 The ‗public‘, which is expressly under a regulatory authority such as a registered company or listed company, 
as opposed to the ‗private‘ such a consumer who is just a member of the public. 
663
 For examples, see Clarke, ―The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China.‖ See also Benjamin L. Liebman 
and Curtis J. Milhaupt, ―Reputational Sanctions in China‘s Securities Market,‖ Columbia Law Review 108, no.4 
(1 May, 2008): 929-83, doi:10.2307/40041782.  Cf. Peerenboom and Cambridge Books Online, China‟s Long 
March Toward Rule of Law. 
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ambiguity. Nonetheless, the lack of access through surveys by questionnaires sheds light on 
why most research on Chinese corporate governance rarely takes place at firm level but rather 
examines Company Law and corporate governance issues and enforcement at a macro level.  
 
III. Implications for Further Research 
Corporate governance on growth enterprise markets is important within the current 
economic climate to ensure that laws and rules promote long-term investment and 
sustainability, which, in turn, will enhance shareholder protection, especially ensuring that 
owner-managers do not revert to venture capital tactics once the initial post-IPO limits on 
trading have been lifted.  
A key issue for further research would be the suitability of adopting a ―comply or 
explain‖ regime for periodic reporting on ChiNext as a way of effectively explaining 
corporate governance variances in companies listed in same equity markets. As mentioned, 
earlier a typical example for comply or explain would be the use of cumulative voting in 
accordance with the Code.  
Conclusion 
China appears to be in an evolutionary stage of both business and modern enterprise, 
specifically moving from the public to the private. There are many implications in terms of 
law and governance. China‘s capital market, not fully developed, means that the law becomes 
caught up in the development of the market and results in frictions caused by regulation in 
anticipation of the market. As demonstrated by the resignations of directors and officers from 
ChiNext companies, anticipatory legislation does not always work in new circumstances, 
such as where the majority of listed companies on a market are privately controlled. 
Their highly speculative nature on ChiNext may be a result of the present social and 
economic atmosphere in China, with everyone trying to capitalise on present opportunities 
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because the future is unknown. Promoting long-term investment strategies leads to more 
interest in the company by shareholders and are the first stage for empowerment of 
shareholders at all levels to engage in the decision-making of the company. It also leads to 
better stability in the company and in the market. However, the problem is how to encourage 
institutional investors and retail investors to take part. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 – List of Surveyed Companies with Industry and Type of Controlling 
Shareholder
1
 
 
Ticker  Date listed on 
ChiNext 
Industry
2
 Type
3 
of 
Controlling 
Shareholder 
300001 Qingdao TGOOD Electric 
Co Ltd 
30 October 2009 Machinery I 
300002 Beijing Ultrapower 
Software Co Ltd  
30 October 2009 IT A 
300003  Lepu Medical Technology 
Beijing Co Ltd 
30 October 2009 Machinery SOE/F
4
 
300004 Nanfeng Ventilator Co Ltd 30 October 2009 Machinery F 
 
300005 Beijing Toread Outdoor 
Products Co Ltd 
30 October 2009 Wholesale and 
Retail 
F 
300006 Chongqing Lummy 
Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 
30 October 2009 Pharmaceuticals F 
300007 Henan Hanwei Electronics 
Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Machinery F 
300008 Shanghai Bestway Marine 
Engineering Design Co. 
Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Social services I 
300009 Anhui Anke 
Biotechnology (Group) 
Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 IT F 
300010 Beijing Lanxum 
Technology Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 IT I 
300011 Beijing Dinghan 
Technology Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Machinery I 
300012 Centre Testing 
International Shenzhen Co. 
Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Social services F 
300013 Jiangsu Xinning Modern 
Logistics Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Transportation A 
300014 Eve Energy Co. Ltd. 
 
30 October 2009 Electronics F 
300015 Aier Eye Hospital Group 
Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Social services I 
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300016 Beijing Beilu 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Pharmaceuticals SOE/I
4
 
300017 Wangsu Science & 
Technology Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 IT F 
300018 Wuhan Zhongyuan 
Huadian Science & 
Technology Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Machinery A 
300019 Chengdu Guibao Science 
& Technology Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Petrochemicals W 
300020 Enjoyor Co. Ltd. 30 October 2009 Wholesale and 
Retail 
F 
300021 GANSU DAYU Water-
saving Group Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Machinery I 
300022 Gifore Agricultural 
Machinery Chain Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Wholesale and 
Retail 
F 
300023 Bode Energy Equipment 
Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Machinery F 
300024 Siasun Robot & 
Automation Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Machinery SOE 
300025 Hangzhou Huaxing 
Chuangye Communication 
Technology Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 IT I 
300026 Tianjin Chase Sun 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 Pharmaceuticals A 
300027 Huayi Brothers Media 
Corp.  
30 October 2009 Media F 
 
300028 Chengdu Geeya 
Technology Co. Ltd. 
30 October 2009 IT I 
300029 Jiangsu Huasheng Tian 
Long Photoelectric 
Equipment Co. Ltd. 
25 December 2009 Machinery F 
300030 Guangzhou Improve 
Medical Instruments Co. 
Ltd. 
25 December 2009 Machinery SOE/I
6
 
300031 Wuxi Boton Belt Co. Ltd.  Petrochemicals I 
300032 Jinlong Machinery & 
Electronic Co. Ltd. 
25 December 2009 Electronics F 
300033 Hithink Flush Information 
Network Co. Ltd. 
25 December 2009 IT I 
300034 Beijing Cisri-Gaona 
Materials & Technology 
Co. Ltd. 
25 December 2009 Metals & Non-
metals 
SOE 
300035 Hunan Zhongke Electric 
Co. Ltd. 
25 December 2009 Machinery F 
300036 Beijing SuperMap 
Software Co. Ltd. 
25 December 2009 IT SOE/I
6
 
300037 Shenzhen Capchem 
Technology Co. Ltd. 
8 January 2009 Petrochemicals A 
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300038 Beijing Meteno 
Communications 
Technology Co. Ltd. 
8 January 2009 IT F 
300039 Shanghai Kaibao 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 
8 January 2009 Pharmaceuticals I 
300040 Harbin Jiuzhou Electric 
Co. Ltd. 
8 January 2009 Machinery SOE/F
 6
 
Notes: 
1. List of first 40 companies listed on ChiNext according to Shenzhen Stock Exchange as of 20 April 2011. 
2. Categorisation by industry according to Shenzhen Stock Exchange as of 20 April 2011.  
3. Types of controlling shareholder: F – Family; I – Individuals; A – Affiliated (i.e., two or more acting in 
concert); SOE/F or I – State-private ventures; and SOE – State only.  Holdings are analysed per surveyed 
companies‘ disclosures in each company‘s annual report as of 31 December 2009. At the start of the research in 
October 2010, there were 135 companies listed on ChiNext (on 26 October 2009), with the aforementioned 
population representing almost 30% of the listed companies.  
4. State-private with either Individuals or Families. 
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Appendix 2 – List of Main Interview Questions Categorised by Type of 
Interviewee 
This Appendix presents a selection of the closed and open ended questions inquired of 
interwees, which form part of the basis of this thesis. Interviewees included retail 
shareholders, regulators, directors of companies, academics, business and finance 
professionals including intermediaries and journalists. These interviews were all semi-
structured and lasted on average between 45 and 60 minutes, but with overall shorter 
interviewing times with retail shareholders. 
 For clarity, interview questions are categorised under three sections. Section I 
presents a mix of the closed and open-ended questions were asked of retail shareholders in 
the following order. Section II lists a selection of questions posed to regulators, 
directors/officers of companies, academics, journalists and business and finance professionals. 
Finally, Section III lists additional questions posed to journalists. Other question not included, 
are those specific to the knowledge of interviewees or naturally arising from the interview 
which help increase the depth of understanding.  
  
I. Retail Shareholders 
1. Do you have investment in companies listed on ChiNext? 
2. Do you invest in other markets? 
3. Why do/don‘t you invest in ChiNext? 
4. What influences you when you invest in ChiNext? 
5. Do you attend shareholder meetings? How often? 
6. Do you vote online? 
7. Do you trust the largest shareholder of the company? 
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8. Does it matter to you whether the largest shareholder is a private person or entity 
rather than the State? If so, why? 
II. Regulators, Academics and Professionals 
1. What are the key achievements of corporate governance in China today? 
2. What are the key challenges of corporate governance in China today? 
3. What role do professionals play in corporate governance? 
4. What are the key achievements of ChiNext? 
5. What are the corporate governance achievements of the regulators of ChiNext? 
6. What are the key challenges of enforcement of corporate governance on ChiNext? 
7. How do you see corporate governance in China developing in future? 
Closed questions included: 
8. Do you think there are any general implications in the rise of family-owned listed 
enterprises? (ownership being judged at 20% or more of total voting shares) 
9. Do you think corporate governance in China has improved? 
10. Do you think non-executive directors are effective in the governance of the company? 
11. Do you think Chinese culture plays an important role in business and compliance with 
law?  
12. Is there a difference in legal and regulatory enforcement against state and private 
controlling shareholders? 
13. Do you think the media has a role as a watchdog of corporate conduct? Do you think 
this role is linked to and/or justified to it public opinion supervisory role (yulun 
jiandu)? 
 
In addition to the main questions above, additional open and closed questions were asked 
specific to the profession of the interviewee, examples of which are given below.   
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Academics and Directors/Officers 
1. What was the reason behind the setup of ChiNext?  
2. What do you think is the key problem companies, (directors, officers) in complying 
with corporate governance law and regulation? 
3. What (corporate governance) issues do you think private ownership poses compared 
to state ownership? 
4. What aspects of Chinese culture do you think are prevalent in business in China?  
5. How are directors nominated and appointed to ChiNext boards?  
6. Do you think the duty of loyalty is appropriate to China? 
 
Finance and Business Professionals 
1. What do you think of financial disclosure in listed companies in China, particularly on 
ChiNext? 
2. What is needed to enhance financial disclosure? 
3. Do you think auditors/supervisory board are an effective corporate governance in 
China today? 
4. What do you perceive are the implications for corporate governance of the rise in 
family ownership of listed companies? 
5. Do you think enforcement affects investments? Why? 
6. How do institutional investors typically monitor their investments? 
7. What do you think affects the (lack of) recruitment of professionals in ChiNext 
companies? 
III. Journalists 
1. Do the media have a role in corporate governance? 
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2. On what basis of authority do the media have a role, if any, in corporate governance? 
3. How does the media carry out its role in corporate governance? 
4. Does the media have a formal/informal relationships regarding corporate governance 
enforcement with the CSRC and the Shenzhen stock exchange? 
5. What do you perceive to be the challenges in corporate governance enforcement on 
ChiNext? 
6. Is public opinion supervision on ChiNext a duty of the press? 
7. Do you think the new delisting regime will be a successful deterrent of undesirable 
corporate conduct? 
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